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THUCYDIDES.

Engraved by J. B. Welch from the

ANTIQUE BUST.

Philadelphia. Thomas Wardle. 15 Minor Street.

1836.

HISTORY

OF THE

PELOPONNESIAN WAR,

TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK

OF

THUCYDIDES.

BY WILLIAM SMITH, A. M.

RECTOR OF THE HOLY TRINITY IN CHESTER, AND CHAPLAIN TO THE RIGHT HON. THE EARL OF DERBY.

A NEW EDITION, CORRECTED AND REVISED.

PHILADELPHIA:

PUBLISHED BY THOMAS WARDLE.

STEREOTYPED BY L. JOHNSON.

1840.

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SOME ACCOUNT
OF
THE LIFE AND WRITINGS
OF
DR SMITH,
BY THE REV. THOMAS CRANE OF CHESTER.

WILLIAM SMITH, son of the Rev. Richard Smith, Rector of the church of all Saints, and Minister of St Andrews, in the city of Worcester, was born in the parish of St Peter's Church in that city, on the 30th day of May, in the year 1711. He was educated in grammar-learning at the College-School in his native city, where he made great proficiency in his studies. In January 1725-6, it pleased God to deprive him of his father. On the 27th day of November, 1728, he was matriculated at New College in Oxford; where he took the degree of Bachelor of Arts, in June, 1732; and that of Master, in July, 1737.

Soon after he had taken his bachelor's degree, his merit caused him to be recommended to the Right Hon. James Earl of Derby, that great patron of arts and sciences: and he was retained three years in his lordship's house, in the office of Reader to his lordship. His connections with my lord of Derby introduced him to the honour of being known to several other persons of fortune and quality; which was of singular service to him in his progress through life.

A gentleman by birth, blessed with an excellent capacity and education, and having ready and easy intercourse with the great and good, it is no wonder that he was adorned with manners most polite, with literary accomplishments most splendid and solid, and with morals becoming a faithful servant of the holy Jesus. Well qualified for the work of the ministry, he took deacon's orders at Grosvenor Chapel in Westminster, on Sunday the first of June, 1735, from Benjamin, Bishop of Winchester. On the 10th of September following, he was presented by his patron, James Earl of Derby, to the Rectory of Trinity Church in Chester. On the 14th of the same month he took priest's orders in the Cathedral Church of Chester, from Samuel, the bishop of that See: was instituted the same day, and inducted the next.

Mr Smith's first publication was * "Dionysius Longinus on the sublime; translated from the Greek, with Notes and Observations, and some Account of the Life, Writings and Character of the Author:" in one volume 8vo.; inscribed to the Right Hon. the

*The fourth is the best edition of Longinus. The Dean corrected two copies of the third edition; the one for the printer to follow, the other for himself to keep; the Dean's copy I possess. I showed the Dean Mr Toup's criticism of his translation. The Dean, knowing Toup to be in the wrong, thought him not worth answering: he said, "I followed Pearce, and Pearce is the best. I shall take no notice of Toup." The frontispiece to Longinus describes the power of eloquence: it was delineated, not by a professed limner, but by Dr Wall of Worcester, an eminent physician.

Earl of Macclesfield. The anonymous author of "the History of the Works of the Learned," for May, 1739, says of this work :—" The Translation of Longinus is, according to the most impartial judgment I can frame of it, after a comparison with others, the most elegant version that has been made of that author into the English tongue. The Preliminary Discourse excels that of the celebrated Boileau, which he has prefixed to his edition." Father Philips in " A Letter to a Student at a foreign University," published 1756, recommending, among other books, Longinus on the sublime, says :—" A late English translation of the Greek critic, with notes and observations by Mr Smith, is a credit to the author, and reflects lustre on Longinus himself. As conversant as you are in the original language, you cannot but be highly pleased with this performance." In the " Weekly Miscellany," by Richard Hooker, of the Temple, Esq. No. 363, dated Saturday, December 8, 1739, we read :—Mr Smith, Rector of Trinity in Chester, " justly deserves the notice and thanks of the public for his version of Longinus on the sublime. Though the learned will not be satisfied without tasting the beauties of the original, which cannot be translated in all their perfection, yet they may reap benefit and pleasure from the judicious sentiments and ingenuity of the Translator, in his account of his author, and from the notes which help to illustrate the text, and discover the excellency of the rules. To the unlearned also it may be of use, and give pleasure. It will enable him to read with more satisfaction, when he can read with more judgment, and distinguish the perfections and faults of a writer. He will be the better able to bear his part in a rational conversation, and appear with credit, when his observations are just and natural. Such compositions, while they form the understanding to a true taste, kindle an inclination to literature, and excite an emulation in mankind to distinguish themselves by such excellencies as distinguish men from brutes. Athens and Rome were even the glory of the whole world, when they were the universities of the whole world ; and those were reckoned the most accomplished gentlemen, who were the greatest scholars, the deepest philosophers, the most eloquent orators, and the best moralists. England—would I could go on without reproaching my country." Mr Hooker sent a copy of his Miscellany to Mr Smith with the following letter :

" Rev. Sir,

" Though I have not the happiness of being known to you, yet as I perceive, by your public writings, that you are a gentleman of learning and parts, I take the liberty of desiring your assistance in the public design * committed to my care. Though it is the common concern of every one who wishes well to religion and the Church of England, yet I find the observation strictly verified, that what is every body's business is nobody's business ; and whilst it is generally presumed that I have a great deal of help, I have in fact little or none, though I stand much in need of it. I hope you will excuse the notice I have taken of you in my paper. In hopes of your correspondence, I am, Sir, with respect, your very humble servant, R. HOOKER."

On a state fast, the 4th of February, 1740, our Author preached in Trinity Church on Prov. xiv. 34. " Righteousness exalteth a nation, but sin is a reproach to any people." This sermon was printed at the request of his parishioners, and inscribed to them. The Right Hon. Edward Earl of Derby had succeeded that nobleman who presented Mr Smith to Trinity Church. but Mr Smith still continued to be esteemed at Knowsley

* Mr Smith did not comply with this request respecting the Weekly Miscellany.

LIFE OF DR SMITH.

v

notwithstanding Knowsley had changed its master. He, who had been long considered as the Earl of Derby's Chaplain, was constituted in form, by letters patent, the 2d day of August, 1743. On the 31st of July, 1746, our Author preached an Assize-Sermon at Lancaster, on St John viii. 32. "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." This Sermon is inscribed to the High Sheriff and grand Jury, being "published at their command."

In the year 1748, the Grammar-school of Brentwood, in the parish of South Weald, in the county of Essex, being vacant, was suffered by Lord and Lady Strange to lapse to the Bishop of London, who, at their recommendation, appointed Mr Smith schoolmaster there for life, by letters patent bearing date 15th day of February, and by license dated the 17th of the same month. He held this school only one year, as he did in no wise relish the laborious life of a schoolmaster. On the 8th of June, 1753, he was licensed as one of the ministers of St George's Church in Liverpool, on the nomination of the corporation there.

In the year 1753, Mr Smith published in two volumes 4to. dedicated to his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, "The History of the Peloponnesian War, translated from the Greek of Thucydides." The Translator has added three Preliminary Discourses: on the Life of Thucydides; on his Qualifications as an historian; and a Survey of his History. In these discourses, as well as in the life of Longinus, he has abundantly proved his own excellence in original composition. This work has been several times reprinted in 8vo. and was highly recommended by the reviewers and others on its first publication, and since that period.

In January, 1758, the Deanry of Chester became vacant by the decease of the Rev. Thomas Brooke, LL. D. There were many candidates for this dignity: But Mr Smith was so well supported by several of his illustrious friends, especially by his noble patron the Earl of Derby, whose interest was powerful at Court, and who prevailed on the Right Hon. Earl Granville, then Lord President of the Council, and on his Grace the Duke of Newcastle, to unite with him in recommending Mr Smith; that his Majesty King George the Second presented him to the Deanry. He now took the degree of Dr in Divinity. On the 28th of July, Dr Smith received institution, and was installed the same day by that learned and accomplished preacher, the Rev. Mr Mapletoft, Vice-dean. On the 30th day of April, 1766 the Dean was instituted to the Rectory of Handly near Chester, on the presentation of the Dean and Chapter.

Dr Smith had, since he left the University, if we except short excursions, chiefly resided first with my Lord of Derby, afterwards at the Rectory of Trinity in Chester, then one year in Essex, and of late at St George's in Liverpool, from whence he went occasionally to Chester Cathedral. But about the beginning of the year 1767, he resolved to resign St George's Church, and wrote a letter to that effect to the body corporate; which letter produced the following resolution:—

"At a council held this fourth day of February, 1767.

"On Mr Dean Smith's Letter this day to the Council, intimating his desire of resigning his Chaplainship of St George's Church into the hands of the common council; therefore it is ordered, that this council do immediately after such his resignation make him a compliment of one hundred and fifty guineas, for his eminent and good services in the said Church."

In July the same year, he came to the Deanry-house in Chester, with intent to pass the rest of his days there. The favourable reception of his Thucydides induced the

Dean, in this healthy and pleasant retreat, to finish his translation of "Xenophon's History of the Affairs of Greece:" which he published in one volume 4to. in the year 1770: this translation appeared without any dedication. To form a judgment of its merit we may only quote the words of the title page, that it is "by the Translator of Thucydides."

When the Dean retired within the precincts of his Cathedral, he had resigned St George's, and held with the Deanry the parish churches of Handley and Trinity only. till the Rectory of West Kirkby, in the Hundred of Wirrall in Cheshire, became vacant by the decease of that excellent magistrate and persuasive preacher, the Rev. Mr Mainwaring, Prebendary of Chester. The Dean was instituted to this Rectory on the 4th of October, 1780. This is a valuable living in the patronage of the Dean and Chapter. At this time the Dean resigned the Rectory of Trinity.

Dr Smith was now Dean of Chester, Rector of Handley, and West Kirkby; but his best parochial preferment happened late in life; he was advanced into his seventieth year, and began to feel the infirmities ever attendant on age and a delicate constitution. He had hitherto been a constant and powerful preacher: he began now to preach less frequently, as every exertion fatigued him exceedingly. But when he could no longer preach from the pulpit, he preached from the press, by publishing in 8vo. "Nine Discourses on the Beatitudes," in the year 1782.¹

From this time, the Dean's friends saw, with infinite concern, his health gradually declining. In the year 1786, he was exceedingly indisposed. In November, he was confined to his room; in December, to his bed.

About eight, on Friday morning, the 12th of January, 1787, the Dean meekly resigned his spirit into the hands of a merciful Redeemer. On the Friday following, the funeral procession passed the nearest way to the Cathedral: the Bishop and five Prebendaries were pall-bearers. The body reposeth on the south side of the holy table. The Dean's name appears over his grave.

In the broad aisle, at the great pillar on your right hand, as you retire from the choir, an elegant and costly monument² is erected to his memory by Mrs Smith, who was a Miss Heber, of Essex. He only once married.

The Dean never was a stipendiary curate. The moment he was ordained a priest, he became a rector; and enjoyed ever after an income which far exceeded his expenses. An enemy to ostentatious legacies, he bequeathed the chief of his fortune, which was very considerable, to his widow and his nephew, for he had no children. He gave one hundred pounds to the Chester Infirmary, and one hundred pounds to the fund for widows of clergymen in the archdeaconry of Chester; these he esteemed useful charities.

The Dean was tall and genteel: his voice was strong, clear, and melodious. He spoke Latin fluently, and was complete master not only of the Greek, but Hebrew language. His mind was so replete with knowledge, that he was a living library. His manner of address was graceful, engaging, delightful. His sermons were pleasing, informing, convincing. His memory, even in age, was wonderfully retentive; and his conversation was polite, affable, and in the highest degree improving.

1 The good and learned Doctor Lowth, late Bishop of London, highly commends these Sermons, in a letter to the Dean, dated at Fulham, July 8th, 1782. Bishop Lowth and Dean Smith were contemporaries at Oxford: where an intimate friendship commenced between them, which continued till that year in which these two luminaries of the church of Christ were "snatched—so Heaven decreed!—away."

2 See the next page

SACRED TO THE MEMORY OF
WILLIAM SMITH, D. D.

DEAN OF THIS CATHEDRAL, AND
RECTOR OF WEST KIRKBY AND HANDLEY IN THIS COUNTY,
WHO DIED THE XIIIth OF JANUARY M,DCC,LXXXVII,
IN THE LXXVIIth YEAR OF HIS AGE.

AS A SCHOLAR, HIS REPUTATION IS PERPETUATED
BY HIS VALUABLE PUBLICATIONS,
PARTICULARLY HIS CORRECT AND ELEGANT
TRANSLATIONS OF LONGINVS, THUCYDIDES, AND XENOPHON.
AS A PREACHER, HE WAS ADMIRER AND
ESTEEMED BY HIS RESPECTIVE AUDITORIES.
AND AS A MAN, HIS MEMORY REMAINS INSCRIBED
ON THE HEARTS OF HIS FRIENDS.

THIS MONUMENT WAS ERECTED
BY HIS AFFECTIONATE WIDOW.

TO
HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS
THE PRINCE OF WALES.

SIR,

THE History of Thucydides hath been studiously read and admired by the greatest princes, and may therefore presume to lay some claim to the protection of your Royal Highness. Great Britain, of all the states now existing in the world, most nearly resembleth what Athens was at the time when the war, which is the subject of it, broke out in Greece. A love of liberty, which hath erroneously been supposed to thrive and flourish best in a democratical government, was then warm and active in every Athenian. Athens, it is true, had thus been raised to a great height of maritime power, and was become a very formidable state : but faction disjointed a noble plan, and at length brought on the loss of her sovereignty at sea. The Athenians soon ceased to be great, when they deviated from those salutary maxims, which their worthiest patriots and most consummate statesmen had recommended to their constant observance.

The maritime power of Great Britain is more substantially founded, and hath ever been more steadily supported, than was that of Athens. The most complete and most lasting form of government that man can invent, happily subsists in this realm under your Royal Grandfather. The British constitution hath long been, and may it long continue to be, the envy of other nations! For the future support of it, the public hopes and expectations are fixed upon your Royal Highness. Long may his Majesty your Royal Grandfather live to secure the freedom and happiness of his people, that your Royal Highness may become equal, in every respect, to the same great and glorious charge!

I have a heart duly sensible of the great honour conferred upon me, by being thus permitted to profess myself,

Your ROYAL HIGHNESS's

most devoted and

most humble Servant,

WILLIAM SMITH.

LONDON, 1753.

P R E F A C E .

It was not from a private choice, but from deference to what was judged a public call, that the following Translation of Thucydides was first undertaken. To explain the motive more largely, might perhaps incur the imputation of impertinence or vanity. The performance, upon the whole, must justify the undertaking. In what manner it is done and not why it was done, will be the point of public arbitration.

It will be also needless to tell the English reader, how many versions have been made of Thucydides into Latin. Their design was to bring the author more under the observation of what is generally styled the learned world ; as the translations of him into modern languages have aimed at introducing him into general acquaintance as an historian capable of innocently amusing most ranks of men, but of usefully instructing the persons, who from duty and from passion would guard the rights or secure the welfare of public communities. The grand business of history is to make men wiser in themselves and better members of society. For this purpose it recalls past ages to their view ; and thus opens a more extensive scope to reflection than any personal experience can offer. To be well versed in a similarity of cases prepares men better for counsel or action on present contingencies. The statesman, the patriot, the friend to liberty and reason, will be better enabled to plan and to regulate his own measures, when he can see the tendency and consequence of such as were followed on parallel occasions, and adjust the degrees in which they were either prejudicial or serviceable to public good.

All men have neither the turn of mind, nor the leisure, to make themselves proficient in the dead and learned languages. Such as have are certainly honestly, perhaps beneficently, employed, in holding out light to others. The Greek historians, as they take a precedency in time, lay further a strong claim to precedency in merit. Thucydides is the most instructive of these ; and, since the restoration of letters in the western world, each nation, that hath piqued itself at all about humanity or politeness, as his manner was soon found to be excellent, have given thanks to those who have endeavoured to investigate his matter and lay it open to public view.

It is to the honour of the French, that they took the lead. The first translation of Thucydides into French, published at Paris in 1527, was that of Claude de Seyssel, bishop of Marseilles. However performed, it went within the space of little more than thirty years, through four impressions. It is said to have been done at the command of Francis I. king of France ; and, to have been carried about with him in his wars, and diligently studied by the emperor Charles V. The Germans had also a translation of him soon afterwards in the year 1533. In 1545 Francis di Soldo Strozzi published an Italian translation dedicated to Cosmo di Medicis. The first English translation made its appearance in London in 1550 ; but, in fact, was only the translation of a translation, since it was intitled a version from the French of Claude de Seyssel. In 1564 he was published in Spanish. A second translation by Louis Jonsaud d'Usez was

published at Geneva in 1600. The second into English, by the famous Mr Hobbes of Malmsbury, was first published in the year 1628, about which it will be necessary immediately to enlarge. A third French translation, by the Sieur d'Ablancourt, was published at Paris in 1662, and hath since gone through four editions. There is also a Danish translation, which closeth the list given of them in the *Bibliotheca Græca* of Fabricius.

Mr Hobbes declares in his Preface, that "the virtues of this author so took his affection, that they begot in him a desire to communicate him further." He considered also that "he was exceedingly esteemed of the Italians and French in their own tongues, notwithstanding that he be not very much beholding for it to his interpreters." He says afterwards, that, by the first translation of Nicholls from the French of Seyssel, "he became at length traduced rather than translated into our language;" alluding perhaps to the Italian sarcasm on translators, *Traduttore traditore*. He then resolved himself "to take him immediately from the Greek—knowing, that when with diligence and leisure I should have done it, though some errors might remain, yet they would be errors but of one descent; of which nevertheless (says he) I can discover none, and hope they be not many."

Hobbes, however sorry and mischievous a philosopher, was undoubtedly a very learned man. He hath shown it beyond dispute in his translation of Thucydides. He is an excellent help, for any one who consults him, to find out the meaning and adjust the sense. But, though his translation hath now passed through three editions, and hath profitably been read by many, yet (I speak not from my own private judgment) he cannot now be read with any competent degree of pleasure. He is faithful, but most servilely so, to the letter of his author. Even in the orations, he merely acts the interpreter, and hath quite forgot the orator. He translates literally throughout, and numbers rather than weighs the words of Thucydides. By this means the construction is very often intricate and confused, the thoughts pregnant with sense are not sufficiently opened, nor the glowing ideas of the author or his orators transfused with proper degrees of warmth and light. Too scrupulous an attachment to the letter of the original hath made the copy quite flat and heavy, the spirit is evaporated, the lofty and majestic air hath entirely disappeared. Too many low and vulgar expressions are used, which Thucydides ever studiously avoided. Such frequently occur in the midst of some grand circumstance, which they throw into a kind of burlesque, and may excite a reader's laughter. The English language hath gone through a great variation, hath been highly polished, since Mr Hobbes wrote. Hence, though his terms be in general very intelligible, yet they have not that neatness, precision, and dignity, to which the polite and refined writers within the last century have habituated our ears. And, after all, I am inclined to think, that, Mr Hobbes either executed in great haste, or performed his revisals in a very cursory and negligent manner. I am inclined to think so from the very many passages, necessary and emphatical periods, nay sometimes in the very speeches, which to my great surprise I have found omitted in his translation. A particle, an epithet, or even a comma, may with the greatest attention sometimes be dropped in a long work. But the omissions in Mr Hobbes are too numerous and important, to be excused in any tolerable consistence with repeated care and circumspection.

Monsieur Bayle hath ascribed the translation of Thucydides by Mr Hobbes to a motive of which he hath not left the least hint himself in his preface:—"in order to show

the English, in the history of the Athenians, the disorders and confusions of a democratical government." Mr Hobbes could not possibly, so long before they happened, foresee the strange revolutions that were soon to take place in the government of his country. The very actors in them could not possibly discern the consequence of their own embroilments. Some violent encroachments had indeed been made on the liberty and property of Englishmen, and a spirit of discontent began to spread throughout the nation. But it cannot be supposed, that the plan of a commonwealth was formed at that time, or for several years after. The History of Thucydides abundantly shows, how dangerous and destructive is faction in a state; that severe or wanton power may make men desperate; and that liberty abused may make them insolent and mutinous. It detects and exposeth venal orators and false patriots; but it exhibits men, who are studious and eloquent in behalf of public welfare, and active in support of liberty and honest power, in full beauty and proportion. And his lessons lie not so apposite and ready for the application of any state now existing in the world, as for that of Great Britain.

The reader may by this time have caught a glimpse of several reasons, for which the present translation of Thucydides was finished and is now made public. No care hath been omitted to make it as correct as possible. It hath been attentively reviewed: the *narrative* part, more than once; the *oratorical* part, with repeated endeavours to reach the spirit and energy of the original. In the former, the author hath been followed step by step: bold deviations here might imperceptibly have misrepresented or distorted the facts, and quite banished the peculiar style and manner of the author. In the latter, it hath been often judged necessary to dilate the expression, in order fully to include the primary idea; though, where it seemed possible the studied conciseness of the author hath been imitated, provided the thought could be clearly expressed, and the sententious maxim adequately conveyed. The turns and figures of expression have been every where diligently noted, and an endeavour constantly made at imitation. This was judged a point of duty; or a point at least, where, though something may be permitted to a translator's discretion or to the genius of modern language, yet he must not indulge himself in too wide a scope, lest, when what ought to be a copy is exhibited, the prime distinctions of the original be lost, and little or no resemblance be left behind.

It is very just and true what Mr Hobbes hath observed, that "this author so carrieth with him his own light throughout, that the reader may continually see his way before him, and by that which goeth before expect what is to follow." And he, who applies to any commentator but Thucydides himself for an explanation of his own meaning, must exceedingly often get quite wide of the sense. The writers of Scholia and the notes of verbal critics put us frequently on a wrong scent, and more frequently leave us utterly in the dark. But, if we will be patient at a dead lift, something will soon occur in the author himself to help us out, the obscurity will vanish, and light beam in upon us. Though sometimes we may be forced to divine his meaning, since in many cases it is vain to apply to the aids of Grammar to develop the construction, yet the context at length will show whether we have succeeded, or help us to ascertain the sense. This, however, demands repeated and attentive revisals. The present translator hath not been frugal of his time or labour in these points. And whether he hath generally succeeded in ascertaining the thought and properly expressing it in another language, must be left to the decision, not of men of no learning, nor of mere learning, but to that class of judges who are well acquainted with the state of Athens at the time of the history, and are really Attic both in taste and judgment. This class, it may be thought, will be small: it is larger

however, and higher seated in this our community, than the generality have either opportunity enough to discover or good-nature enough to own.

The complaints so often made by the most able translators are indeed alarming. Their performances (they say) may very much disgrace, but can never commend them. The praise of all that is clear, and bright, and pleasing, and instructive, is reflected back upon the original author: but every appearance of a different nature is laid with severity of censure at the door of the translator. If it be so, we know the terms beforehand on which, either able or unable, we engage, and must patiently acquiesce in the issue. But candour is always expected, nay, ever will be had, from persons of good sense and sound judgment. Few but such may be pleased with Thucydides either in his old native Greek, or in a modern English garb; and, if such confer the honour of their applause, the clamour of some will not terrify, nor the silence of others mortify at all. The bookseller, it is true, forms his own judgment, and then dictates to the judgment of others from the sale. And it must be owned, that every original writer, as well as every copyist, is heartily glad to receive that mark of public approbation.

The present translation of Thucydides is accompanied with a few notes, and three preliminary Discourses. Concerning these something must be added.

The notes are only designed for the English reader, to give him light into that antiquity, with which he may be little acquainted: and therefore the first time that any thing relating to the constitution or forms of the Athenian republic, or peculiar to their fleets and land armies, occurs, I have endeavoured in a note to give him a competent perception of it. I have done the same, in regard to the characters of the chief personages in the history, which seemed to need a farther opening than what Thucydides hath given them. The persons were well known when he wrote: but a modern reader may not be displeased to be regularly introduced, and early to be made acquainted, with the characters of the principal agents in these busy and important scenes. In notes of verbal criticism or mere learning, I have been very sparing, judging they would never be read with patience.

Of the preliminary discourses the two first were due, by the rules of decorum observed by editors and translators, to the author. In the last, I have thrown into one continued discourse what might have been broke into pieces, and interspersed occasionally by way of notes. The method observed appeared most eligible, as it will give the reader a clear prospect of the whole history; preparing him for or inciting him to a close and attentive perusal of it; or enabling him, after he hath perused it, to recollect the most instructive passages and most material occurrences. By this means, also, a more lively and succinct account could be given of the speakers and the speeches, than could have been done by way of set and formal arguments.

I think the English reader can want nothing more, to enable him to read Thucydides with pleasure and profit; especially if he be at all acquainted with the Grecian history, of which few that ever read can now be ignorant, since Mr Stanyan's History of Greece and the Universal History are in so many hands. I dismiss the work with some hope, but more terror, about its success. That hope is encouraged and supported by the list of my Subscribers. There are names that do me honour indeed; and which, whether the work may suit the generality or not, will preserve me from ever repenting, that I have bestowed so much time on translating Thucydides.

THREE DISCOURSES.

- I. ON THE LIFE OF THUCYDIDES.
- II. ON HIS QUALIFICATIONS AS AN HISTORIAN.
- III. A SURVEY OF THE HISTORY.

DISCOURSE I.

ON

THE LIFE OF THUCYDIDES.

It is a natural piece of curiosity, either when we have read a book we like, or hear one commended, to inquire after the author. We acquiesce not in his bare name; we immediately seek farther information. The stranger shows an inclination to form some acquaintance with him; the reader to improve what he already hath. We at length grow inquisitive about all that concerns him, and are eager to be let into the particulars.

Some claim of this kind will no doubt be made in regard to Thucydides. He who endeavours to introduce him to general notice, ought at least to have something to say about him, and something rather tending perhaps to give favourable impressions. All his editors and translators have reckoned this a point of duty incumbent upon them: but it hath been generally performed in a very imperfect and slovenly manner. His life wrote by Marcellinus, a crude incoherent morsel, hath been prefixed to all the Greek editions. That by Suidas is an unsatisfactory mere dictionary-account. A third in Greek, by an anonymous author, is also but a very slight and shapeless sketch, and seems the work of a grammarian, who hath read indeed, but very superficially read his history. Some incidental escapes from his own pen are the marks, which should be always kept in view by him who would give any tolerable account of Thucydides. Writers of a better age and class will contribute now and then a little assistance. And the laborious care of a late author,* in adjusting the chronology and clearing away rubbish, will enable one now to give at least a coherent, though by no means an accurate, account of him.

Thucydides, an Athenian, by borough a Halymusian, was born in the year before Christ four hundred and seventy-one; twenty-five years after Hellanicus, thirteen after Herodotus, according to Aulus Gellius; and about three years before Socrates, as the birth of the latter is settled by Laertius. He was descended of a very splendid and noble family, though perhaps not so honourable as many others, since it was not purely Attic. Its splendour can no longer be doubted, when it is known to be the family of Miltiades. Miltiades the elder, born a citizen of Athens, had reigned over the Dolonci, a people in Thrace; and left vast possessions in that country to his descendants: and Miltiades the younger had married Hegesipyle the daughter of Olorus, a Thracian king.† Yet foreign blood, though royal, was always thought to debase the Athenian. The firm republicans of Athens had an hereditary aversion to every circumstance of royalty;

* Vitæ Thucydidis Synopsis chronologica, ab Henrico Dodwell.

† Herodotus in Erato.

and the polite inhabitants of it abhorred all connexions with Barbarians, the scornful title they gave to all the rest of the world, except their countrymen of Greece. Iphicrates, a famous Athenian in later times, was the son of an Athenian shoemaker and a Thracian princess. Yet, being asked to which of his parents he thought himself most obliged, he replied haughtily—"To my mother. She did all she could to make me an Athenian; my father would have made me a Barbarian." The younger Miltiades whom wars had obliged to quit his hold in Thrace, commanded the troops of Athens in the famous field of Marathon. He died afterwards in a jail, unable to pay a large fine set upon him by the people of Athens. His son Cimon contrived afterwards to pay it. The family for a time had been in poverty and distress, but emerged again in Cimon. Cimon the same day gained a victory both by land and sea over the Persians at Mycale. By his conduct he very much enlarged the power of Athens, and put it in a train of much greater advancement. In civil affairs he clashed with Pericles, who was leader of the popular party: Cimon always sided with the noble or the few; as were the party-distinctions in vogue at Athens.

The proofs that Thucydides was of this family are strong and convincing. Plutarch directly asserts it in the life of Cimon. His father, in grateful at least if not honourable remembrance of the Thracian king, whose daughter Miltiades had married, bore the name of Olorus. His mother also was another Hegesipyle. He inherited rich possessions in Thrace; particularly some mines of gold. A monument of him was to be seen for many ages after, in the Cœle at Athens, amongst the Cimonian, or those belonging to the family of Cimon; and stood next, according to Plutarch, to that of Elpinice, Cimon's own sister. His father's name in the inscription on this monument, at least some latter grammarians have averred it, was Olorus. Thucydides himself, in the fourth book of his history, calls it Orolus. Can we want stronger authority? Whether any stress ought to be laid on the variation, or whence the mistake, though a very minute one, might proceed, are points too obscure and trifling to take up any attention.

Such was the family of which Thucydides was descended. His pedigree might be fetched from the gods; since that of Miltiades is traced down from Æacus. But, like my author, I should choose to keep as clear of the fabulous as possible. Cicero says of him, "Though he had never written a history, his name would still have been extant, he was so honourable and noble."* I quote this, merely as a testimony to the splendour of his birth, since it may be questioned whether the historian, in the present instance, hath not entirely preserved his memory, and been solely instrumental in ennobling and perpetuating the man.

His education no doubt was such as might be expected from the splendour of his birth, the opulence of his family, and the good taste then prevailing in Athens, the politest city that then existed, or ever yet existed in the world. It is impossible however to give any detail of it. The very little to be found about it in writers of any class whatever, seems merely of a presumptuous though probable kind. It is said Anaxagoras was his preceptor in philosophy, because the name of Anaxagoras was great at this period of time. Anaxagoras, the preceptor of Euripides, of Pericles, and of Socrates, is named also by Marcellinus for the preceptor of Thucydides. And he adds, quoting Antyllus for an evidence, that "it was whispered about that Thucydides was atheistical, because he was so fond of the theory of Anaxagoras, who was generally

* In the Orator.

reputed and styled an atheist." The solution of an eclipse from natural causes accounting for appearances from the laws of motion, and investigating the course of nature, were sufficient proofs of atheism amongst a people so superstitious as the Athenians. Thucydides, possibly, might be well acquainted with the philosophy of Anaxagoras, without having personally attended his lectures. However that be, his own history abundantly shows that he was no atheist; it may be added, and no polytheist. By his manner of speaking of the oracles and predictions tossed about in his own time, it is plain he looked upon them as equivocal, or rather insinuates them to be mere forgeries. "And yet," says Mr Hobbes,* "he confirms an assertion of his own touching the time this war lasted, by the oracle's prediction." The passage occurs in the fifth book of this history. But whoever considers it, will find it only an *argumentum ad hominem*, to stop the mouths of such as believed in oracles, from contesting his own computation of the whole time the Peloponnesian war lasted. I can only say, that he was undoubtedly a serious man, and of a large fund of solid sense, which deriving originally from the bounty of nature, he had most certainly improved by a regular and sound education.

For a reason of much less weight, Antipho is assigned for his master in rhetoric—because he speaks handsomely of him in the eighth book. He there indeed pays due acknowledgement to the merit of Antipho as a speaker; but it cannot be inferred from hence, that he had ever any connection with him. Others have made Antipho a scholar of Thucydides,† with full as little reason. Thucydides certainly was never a teacher by profession. It is pity to waste so much time on uncertainties. It is certain Thucydides had a liberal education, though the particular progress of it cannot now be traced.

But, to show the peculiar bent of his genius, and a remarkable prognostic what sort of person he would prove, the following story is recorded by several authors, and dated by Mr Dodwell in the fifteenth year of his age.—His father carried him to the Olympic games. He there heard Herodotus read his history to the great crowd of Grecians assembled at that solemnity. He heard him with fixed attention; and, at length, burst out into tears. "Tears childish indeed," it hath been remarked: but however such as few children would have shed, and highly expressive of his inward spirit. The active aspiring mind of Themistocles was not stronger shown, when the trophy of Miltiades would not let him be at rest; nor the genius of the lad at Westminster-school, when he could not sleep for the colours in Westminster-hall. Herodotus is said to have observed it, and to have complimented Olorus on his having a son, that had so violent a bent to letters. A similar passage in any person's life would always be called to mind, when he was the subject of conversation.

In about two years more, Thucydides was obliged by the laws to take his exercise in the study of arms, and to begin to share in the defence of his country. Every citizen of Athens was also a soldier. They served at first within the walls, or on great emergencies marched, though to no great distance from home. As years and skill advanced, they were called upon to join in more distant and foreign expeditions. We are quite in the dark about the particular services in which he might thus be employed. We are sure at least he much improved in the theory of arms. He qualified himself for the great trust of heading the forces of the state; and, in the sequel, we shall see him invested with a command.

The anonymous author of his life relates, that Thucydides was one of the number,

* Of the Life and History of Thucydides.

† Plutarch's Lives of the ten Orators.

whom the Athenians sent to found a colony at Thuria in Italy. Lampo and Xenocritus were the leaders of this colony, and Herodotus is said to have been associated in it. If Thucydides went the voyage (and the strange inconsistencies of him who relates it render his whole account suspicious,) he must have been about twenty-seven years of age. One thing is pretty certain; his stay at Thuria could have been of no very long continuance. This is not to be inferred from the ostracism, which the same writer says he soon after suffered; a mistake incurred, it is highly probable, by confounding him with Thucydides the son of Milesias, who was of the same family, and being a leader in the oligarchical party at Athens, had the ostracism thrown upon him by the interest and popularity of Pericles. But the quarrel between the Corcyreans and Corinthians about Epidamnus broke out soon after this. The enemies of Athens were now scheming the demolition of its growing power. Thucydides writes all the preparatory transactions, marks all the defensive measures of the Athenians, as a person who was privy to every one of them. And there should be very strong and very positive proofs of the contrary, before any reader of his history doubts of his having been all the time at Athens.

His own Introduction, of itself in a great measure establishes the fact. He perceived the storm was gathering; he knew the jealousies of the states which composed the Lacedæmonian league; he also knew the real strength of Athens, and heard all the preventive measures recommended by Pericles to put his countrymen in a proper posture of defence. He himself seems to have been alert for the contention, and ready both with lance and pen, not only to bear his share in the events, but also to perpetuate the memory of them. His own words (*ἀσπίς* and *ῥυπαροειδὲς*) seem to denote the great earnestness and attention of his mind to the wide field of matter which was now going to be opened. He longed to become an historian; he saw a fine subject for history fast approaching; he immediately set about noting all occurrences, began at once to collect materials; and was resolved to write the History of the Peloponnesian War before it was actually on foot.

Can we doubt then of his residence during this portion of time at Athens? He was arrived, at the breaking out of this war, to the full vigour and ripeness of his years and understanding, according to his chronologist, Mr Dodwell, was just forty years old. We learn from himself,* that he knew personally the whole series of things; he was ever present at the transactions of one or other of the contending parties; more, after his exile at those of the Peloponnesians; and consequently, before his exile, at those of the Athenians. He speaks of Pericles, as one who was an eye-witness of his conduct; as one who heard him harangue in the assembly of the people, convincing that a war there would necessarily be, and for that reason they ought not to weaken themselves by ill-judged concessions, but gallantly to exert that naval power which had made Athens envied and dreaded, and which alone, as it had made, could keep her great. He must regularly have taken his post upon the walls, and seen the Peloponnesians, in the first year of the war, lay all the adjacent country waste. He must have marched under Pericles to retaliate on the territories of Megara, since the whole force of the state was obliged to take the field on this occasion. He must have assisted at the public funeral solemnized in the winter for the first victims of this war, and heard Pericles speak in honour of the dead and the living, and make his countrymen enamoured of their own laws and constitution. The plague broke out immediately after this; we are absolutely certain he was then in Athens. He himself assures us of it. He was an eye-witness

* Book the fifth.

to all that horrid scene. He had the plague himself; and hath given a circumstantial detail of it.

The war proceeds with vigour, and through a great variety of events. Thucydides must have borne his share in the service; the particulars he hath not recorded. No man was ever less guilty of egotism; he never mentions himself but when it is absolutely necessary. His next six years were certainly employed in fighting and in writing; the latter was his passion, and the former his duty. In the forty-seventh year of his age, he was joined in the command of an Athenian squadron and land-force on the coasts of Thrace. He might be assigned to this particular station, on account of his possessions and interest in this part of the world. It was judged at Athens, that he was best qualified to serve his country in this department. The Lacedemonian commander in Thrace dreaded his opposition. Let us wait a little for the event: it is the most important passage in the life of Thucydides.

It was entirely on the authority of Plutarch, that Thucydides was asserted above to be a descendant from Miltiades, and in the mode of consanguinity to have inherited his fine estate in this part of the world. Marcellinus, who is forever jumbling and confounding facts, hath also made him marry a Thracian lady, who brought him his gold-mines for her fortune. Mr Hobbes is willing to reconcile the facts, and solves all the difficulty in a very plausible manner. "In Thrace," says he, "lay also the possessions of Thucydides and his wealthy mines of gold, as he himself professeth in his fourth book. And although those riches might come to him by a wife, (as is also by some affirmed,) which he married in Scapte-syle, a city of Thrace; yet even by that marriage it appeareth that his affairs had a relation to that country, and that his nobility was not there unknown." I cannot believe that Thucydides ever married a lady that was not purely Attic. He seems to have been high-spirited in this respect, and proud of his country. Miltiades indeed had married a Thracian princess; and nothing, but the vast estate brought into the family by this match, could have made his descendants easy with such a blemish in their pedigree: for a blemish undoubtedly it must have been thought at Athens. Let us see how Thucydides himself drops his sentiment of such another match. The passage I have in view occurs in the sixth book. He is speaking of Hippias, the son of Pisistratus, tyrant of Athens. "To Æantidas the son of Hippoclus tyrant of Lampsacus—to a Lampsacene, though he himself was an Athenian—he married his daughter Archedice." I cannot think, that he, who let such a sarcasm fall from his own serious pen, could ever condescend to marry a Barbarian, let her fortune be ever so great. The reader, if it be worth his while to think at all about it, may determine for himself.—This digression was caused by the express mention Thucydides hath made of his mines, the very moment he is going to enter the lists against the most gallant and active commander at this time in the armies of the Lacedemonian league.

It was Brasidas the Spartan, who was now at the head of the Peloponnesian troops in Thrace. He had made a forced march thither through Thessaly and Macedonia. By his fine deportment and his persuasive address joined to uncommon vigilance and activity, he had hitherto carried all before him. He at length endeavoured to get possession by surprise of the important city of Amphipolis: he had very nearly succeeded. Eucles commanded there for the Athenians. Thucydides was at this time in the isle of Thasus, about half a day's sail from Amphipolis. A messenger was despatched to him, to hasten him up for the defence of that city. He put to sea immediately with a small squadron of seven ships. Brasidas, knowing he was coming, opened a negotiation with the Amphipolitans, and gained admission for his troops. Thucydides stood up the Strymon in

the evening, but too late, since Brasidas had got fast possession of Amphipolis. The city of Eion is situated also upon the river Strymon lower down, and about two miles and a half from Amphipolis. Thucydides put in here, and secured the place. "Brasidas (in his own words)¹ had designed that very night to seize Eion also. And, unless this squadron had come in thus critically to its defence, at break of day it had been lost." Thucydides, without losing a moment, provided for its defence. Brasidas, with armed boats, fell down the river from Amphipolis, and made two attempts upon it, but was repulsed in both: upon which, he gave up the scheme, and returned back.

One would imagine that Thucydides had done all that could be done on this occasion, and deserved to be thanked instead of punished. The people of Athens made a different determination. Cleon was now the demagogue of greatest influence there, and is generally supposed to have exasperated them against the man who had not wrought impossibilities in saving their valuable town of Amphipolis. It is certain their fury rose so high against him, that they stripped Thucydides of his command, and passed the sentence of banishment upon him. It is himself who tells us,² "It was his lot to suffer a twenty years' exile from his country after the affair of Amphipolis."

We have thus lost Thucydides the commander to secure more fast Thucydides the historian. Though sadly treated, he scorned to be angry with his country. His complexion was not at all choleric or resentful; there appears not the least sign of any gall in his constitution. Discharged of all duties and free from all public avocations, he was left without any attachments but to simple truth, and proceeded to qualify himself for commemorating exploits, in which he could have no share. He was now eight and forty years old, and entirely at leisure to attend to the grand point of his ambition, that of writing the history of the present war; a calm spectator of facts, and dispassionate observer of the events he was determined to record.

To judge of him from his history (and we have no other help to form our opinion about him), he was so nobly complexioned as to be all judgment and no passion. No murmur or complaint hath escaped him upon account of his severe undeserved treatment from his country. Great souls are congenial; their thoughts are always of a similar cast.

Sweet are the uses of adversity,
Which, like the toad, ugly and venomous,
Bears yet a precious jewel in his head.

Shakspeare has thus expressed what Thucydides, as it is highly probable, must have thought. "Exile, according to Plutarch,³ was a blessing which the muses bestowed upon their favourites. By this means they enabled them to complete their most beautiful and noble compositions." He then quotes our author for the first proof of his observation—"Thucydides the Athenian compiled his history of the Peloponnesian war at Scaptesyle in Thrace." At that place he fixed his residence. It lay convenient for taking care of his private affairs and overlooking his mines: they lay not within the dominions of Athens; for then they would have been forfeited to the state. Hence he made excursions at proper seasons to observe transactions, and pick up intelligence. He was now more conversant in person on the Peloponnesian side. Some private correspondences he might still carry on with Athenians. And he had money to purchase all proper materials, was ready, and knew how to lay it out. This was his employment till the very end of the war; and it is certain he collected materials for carrying down his history to

1 Book the fourth.

2 Book the fifth.

3 Of Banishment.

that period of time “when (in his own words⁴) the Lacedemonians and their allies put an end to the empire of Athens, and became masters of the Long Wall and the Piræus.” But whoever reads it, will be inclined to think, that he drew it not up in that accurate and elaborate manner in which it now appears, till the war was finished. He might keep every thing by him in the form of annals; he might go on altering or correcting, as he saw better reason or gained more light. His complete well-connected history, though the first thing in his intention, was the last in execution.

His exile lasted twenty years. It commenced in the eighth year of the war, in the year before Christ four hundred twenty-three. Consequently, he was restored the year before Christ four hundred and three, being at that time sixty-eight years old. In that very year an amnesty was published at Athens, in the archonship of Euclides, after the demolition of the thirty tyrants by Thrasybulus.

Thucydides was now at liberty, if he pleased, to return and pass the remainder of his days at Athens. Whether he did so or not, is left quite in the dark. He lived twelve years after, and died in the year before Christ three hundred ninety-one, being then about fourscore years old. He was constantly employed in giving coherence and dignity to this History;—with what accuracy, what severity, what toil, the reader may judge, since he will find that after all he left it imperfect. The first seven books are indeed fully and exactly finished. The eighth, though moulded into due form, hath plainly not had a final revisal, and breaks off abruptly. The whole work is said to have fallen into Xenophon’s possession, who at the time of the death of Thucydides, was exiled from Athens: and Xenophon is also said to have made it public. This carries a great air of probability with it, since Xenophon became the continuator of Thucydides, not in so lofty and majestic, but in a sweeter and more popular style. There is a chasm indeed between the time the History of Thucydides breaks off, and the Grecian History of Xenophon begins. There is no accounting for this but by conjecture. May I venture to offer one, I believe, entirely new, but which, for that reason, I shall readily give up to the first person of judgment, who thinks it hath no foundation? It is this—That Thucydides left somewhat more behind him than now appears. How it came to be suppressed or lost, I will not pretend to guess. It is natural to imagine, that his acknowledged continuator resumed the subject at the very spot where his predecessor had left off. Nearly two years are however wanting, in which several important incidents took place. It is pity; but we have no redress. General historians are by other means enabled to supply the deficiency; but the loss of any thing from so masterly a hand is still to be regretted.

The place of the death and interment of Thucydides was most probably Scaptesyle in Thrace. Long habitude might have made him fond of a spot where he had passed so many years in studious and calm retirement. The hurry and bustle and engagements of Athens could not have been much to the relish of so grave, and now so old a man. His monument there among the Cimonian confirms this opinion, since most writers agree, it had the mark upon it which showed it to be a cenotaph, and the words, ‘Here lieth,’ were not in the inscription.⁵ I have nothing to add about his family. It is said he left a son; but the very name of that son is merely conjectural. I have collected every thing that carries any consistency with it about the Man; I shall proceed with more pleasure to view him in a clearer and more steady light, and mark the character in which it was his ambition to be distinguished, that of an Historian.

4 Book the fifth.

5 Marcellinus.

DISCOURSE II.

ON HIS

QUALIFICATIONS AS AN HISTORIAN.

It is now to be considered, how well qualified Thucydides was, to undertake that nice and arduous task of writing history.—No one certainly was ever better fitted for it by outward circumstances; and very few so enabled to perform it well by the inward abilities of genius and understanding.

Lucian, in his celebrated treatise “How a History ought to be written,” is generally supposed to have had his eye fixed on Thucydides. And every person of judgment, who loves a sincere relation of things, would be glad, if it were possible, to have the writer of them abstracted from all kind of connection with persons or things that are the subject-matter; to be of no country, no party; clear of all passions; independent in every light; entirely unconcerned who is pleased or displeased with what he writes; the servant only of reason and truth.

Sift Thucydides carefully, and we shall find his qualifications in all these respects very nearly, if not quite, complete.

No connection with, no favouring or malevolent bias towards, any one person in the world, can be fixed upon him. Never man so entirely detached, or proceeded so far (if I may use the expression) in annihilating himself. He had a father indeed, whose name was Olorus; he was an Athenian born;—but, who are his relations? who were his associates? what, rival or competitor doth he sneer? what friend doth he commend? or what enemy doth he reproach?—Brasidas was the immediate occasion of his disgrace and exile. Yet, how doth he describe him? He makes the most candid acknowledgments of his personal merit, and doth justice to all his shining and superior abilities. Cleon is generally supposed to have irritated the people against him, and to have got him most severely punished, when he merited much better returns from his country. Doth he show the least grudge or resentment against this Cleon? He represents him indeed in his real character of a factious demagogue, an incendiary, a bully, and of course an arrant coward. And how do all other writers? how doth Aristophanes paint this worthless man, this false bellowing patriot? I would never call Aristophanes for an evidence to character, but in cases where every other writer accorded fully with him, on the same foundation of truth though not with the same superstructure of bitterness and abuse. He should not be a voucher in regard to Socrates, or Pericles; but certainly may be heard about an Hyperbolus or a Cleon. Thucydides never mentions himself as of

posed to any man but Brasidas; and never so much as drops an insinuation that he was hurt by Cleon. And thus, by general consent, he hath gained immortal honour by giving fair and true representations of men, whom he never felt to be such, but whom succeeding writers have assured us to have actually been his enemies.—As to things; though in the first seven years of the war he must in some measure have had employment, yet he was soon disentangled from all business whatever, in a manner which bore hard upon his reputation. He hath stated the fact; and then with the greatest calmness and unconcern, he hath left the decision to posterity.

He was henceforth of no country at all. Cut off from the republic of Athens, he never sought after or desired a naturalization in any other state of Greece. He was now only to choose out and fix a proper spot of observation, from whence, like a person securely posted on a promontory, he could look calmly on the storm that was raging or the battle that was fighting below, could note every incident, distinguish every turn, and with a philosophical tranquillity enjoy it all. In short, he now was, and continued all the rest of the Peloponnesian war, a citizen of the world at large, as much as any man ever actually was.

But before this separation from the community, whilst yet he continued at Athens, where liberty opened the field to all passionate chases after power, where consequently competitions were ever fermenting, and party was always alive and active,—can we find him associated with any particular set of men? can we find him dabbling in political intrigue? a leader of, or led by, any party? or, can we assuredly find out his principles? or even guess at his real thoughts about the form of government under which he had lived? His biographers indeed, though ever parading his candour and impartiality, are often tracing out signs and marks of party-zeal and personal prejudices from the very characters in his history. Marcellinus says, “he described Cleon as a madman because he hated him;” forgetful what Cleon really was, and of the concurrent testimonies to the truth of the character. The anonymous writer says, “he opposed Pericles at Athens, got the better of him, and became the first man in the republic.” A ridiculous story! void of all manner of support. According to this writer’s way of arguing in other places, who says, “he cajoled the Lacedemonians, and inveighed against the tyrannic all-grasping temper of the Athenians, in his history, because he had no opportunity to rail at them in any other shape;”—he should have left a far different character of Pericles behind him, than he had actually left. But these are strange compilers of patch-work, and deserve no regard. From what the former hath said about him, a reader might be tempted to judge him of the oligarchical, from what the latter hath said of him, of the democratical principle. Mr Hobbes imagines he hath dived to the bottom of his real principles, and avers him a tight and sound royalist. He is sure, that he least of all liked the democracy: as sure, he was not at all fond of an oligarchy. He founds this assurance on a passage in the eighth book—“They decreed the supreme power to be vested in the five thousand, which number to consist of all such citizens as were enrolled for the heavy armour, and that no one should receive a salary.”—Thucydides just after pronounceth this, in his own opinion, “a good modelling of their government, a fine temper between the few and the many, and which enabled Athens from the low estate into which her affairs were plunged to re-erect her head.” If this passage proves any thing of the author’s principles, it certainly proves them in a pretty strong degree republican. Mr Hobbes however sets out from hence to prove him a royalist. “For,” says he, “he commendeth the government of Athens more, both when Pisistratus reigned (saving that it was an usurped power,) and when in the beginning of this war it

was democratical in name, but in effect monarchical under Pericles." He praiseth, it is true, the administration at both these periods; and he also praiseth the good effects resulting from an administration lodged in the hands of five thousand men. Under Pericles it was lodged in more, but the extraordinary abilities and influence of the man had taught all their voices to follow the dictates of his heart. Yet Pericles was all the time a strong republican, and owned his masters. Plutarch says, he never harangued them without praying beforehand, that "not a word might slip out of his mouth, that was not pertinent to the business in hand;" and that he never put on his armour to lead them out into the field, without saying to himself—"Remember, Pericles, you are going to command free men and Grecians." I leave it to the reader, whether the principles of Thucydides can thus be discovered. It appears only, that he was always candid to a good administration, and might possibly think of government, as Mr Pope has wrote:

For modes of government let fools contest,
That which is best administer'd is best.

That studied obscurity in which he hath veiled himself, will not let us discover, whether on instant and critical occasions he ever suffered himself to be actuated by any of the darker passions, or too fondly indulged those of a brighter cast. But it cannot be found from what he writes, that he hath praised any man from fondness, or even from gratitude, degraded any one though envy, or reproached any one with malice and ill-nature. The same will hold in regard to states or whole communities. Doth he ever censure the Athenians in the wrong place? or commend the Lacedemonians but in the right? Were his name expunged from the beginning of the whole work and the conclusions of the years, could any one guess to what state he had ever belonged, whether he was a Lacedemonian, a Corinthian, an Athenian, or a Sicilian, except from the purity of the Attic dialect in which he writes? In that dialect he was cradled; he could not possibly swerve from it; without it he could neither write nor speak. Could he have thought that this might yield suspicion of an impassioned or prejudiced spirit, he might perhaps have endeavoured to write in the Doric or Ionic idiom.

Independent, further, he certainly must have been, since he had no great man to cajole, and no prince to dread or flatter. The powers of Greece or the monarch of Persia could affect him no more, than the Germanic body or the grand monarch of France the quiet and contented refugee, who lives on the sunny side of a hill in Switzerland. The circumjacent powers had no more, perhaps not so much influence at Scaptesyle, than the neighbouring kingdoms can have at Lausanne. The states of Greece had garrisons on the coasts, but were not masters of Thrace. Thrace was full of little communities and petty principalities. Thucydides had credit enough amongst them to insure his personal safety and guard his retirement. He could disoblige those about whom he wrote, without fear of their resentment, and could praise without being in the reach of a requital. Human nature will not admit of a stricter independence.

His unconcern about the opinions of a present generation, is strong and clear. It looks as if he thought they would scarce give him a reading, so little care had he taken to soothe or to amuse them. He had a greater aim than to be the author in vogue for a year. He hated contention, and scorned short-lived temporary applause. He threw himself on posterity. He appealed to the future world for the value of the present he had made them. The judgment of succeeding ages hath approved the compliment he thus made to their understandings. So long as there are truly great princes, able statesmen, sound politicians, politicians that do not rend asunder politics from good

order and general happiness; he will meet with candid and grateful acknowledgments of his merit.

Other historians have sooner pleased, have more diffusively entertained. They have aimed more directly at the passions, have more artificially and successfully struck at the imagination. Truth in its severity, and reason in its robust and manly state, are all the Muses and Graces to which Thucydides hath done obedience. Can we wonder, that he hath not been more generally read and admired? or, could we wonder, if he had not been so much? A great work planned under such circumstances and with such qualifications as I have been describing, cool serious judgment will always commend as a noble design, even though executed it may prove too cheerless to the more lively passions, its relish not sufficiently quick for the popular taste, or piquant enough to keep the appetite sharp and eager.

But to proceed. Thucydides hath been censured in regard to the choice of his subject. It hath occasioned the solidity of his judgment and excellence of his taste to be called in question. Dionysius of Halicarnassus hath exerted himself much on his account; hath tried him by laws which have poetry rather than history for their object; and censures him for not delighting, when his profession was only to instruct. Mr Hobbes has gallantly defended his author, and shown all the arguments of Dionysius to be impertinent, and to proceed from partiality and envy. I shall not repeat, it will suffice to refer the curious reader to what Mr Hobbes hath written upon this topic. Homer hath celebrated the Trojan war, and intermingled in his poems all the historic strokes of that and of preceding ages, enlivening and exalting every thing he touched. That splendid part of the Grecian history, in which his countrymen resisted and triumphed over the very formidable arms of the Persian monarch, had already been recorded by Herodotus. Should Thucydides plunge back into dark and fabulous ages, and turn a mere legendary and romantic writer? He had, he could have, no subject equal to his ambition and his abilities, but the war which broke out in his own days, which he foresaw would prove extensive and important, when the efforts of her enemies would be vigorously exerted to pull down the power of Athens, to demolish that naval strength which gave her the sovereignty of the sea, and made her the dread and envy of her neighbours. Coolly therefore with my reason as an examiner of things, and warmly with my passion as an Englishman, I cannot but applaud his choice, who hath projected the soundest and best system of English politics, so long before the constitution had existence; and hath left us fine lessons, such as his factious countrymen would not observe, how to support the dominion of the sea on which our glory is built, and on which our welfare entirely depends. In this light it is a most instructive and interesting history, and we may felicitate ourselves on the choice of Thucydides. I must not anticipate; Thucydides would have his readers pick out their own instructions. I can only add, that Thucydides is a favourite historian with the statesmen and patriots of Great Britain: this fits him also to be an historian for the people. Other nations have admired him, and I hope will continue to admire him, gratis: we are bound to thank him, and never to lose sight of that grand political scheme, formed by a Themistocles, and warmly and successfully pursued by an Aristides, a Cimon, and a Pericles; the swerving from which at Athens drew after it the loss of the sovereignty at sea, then sunk her into a petty state, and made her end at last in a mere academy, though most excellent in its kind.

From such considerations it will also follow, that the history of Thucydides is more useful than that of Livy; at least, that we have more reason to applaud the choice of the former. I design no comparison between these two historians. The performance of

the Jesuit Rapin on that point is in general reading. Livy's history is certainly more august, more splendid, more amazing: I only insist that it is not more useful. And, though Livy be happier in his subject, this ought not to degrade Thucydides, who seized the only fine subject that could offer itself to him: in regard to him, it was either this or none at all. The parallel should be only drawn in regard to execution, where much hath been said on both sides, and the superiority still remains undecided.

This brings me to the inward abilities of genius and understanding, which capacitated my author to execute his work. His genius was certainly of the highest order: it was truly sublime. Here the critics unanimously applaud. In the arrangement of his matter he emulated Homer. In the grandeur of his thoughts and loftiness of his sense he copied Pindar. He is ever stately and majestic; his stateliness perhaps too formal, his majesty too severe. He wrote, as he thought, far beyond an ordinary person. He thinks faster than he can utter: his sentences are full-stored with meaning; and his very words are sentences. Hence comes his obscurity. Where pure thought is the object, he connects too fast, nor is enough dilated for common apprehension. But this is not the case with the narrative part of his history, which is pithy, nervous, and succinct, yet plain, striking, and manly. He never flourishes, never plays upon words, never sinks into puerilities, never swells into bombast. It is a relation from the mouth of a very great man, whose chief characteristic is gravity. Others talk more ingenuously; others utter themselves with a more cheerful air; yet every one must attend to Thucydides, must hearken with serious and fixed attention, lest they lose a word, a weighty and important word, by which the whole story would be spoiled. It is in his *Oration*s, that he is most remarkably obscure. He might not be so in so high a degree to the apprehensions of mankind, when his history was first made public. The world was then used to hear continual harangues: no business of a public nature could be carried on without them. In his time, the speakers aimed entirely at strength and brevity. If they were not exceeding quick, the apprehensions of the Athenians would outstrip, or at least affect to outstrip, their utterance. They must think much, and yet leave much of what they had thought to the ready conception of the audience. An orator in the following history* calls them "Spectators of speeches." They affected to discern at the first glance; and without waiting for formal deduction and solemn inference, to be masters of the point as it were by intuition. The more copious and diffusive eloquence was the improvement of the next generation. But the most forcible orator that even Athens ever boasted, improved, if he did not quite learn, his peculiar manner from Thucydides. It was Demosthenes, who copied him in the close energy of his sentences, and the abrupt rapidity of his thoughts. Demosthenes is said to have transcribed him eight times over with his own hand: so diligently did he persevere to form an intimate acquaintance with him, and habituate himself to his quick manner of conception, and to his close and rapid delivery. Cicero says however,† that "no rhetorician of Greece drew any thing from Thucydides. He hath indeed been praised by all; I own it; but, as a man who was an explainer of facts with prudence, severity, and gravity: not as a speaker at the bar, but an historical relater of wars. And therefore he was never numbered amongst the orators." Cicero learned nothing from him: he could not, neither in his own words "would he if he could." His talents were different; he was quite in all respects accomplished; he was eloquence itself. But Demosthenes—and can there be higher praise!—Demosthenes certainly loved and studied Thucydides;

* Cleon's speech in book the third.

† In the *Orator*

for whose perfection I am not arguing; I would only establish his character of loftiness and sublimity. Longinus* proposeth him as the model of true grandeur and exaltation in writing history.

And now, I have mentioned this princely and most judicious critic, let us call Thucydides to take a trial at his bar, and see whether he hath all the genuine constituents of the true sublime. For elevation of thought, for his power in alarming and interesting the passions, for his bold and frequent use of figures, his character will soon be established. Even Dionysius of Halicarnassus bears testimony here, who loved him not, and would have been glad to degrade him. Plutarch calls him the most pathetic, and a writer of the greatest energy and variety that ever was. The scenes in his history are strong, most expressive paintings. He makes the past to be present; he makes hearing sight. In the very words of Plutarch†—"His readers are thrown into the same astonishment and hurry of passion, as the eye-witnesses to every scene must have felt. Demosthenes drawing up his men on the craggy shore of Pylus—Brasidas calling out on his pilot to run the vessel ashore, getting himself on the stairs, then wounded, fainting, falling down on the gunnel; here, the Spartans fighting a land battle from the water, the Athenians a naval battle from the shore;—and again, in the Sicilian war, the land armies of both parties on the beach, whilst a naval engagement is yet under decision on the water, sympathising in all the contest, adjusting themselves to all the various turns of battle, by new attitudes, quick contortions of the body;—All these things are set before the readers in actual representation, in all the disposition, all the expression and perspicuity, of picture." Though the whole course of the history, a battle either at land or sea is an object clear and distinct. The writer is never confounded himself, nor throws confusion on his reader. That reader sees the whole, from the pean of attack to the erecting of the trophy; he discerns the whole train of fight, and beholds exactly the loss or gain of the victory. He further assists at the assemblies of the people, and all important consultations. He learns the state of affairs from the managers themselves; he hears the debates, is let into the tempers of the assembly, pries into all the politics, and preconceives the resolution. Where the politics are bad, he will own no other could be expected from those who recommend them. Where they are sound and good, nor wilfully severed from duty to their country, and in moral consistence with the welfare of their fellow-creatures, the reader will applaud, and think he hath been himself discovering the fine maxims which the author hath been teaching, who never appears in person, never puffs his own integrity and discernment, and without digressing into comments or setting up for a politician, is found upon reflection the best of the kind that ever wrote.

To quote passages for the truth of his sublime thought or his pathetic address, would be to transcribe the greater part of the following history. They will be observed in the orations of these two different casts, and the incidents of the work. His figures are thick set; the figures that regard both the sentiment and the diction. His metaphors are strong and uncommon; his hyperboles far but not overstretched, the tone is still preserved, they flow out from a warm pathetic in the midst of some grand circumstance. The figures in which he most delights, are the Interrogation; the Change of number and time; the Hyperbaton, or transposing and inverting the order of things which seem naturally united and inseparable; and above all, the Antithesis. This last he hath fondly used, almost to satiety. Term is not only opposed to term, but thought to

* On the Sublime. Section 14.

† De gloria Atheniensium.

thought, sentence to sentence, and sometimes whole orations to one another even where the latter speaker cannot possibly be supposed to have heard the former. A constant adherence to this method carries with it the danger of glutting the reader. I am sensible there should have been more variety to make the whole quite beautiful and graceful.

As the fourth constituent of sublimity, which according to Longinus is noble and graceful expression, our author's claim cannot be so well established. Noble undoubtedly he is, but as for the graceful—the reader may wish he had been more careful in this particular, and I am sure his translator wishes it from his heart. For fear of being vulgar, he is too set and solemn; and from the passion to be always great, he hath lost the air of ease and gentleness. Dionysius of Halicarnassus says he studiously affected hard and obsolete words. But yet the same writer sets him up as the standard of Attic purity; nay, hath frequently strengthened his own style by using the hard and obsolete words of Thucydides. However this be, it is certain Thucydides hath in this respect fallen half-way short: and more so, in the fifth constituent of sublimity, composition or structure of his periods. He hath no harmony, hath given little or no proof of having a good ear. He is rough, austere; his periods are sometimes a mile long, in which he labours himself both out of tune and time. I acknowledge his imperfections, and beg the reader would weigh them and set them in the balance with his excellencies: he may judge if the latter do not greatly preponderate. He thinks nobly, affects surprisingly; his expression is noble, but not graceful; his final colouring is neither bright nor cheerful. But, though his pieces are not so completely finished as to stand every test, yet they are certainly high-wrought in his own peculiar style, and for greatness of design and strength of expression are beyond every other hand.

I think no fair comparison can be made of him, except with the historians who are his countrymen, who like himself are original in their own way, and the first in their manner. These are only two, Herodotus and Xenophon. In point of life, Thucydides was junior a little to the former, and senior to the latter. In stateliness, grandeur, and majesty, he far surpasses them both. The manner of Herodotus is graceful and manly; his address is engaging; he loves to tell a story; and, however fabulous or trifling that story, he will be heard with pleasure. The course of his history is clear and smooth, and yields a most cheerful prospect: that of Thucydides is deep, rapid, impetuous, and therefore very apt to be rough and muddy. You may clearly perceive the bottom of the one: but it is very hard to dive to the bottom of the other. Herodotus, like a master on the horn, can wind a lofty air, and without any harshness sink down into the lowest and mellowest notes. Thucydides sounds the trumpet; his blasts are sonorous and piercing, and they are all of the martial strain.* Xenophon never pretends to grandeur; his character is a beautiful simplicity; he is sweeter than honey; he charms every ear; the Muses themselves could not sing sweeter than he hath wrote. Each beats and is beaten by the others in some particular points. Each hath his particular excellence: that of Herodotus is gracefulness; that of Thucydides, grandeur; and that of Xenophon, sweetness itself. If generals, and admirals, and statesmen, were to award the first rank, it would undoubtedly be given for Thucydides; if the calmer and more polite gentry, it would go for Herodotus; if all in general who can read or hear, Xenophon hath it all to nothing.

As to the Roman historians, who saw what these mighty originals had done before

* *Canit quodammodo bellicum.* Cicero in the Orator.

them, I cannot judge it fair to form decisive parallels. Time had enabled them to judge maturely about defects and excellencies of their Greek predecessors. Yet every Roman historian shows plainly he is a Roman himself; he stood not so aloof from his subject as Thucydides. The loss of a Peloponnesian writer is never regretted in regard to the latter: the loss of Carthaginian and historians of other nations is highly regretted in regard to the former. National partiality will admit no comparison here, though excellence of composition may admit a great deal. Sallust is the only one who seems to have had our Author ever in his eye, and to have been his professed imitator. Sallust frequently translates his political maxims, copies him exactly in the conciseness and laboured energy of his phrase; and Sallust, for that reason, is like him very often obscure. It is entirely in his manner, that he draws up his orations, contrasts his speakers, and fights his battles. Sallust hath many, hath deservedly many admirers: and I hope, if I am so fortunate as to bring Thucydides into more general acquaintance, that the admirers of the one will bestow regard upon the other, and pay due honour to his historic progenitor.

I shall wind up this essay on Thucydides as an historian with a passage from the Critic on the Sublime,* only desiring the reader to keep Thucydides in remembrance, as Longinus extended his view to writers both in poetry and prose—

“I readily allow, that writers of a lofty and towering genius are by no means pure and correct, since whatever is neat and accurate throughout, must be exceedingly liable to flatness. In the Sublime, as in great affluence of fortune, some minuter articles will unavoidably escape observation. But it is almost impossible for a low and grovelling genius to be guilty of error, since he never endangers himself by soaring on high, or aiming at eminence, but still goes on in the same uniform secure track, whilst its very height and grandeur exposes the Sublime to sudden falls. Nor am I ignorant indeed of another thing, which will no doubt be urged, that in passing our judgment upon the works of an author, we always muster his imperfections, so that the remembrance of his faults sticks indelibly fast in the mind, whereas that of his excellencies is quickly worn out. For my part, I have taken notice of no inconsiderable number of faults in Homer, and some other of the greatest authors, and cannot by any means be blind or partial to them; however, I judge them not to be voluntary faults, so much as accidental slips incurred though inadvertence: such as, when the mind is intent upon things of a higher nature, will creep insensibly into compositions. And for this reason I gave it as my real opinion, that the great and noble flights, though they cannot every where boast an equality of perfection, yet ought to carry off the prize by the sole merit of their own intrinsic grandeur.”

* Longinus, Section 33.

DISCOURSE III.

A

SURVEY OF THE HISTORY.

In the preceding discourse we have examined into the capacity and qualifications of our author for writing history, and settled his character. Let us now take a view of the work itself; first casting our eyes upon and noting the general disposition of the whole; and then surveying it more distinctly in its parts.

The disposition of the whole is most elaborately exact. Order is scrupulously observed; and every incident so faithfully arranged in its proper time, that some have doubted whether annals were not a more proper title for it than history. If we should call it annals, it must be owned at the same time that annals were never composed with so much majesty and spirit; and never was history more accurately distinguished by the punctuality of dates so nicely interwoven. Thucydides states every occurrence in its just place and time. But he is forced for this purpose to make frequent transitions, and to drop a particular narration, perhaps the very moment a reader's attention may be most fixed upon and most eager for the event. If they cannot bear a disappointment here, the remedy is ready at hand. By turning over a few leaves, they will find it regularly resumed in due place and time; and they at once may satisfy their own curiosity, without disarranging the author's scheme, or perplexing that work which he was determined to keep quite clear and unembarrassed. They will afterwards forgive, perhaps applaud him, for his great care to prevent confusion, and to give a new and precise conception of all that passeth. He constantly gives notice, when he is necessitated, by the method he laid down for himself, to make such transitions; and when we have been amused with what looks like a ramble from an engaging part of history, but is really a coincidence of events not to pass unheeded; when we have been so long at it, that we are convinced it lies in the road, and is no excursion at all; yet we are glad to see him re-connect, and land us on a spot, where we are already well acquainted. He shows a steady and inviolable attachment to chronology, a necessary attendant upon history. But the chronology of Thucydides is like a herald, that exactly marshals a long stately procession, adjusts the rank, clears the way, and preserves every step distinct and unincumbered.

No writer had done this before him. No settled era was yet in use, not even the famous one of the Olympiad. The several states of Greece computed time by a method of their own. It was not easy to make those methods coincide with one another. The Athenians reckoned by their annual archons; the Lacedemonians by their ephori; the Argives by the years of the priestess of Juno. The seasons of the year, when the two former entered on their offices, were fixed, but did not suit together in point of time.

beginning of the years of the latter was variable, since it depended on the death removal of a predecessor. Thucydides, to avoid confusion, left all these artificial ring rules, and adhered to the course of nature. He divided the natural year into ves, into a summer and winter. His summer includes the spring, and reaches in the vernal to the autumnal equinox; the other half-year is comprehended in winter. He always records eclipses, as strange events, and proper concomitants for horrors of this war. I must not be so sanguine as to imagine, that he supposed such appearances might some time or other be reduced to exact calculation, and astronomy be made the faithful guide of chronology.

Book I.—The First Book of Thucydides is introductory to the rest. It is a comprehensive elaborate work of itself. It clears away rubbish, opens a view from the earliest ages, strikes out light from obscurity, and truth from fable; that the reader may enter upon the Peloponnesian war with a perfect insight into the state of Greece, and the motives, interest, and strength, of the contending parties. The author unfolds his sign in writing, magnifies his subject, complains of the ignorance and credulity of mankind, rectifies their mistakes, removes all prejudice, and furnishes us with the knowledge of every thing proper to be known, to enable us to look at the contention with judgment and discernment, when the point contended for is no less than the sovereignty of the sea, which that of the land must necessarily follow.

He begins at the source, and traces the original of the Greek communities from certain and indisputable facts; and the growth of Attica in particular, from the natural barrenness of the soil, which tempted no invasions; and from the shelter its inhabitants gave to all who would settle amongst them, and share their polity.—He shows the invention of shipping to have been exceedingly mischievous at first. It filled the sea with pirates, to whom it gave a ready conveyance from coast to coast, enabling them suddenly to seize, and at leisure to carry off and secure their booty. No considerable commerce, or rather none at all, could be carried on, till the shore was cleared of such annoyance. And when few durst venture to settle on the coasts, no marts could be opened for traffic, and no ports were yet secure. A ship was merely the instrument of ready conveyance from place to place: it was not yet become an engine of attack and defence on the water. Minos king of Crete made the first attempt with success to obtain a naval strength,* by which he cleared the isles of the pirates, who had settled upon them to set out readier from thence on their plundering excursions.—The grand fleet that carried such a numerous army to Troy, was a mere collection of transports. Thucydides gives us a just and clear idea of that famous expedition. After this celebrated era,† the Corinthians were the first people of Greece, who became in reality a maritime power. Their peculiar situation gave them an inclination and opportunity for commerce; and commerce must have strength to guard and support it. They first improved a vessel of burden into a ship of war,‡ and set power afloat as well as wealth. Their neighbours in the isle of Corcyra soon followed their example, and, though originally a colony of their own, became a rival power at sea. They fought on their own darling element for superiority.|| This was the most ancient sea-fight, but it was not decisive. They continued for two centuries more to be rival and jarring powers; till a third, that of Athens, grew up, which politically joined with one to gain the ascendant over them both, and to assert the empire of the sea for itself.

* Years before Christ 1006.

† Before Christ 697.

‡ Before Christ 904.

|| Before Christ 657.



The claim both of Corcyra and Corinth to the town of Epidamnus had occasioned their most recent embroilment,* and a hot war, in which the Corcyreans applied for the alliance and aid of Athens. On this was afterwards grounded the first pretext for the Peloponnesian war, and therefore our author opens the affair at large. Athens held the balance of power in her hands: how she came to be possessed of it, will soon give room for as pertinent a digression as Thucydides could have wished. Ambassadors from both parties are soon at Athens; one, to negotiate alliance and aid; the other, to traverse their negotiation. The people of Athens, in whom the supreme power was vested, admitted them both to audience, and orations of course must follow. Our grave historian is now retired, to make way for statesmen and orators to mount the stage, who are very well worth hearing.

The Corcyreans, who take the lead, recognize "the necessity of alliances, which, though sometimes entanglements, are generally security and defence. Wronged as they now are, they sue for alliance as the means of redress. In granting it to them, the Athenians would show honour and virtue, and at the same time promote their own private interest. The accession of the naval strength of Corcyra to their own was very well worth the gaining; in the end, it might preserve their state.—They open the nature of colonies, show the original contract between them and the mother-country; obedience and protection are reciprocal, and imply one another.—They prove that Athens may grant them alliance, in consistence with all other engagements; by doing it, may secure herself in time against the envy and attack of the Peloponnesians; since the naval strength of Corinth, joined to all the efforts of the latter in a future war, will be weak and ineffectual against the combined fleets of Corcyra and Athens."

The Corinthians, in their answer, inveigh highly against the Corcyreans. They describe them as "a very designing iniquitous set of men, and a colony in the highest degree undutiful to its mother-state. They endeavour to prove it unjust, and ungrateful too, in the Athenians, to take them into alliance, and abet their criminal behaviour. They maintain, that true honour points out another conduct; and schemes of interest should never supersede the laws of equity and good faith. What may happen should be less regarded, than what on present occasions is strictly right. They entreat at last, though with a menacing air; and close with warmly adjuring the Athenians to stand neutral in the quarrel."

The Athenians however resolve to enter into a defensive alliance with Corcyra. The war is renewed; and the Athenians send the Corcyreans a petty aid, which they afterwards reinforce. Corcyra is secured, and all the projects of the Corinthians are baffled, who are highly exasperated against the Athenians, and never will forgive them.

Another affair soon happens to embroil them more, and to make the second pretext for a general war. Potidæa, a town in the isthmus of the Pallene, was a Corinthian colony, but at this time tributary to the Athenians. Its situation between two bays, and amongst the Athenian colonies on the coast to Thrace and Macedonia, would enable it to gall the Athenians sorely in case of a rupture. They order it therefore to be dismantled. The Potidæans refuse obedience, and revolt. A war ensues. The Athenians attempt to reduce Potidæa; and the Corinthians to support the revolt. It is at length besieged by the former. The siege runs out into a great length of time, and at last becomes one of the considerable events of the Peloponnesian war.

The Corinthians, after this repeated provocation, are full of resentments, and leave no

* Before Christ 438.

stone unturned to stir up a general war in Greece. They were parties themselves in the Peloponnesian league, of which the Lacedemonians were the head. The Corinthians never set up for a leading state. They were ever content with the secondary rank, though the first in that rank. Their turn was always more to commerce than war. Commerce had long since made them rich; riches had made them luxurious; and, though they often produced great and excellent soldiers, yet they never piqued themselves on being a martial or formidable people. Athens indeed they hated: Athens had rivalled them in trade, and very much abridged the extent of their commerce. One of the gulfs on which Corinth is seated, that of Sarone, was now entirely in the jurisdiction of the Athenians, who had also begun to curb and straiten them much in the gulf of Crissa. They were consequently bent on the demolition of this all-grasping rival, but were unable to effect it by their own strength. They solicit all the confederates to repair to Lacedemon, all full of complaint and remonstrance against the Athenians. The Corinthians reserve themselves for the finishing charge; and our author repeats (or makes for them) their most inveigling and alarming speech on this occasion.

“ They address the Lacedemonians with an artful mixture of commendation and reproach; of commendation, for their strict adherence to good faith; of reproach, for their indolence and sloth. They had suffered the state of Athens to grow too mighty for her neighbours. Though the acknowledged deliverers of Greece, they had now for a length of time taken no notice of the encroachments of the Athenians; but, through wilful ignorance and habitual supineness, had let them grow too big, and able now to enslave them all.—They do all they can to irritate and provoke them. They draw an admirable parallel between them and the Athenians; invidious and reproachful, but directly tending to exasperate those whom they want to exasperate.—Then, they warmly renew their applications to the pride of the Lacedemonians; they alarm their fears; they flatter and reproach their foibles. They even threaten to abandon their league, unless they exert themselves in defence of their friends; they endeavour to prove the necessity of active and vigorous measures; and end with a very artful stroke of insinuating and persuasive address.”

An Athenian embassy, now residing at Lacedemon, being informed of these loud and bitter outcries against their masters, beg an immediate audience. Accordingly, they are admitted; not indeed to plead before Lacedemonians, as their judges or superiors—Athenians scorn such self-debasement; but to vindicate their state from misrepresentations, to clear her reputation, and justify her power.

“ With this view, they run over the great services they had done to Greece, in the time of the Persian invasions: they had ever been the most strenuous, most disinterested, and most gallant, champions for liberty. They pompously detail their battles of Marathon and Salamis: their evacuating Athens on the last occasion: and when they had no polity of their own subsisting, fighting ardently and successfully for the other communities of Greece. Their power had been nobly earned; and must they forego it, because it was envied? They had honourably gained, and justly used it; much more justly, than the Lacedemonians had it either in will or ability to have done. They are calumniated merely from that spite and discontent so common to mankind, who ever hate and abuse their superiors, and ever repine at subjection though to the most gentle masters.—Lacedemonians have neither skill nor judgment for large command, and though most eagerly grasping at it, are unable to manage it with any measure of dexterity and address. They should reflect again and again, before they ventured upon war: it might last longer, and involve them in more calamities, than they seemed willing to ap-

prehend. They had better submit their complaints to fair arbitration: if not, the Athenians invoke the gods to witness their readiness to defend themselves, whenever and however their enemies shall attack them."

All parties now withdraw; and the Lacedemonians go to counsel amongst themselves. Exasperated by the Corinthians, and mortified by the speech of the Athenians, the majority are for an immediate declaration of war. Archidamus one of their kings, rose up to temper their fury. And the speech of his Spartan majesty on this occasion carries all the marks of a good king, an able statesman, and a thorough patriot: it does honour both to his heart and head. A Spartan king never made a royal figure but at the head of an army: then he reigned indeed. And yet, Archidamus retains no selfish considerations; they are lost in his regard for the public welfare.

He tells them, "he is not fond of war himself; raw unexperienced youth alone is liable to such weakness. The war now under consideration is a most important point. It may run out into a great length of time. It is against Athenians—a remote people—a naval power—abounding in wealth—excellently provided in all respects. He demands, in every single article, whether they can presume to become a match for such antagonists? They should remember the high spirit, the habits of activity and perseverance so natural to these Athenians, who are not to be dejected at the first loss, nor frightened at big words or haughty threats. Insults indeed must not be brooked; but adequate preparations should be made to avenge them, and time be gained to make such preparations. It would be most prudent to begin a negotiation, to spin it out into length. If affairs can be amicably adjusted, it would deserve their choice;—if not, when they are competently enabled, it will be soon enough to act offensively. He dreads not war himself, yet war cannot be carried on without money. Ample funds must be provided, a work of time and deliberation. Circumspection is no real reproach; precipitation draws positive mischiefs after it. Lacedemonians are used to be calm and considerate; they should not now be cajoled or exasperated out of their judgment. The Athenians are a wise and dextrous people. The Lacedemonians should keep that in remembrance, and support their own character of calmness of spirit and true manly resolution: they should begin with caution, proceed with temper, end all things amicably if they can; if not, when duly prepared and adequately provided, they might trust the decision to arms."

The kings of Sparta were ever jostled on their thrones by the haughty overbearing Ephori. Sthenelaidas, one of that college, answers Archidamus in a short, blunt, properly Laconic speech. "He is severe upon the Athenians, sneers Archidamus, and avers that Lacedemonians should not deliberate upon, but instantly take the field and avenge their wrongs." He then put the question—whether the peace was broken?—divided the council; told the votes; and declared, in the English style, that the Ays had it.

The confederates were now called in, and acquainted with the resolution. Yet, it seems the advice of Archidamus had carried some weight, and actual war was to be deferred, till all the parties in the Lacedemonian league had ripened their measures, and were ready to act with unanimity and vigour.

Here the author again makes his appearance, and assures us the true motive of the determination for a war at Sparta, was a jealousy of the Athenian power, now very great, and a dread of its more extensive growth; the latter of which they were determined to prevent, and to reduce the former within less distasteful and terrific bounds.

Then follows a most pertinent digression, in which Thucydides points out the steps by which the Athenians had so highly exalted their state. In a close and succinct man-

ner he runs over the history of Athens for fifty years, from the invasion of Xerxes to the breaking out of the Peloponnesian war. He arranges all the incidents in due place and time. Herodotus hath related the splendid passages of the Grecian history during that invasion; hath exhibited Themistocles in all the lustre of his command at the battle of Salamis, where the Athenians, who had abandoned their all, fought, and, through the address of Themistocles obliged all parties to fight, for liberty against Xerxes. On this day they earned a greater title than that of citizens of Athens; they were afterwards acknowledged the sovereigns of the sea. The Lacedemonians became mortified at it; but the Athenians had gloriously deserved it. Themistocles was the very life and soul of Greece on this occasion. In the midst of difficulties he formed a most extensive plan for his beloved Athens, which he began to execute at once. Thucydides describes his address and foresight. He soon sets the city beyond the reach of envy and jealousy. And though soon after he lost his country, through the malice of his personal enemies and the enemies of his country in conjunction with them, yet the statesmen and patriots left behind pursued his plan of naval power; and the steps of its progress and advancement are mutually traced out by our historian.

Themistocles had made all safe and secure at home. The Long Walls were built; the Piræus, a spacious harbour, opened and fortified, a magazine for traffic, and an arsenal for war. Aristides, as true a patriot as ever lived, made all secure abroad. Through his honest management, all Greece submitted to an annual tax, for the guard of their common liberty against future invasions; and the leaders at sea were made collectors and treasurers of this naval fund. The isle of Delos was the place, at first, of lodging this fund; but it was soon after removed to Athens;—a shrewd political step, yet capable however of an ample, if not full, justification. The war is briskly carried on against the Persian monarch; the isles and seas are cleared of the common enemy; the cities on the coast are regained or conquered. Cimon also performs his part nobly; he earns two victories the same day, by sea and land, on the coast of Ionia, from the Persians. He completed a negotiation with the petty maritime states, confederate with Athens, who were tired of incessant warfare, for accepting sums of money instead of ships and personal attendance. By this means the shipping of those states soon mouldered away, and their money was by their own agreement sent thither, to increase and strengthen the maritime power of Athens. In spite of all the opposition, which the Corinthians and Boeotians gave them at home, whose rancour to them was never to be appeased, in the course of no large number of years they had established a very extensive and formidable empire indeed. The isles and coasts of the Ægean sea were mostly their own. The bay of Sarone was entirely in their own jurisdiction: and, by being masters of Naupactus, they considerably awed the bay of Crissa. Their squadrons cruised round and quite awed the coasts of Peloponnesus. Their interest at Cephallene, and the new alliance which gained them the accession of the naval strength of Corcyra, rendered them masters of the Ionian, and they had colonies to extend their traffic and influence both in Italy and Sicily.

These points are opened step by step in this digression by Thucydides, till jealousy in the Lacedemonians and malice in the Corinthians irritated all the Peloponnesian states and their allies against them, and ended in the determination for war. The Corinthians had now carried their point, and hoped soon to gratify all their resentments. Accordingly, at the second grand congress at Sparta, when all the rest of the states had declared their minds, they warmly encourage them to enter at once upon an offensive war, in a very studied and elaborate speech.

"They set out with handsome compliments to the Lacedemonians. They animate the land states of Peloponnesus to join effectually with those on the coasts. A firm and lasting peace can only be obtained by a vigorous war; and the power of Athens must needs be reduced.—They open a plan—for establishing funds—for weakening the marine of Athens, and consequently for improving and strengthening the marine of her enemies—for effectuating the revolts of her dependents—and raising fortifications in Attica itself. Independence can never be earned at too great a price; it costs as much to be voluntary and obedient slaves. A single state should never be suffered to play the tyrant in Greece. Their own reputation, their dignity, their liberty, their welfare, a most righteous cause, nay, the very gods themselves, summon them to action. They close with a very warm and pathetic recapitulation, sounding as it were the alarm for the destruction of Athens."

Now war is a second time resolved upon by ballot. All are ordered to get ready, with the utmost despatch, to begin its operations. In the mean time the Athenians are to be amused with embassies and negotiations, merely to gain time and save appearances. Frivolous they really are, but our author minutely details them, as they give him an opportunity of introducing some notable passages relating to Cymon, Pausanias, and Themistocles. He then shifts the scene to Athens; and introduces Pericles, the most commanding orator, the greatest general, the most consummate statesmen, and at this time prime minister of the republic—introduces Pericles, I say, in the assembly of the people, to give them an insight into the schemes of their enemies, and a plan for their own conduct; to encourage them to a brave and steady resistance, in strict adherence to such methods, as in the end will infallibly not barely secure but aggrandise their state.

The thoughts in this speech of Pericles are so grand, so nervous, so emphatically and concisely just, that if the reader be not immediately struck into an adequate conception of them, I know no method of opening his eyes or enlarging his understanding. He says but little, but says every thing in that little. He demolishes all the assertions of the Corinthians in their last speech at Sparta, as if he had heard them speak. Perhaps Thucydides here hath not sufficiently concealed his art in writing. But the speech is entirely in character, completely suited to the heart and head and mouth of Pericles. Pericles, I observe it with pleasure, is an Englishman both in heart and judgment. England hath adhered and will adhere to the lessons which Athens neglected and forgot.—"Of vast consequence indeed," says this enlightened statesman, "is the dominion of the sea. But consider it with attention. For, were we seated on an island," as the force of his argument evidently implies, "we could never be subdued. And now you ought to think, that our present situation is as nearly as possible the same, and so to evacuate your houses and lands in Attica, and to confine your defence to the sea. If this can need a comment, Xenophon will give it in his Polity of the Athenians.—"In one point," says he, "the Athenians are deficient. For if, beside their being sovereigns of the sea, they were seated on an island, it would be ever in their power to ravage others at pleasure, and yet they could not be ravaged themselves so long as they held the mastery at sea; their lands could never be laid waste, no enemy could post themselves upon them. But now, the occupiers of lands and the wealthy Athenians fly before invaders; whilst the people in general, conscious they have nothing to be burnt and nothing to be plundered, live exempt from fear nor fly before an invader. The expedient used on such occasions is, that the former deposit their most valuable effects in the isles, and trusting to their superiority at sea, slight all the devastations an enemy can make in Attica." England is complete where Athens was deficient. And how fond must both Pericles

nd Xenophon have been of the island and maritime power of Great Britain! I will not pretend to anticipate the reader's pleasure by descending into more particularities.

may suffice to add, that the final answer of the Athenians is drawn up by the advice of Pericles, that "they will do nothing by command; they had already offered to refer all disputes to a fair judicial decision: so far only, but no farther, compliance must be expected from Athens."—Here all negotiation comes to an end; and the war will very soon commence.

Thus I have endeavoured to give some idea of the first book of Thucydides. It is a grand piece of work beyond all denial. But Rapin thinks our author hath overdone it "out of a desire of prefixing a too stately portal to his history." Could the portal have been thought too stately, if the whole fabric had been completely finished? To form a right judgment here, we should examine the design and not the execution: the latter is imperfect, is broke off. So, look at it from the Park, the Banqueting-house

Whitehall is too big for what stands near it. But hath it that appearance in the original plan of Inigo Jones for the magnificent palace once designed to be erected? Something of this nature may justly be pleaded in favour of Thucydides, and teaches us not to judge too hastily of a whole, when we cannot survey all the parts, because they never were finished. Moved by decorum, I would gladly justify my author, but I by no means pretend to decide the point.

BOOK II.—The second book opens with the first act of hostility. The Thebans march by night, and enter by surprise the city of Platæa. This city and petty state, though just within Bœotia, was not comprised in the union, of which all the other cities of Bœotia were constituents, with Thebes at their head; but had ever been firmly attached, even in the worst of times, to the common liberty of Greece, and was under the protection of, and in fast alliance with Athens. This surprise of Platæa our author describes in all its turns, till its enemies are driven out or slaughtered, and a place is secured for the Athenians.

A rupture hath now been made, and the war is going to be general. Thucydides sounds the charge in all the disposition and spirit of Homer. He catalogues the allies on both sides. He awakens our expectation; and fast engages our attention. All mankind are concerned in the important point now going to be decided. Endeavours are made to disclose futurity. Heaven itself is interested in the dispute. The earth totters, and nature seems to labour with the great event. This is his solemn and sublime manner of setting out. Thus he magnifies a war between two, as Rapin styles them petty states; and thus artfully he supports a little subject by treating it in a great and noble method.

Writers who have been long contemplating the vast gigantic size of the Roman empire, if they cast their eyes on the state of Athens even at the present juncture, are apt to form a low idea of it. Athens, it is true, was at this time in the highest meridian of her power. Yet, why ever to be pitching upon the most disadvantageous and incongruous parallels? His subject was certainly the greatest that to his day had occurred in the world: and ought Thucydides to be degraded, or even lessened at all, because he was not born in the same age with Livy? As much amusement at least accompanies and as much instruction flows from reading carefully the history of Athens, as from that of Rome. Wonder may be more raised by the latter, and the wonder may end in detestation of a people who became enormously great by the miseries and destruction of their fellow-creatures. The Romans were but brute-like men; they were not tolerably humanized till they had conquered Greece. Greece reconquered them, and

established a better, more lasting triumph over mind, than the others over body.

Græcia capta ferum victorem cepit.—Hor.

Who then best deserves the applause of the heart; the citizens of Athens, or the citizens of Rome? I am not at all in doubt, how men of a calm and considerate spirit will decide the question. Or, let such as judge only by numbers, consider a little more sedately, whether Athens at this time was that diminutive and petty state, which could be magnified and ennobled only by artifice. The first army, that invaded her territories in this war, consisted (according to Plutarch) of sixty thousand men. This is an object big enough to fill the eye. The state of her revenue, when the value of money is adjusted, will turn out by no means trifling. They were possessed, at the breaking out of the war, of three hundred triremes fit for sea. Two hundred and fifty of them were at one time in commission, in the fourth year of the war; consequently, at two hundred men a ship, the number of seamen employed must have been fifty thousand. If the reader be not yet convinced, that Athens was not a petty state, nothing can get the better of his prejudice. It would be pity, any one should go down to Thucydides with such low prepossessions against his subject.

The confederate army of Peloponnesians is now assembled, and ready to march into Attica, under the command of Archidamus. Like an able and cautious general he harangues his troops, "encourages them with a sight of their own numbers, but guards them from catching at that sight a contempt of their foes. The strict observation of discipline is always necessary to armies, be they ever so large. No enemy ought ever to be despised, much less Athenians. Though an enemy, he speaks in high commendation of the latter, and establishes the dignity of their characters. He ends with an exhortation to his troops, to observe rules, conform to discipline, and bravely to execute orders; and, Spartan-like, concludes with an encomium on the beauty and strength of strict military obedience."

He then sends a messenger to Athens, to try if a war were yet to be avoided. The Athenians are as determined as ever to make no submissions. The messenger is conducted out of their territories, and parts from his escort with a pathetic prediction of the miseries in which all Greece is going to be involved. Attica soon after is invaded. The mischief done by the invaders is described; and the sense at Athens of their sufferings and distresses represented at large. The reader, on this occasion, will be let into the form and constitution of the Athenian polity. He will see, how they began to be moulded into one community by the prudence of Theseus, one of their earliest kings. Other historians expatiate on the method, by which, from being under a regal, they had varied gradually into a purely republican form. I shall only mention an observation,* that, contrary to most other nations, they had abolished the regal government, not from distaste but reverence to kings. Codrus, the last of their kings, had devoted himself for his country, and was so worthy a man, that they resolved no mortal should afterwards wear that title amongst them. They declared Jupiter king of Athens, about the same time that the Jews rebelled against theocracy, and would have a man to reign over them. Archons for life succeeded; whose term was afterwards abridged to ten years; then, to a single year. All general histories point out the variations, till they came to the popular form which now prevailed.

The enemy, after heavy depredations, at length evacuated Attica; and the Athenians take the field to retaliate upon them. Their squadron had been all the time at sea, cruising upon and infesting the coasts of Peloponnesus. But, in the winter, we are

* Tourreil's Preface Historique.

called to Athens to see the public funeral of those who were killed in the first campaign. Here, the first time it occurs, our author describes this solemnity, and Pericles makes the funeral oration.

I shall make no reflections on this celebrated performance. Should the reader not think it deserving of its high reputation, I fear the translator will be sadly to blame. It is hard to give such noble ideas their proper energy, and such refined ones their due exactness. The great orators of Athens were always glad to display their abilities on the same occasion. Plato hath entered the lists with a high spirit of emulation, and with a high degree of success: and a great master * this way hath lately made him English. If Thucydides suffers by a comparison, which now the unlearned but judicious reader is empowered to make, the latter must be entreated to observe, that the eloquence of Plato was beyond dispute more smooth and fluent, more accomplished in all that is beautiful and sweet, than the eloquence of Thucydides, but an adjudged inferiority in any other respect must be laid at the door of his translator.

After such an exhilarating and enlivening piece, for such it must have been to all who heard it, and must have determined every Athenian to suffer any thing with intrepidity and patience in the cause of his country, a very mournful scene immediately succeeds, which lays them under such a heavy load of affliction and distress, as no arguments, no philosophy, can alleviate. The plague breaks out at Athens; and the reader must be ready to feel very sharp emotions in behalf of his fellow-creatures, and in behalf of morality and virtue too. Amidst their accumulated distresses, Pericles is the only support of the community; and, like the greatest benefactors to ungrateful men, is cursed for being their support, and reproached for being steadily wise and in the right. At last he convenges them, and addresses them with such an air of ingenuity, such spirit, and conscious dignity, and firm reliance on a good cause, as only two orators that I know of have ever equalled on parallel occasions. Those I mean are Demosthenes and St Paul. All the world of letters and good taste are well acquainted with the oration of the former against Æschines about the crown; and every class of readers is surely well versed in the Second Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians. I can but hint these resemblances, since now I must attend on Pericles, who soothes or thunders his countrymen out of all their discontent and malice, and sends them home convinced and ashamed. But domestic distress soon effaceth any other impressions; their passions are again inflamed by inwardly corroding anguish; and Pericles after all must be fined, and turned out of his employments. Yet people are not always mad; good-sense and conviction return upon them; and he is begged, because most worthy, again to accept the sole administration. He enjoys it but a little time, before he is carried off by the plague. Athens then lost her ablest, honestest statesman. He was able to have sat at the helm of government, to have steered the republic safe through every storm, and to have insured her not bare security but open triumph. His successors were very alert at catching hold of that helm; but none of them could hold it long; and the vessel, through their mutual quarrels, must needs run aground or foundered at last.

But the next remarkable passage in the history, is the march of the Peloponnesians to invest Platæa, and the solemn parley held at their approach. Archidamus is at the head of this ungenerous enterprise. The malice of the Thebans must be gratified, since the alliance of Bœotia in this war is of mighty consequence, and to be purchased at any rate. Archidamus indeed struggles hard for the Platæans; he would fain spare them, could he persuade them to a neutrality. But the Platæans have too much honour and

* Mr West.

gratitude to be neutral, when Athens, their faithful guardian and ally, is principally struck at. They remonstrate in vain from the topics of honour, justice, gratitude, the glory and sanction of the great progenitors on either side. The siege is formed, and strenuously plied, though without success. Our author always shines in exact description; no method of annoyance or defence is omitted. It is at length turned into a blockade; and a sufficient body of troops left behind to carry it on, when the main army marcheth off.

The war grows warm in more remote quarters; in Thrace; and in Acarnania. An Athenian squadron, stationed at Naupactus in the bay of Crisea, awed all the motions of the Corinthians and allies on their own coasts; and it was determined, to clear away this annoyance. Accordingly they launch out against it with more than double the number of vessels. The Athenians, at one exertion of skill, drive them all on a heap, defeat them, and make prizes of twelve. The Lacedæmonians, excellent land men, but very awkward seamen, think this an unaccountable event. They send down their most active commanders to refit and reinforce the fleet, and to try their fortune again at sea. Much artifice is employed on both sides. The short harangues of the admirals let us into all the views and designs of either party. Phormio at length is snared; the enemy blunders; then Phormio extricates himself, and gives them a second defeat. The reader sees every tack, and the motion of every vessel.

Disconcerted here, they form a bold project indeed to surprise the Piræus by night, and to finish the war in a moment. The project is described, and the probability of success established. But the very grandeur of the attempt deters the undertakers. Athens indeed is alarmed, and thrown into great consternation; but the project totally miscarries, and the Piræus is better secured for the future.

All Thrace is now arming under Sitalces against Perdiccas king of Macedonia. A vast army of Barbarians is assembled, marches over a great length of country, strikes a general panic, effectuates no real service, and soon disperses or moulders away. Such bulky unwieldy armies make an awkward figure, compared with the regularity, exact discipline, and personal bravery, of the diminutive armies of Greece.

Thucydides gives us once more a sight of Phormio and his gallant squadron; and then closeth the book, and the history of the third year of the war. "Never history," says Rapin, "comprised so much matter in so little room, nor so much action in so few words. If any thing can be found fault with, it is that the exploits are too closely crowded with one another, so that the coherence seems somewhat intricate and confused, and the multiplying of objects tends only to dissipate the attention of the reader." An historian however is to take his incidents in their natural order, as they subsist in fact. He is not so much to dispose, as to describe them. If he does the latter pertinently, accurately, and with due attention to their importance, he hath acquitted himself of his duty. The poet or writer of fiction must pick out and heighten his incidents, with a view to fill up properly, and give to every distinct object its needful splendour: he is to exert his choice, and by exerting it judiciously to gain applause. The historian is not to pick, but to make the best use of his materials. He may give them indeed all possible lustre; but, if they crowd too thick upon one another, the reader may be embarrassed with the number, yet nobody can be justly blamed.

Book III. The Third Book is no less full of matter than the preceding. The incidents crowd fast upon one another, and politics and oratory are in full employ. The revolt of Lesbos is the first occurrence of importance. The people of that isle had been long in the Athenian league: but the members of this league were dependents

rather than confederates. Thucydides always employs the same Greek word (*συνεταίροι*) for the members of either league: the idea it gives is that of companions in war but there is great difference between such as accompany, because they choose it; and such as accompany, because they are summoned and cannot help it. The former was in general the case of those who sided with Sparta; the latter, of those who sided with Athens. The least thought of compulsion is grating to any state, which thinks it ought, and is able to be quite independent. This was the case with the Lesbians, a people considerable in many respects, but especially for their naval strength. It is well worth the while of the Lacedemonians to gain such confederates; it must be a sad blow to the Athenians to lose such dependents. The fact was, all the cities of Lesbos, except Methymne, declare a revolt. The Athenians lose no time, but are at once with a powerful squadron before Mitylene, and block it up. The Mitylenians had sent ambassadors to beg immediate aid from the Lacedemonians. They had an audience from them and the rest of their league at Olympia, so soon as the games were ended. The speech they make on this occasion is very artful, very insinuating, and nicely adapted to carry their point.

“ They open the nature of a revolt, and the cases in which it merits protection and succour from others. They have been ill used by the Athenians; have been made their tools in enslaving their compatriots of Greece; have been long caressed indeed, but are well assured what their own fate would soon have been. Every state hath a natural right to take preventive measures against the loss of their liberty, and to stand on their defence. They had revolted sooner, would the Lacedemonians have countenanced the measure: they had declared it on the first invitation of the Boeotians. It was a noble revolt; it had disengaged them from a combination to enslave the rest of Greece; it had associated them in the cause of honour and liberty. It had been made indeed with too much precipitation; but this should make others more zealous and active in their protection, who would reap a great accession of strength by it; an accession of maritime strength; whilst the Athenians would be weakened in point of shipping, and in point of revenue. It would be a signal of revolt to others, and assurance to them that they might do it safely. It would reflect abundant honour on the Lacedemonians to succour the distressed, to save men whose preservation would give them glory and strength, and prove them those hearty friends to liberty, which all Greece with united praises acknowledged them to be.”

Interest without rhetoric was strong enough to insure their success. But the latter helped to gain them a prompt reception from the Lacedemonians, who resolve on sending them a succour, and making diversions on the Athenians, in order to oblige them to raise the siege of Mitylene.

The blockade of Platæa by the Peloponnesians still continuing, our author relates the bold project, and bold execution of the project, of a party of Platæans, in making their escape over all the works of the besiegers. It is a most circumstantial and a most clear and intelligible relation.

Mitylene is now forced to surrender at discretion. The principal agents in the revolt are sent prisoners to Athens, where the people vote that “ not they only but all the Mitylenians in general be put to death; and an order is immediately despatched to their commander at Mitylene to execute his part of the sentence. This bloody decree was carried by Cleon, a furious demagogue. It was he who worked up the people of Athens to such a pitch of inhumanity; which, however, instantly subsided. They are struck

with horror at their own resolution, and will have it again debated. We shall hear the two speakers on each side of the question, Cleon and Diodotus.

"Cleon sets out with all the fury and fire of a man who hath a bad heart. He hath abjured humanity to show himself a most zealous patriot. Eloquent he is acknowledged to have been, and so appears in his invectives against his own masters and his own tools, the people, for their foolish commiseration, for their being the eternal dupes of orators, of subtle and venal speakers. For his own part, he loves his country; and hates her enemies. Guilt shall never find an advocate in him; he calls out for vengeance on the Mityleneans; none but their pensioners, none but men who are bribed and corrupted can offer a plea in their behalf. He bids his audience throw away all foolish pity, all womanish forbearance; to fix their attention on the crimes of the guilty, and not on the horrors of their punishment: and give this proof to their dependents, that death shall inevitably be the portion of all revolvers, that their arms may be henceforth employed in opposing their public enemies, and not in chastising their own subjects."

Diodotus replies in a speech that shows him a real patriot, and who thought good manners, a calm considerate temper, and a regard to humanity, to be very consistent with the true patriot spirit. "He there defends the re-committing of their former resolution, since repeated consultations cannot be prejudicial to the public welfare. It is a base and odious method, to lavish the charge of ignorance and venality on men who differ in sentiment; it robs the public of its ablest counsellors and sincerest friends. Strict justice, in the present instance, may be with Cleon; but the future and lasting welfare of their country is the object now apt to be kept in view. The punishment of death hath never effectually awed the tempers of mankind. To make men desperate is very impolitic; to extirpate their dependents is lopping off their own limbs, and ruining their own revenue. Men should be retained in their duty by mild discretionary precautions; severe and sanguinary proceedings never answer the purpose. And what cruelty, to doom a whole people to destruction! to involve the innocent with the guilty! to murder even such as had been their friends and benefactors! He advises them not to give too large a scope to mercy, but to punish the guilty, and the guilty alone. This will sufficiently intimidate others; will secure their interest in Lesbos better for the future; and convince the world how soundly Athenians can deliberate upon all their concerns."

Diodotus carries his point. The Athenians, cruel only in fits of choler, but habitually humane, repeal the bloody sentence; and despatch a vessel with all haste to stop execution, which arrives at Mitylene but just time enough to prevent the massacre.

The next event of importance contrasts the Lacedemonian character with that of the Athenians. The author takes no pains to point it out; but it lies too ready and obvious to pass unobserved.—Platea, after a tedious blockade, is obliged by famine to surrender. They surrender however to the Lacedemonians, on condition of being brought to a judicial trial, and only if found guilty of unjust behaviour, to be put to death. Some delegates arrive from Sparta to preside in this court of mere inquisition, since the whole process is confined to a single question—"Whether they had done any positive service to the Lacedemonians and allies"—that is, to their declared and determined enemies—"in the present war?" The question plainly manifested a deliberate resolution to put them all to death. And all the favour they obtain is, to be suffered to make a kind of dying speech before men who were styled indeed judges, but in fact were butchers. It was a case of great commiseration, and the speaker lays it open with all that natural eloquence which flows from an inward and keen sensibility. If men were not deaf to per-

uasion, it must have persuaded. The cause was most alarming, and a more pathetic plea hath never been exhibited.

“ They insist that on a fair and explicit condition they had surrendered to the Lacedæmonians, whereas now they were prejudged and precondemned to gratify their unrelenting foes the Thebans. The insidious question left them no plea at all. They could not answer it, and must not be silent. Since life is at stake, something must be said even by men who despair of persuading. Their quarrel with the Thebans had been just and honourable; quarrel with the Lacedæmonians they never had any. Nay, merely at the desire of the latter, had they cultivated Athenian friendship, that unpardonable crime for which they were now doomed to destruction. They expatiated with truth and energy on the great services they had done to the liberty of Greece. All Greece was bound in honour, in gratitude, in deference to positive and solemn oaths, to preserve the Platæans. Ought every tie to be rent asunder, generosity to be quite expunged, and all benevolence thrown aside, to serve a private turn? Ought Platæans to be thus basely reduced, as they really had been, either to be starved or to be butchered? The Lacedæmonians should entreat the Thebans for them, should beg them to save the lives of friends and benefactors; at least, should replace them within their walls, and leave them to the fate of war. They apply to their generosity, to their humanity; to strive to give them some emotions of pity; they represent the liahleness of mankind to calamity; how brutal it is to be deliberately hard-hearted; how sinful it is to be resolutely ungrateful! They call upon heaven and earth to interpose in their behalf; they run over every pathetic and persuasive topic; till they can add no more, and yet dare not end; and again entreat the Lacedæmonians to save those worthy patriots to whom all Greece is indebted for her liberty and independence.”

The Thebans, who were afraid the Lacedæmonians had a higher sense of honour and gratitude than they really had, demand also to be heard.

In the speech they made on this occasion, “ they first accuse the Platæans of slander and invective. They endeavour to palliate the reproach on themselves for deserting the cause of liberty and joining the arms of Persia. The Platæans had been active ever since to betray it to the Athenians; that wicked scheme, which with all their power the Thebans had ever opposed. By such iniquitous conduct the Platæans had extinguished their former glory, and effaced all their former merits. Nobody was bound to redress or pity them, but their friends the Athenians. Their temper had been always bad; always bent on violence and mischief; always addicted to tyranny in Greece, provided Athenians were the tyrants. They then endeavour to throw an anti-pathetic into their own representations. They paint the death of their countrymen slain at the surprise of Platæa in a mournful light, as put to death contrary to every law, and murdered in the very act of stretching out their hands and pleading a promise of life. The lives therefore of such butchers are forfeited to justice; and they insist the forfeit shall be taken: the Lacedæmonians are bound in honour to take it. They beg them therefore to be deaf to vain complaints and entreaties, to revenge the injured, and to punish the guilty; to regard what bad men have done, and not what they have said; to defy eloquence, and heed only simple unsophisticated truth; by which alone men, who preside in judgment, can satisfy their conscience and their duty.”

An alliance with Thebes is necessary in this war to the Lacedæmonians, and they purchase it at a mighty price indeed. The wretched Platæans, by all mankind abandoned, are butchered one after another, to the number of two hundred; their wives are sold for slaves; their city is rooted up from its foundation.

Thucydides soon after describes the sedition of Corcyra, the horrors of which are scarcely to be paralleled in story. He paints all the dreadful consequences of faction in a community. And what pity it is, that a warm, generous and innate love of liberty, when carried to excess, should be the source of so much misery to reasonable creatures! Our author, contrary to his custom, runs out here into many grave and judicious reflections, in the interest of no party, a champion for no particular form, but as a friend to man, and a friend to virtue. It is the lust of power, that throws embroilments and confusions into all communities. In governments strictly republican, the ambitious are eager to obtain more than an equal share. In an oligarchical form, the few in power want ever to retain and often to enlarge their share; and the cry of liberty is shouted loudest by those who want most to overthrow it. But yet; was the matter ever mended, or the miseries of mankind prevented, by setting up a single tyrant? Communities have suffered more, for the caprice, for the support of the nominal glory of such a head, than they have done by a number of popular seditions. The reader will certainly all along reflect on the fine model of government established in his own country; and own that a community may be governed and yet be happy, that the power of the one and of the few and of the many may be tempered into an apt and lasting consistence; and, as it hath been for ages in a train of improvement, keep it but unhurt by intestine faction, may last to the dissolution of this great globe itself.

After this tragical business of Corcyra, Thucydides enters upon the affairs of Sicily. The seeds of war are sowing in that island, which will afterwards grow into a mighty harvest.—He relates other incidents, till he comes to a remarkable scene of war in Ætolia, where Demosthenes the Athenian commander is totally defeated.—He describes the purification of the isle of Delos by the Athenians; and hath found the art to make it a cheerful and entertaining piece, for the relief of the reader, after he hath been engaged in so many scenes of horror and destruction, and is soon going to be engaged in more.—The battles of Olpe and Idomene are sufficiently stored with slaughter, to glut any reader who delights in blood. The armies in this history have been often thought not to be sufficiently numerous. They made no havoc; they do not knock one another on the head fast enough to preserve attention. But these old Greeks were men, and not brutes. And it is pity, that the history of men should be so much a history of the destruction of the human species.

Book IV.—In the Fourth Book, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, principals in the war, are matched directly against one another. Demosthenes, a wise and brave commander, had seized and fortified Pylus in the territories of the latter, had placed such a garrison in it as annoyed the whole country, and in the end might wound the very vitals of that state. The Lacedæmonians slight it at first, as if their bare appearance would remedy all. But upon trial, their land armies and their squadrons are unable to dislodge the enemy. It is with the true martial spirit of an experienced and gallant commander, that Demosthenes harangues his small body of Athenians; when he draws them up on the beach of the sea, to beat off the ships of the enemy. Thucydides shines on these occasions; in him the addresses are always made, and pertinently made, to the soldiers who are present; they interest and animate, but never run into declamation and common-place.—The turns of war at Pylus are sudden and engage attention. They fight by land, and fight by sea; nay, what is more, land battles are fought from the water, and naval battles fought from off the shore. The eye will distinctly view these strange occurrences; they are painted strong; the groupes are not mere heaps of confusion, and the principal figures are

eminently distinguished. The body of Spartans intercepted in the isle of Sphacteria, who must either starve, or, what to Lacedæmonians is full as bad, must surrender their persons and their arms, is a point that exceedingly alarms that martial community. Things had long since gone against them; but now, their hereditary honour and military glory, on which, and which alone, they piqued themselves, are in danger of being miserably tarnished. Their proud spirits condescend to beg a truce, that they may send an embassy to Athens to solicit an accommodation.

It must have afforded a high degree of spiteful joy at Athens, to find the Lacedæmonians lengthening their monosyllables and petitioning for peace. It is curious to hear in what manner they solicit, when admitted to audience. They declare themselves sent, "in behalf of their countrymen, to propose an expedient very much for the honour of Athens, and which would extricate themselves from difficulties that now bore hard upon them. Athens never had so fine an opportunity of raising her credit, securing her acquisitions, and carrying her glory to the highest pitch. They should not be puffed up, but reflect on the strange vicissitude of human affairs. Who could expect, the Lacedæmonians should ever be sunk so low, as to sue for peace? Yet what was the lot of Sparta might possibly become, sometime or other, the lot of Athens. The latter should be moderate now, should accept of offered friendship, should cheerfully receive submission, made only to prevent desperation in great and gallant souls, and open a field for mutual benevolence. The rival states may now be reconciled; and only now, before things are brought to extremities, and disgrace hath rendered one party desperate. At this crisis, the Athenians may confer on Greece the blessing of a firm and lasting peace, and reap all the honour and advantage of it, since all the credit of it will be their own. Lacedæmonians may be obliged, but will not be compelled. At length they propose their expedient, not explicitly, but with a shrewd insinuation; that would the Athenians strike up a bargain with them, they might jointly lord it over Greece for the future, beyond control."

Had Pericles been now alive, we may easily guess how readily he would have laid hold on this opportunity to end a burthensome and distressful war, which on the side of Athens had at first been necessitated and merely defensive. But success had elevated Athens quite too high; and no real friend to the state had at present so much influence as Cleon, that loud and boisterous demagogue. Hence it comes, that such terms are insisted upon as the Lacedæmonians cannot in honour accept. The truce expires; and all the attention of Greece is fixed on the important scene of contention at Pylus.

The author here interposeth an account of what was now doing in Sicily, and then returns to Pylus. The Spartans in the isle seem as far off a surrender as ever. The people of Athens murmur at the slowness of their troops, and begin to think that after all they shall not carry the point. Cleon amuses them with lies, and exasperates them by slanders. In short, though quite undesigning it, he bullies himself into the command; and, at the head of a reinforcement, joins Demosthenes at Pylus. The author describes the event with so much state and dignity, that he raises it into another Thermopylæ. There three hundred Spartans stopped for a long time the whole numerous army of Xerxes, and perished in the service. About the same number of them struggle here as long as they can against the troops of Athens; but, to the disappointment of all Greece, they at last surrender prisoners of war, and are carried, nay, are carried by Cleon, in triumph to Athens. The territories of Corinth are invaded soon after by the Athenians under Nicias, the consequence of which is the battle of Solygia. We are then recalled to view the last acts of the tragical sedition at Corcyra, quite of a piece with, or rather in cruelty and horror transcending, the preceding.

In the eighth year of the war, the Athenians proceed with success. The conquest of the isle of Cythera by Nicias is another sad blow to the Lacedæmonians. They are quite dispirited; and dare no longer face in the field these active and lively, and now more so because successful enemies.

Our author repasseth to Sicily. The Athenians had been hovering with a squadron on that coast, on pretence of aiding the Egesteans, but in fact to excite a war and embroil the states of that island. Syracuse, the leading state, perceived all their schemes, and endeavoured to prevent them. They first obtain a suspension of arms amongst all the parties at war; and prevail on the Sicilians to hold a general congress at Gela, for the amicable adjustment of all their quarrels, and a perfect re-union against foreign enemies. Hermocrates, the plenipotentiary from Syracuse, opens the true interest of Sicily on this occasion. The warrior must now give place to the politician, who shows himself a master in the business.

"He is here," he tells them, "as representative of the greatest of the Sicilian states. As such, he cannot speak from pusillanimity or a sense of fear, though he declares himself averse to war. It is difficult to enlighten ignorance, and difficult to check ambition. But there is a prudence, which all ought to learn; a prudence, which points out the proper season for every pursuit. It was separate interest, that first kindled the flames of war in Sicily; but separate interest should always be hushed, when the general welfare is at stake. The Athenians have been busy amongst them, to inflame their mutual resentments, to note their indiscretions, and turn them to their own advantage; that, when the Sicilians have warred one another down, they may seize the whole island for themselves. The great passion of these Athenians is conquest; they regard no ties of consanguinity; they aim at acquiring vassals, no matter who. He blames them not; he can never blame men, who are desirous of command; but he must blame such as are ready and willing to put on their chains. The Athenians have no strength in Sicily, but in the divisions of its states. Let those states but once re-unite, and Athenians must get them gone; and may depart with a face of success as if they had united whom they really wanted to disunite, and had effectually re-settled peace, when their latent design was war."—He touches every topic in a succinct but masterly manner. He hath recourse often to figures; renders his addresses emphatical, by making his own community speak from his mouth. He applies the first person and the singular number with great energy and weight. He useth those figures in the same manner as Saint Paul does in the Epistle to the Romans. He presses harmony and cordial re-union amongst them in a manner best fitted to persuade. The whole speech, in a word, is a very interesting and persuasive piece of oratory.

The consequence is, a peace is settled in Sicily to general satisfaction; and the Athenian commanders are obliged to return to Athens with their squadrons, to be punished there for what they could not possibly prevent.

The war continues hot through the remainder of this book. The Athenians take their turn in being checked and vanquished. Their attempt on Megara is related large; and this piece of narration is by far the most intricate of the kind to be met with in Thucydides. The matter is quite too much crowded, when he endeavours to comprehend in a few terms the various incidents of this struggle for Megara, the fluctuation of events, the views and motives of the parties engaged. Brasidas at length secures the city, and quite disconcerts the main project of the Athenians.—The latter also had another great scheme in agitation for a total revolution in Bœotia. Arms and intrigues were at once to act, both without and within. The whole force of Athe-

takes the field on this occasion, under the command of Hippocrates. The famous battle of Delium ensues, before which the generals harangue their troops. Pagondas the Theban is an excellent speaker on this occasion. The Boeotians are not represented in this history, as that gross and stupid people, which was their character from the succeeding wits of Athens. The Athenian general begins also to harangue his troops, but is cut short by the attack of the enemy. The battle is finely described, and the dispute afterwards about the dead. The Athenians have received a dreadful blow, which will soon make them begin to accuse their own judgments, in refusing the accommodation lately offered from Sparta.

In other quarters also the balance of war begins to incline in favour of the enemy. Brasidas, that active and accomplished Spartan, had now completed a march, at the head of a small army, through Thessaly and Macedonia into Chalcidic Thrace. His bravery prevails much, but his conduct more. He disjoins Perdiccas king of Macedonia from the Athenian league. Whenever he fights, he conquers; and whenever he harangues, he effectually persuades. His speech to the Acanthians, is strong, pertinent, laconic. He says all that can be said in favour of his countrymen, in recommendation of the cause of liberty. There is that air of sincerity and good faith in it, which were constantly approved and verified by his personal deportment. The Athenians revolt to him as fast as he has opportunities to address them. The reader will follow him with pleasure through his many and great exploits, and acknowledge he wears his laurels deservedly, and with peculiar grace.

BOOK V. In Book the Fifth, Cleon appears again upon the stage to stop the rapid conquests of Brasidas. The former had been laughed into a general, and is now grown so conceited that he wants to enter the lists against that truly heroic Spartan. He accordingly arrives in Thrace, at the head of a squadron and a fine body of land forces. He retakes a town or two; is confident he shall soon recover the important city of Amphipolis; and though contemned by his own soldiers, he endeavours to brave the enemy. Brasidas having harangued his men with his usual spirit, throws open the gates, sallies out of Amphipolis and routs him in an instant. Cleon falls a victim to his own cowardice, and Brasidas also drops a victim to his own valour. The latter lives long enough to know his own side had conquered, and then expires, admired by all that knew him, and most highly regretted by the allies of his country.

Their riddance from Cleon diminished the loss of Athens in this defeat, and the Lacedæmonians had dearly purchased the victory with the loss of their hero. As the principal states were now pretty nearly balanced, and sadly tired of the war, a truce is concluded for a year, and a peace soon after settled by the management chiefly of Nicias. Thucydides hath given us the forms of negotiating and drawing up treaties. They are curious morsels of antiquity, and the reader will see with admiration, how solemn, how concise, and yet how guarded, they are. The peace turns out to be merely nominal. The Corinthians, who cannot relish it at all, set their invention to work in order to embroil Greece afresh, and to rekindle a general war. Several wars break out, in which the Athenians and Lacedæmonians are concerned as auxiliaries. And another state in Greece, which hitherto had been neutral and saving its strength entire, endeavours now to seize the primary of Greece for itself. We shall be made privy to all her negotiations for carrying on the plan, and see it all blasted by one battle at Mantinea. This state was the republic of Argos in Peloponnesus, which had been in long alliance with, but in no dependence at all upon, Athens, and had been a long time also at peace with Sparta, by means of truces of thirty years. Young

Alcibiades doth all he can to promote the quarrel, till at length the troops of Sparta and Argos come to an engagement near the city of Mantinea. Thucydides introduceth the battle with all the spirit and precision of Homer. The auxiliaries are marshalled and animated by such exhortations, as are best suited to the peculiar circumstances of each. The Spartans are exhibited at last in all their glory. Trained up for a camp and the day of battle, we shall view them in their discipline and actual exertion of their personal bravery. They were excellent combatants indeed; and the reader will judge whether Thucydides did not love good soldiers, and take a pleasure in doing them justice. It was the greatest battle, which for many years had been fought in Greece. The Spartans, on this occasion, wiped off all the imputations that had lately been thrown on their bravery, because they had not been always successful: and the aspiring state of Argos is compelled to acquiesce in her usual rank, and still leave the contention of supremacy to the leading states of Athens and Sparta.

This book affords but one incident more, of consequence enough to be particularly distinguished; and that is the conquest of the isle of Melos by the Athenians, which fell out in the sixteenth year of the war. When the Athenians were landed and encamped on that island, they summon the Melians to a conference, of which Thucydides hath drawn out the particulars. It is really an uncommon one, and had sadly puzzled the critics, whether they should praise or condemn it. But is there any thing more unnatural in reciting what was said at it, than in holding a conference? It is my business only to look at the management of it, and not draw a veil over the Athenian politics, as they are avowed on this occasion, since my author was too impartial to do it. Nothing could tempt him to make palliating representations, or to suppress the truth.

"The Athenians, on this occasion, avow without a blush that principle on which conquerors and tyrants have always acted, and yet have been ashamed to own: they are ever hunting for colourings and pretexs, and would fain give to greedy power a little of the air of equity: but here, without the least shame or remorse, the Athenians assert their right to enslave another community, because it suits their own interest, and because they have power to do it. This is the principle from which they argue; and, how scandalous soever it be, they argue strongly from it. They represent the politics of their own state, of the Lacedemonian state, nay of all mankind, as encroaching, oppressive, rapacious, and totally estranged from humanity, good faith, and the least tincture of morality. The whole conference yields perhaps a just representation of human nature in the gross; but then, the representation is distasteful to a mind that is cool and disengaged. Such a mind must interest itself on the side of the Melians and be sorry that the Athenians have not more equity and honour to qualify their power; or, that the Melians, with the regard they show to honour and justice, should not have had more power, or been able to interest at least one ally in defence of their liberties and rights. In short, through the whole course of this history, the Athenians never made so scandalous a figure as on this occasion."

Book VI. In the Sixth Book, a spacious theatre is opened for a renewal of the war. The scene is going to shift from Greece to Sicily. The Athenians, who have so bravely resisted all their enemies in Greece, are now going to do for those enemies what they could not do themselves. No patriot, no statesman, no orator, is able to dissuade them from lavishing their strength on the projects of sanguine ambition and foreign conquests. Their enemies, in the mean time, are at leisure to note their indiscretions, and improve them all to their own advantage, till the great name of Athens is quite

eclipsed, and an end is put to that empire of the sea, which she had maintained for seventy years with great lustre and reputation.

The Sicilian war, which some critics* are inclined to think hath no connection with the subject of Thucydides and to be mere digression, whatever it may appear at first, the reader will at length be satisfied, was an essential part of the Peloponnesian war, and hastened its decision. But, supposing it remote from the principal subject, it must however be acknowledged, that it is the history of a war nobly related, well connected very closely followed, and full of incidents to engage attention, to alarm and interest the passions. Thucydides in the course of it, which takes up the two following books, will display the excellencies of the poet and the painter as well as of the historian. Let his merit be regulated from this portion of his work, it is presumed that, without a negative, he will be allowed the master of history.

He begins with describing the theatre, on which two mighty *States* are going to enter the lists.—The geography and antiquities of Sicily could not in their nature be very entertaining, and therefore they are drawn up in the concisest manner.—The soaring enterprising genius of Alcibiades hath formed a superb plan for the aggrandizement of himself and his country. Alcibiades could plan with all the magnificence and wild ambition of an Alexander; but a citizen of Athens could not have the means of executing in so imperial a manner as the monarch of Macedonia and captain-general of Greece. He was able soon to convince the younger and more numerous part of the Athenian community, that the enterprise was most inviting, and carried with it such a probability of success as overbalanced all expense and hazard. It was long the subject of general conversation; it gradually inflamed the public ardour; and at length engrossed all their hopes and wishes. In a word, the expedition to Sicily is formally proposed and decreed in the assembly of the people. A second assembly is convened on ways and means. On this occasion a grand debate ensued, the managers of which are Nicias and Alcibiades.

Nicias declares himself “totally averse to the expedition; but doth it with that diffidence, which was a principal foible in his character. The honour conferred upon himself in his nomination to the command, shall not suppress his real sentiments. He is neither fond, nor prodigal, of his life; but he loves his country, and would advise them to give up the expedition.—He next runs over the political topics, and shows it to be in every light an undesirable and ill-judged project. And then, without naming him, strikes at Alcibiades; proves him not qualified in any respect for so important a command; he reflects with some severity on his life and behaviour; and though owning himself afraid he shall be out-voted, yet he would fain have the question put again, whether the expedition shall proceed.”

Beside all the natural vivacity and fire of his temper, Alcibiades was now provoked by the personalities that Nicias had thrown out against him. He had been a constant opposer of the latter, who was beloved at Athens for his amiable qualities. For, though Nicias had not spirit enough to lead the people; yet he had influence enough oftentimes to check and restrain the aspiring busy Alcibiades. The reply he makes on this occasion strongly marks the character and complexion of Alcibiades; and, delivered with that life and grace, and pretty lisp, for which he was remarkable, must have engaged all the attention of his hearers, and drawn their approbation perhaps in spite of their judgment.

“Censured and provoked by Nicias, he begins with a vindication of himself. He

*See Rapin's Comparison of Thucydides and Livy.

maintains his right to the command. He hints at the splendour of his birth, his public spirit, the generosity of his heart. He recites, with a haughty and exulting air, his victories at the Olympic games, his magnificence at home, and his capacity for political intrigue already and successfully exerted. He then justifies the wisdom of the decree for the Sicilian expedition. He shows all the political topics in a different light from Nicias. He insinuates the advice of the latter to proceed from indolence and a desire to sow dissensions amongst them. He exhorts to union, and to the observation of order. So Athens rose; so Athens may yet be much higher exalted. The fire of youth, the temper of the middle-aged, and the experience of the old, should ever duly accord and act together. Sloth ruins a community; practice enables it to go through every conflict, and to triumph over all opposition."

Such an address could not but effect, such arguments could not but be persuasive with the people of Athens; the expeditions must go forwards. But Nicias makes a second effort, if possible to divert them from it.

He begins with "a prayer for its success; and a desire, that the preparations may be adequate to the ends proposed. He states the nature, the power and strength, of the people they are going to invade. He then, in general terms, gives in a bulky roll of necessary articles for those who invade them. He hopes to frighten and deter his audience by the vast expense, which he shows must necessarily be incurred on this occasion. The Athenians must provide every thing themselves, and trust nothing to the care and fidelity of Sicilian allies. The public welfare, and the safety of all who are to be employed in this expedition, demand all manner of previous foresight and care."

This speech had a different effect to what Nicias designed. Instead of discouraging, it animated his countrymen more than ever for execution. Accordingly a decree was soon passed, investing himself and his colleagues, who were Alcibiades and Lamachus, with full power to provide every thing needful for the service.

All hands now were soon at work. The quotas from the dependents were demanded; the fleet was equipped and manned; the levies went on briskly, since all men came into the service with alacrity; and every thing was soon ready for the expedition.

At this juncture, some drunken frolics, in which Alcibiades was engaged, threw Athens into consternation. They were soon construed by his enemies into a plot to bring about a revolution in the government. Informers came in, and he was directly accused of being a party. He avowed his innocence, insisted on an immediate trial, which he was sure would end in his justification. The plot, which in fact was a plot against Alcibiades, was not yet ripe enough to ruin him; and therefore, by a strange preposterous stroke of cunning, he is ordered to proceed in the expedition, and take his trial at his return.

Our author next describes the departure of the grand armament in all its solemnity, and with all the medley of hopes and fears shown by the whole people of Athens on this occasion. He lays open to our view the very hearts of the spectators. The prime flower of their strength, nay, Athens itself, is now sailing out of the Piræus, never again to return. They make the best of their way to Corcyra, where they are left for a time, that we may be made privy to the consultations and defensive measures of Sicily. The scene is now removed to Syracuse, the most powerful state in that island, inhabited by Grecians, and if indeed inferior, yet second at this time to no other state in Greece but Athens alone. It had frequently been harassed by seditions, had often been plagued with tyrants, but was at present under a democratic constitution.

Advice had been received there of the intended invasion. The people are convened

about it. Harangues are made; and the temper of mankind, when party is fermenting, justly exemplified. Some are incredulous; others magisterially pronounce it all a falsehood. At length Hermocrates riseth up, and gives them his own sense of the affair. He assures them, "his country is eminently endangered, and neither incredulity nor ridicule shall awe him into silence. To his certain knowledge, the Athenians are already at sea, fully bent on the conquest of Sicily. The Syracusans ought to believe it, and to prepare for their defence. Fear will unite all Sicily against the invaders. Athens will only reap disgrace, but Syracuse abundant glory on this occasion. Large armaments are seldom successful; they moulder away for want of supplies or are ruined for want of conduct. They should therefore prepare for gallant resistance, by getting every thing in readiness at home, and strengthening themselves by foreign alliances. They should do more; they should at once put out to sea, and dispute their very passage with the enemy. A defeat, or even delay thus given them might oblige them to give up the project. He supports his advice by many strong and judicious arguments; and ends with warm exhortations to his countrymen to be lively and active, by no means to despise the enemy except in action, but vigorously and with all their foresight to prepare for resistance, since their enemies are undoubtedly at sea and only not arrived on their coasts."

Such advice was now given to the people of Syracuse by Hermocrates. That community, it is evident, was full of cabal and faction, since this worthy patriot was regarded as a party-tool and a public incendiary. Athenagoras, the blustering demagogue who replies, treats him in this light. His virulence shows that he regarded Hermocrates, as one who wanted by any means whatever to force himself into employment. He seems more alarmed for the lucrative posts of the state than for the welfare of his country. He throws out a deal of good sense, but in a very impertinent and scurrilous manner. Such are the persons, who study popularity more than duty, and sacrifice all their talents to ambition or private lucre.

He affirms, that "none but cowards and traitors wish the Athenians might not invade them, and so infallibly meet their destruction: but the whole account is a glaring falsehood, the glory of a factious cabal. He appeals to his audience whether it carries the least probability with it. Athenians invade them! The Athenians esteem themselves happy they are not invaded by the Syracusans. Yet, supposing them so mad, nothing but their own disgrace and ruin can be the consequence. But it is all a fiction; a scheme to dishearten the friends of the people, and seize the government of the state. Some men have ever been, and ever will be, dabbling in such vile machinations. But let them not hope to escape detection. The intention is plain already, and ought to be punished like open treason. He then exhorts the people or the many to support their friends, and entirely to disarm the malice of their domestic foes; and inveighs severely against the few, or the party whom he supposeth to be bent on the overthrow of the democracy at Syracuse."

This speech of Athenagoras was so full of ill-timed choler and party animosity, that, had the debate proceeded, dissensions might have run very high at a season when unanimity was so needful in all the members of that community. A general of great eminence and weight thinks it high time to interpose; who, in a short speech reprimands Athenagoras, recalls the general attention to their own preservation from the imminent danger, and adjourns the assembly.

The grand fleet of Athens is now putting to sea from Corcyra. The historian takes a review of the whole, and gives a short account of its numbers and strength. They

arrive on the coast of Italy, where they are refused a reception. Every thing yields them a discouraging and gloomy aspect. They soon find they had been grossly deluded by their Sicilian friends, who instigated them chiefly to the expedition. The trick, which the Egestians had put on their ambassadors, is particularly recited. The commanders at a council of war, differ highly in opinion, and at last come to no sound resolution. They hover about the coast of Sicily, and parade in sight of Syracuse. Alcibiades endeavours to persuade the Cataneans to join with and receive them, but a mere accident accomplishes what his eloquence could not. The command of Alcibiades came here to an end. One of the state-vessels arrives, and summons him to Athens, to take his trial for the late frolics and irregularities committed there. That city, ever since the departure of the fleet, had been filled with confusion and horror. A plot there was, or rather a plot it was determined there must be, to set up a tyrant, that most odious sound to Attic ears. Recollection of the most dismal things they had heard about the tyranny of the Pisistratidæ increased their fears, and drove them into furious and desperate proceedings. Thucydides here digresseth to settle some facts relating to that set of tyrants, and their demolition; particularly the affair of Harmodius and Aristogiton, one of the most famous incidents in the annals of Athens. He differs indeed from most other writers, and the moderns have not thought proper to rest the point upon his authority, great as it is; though no man ever traced out facts, or made his inquiries, with more sedateness and impartiality.

But to return to Alcibiades; he was obliged to quit the command, and he seemed quietly to submit to the orders of the state. But, determined not to face his countrymen in their present mood nor to hazard a trial, he gave them who were sent for him the slip, and sheltered himself in Peloponnesus. He became instantly a most violent and dangerous enemy to his country. He is gone to pave the way for the ruin of Athens; of Athens, which he loved better than any thing except the parade of his own personal importance, and the gratification of private caprice.

Nicias and Lamachus, who now remained in the command of the fleet, by help of a stratagem, land at Syracuse without opposition, and seize a strong post for their encampment. The Syracusans determine on a battle to dislodge them. Both sides form in order. Nicias encourages his men by a short, but spirited and forcible harangue. Thucydides paints the battle with the exactness, perspicuity, and ardour, of Homer. The Athenians had the better; yet not so decisively, as to think proper to continue in their post, since they re-embark, and sail back to Catana.

The winter, it is true, was approaching, which both sides spend in negotiations for the acquisition of allies. That at Camarina, where ambassadors from both the warring parties are at the same time admitted to an audience, is particularly recited.—Hermocrates, in behalf of Syracuse, makes the first address. "It is masterly, like all that Hermocrates performs. It is designed to convince the Camarineans, how insidious and how vile the schemes of the Athenians had ever been, and still continue to be. He arraigns all their politics and their conduct since the Persian invasion; and gives that artful turn to his remarks, which might well deter others from entering into any connexion or alliance with them. His strokes are severe and cutting. He makes use of the figures, which give force and energy to discourse. No person better understood the common welfare of Sicily; and no person could better explain it. He unfolds the political scheme at present in agitation; declares the consequence in case the Athenians prevail, to alarm the concern of the Camarineans for their country, and further to alarm their fears for themselves. He even threatens them with a severe revenge, in

case the Syracusans, without their aid, get the better of the invaders." In short, if the Camarineans had been good Sicilians, his arguments must have prevailed.

Euphemus, who is the mouth of the Athenian embassy on this occasion, makes a bold and spirited defence for his country. "He at once briskly attacks Hermocrates for the bitter imputations he had cast upon Athens. He asserts her fair reputation, and justifies her series of politics ever since the invasion of Xerxes. Liberty had been the object of all her care and all her conduct. The Athenians had guarded, had established it in Greece; and were come to support and secure it in Sicily. He throws back the charge of enslaving-projects on the Syracusans, who now are eager to deprive the rest of Sicily of their best defence, by raising distaste towards the Athenians. He spares no artifice, omits no topic that is likely to effect. He proves a notable advocate for his Athens, pompously celebrates her passion and her care for liberty, and most ingeniously strives to conceal her present ambition under a veil of most generous and disinterested principles."

The issue is, that the orators have just counterpoised one another's arguments, and the Camarineans declare a neutrality.

The embassies from Syracuse succeed much better in Peloponnesus. The Corinthians are zealous and active in their behalf; and they have now got an advocate to rouse up and inflame the phlegmatic Spartans, who was born to be of every party, and to be the best support of whatever party he by times espoused. It is the exiled Alcibiades who pleads most effectually in their behalf at a grand consultation at Sparta. His speech on this occasion is a masterpiece. "He insinuates himself into the favour and confidence of men who had feared and hated him. Whilst he is making his own personal justification, he praiseth and magnifieth himself. He betrays all the schemes of Athens, discloseth all her plan, points out her weak and unguarded parts, directs towards them the attack of her foes; and, full as he is of resentment against, and skilful to annoy her, she totters whilst he speaks." Syracuse and Sparta are now to grow famous by the debasement of this mighty and imperial republic. Her glory hath reached its summit: it immediately will begin to sink, and her laurels will fade away apace.

In the summer of the eighteenth year of this war, the Athenians stand away from Catana, and land by night at Syracuse. They instantly march, and seize Epipolæ, a strong post that commanded the city. The Syracusans fight, but without success, to beat them from it. The siege now commenceth in form. It is clearly represented in the whole of its progress, in all its forms. Every skirmish is a distinct and lively picture. In one of them old Lamachus is killed, and Nicias of course left singly in the whole command. He carries on the siege with vigour and success for a short space of time; but Gylippus from Sparta, and the Peloponnesian aids, are now only not arrived.

Book VII. "If you would read truly great things," said a Spartan to Augustus Cæsar, "read the Seventh Book of Thucydides." Thither we have now brought this cursory survey. The reader of it will undoubtedly own, that no historian ever executed so closely, so strongly, so clearly, and so pathetically, as Thucydides. "No fleet but that of the Athenians," it is the observation of Cicero,* "was ever able to enter the harbour of Syracuse. The fleet was only able to achieve it by the mighty force and number of three hundred ships. But here first was the power of Athens defeated, lessened, depressed. In this harbour the fame, the empire, the glory of Athens, are judged to have suffered a total wreck." Schemes projected and actions conducted by Hermocrates and Gylippus the Spartan prove too hard for Nicias, whose phlegm and natural

* Orat. quinta in Verrem.

diffidence are no match against such vigilance and activity. The besieging party soon becomes as it were the besieged. The letter of Nicias to the people of Athens, represents all the difficulties to which he finds himself reduced. No man ever wrote so precisely and perspicuously about military affairs. The reader of it wants no light, no dictionary of arts, or an adept in war, to explain the terms; and can judge, as could the meanest citizen of Athens to whom it was read, what was proper to be done. Secure in the consciousness of his own integrity, he neatly reprimands his countrymen for the great foible in their behaviour, justifies his own conduct, and begs to be recalled. In short, Nicias is finely characterized by his own pen in this epistle.

The Athenians are too high-spirited to recall their troops, and have too good an opinion of Nicias to dismiss him from the command. Though Attica was now invaded by the Peloponnesians, and a fortress raised by them within sight of Athens itself for their lasting annoyance, they send a powerful reinforcement to Nicias under the command of Demosthenes. They empty Athens of the residue of her strength, so highly wanted for domestic support. The Syracusans, when advised of this reinforcement, redouble their alacrity, and hope to finish the war before it could arrive. They had had a career of success against Nicias, had just beat him both by land and sea, when Demosthenes steered into the harbour of Syracuse. The sight caused a strange alternative of elevating hope and dreadful apprehensions in the contending parties. The Syracusans again become the besieged; and Demosthenes is intent to put an end to the siege, if possible, by vigorous and daring measures.

His attempt to retake Epipolæ is, in our author's description of it, as fine a night-piece as can possibly be drawn, and no pencil could express it stronger. The moon shines just bright enough, to show us the Athenians gaining the ascent, and to give a glimpse of the approaches of the armies and their first struggles with one another. The whole soon becomes gloomy confusion and horrid tumult. What a medley of singing their pæans, of conflict, of flight, of pursuit! friends and countrymen routing one another, till numbers come tumbling down the precipices, and perish in the fall! The hope of the Athenians is blasted: Syracuse erects her trophies fast.

Demosthenes is now convinced the most prudent step they could take is to raise the siege, and Nicias at last complies. The very moment they are going to embark their troops, the moon is eclipsed. Who but must pity the weakness of Nicias at so dangerous a crisis? who but be sorry indeed, that so good and amiable a man should stop an army from a principle of superstition, and detain them for so long a time on a spot of ground, where nothing but ruin and destruction could befall them? Men so dispirited can make but faint opposition against an always high-spirited and now successful enemy. They soon lose another battle, and the decisive engagement is fast approaching.

But before it is fought, Thucydides, animated with more than historic spirit, emulates his admired Homer, reviews the parties concerned, and catalogues the troops now warring against and in defence of Syracuse. This catalogue is far from being a mere muster-roll of names. It is full of such strokes as must imprint many useful and moral reflections in the mind. His little incidental sketches represent mankind in a true light, as Homer's do the world of nature. Homer paints the soil, and Thucydides the people.

The mouth of the harbour is now barred up by the enemy. The Athenians must fight their way out; or, burn all their ships, and march off by land. It is determined to attempt the former; and the consequence is the battle within the harbour of Syracuse. A more striking, more astonishing battle-piece was never exhibited; and a masterly

ail, though none but a masterly one, might exactly delineate it from this description. The present temper of the combatants on both sides is strongly marked in the harangues before the engagement. Nicias then said all, and the Athenians in action did their best; all was unavailing. I shall say no more about it, since the reader hath nothing to do but turn his eye towards it, and distinctly view it through the whole of its process, till the Peloponnesians sail in triumph to their city, and raise the most glorious of all their trophies. The wretched perplexities of the Athenians, the raising of the siege, the mournful campment, the good heart of Nicias sympathising in all their distress, and endeavoring to cheer a little their desponding minds, their laborious marches whilst the enemy is harassing them both in front and in rear and on all sides, the surrender of the column under Demosthenes, the carnage in the river Asinarus of the troops under Nicias, his surrender too, the butchery of the generals, and the miseries of the privated residue of once so flourishing and gallant an army—these are the several incidents of this book, for which an attentive reader will give the highest commendation to the historian, when he hath read them through: he will have no leisure but then to think of Thucydides.

Book VIII. The catastrophe hath now taken place in this history, and the reader is assured how all will end. The wings of this soaring republic of Athens are clipped, never to reach their full growth again: yet, like an eagle in the same situation, she will struggle hard a long time (as it were) with beak and talons, and would yet repulse her assailants, did she not grow sick at heart. Intestine faction will assist her enemies to finish her ruin, as a state imperial and commercial. A regular deduction of such incidents as these is the subject of the eighth and last book of Thucydides. As a writer, he now performs in a more faint and less engaging manner, compared with that hath gone before. He hath but drawn his lines, but just sketches his pieces: but his drawings and sketches will still manifest the master's hand. We will give them a cursory view: the reader will give them a more exact and deliberate perusal.

He sets out in his usual grave and solemn manner, to describe the people of Athens, spirited and distressed as they are by the overthrow in Sicily. All the passions and motions of the human nature take their train. They are incredulous; they are angry; they are convinced; and then, they despond; they pluck up their spirits again, and are resolved to stand it out, nor abandon their own preservation. They now cast their thoughts towards every resource, and prepare again for war with spirit and resolution. All the rest of Greece is ready to concur with the victorious party; all are eagerly running in to share the glory and the spoil. Their own dependents are meditating revolts, and some make them at once without premeditation. The Lacedæmonians, amidst the many applications made to them, are puzzled which of the revolting states they shall first countenance and assist. Alcibiades is busy at Sparta, advising proper measures, and guiding their counsels. Even the Persian monarch, by his lieutenants, enters into league against them; and some of their finest islands are immediately rent asunder from subjection to the Athenians.

The various turns of the war at Chios, and on the coast of Ionia, are distinctly but concisely related; till Alcibiades appears in action, and exerts his busy and intriguing genius. Suspected at length, and hated by the Lacedæmonians, he became again their enemy, and turned all his projects on accomplishing his return to Athens, and saving his country from impending ruin. His partizans, in the fleet and troops of Athens now lying at Samos, cabal in his favour. A change of government is judged a necessary measure to bring about his recalment. It is the scheme of Alcibiades himself; but it is

opposed and disconcerted by Phrynichus ; by Phrynichus, who soon after turns out a violent enemy to the democracy, whilst Alcibiades is active and zealous in its support.

None but our author's pen could have so clearly unfolded that series of caballing, that fluctuation both in principle and conduct, and that horrid embroilment of the leading members of the Athenian state amongst themselves, which brought on seditions amongst the troops abroad, and a revolution of government in the city of Athens. The democracy is at length overturned ; and an oligarchy, consisting of four hundred persons, erected in its stead. The Athenians at Samos, where the project was first laid, declare against the Athenians at Athens. Alcibiades is grown again a hearty republican ; and Thrasybulus alone manifests throughout a sincere love and regard for his country. Parties newly formed are broke again into divisions ; and Athens was indebted to nothing but the indolence of the Lacedæmonians, that she did not fall immediately into their hands, through the violence of her own intestine seditions. But the new administration proved of short continuance ; the democracy, though on a model somewhat varied, is again established ; and Athens thus obtains a respite.

Full of matter as this part of the history is, Thucydides hath kept his narration clear and unembarrassed. But then, it is a simple unadorned narration, and never received the finishing hand. There are scattered occasionally throughout it some short accounts, in what manner the principal agents delivered their sentiments at important junctures. They seem to have been memorials, laid down as the ground-work, for regular and full orations. The reader will be sorry the author was hindered, by what accidents can only be guessed, from drawing out some of them at least into full proportion ; particularly that of the deputation from the army at Samos to Athens, in which " the people are persuaded to part with their darling democracy ;" of Thrasybulus to the troops at Samos, when they mutiny in favour of the democracy, in which " he must pathetically have expatiated on the revolt of Athens from liberty and her choicest patriots, who might now form another Athens at Samos, and preserve her empire, though they had lost the city ; that of Alcibiades further, when on his recallment he harangues the army at Samos which recalled him, where " he deplores the malignity of his fate, magnifies his ability yet to serve his country, and again shines in the character of an able statesman, a subtle politician, and a zealous patriot."

Upon the whole. One point more must be particularly distinguished in honour of the Athenians. The characters of them and of the Lacedæmonians are strongly contrasted through the whole course of this history, and highly to the credit of the former. Their spirits rise with difficulties, and patriotism starts out of mutiny and faction. The Lacedæmonians are indolent in success, and show neither alacrity nor address in promoting that cause of liberty, which was the grand pretext of engaging in this destructive war. They seem at last more intent on pocketing the royal subsidies, than doing their duty, as leaders and champions of Greece. They have not yet learned to make a figure at sea. The last view we have of them is at the battle of Cynos-sema, where they received a signal defeat from those very men, whose ruin they judged as well nigh completed. When Athens is totally to be vanquished, as her doom is fast approaching, she must aid her own conquerors and tyrants, in demolishing her own trophies, and trampling under foot her liberties and rights. Her own factions will help to accomplish, what without them no foreign enemy could have done. Whatever is human must decay. The best constituted state in the world may be undermined by its own members, when they could not be conquered, and at length be rendered an easy prey to foreign powers. May GREAT BRITAIN prove an exception to this affecting but just observation !

THE
PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

BOOK I.

Introduction. containing the Author's reasons for writing this History, upon a review of the affairs of Greece from the earliest times. — The true reason of the Peloponnesian war was a jealousy of the Athenian power. Those pretended were, I. The affair of Epidamnus, which is opened at large; II. The revolt of Potidæa, the circumstances of which are exactly related. Consultations held at Sparta by the members of the Lacedæmonian league, where at length war is decreed, but the rupture protracted for a year. The Lacedæmonians act from a dread of the growing power of Athens. A digression showing how that power arose, which gives the author opportunity to relate the history of fifty years between the retreat of Xerxes, and the breaking out of this war. Embassies accusing and recriminating are sent to and fro, in the account of which are interwoven the stories of Cylon, Pausanias, and Themistocles. The Lacedæmonians send a final demand to Athens; and the Athenians, at the persuasion of Pericles, return a resolute answer, upon which all negotiations are ended, and an open rupture ensueth.

THUCYDIDES an Athenian hath compiled the history of the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, as managed by each of the contending parties. He began to write upon its first breaking out, from an expectation that it would prove important, and the most deserving regard of any that had ever happened. He grounded his conjecture on the earnestness of both the flourishing parties to make all necessary preparations for it; and he saw that all the rest of Greece was engaged on one side or the other, some joining immediately, and others intending soon to do it; for this was the greatest commotion that ever happened amongst the Grecians, since in it some Barbarians, and it may be said the greatest part of mankind, were concerned. The actions of an earlier date, and those still more ancient, cannot possibly, through length of time, be adequately known; yet, from all the lights which a search into the remotest times hath afforded me, I cannot think they were of any great importance, either in regard to the wars themselves, or any other considerations.

It is certain, that the region now known by the name of Greece was not formerly possessed by any fixed inhabitants, but was subject to frequent transmigrations, as constantly every distinct people easily yielded up their seats to the violence of a larger supervening number. For, as to commerce there was none, and mutual fear prevented intercourse both by sea and land, as then the only view of culture was to earn a penurious subsistence, and superfluous wealth was a thing unknown, as planting was not their employment, it being uncertain how soon an invader might come and dislodge them from their unfortified habitations, and as they thought they might every where find their daily necessary support, they hesitated but little about shifting their seats: and for this reason they never flourished in the greatness of their cities or any other circumstance of power. But the richest tracts of country ever were more particularly liable to this frequent change of inhabitants, such as that which is now called Thessaly, and Bœotia, and Peloponnesus mostly except Arcadia, and in general every the most

fertile part of Greece. For the natural wealth of their soil increasing the power of some amongst them, that power raised civil dissensions, which ended in their ruin, and at the same time exposed them more to foreign attacks. It was only the barrenness of the soil that preserved Attica through the longest space of time, quiet and undisturbed, in one uninterrupted series of possessors. One, and not the least convincing, proof of this is, that other parts of Greece, because of the fluctuating condition of the inhabitants, could by no means in their growth keep pace with Attica. The most powerful of those who were driven from the other parts of Greece by war or sedition, betook themselves to the Athenians for secure refuge, and as they obtained the privileges of citizens,¹ have constantly, from remotest time, continued to enlarge that city with fresh accessions of inhabitants, insomuch that at last, Attica being insufficient to support the number, they then sent over colonies into Ionia.

There is another, and to me a most convincing proof of the weakness of the ancients. Before the affairs of Troy, it doth not appear that Greece (or Hellas) was ever united in one common undertaking; nor had the whole country that one general appellation; not indeed did the same subsist at all before the time of Hellen, the son of Deucalion; the several nations taking their distinguishing names from their own selves, and Pelasgicum being that of the greatest tract. But when Hellen and his sons had acquired power in Phiotis, and led out their dependents by way of aid to other cities, conversation made the use of this name become much more frequent among the several people, though it was long before it so prevailed as to become the general appellation of them all. For this Homer is my principal authority, who, though born a long time after the Trojan war, hath no where mentioned

¹ They were admitted to the same privileges with free-born native Athenians. But this was practised only in the infancy and early growth of that state. It was afterwards an honour very seldom and with difficulty granted. Those who came from other places to settle at Athens are distinguished from πολῖται citizens, by the name of μετοικοί sojourners, who had taken up their residence and cohabited with them. They performed several duties as subjects to the state which gave them protection, but never became Athenians, or citizens of Athens, in the emphatical sense of those terms. The English reader will please to remember this, as the distinction often occurs in the sequel of our history.

them all in this general style, but hath appropriated it to those who came with Achilles from Phiotis, and were the first that bore this name of Grecians (or Hellenes). In his poems Danaans, and Argives, and Achæans are their distinguishing titles. Nor hath he farther once mentioned the Barbarians, for this plain reason in my opinion, because Grecians were not yet distinguished by this one comprehensive name in contradistinction to that other. These Grecians therefore whatever, whether so apart in their different cities, or united by mutual converse, or at length comprehended in one general name, for want of strength and correspondence, never acted together in joint confederacy before the war of Troy: nor was it till the use of the sea had opened free communication amongst them that they engaged together in that expedition.

For Minos is the earliest person whom we know from tradition to have been master of a navy, and to have been chiefly lord of the sea which is called the Grecian. To him were the isles of the Cyclades subject; nay, most of them he planted himself with colonies, having expelled the Carians, and substituted his own sons in the different commands. And then of course he exerted his utmost power to clear that sea of pirates, for the more secure conveyance of his own tributes.

The Grecians formerly, as well as those Barbarians who, though seated on the continent, lived upon the coast, and all the islanders, when once they had learned the method of passing to and fro in their vessels, soon took up the business of piracy under the command of persons of the greatest ability amongst them, for the sake of enriching such adventurers and subsisting their poor. They landed, and plundered by surprise unfortified places and scattered villages, and from hence they principally gained a subsistence. This was by no means at that time an employment of reproach, but rather an instrument of glory. Some people of the continent are even to this day a proof of this, who still attribute honour to such exploits if genteelly performed:² so also are the ancient poets, in whom those that sail along the coasts are every where equally accosted

² "With due respect, with humanity," as the scholiast explains it. For then they never made booty of, or carried away by stealth, the labouring cattle; they never made their attacks by night, nor committed any murder.

with this question, Whether they are pirates; as if neither they to whom the question was put would disown their employment, nor they who are desirous to be informed would reproach them with it. The people of the continent also exercised robberies upon one another: and to this very day many people of Greece are supported by the same practices: for instance, the Ozolian Locrians, and Etolians, and Acarnanians, and their neighbours on the continent; and the custom of wearing their weapons, introduced by this old life of rapine, is still retained amongst them.

The custom of wearing weapons once prevailed all over Greece, as their houses had no manner of defence, as travelling was full of hazard, and their whole lives were passed in armour, like Barbarians. A proof of this is the continuance still in some parts of Greece of those manners, which were once with uniformity general to all. The Athenians were the first who discontinued the custom of wearing their swords, and who passed from the dissolute life into more polite and elegant manners. And it is not a long time since those amongst the rich, who were advanced in years and studied their ease, left off wearing the linen garments and fastening the hair of their head behind with grasshoppers of gold;³ though the aged amongst the Ionians have constantly persevered in the use of those ornaments as marks of their affinity. That modest uniformity of dress, which is still in vogue, was first introduced by the Lacedæmonians; amongst whom in other points also there was the greatest equality of dress and diet observed, both in the highest and meanest ranks. They also were the first who performed their exercises naked, stripping themselves in public and anointing with oil before they entered the lists; though, before, the custom had prevailed at the Olympic games for the champions to wear scarfs about their loins: and it is only a few years since these were quite disused.⁴ But even yet, amongst some Barbarians, more especially those of Asia, where the matches of boxing and wrestling are in repute, the combatants engage with scarfs

round their loins. Many other arguments might with ease be alleged to prove that ancient Greece had forms and modes of living quite similar to those of the present Barbarian world.

As for cities, so many as are of a later foundation, are better placed for the increase of wealth, since the improvement of naval skill; all these have been built on the sea-shore, and walled about, and are situated upon necks of land jutting out into the sea, for the sake of traffic and greater security from the insults of neighboring people. But those of an earlier date, having been more subject to piratical depredations, are situated at a great distance from the sea, not only on islands, but also upon the main. For even those who lived upon the coast, though inexpert at sea, were used to make excursions up into the country for the sake of plunder: and such inland settlements are discernible to this very day.

But the people of the islands, that is, the Carians and the Phœnicians, were by much the most expert at these piratical adventures: for by them the greatest part of the isles was inhabited. This is proved from the expiation solemnized at Delos in the course of this war; on which occasion all the sepulchres of the dead in that island being broken open, more than half of the number appeared to be Carians, known to be such from the weapons found in their graves and a particularity of interment still used amongst them.⁵ It was not till after the equipment of fleets by Minos, that a communication was opened at sea. For by him the mischievous banditti were ejected from the islands, and many colonies of his own planted there in their stead. And from this period it was that the maritime people, grown more intent on the acquisition of wealth, became more fond of settled habitations: and such of them as then surpassed in wealth, strengthened their settlements by walling them about. And this their passion for gain continuing to increase, the poorer hired out their services to those who had affluence; and the great, who had all need-

³ To intimate their being the original possessors and pure natives of the soil, as much as the very grasshoppers, which they supposed to be a natural and spontaneous production of the earth. They regarded themselves as cotemporary with the insects.

⁴ See Mr West's Dissertation on the Olympic Games, p. 50.

⁵ The Carians first invented the boss of shields and the crest of helmets. In remembrance of this, a small shield and a crest were always buried with them. By this means were the Carians known. The Phœnicians were distinguished by the manner of their interment: for, whereas other nations laid the faces of their dead towards the east, the Phœnicians reversed the posture, and laid them to the west. *Scholias*

ful supplies at hand, reduced less powerful cities into their own subjection. And their power by these methods gradually advancing, they were enabled in process of time to undertake the Trojan expedition.

It is farther my opinion, that the assemblage of that armament by Agamemnon was not owing so much to the attendance of the suitors of Helen in pursuance of the oaths they had sworn to Tyndarus, as to his own superior power. It is related by those who received from their ancestors the most certain memorials of the Peloponnesian affairs, that Pelops, arriving there from Asia with abundance of wealth, soon gained so great an influence over those needy people, that, though a foreigner, he had the honor to have the country called after his own name; and that the power thus gained by him was successively enlarged by his posterity. Eurystheus, indeed, whose mother was the sister of Atreus, perished in Attica by means of the Heraclidæ; and Eurystheus, when he departed on that expedition, left the government of Mycenæ and his kingdom, because of his affinity, in the care of Atreus, who then resided with him, having fled from his father upon the murder of Chrysippus. When therefore the return of Eurystheus was prevented by death, and the Mycenæans from a dread of the Heraclidæ were well inclined to Atreus, as a person of great abilities and deep in the affections of the people, he easily obtained the kingdom of Mycenæ and all the territories which had belonged to Eurystheus; and from hence the family of Pelops quite overpowered the family of Perseus. To these enlargements of power Agamemnon succeeding, and being also superior to the rest of his countrymen in naval strength, he was enabled in my opinion to form that expedition more from awe than favour. It is plain that he equipped out the largest number of ships himself, besides those he lent to the Arcadians. Homer is my witness here, if his testimony have any force; who hath farther, at the delivery of the sceptre, styled him,

"Of many isles, and of all Argos, king."

And a king who lived upon the continent could not possibly be lord of islands, except such as were adjacent, the number of which must needs be small, unless he had a competent strength at sea: but from this armament we have good light afforded to guess at the preceding.

What though Mycenæ was a small city, or

though any place at that time remarkable appear at present inconsiderable to us? yet, no one ought on these motives prematurely to imagine that armament to have been less considerable than it is described by the poets and reported by tradition. Supposing the city of Lacedæmon to be now in a ruined condition, nothing left but the temples and the pavements of the mass, I fancy, in process of time, posterity could not easily be induced to believe that their power had ever been proportioned to their glory. Of the five divisions of Peloponnesus¹ they are actually possessed of two, having the command of the whole, and of many confederate states without: yet, as the city is neither closely built, as the temples and public edifices are by no means sumptuous, and the houses detached from one another, after the old mode of Greece, it would suffer disparagement from such a view. If we farther suppose the Athenians in the same reverse of fortune, from the view the city then would afford, it might be guessed that once it had double the strength which it really hath. We ought not therefore to be incredulous, nor so much to regard the appearance of cities as their power; and of course, to conclude the armament against Troy to have been greater than ever was known before, but inferior to those of our age. And whatever credit be given to the poetry of Homer in this respect, who no doubt as a poet hath set it off with all possible enlargement, yet even according to his account it appeareth inferior. For he hath made it to consist of twelve hundred ships; those of the Bœotians carrying each one hundred and twenty men, those of Philoctetes fifty; pointing out, as I imagine, the largest and the smallest rates; for of the rate of other ships he hath not made the least mention in his catalogue, though he hath expressly informed us that every person of the crews belonging to the ships of Philoctetes were both mariners and soldiers, since he hath made all who plied at the oar to be expert at the bow. It is not probable that any ships carried supernumeraries, excepting kings or persons in command, especially as their point was a mere transportation with all the necessary habiliments of war, as their ships were not decked, but built entirely

¹ These were Laconia, Arcadia, Argolica, Messenia, and Elis. The Lacedæmonians were possessed of Laconia and Messenia.—*Scholias.*

n the fashion of the old piratical cruisers. If therefore a mean be taken between the largest and smallest rates, the number of the whole will turn out of small account for quotas sent in general from the whole of Greece.¹ The reason of this was not so much a scarcity of men as want of money. They adjusted the number of men to the slender store of provisions they already had, and the probability of procuring a competent subsistence in the course of the war. On their first landing they got the better in fight; the proof is, that they could not otherwise have fortified their camp with a wall. Neither doth it appear that they exerted all their strength at once, numbers being detached for supplies of provisions, to till the Chersonesus, and to forage at large. Thus divided as they were, the Trojans were better able to make a ten years' resistance, being equal in force to those who were at any time left to carry on the siege. For had the stores of provision at the first landing been ample enough for the whole number of men they brought, and had they been able to prosecute the war free from the avocations of foraging and tillage, their superiority in the field must have given them an easy and expeditious conquest. But in fact they did not ply the work with all their number, but only with a part constantly reserved for the purpose: had they formed the siege with their whole force, in less time and with less difficulty they must have taken Troy. Through want of money it was that expeditions prior to this, and even this the most celebrated of all that ever happened, are plainly found to have been less in reality than they are in fame or current estimation at present through poetical assistance.

Nor did the prosperous event of the Trojan expedition put an end to the unsettled and fluctuating state of Greece, or secure that tranquillity so necessary to advancement. The return of the Grecians from Ilium, after so long an absence, gave rise to many innovations. Seditions were excited in almost every city; and those who were forced to withdraw, built cities for themselves in other places. The present

Boeotians, for instance, being driven out of Arne by the Thessalians, sixty years after the taking of Troy, planted themselves in the country now called Bœotia, though before that time Cadmeis: but a body of them had already seated themselves there, of whom were those who went in the expedition against Troy: and eighty years after it, the Dorians with the Heraclidæ took possession of Peloponnesus. It was not without much ado and length of time, that Greece, quiet and settled at home, had opportunity to send colonies abroad. Then the Athenians planted Ionia and most of the islands; the Peloponnesians the greatest part of Italy and Sicily, and even some colonies in the different tracts of Greece. But all these transactions are of a later date than the Trojan war.

But when once the state of Greece was grown more robust, and an increase of wealth became their study more than ever before, as the public revenues grew apace, in many places tyrannies started up: for before this, kingdoms were hereditary and with limited authority. Now Greece throughout was employed in building navies, and became addicted to naval affairs with unusual application. The Corinthians are said to have been the first, who, by varying the make of their ships, brought them to that model which is now in use, and Corinth to be the first place of Greece where triremes² were built. It is a known fact, that Aminocles, a ship-carpenter from Corinth, built four ships for the Samians; now, from the arrival of Aminocles at Samos to the conclusion of the war which is now my subject, there passed at most but three hundred years. The oldest sea-fight we know any thing of was that of the Corinthians against the Corcyreans: but the distance between that and the same period is not more than two hundred and sixty. For the city of the Corinthians, being seated on the isthmus, hath ever been a place of trade, as formerly the Grecians both within and without Peloponnesus, more ac-

¹Thucydides makes it of small account, in regard to the war which is his subject. But the number of men employed in the expedition against Troy was 102,000. For the mean between 120 and 50 is 85, and $85 \times$ by 1200 = 102,000.

²The triremes were the ships of war, of the galley kind, and take their name from the three banks of oars with which they were furnished. They were also masted and carried sails; but they generally lowered the sails when they came to action, and relied chiefly on their oars, that they might be more able to tack about, or to run down upon the enemy with more force and steadiness. See Potter's *Archæologia*, vol. ii. c. 14.

customed to land than sea, could have no traffic with one another without passing through their territory. They were also remarkable for wealth, as clearly approveth from the ancient poets, who have given that city the epithet of rich. And, when once navigation was practised in Greece, they lost no time in their own equipments; they cleared the sea of pirates; and, opening their town as a public mart, both by land and sea, made Corinth powerful by the increase of its revenue. The Ionians had no naval force till a long time after this, in the reign of Cyrus first king of the Persians, and his son Cambyses; and, waging war with Cyrus, they were for a time masters of the sea which lieth upon their own coasts. Polycrates, also, who was tyrant of Samos, in the reign of Cambyses, having a powerful navy, subdued many of the islands, and among the rest Rhenea, which as soon as conquered he consecrated to Delian Apollo. The Phocceans also, when planting their colony at Marseilles, had a successful engagement at sea against the Carthaginians.

These were the most remarkable equipments of a naval force; and these, though beyond contest many generations later than the war of Troy, had a very small number of triremes, but consisted chiefly of vessels of fifty oars and barges of the more ancient model. And it was but a little while before the Median war and the death of Darius, who succeeded Cambyses in the kingdom of Persia, that the tyrants of Sicily and the Corcyreans became masters of any considerable number of triremes. For these last were the only instances of a naval strength in Greece, before the invasion of it by Xerxes, that deserve particular mention. The vessels of the *Æginetæ*, of the Athenians, and some others, were few in number, and most of them but of fifty oars. It was not till later times, when the Athenians had war with the *Æginetæ* and also expected the approach of Xerxes, that at the persuasion of Themistocles they built those ships with which they fought successfully against the Barbarians; and even these were not yet completely decked over.

Such therefore were the navies of Greece, both of an earlier and later date. And the states to which they belonged gained by them considerable strength, through an increase of their revenue and the enlargement of their dominions. Embarkations grown more frequent,

especially to those who were pent up in a narrow soil, occasioned the reduction of the isles; but for a land war, and, in consequence of that, an accession of power, none such was at that time known. All conflicts of that sort which ever happened, were disputes of boundaries between contiguous states. The Grecians had not yet launched forth into distant expeditions, nor aimed ambitiously at foreign conquests. There were no dependent cities, which furnished quotas at the will of others who gave them law; nor did those who were upon equality concur in any joint undertaking; each petty state took up arms occasionally in its own defence against the encroachments of its neighbours. At most, the greatest division of Greece that ever happened was in the old rupture between the Chalcideans and Eretrians, when leagues were formed in favour of both.

By these means was the growth of many states prevented, and that of the Ionians by a different cause—the great and surprising growth of the Persian power. For Cyrus, after he had completed the conquest of Cræsus, and all the country which lieth between the river Halys and the sea, invaded them and enslaved their towns upon the continent; and Darius afterwards, victorious by the strength of a Phœnician fleet, did the same by the islands.

As for those tyrants who had any where usurped the government of Grecian cities,—their whole application being confined to their own private concerns, to the guard of their persons, or aggrandizement of their families—they resided in their own cities so far as was consistent with their own security. Nothing worthy of remembrance was achieved by them, unless we take into account the frequent broils between them and their neighbours. Not but that the tyrants in Sicily had advanced their power to a great height. But Greece, in general, was thus withheld for a long course of time from performing any remarkable exploit, by the strength of her united, or the adventurous efforts of her separate states.

But after that the tyrants of Athens, and all the tyrants of other parts of Greece, generally, and of old, subject to these violent encroachments, notwithstanding their number and the fresh vigour of the last, were all (except those of Sicily) demolished by the Lacedæmonians.—For Lacedæmon, ever since it came into the hands of the Dorians, in whose possession it still continueth, though harassed with seditions

he longest of any place we know, yet hath ever been happy in a well regulated government, and hath always been exempt from tyrants; for, reckoning to the conclusion of this resent war, it is somewhat more than four hundred years that the Lacedemonians have enjoyed the same polity. On this basis was their power at home founded, and this enabled them to exert it in regulating other states.—but, after that the tyrants were by them extirpated from Greece, not many years intervened before the battle of Marathon was fought by the Medes against the Athenians; and in the tenth year after that, the Barbarian (Xerxes) again, with a vast armament, invaded Greece in order to enslave it. Hanging then on the very brink of ruin, the Lacedemonians, on account of their pre-eminent power, took the command of all the Greeks combined together in their own defence; whilst the Athenians, on the approach of the Medes, having already determined to abandon their city, and laid in their necessary stores, went on board their ships, and made head against him by sea. Having thus by their common efforts repulsed the Barbarian, the Grecians, not only those who revolted from the king, but those also who had combined together against him, were soon after divided among themselves, siding either in the Athenian, or in the Lacedemonian league; for the mastery appeared plainly to be in their hands, since these were the most powerful by land and those by sea. The agreement between the Athenians and Lacedemonians was but of short continuance; variance ensued; and they entered the lists of war one against another, each with the additional strength of their own respective allies: and hence, if any other Grecians quarrelled, they went over in parties to these as their principals. Inasmuch that from the invasion of the Medes quite down to the breaking out of this war, one while striking up truces, another while at open war, either with one another or the confederates revolting from either league, they had provided themselves with all military stores, and much improved their skill by constant practice exercised in dangers.

As for the Lacedemonians, they gave law to their confederates without the heavy imposition of tributes. Their study was only to keep them well affected to themselves, by introducing the oligarchy among them. But the Athenians lorded it over theirs, having got in course

of time the ships of all those who might oppose them, into their own hands, excepting the Chians and the Lesbians, and imposed on them a certain payment of tribute. And their own particular preparations for the present war were more ample than former times had known, even during the greatest vigour of their state and the most perfect harmony between them and their allies.

Such are the discoveries I have made concerning the ancient state of Greece; which, though drawn from a regular series of proofs, will not easily be credited; for it is the custom of mankind, nay, even where their own country is concerned, to acquiesce with ready credulity in the traditions of former ages, without subjecting them to the test of sedate examination. Thus, for instance, it is yet a received opinion amongst the bulk of the Athenian people, that Hipparchus was the tyrant, and therefore slain by Harmodius and Aristogiton; and they have not yet discovered, that Hippias then governed by virtue of his being the eldest of the sons of Pisistratus, and that Hipparchus and Thessalus were his brothers. Harmodius and Aristogiton, on the very day appointed, and just at the crisis, suspecting that information had been given to Hippias by some who were privy to the design, made no attempt upon him, as put already on his guard. Yet willing, before they were apprehended, to show their resolution and contempt of danger, they accidentally found Hipparchus at the Leocorium superintending the Panathenaeal procession,* and immediately slew him. There are many other things of a more recent date, and of memory not yet invalidated by time, about which the other Grecians are very wrong in their notions; such as, that the Lacedemonian kings had each of them a double and not a single vote in public questions; and that amongst them the Pittanate was a military band, which never yet existed. So easy a task to numbers is the search of

* This procession was made at the great Panathenaea, which festival was celebrated once in five years in commemoration of the union of all the people of Attica by Theseus. The lesser Panathenaea was celebrated every third year, some say every year, and was lengthened out by public games. These were also used at the great Panathenaea, in which the greatest splendour and magnificence were employed, and the procession added, here mentioned by Thucydides, and of which the curious reader may see a particular account in Potter's Archaeologia, vol. i. p. 421.

truth; so eager are they to catch at whatever lieth next at hand!

But, from the testimonies alleged in support of what I have hitherto advanced, any one may depend on my account of things, without danger of false opinions. Let him withhold his credit from the songs of poets, whose profession it is to give all possible enlargements to their subjects; let him do so farther, by the writers of prose,¹ who study more that artful composition which captivateth the ear than the plain and simple recital of truth, where proper attestations are never to be found, and many things through length of time have incredibly sallied out into mere fable; and then he will be convinced upon the plainest proofs, that the state of ancient Greece was very nearly the same as I have described it. And this present war, when considered in all its operations, notwithstanding the propensity of mankind to imagine that war in which they are personally engaged, to be the greatest that ever happened, and so soon as it is over to replace their admiration upon others more ancient, will easily be owned to have been the most important of all.

As to the speeches of particular persons either at the commencement or at the prosecution of the war, whether such as I heard myself or such as were repeated to me by others, I will not pretend to recite them in all their exactness. It hath been my method to consider principally what might be pertinently said upon every occasion to the points in debate, and to keep as near as possible to what would pass for genuine by universal consent. And as for the actions performed in the course of this war, I have not presumed to describe them from casual narratives or my own conjectures, but either from certainty, where I myself was a spectator, or from the most exact informations I have been able to collect from others. This indeed was a work of no little difficulty, because even such as were present at those actions disagreed in their accounts about them, according as affection to either side or memory prevailed.

My relation, because quite clear of fable, may prove less delightful to the ears. But it will afford sufficient scope to those who love a

sincere account of past transactions, of such as in the ordinary vicissitudes of human affairs may fully occur, at least be resembled again. I give it to the public as an everlasting possession, and not as a contentious instrument of temporary applause.

Of former transactions the greatest was that against the Medes, which however, by two engagements on sea and as many at land, was brought to a speedy conclusion. But the continuance of this war ran out into a much greater length; and Greece in the course of it was plunged into such calamities as were never known before in an equal space. Never had so many cities been made desolate by victories, some by Barbarians and some by the violence of intestine feuds; to say nothing of those where captivity made room for new possessors; never so many instances of banishment; never so many scenes of slaughter either in battles or seditions. Such calamities, farther, as were known only by report, but had rarely been felt in fact, now gained credit from experience; earthquakes, for instance, which affected the largest part of the habitable globe, and shook it with the utmost violence: eclipses of the sun, which happened more frequently than former times had remembered: great droughts in some places, the consequence of which was famine; and, what made not the least ravage, but did its share of destruction, the noisome pestilence. For all these things ensued in the sequel of this war, which was carried on between the Athenians and Peloponnesians, after breaking the thirty years' truce concluded between them upon the reduction of Eubœa.

The reasons for which this truce was broke, and their course of variance, I have in the first place thought proper to write, that none may be at a loss about the origin of so momentous a war among the Grecians. The growth of the Athenian power I conceive to have been the truest occasion of it, though never openly avowed; the jealousy struck by it into the Lacedæmonians made the contest necessary. But the pretences, publicly alleged on either side for breaking the truce and declaring open war, shall now be related.

Epidamnus is a city on the right hand as you sail into the Ionian gulf: adjoining to it live the Barbarian Taulantii, a people of Illyria. The Corcyreans settled a Colony here, the leader of which was Phalius the son of Heratocles, a Corinthian by birth, of the lineage of

¹Thucydides is here supposed to glance at Herodotus; and again a little after he justly thinks, that *fiction* and *fable* ought to have no place in history.

Hercules, invited to the office out of the mother-city, according to the custom of ancient times: and beside this, some Corinthians and others of Doric descent joined themselves to this colony. In process of time, the city of the Epidamnians became great and populous. Yet, having been afterwards harassed with seditions of many years' continuance, they were brought very low (according to report) by war waged against them by the neighbouring Barbarians, and were deprived of the greatest share of their power. But the most recent event at Epidamnus before the present war was, that the people there had driven the nobles out of the city. These sheltering themselves amongst the Barbarians, began depredations on those who remained behind, both by land and sea. The Epidamnians of the place, suffering vastly from these depredations, despatched ambassadors to Corcyra as their mother-city, beseeching them, "Not to behold their destruction with eyes unconcerned, but to reconcile their exiles to them, and to deliver them from this Barbarian war." The ambassadors, sitting down submissively in the temple of Juno, offered these supplications. But the Corcyreans refusing to receive them, sent them home again without effect. The Epidamnians, thus convinced that no redress could be had from Corcyra, and ignorant how to proceed in their present perplexities, sent to Delphos to inquire of the god, "Whether they should surrender their city to the Corinthians as their founders, and should seek security from their protection?" He answered, that "they should surrender and take them for their leaders." The Epidamnians, in pursuance of this oracle, arriving at Corinth, make there a tender of the colony, representing that "the leader of it had been at Corinth," and communicating the oracle; and farther entreated them "not to look on with eyes of unconcern till their destruction was completed, but to undertake their redress." The Corinthians granted them their protection from a regard to justice, imagining themselves to be no less interested in their colony than the Corcyreans. But they were also actuated by a hatred of the Corcyreans, from whom, though a colony of their own, they had received some contemptuous treatment: for they neither paid them the usual honour on their public solemnities, nor began with a Corinthian in the distribution of the sacrifices, which is always done by other colonies. This their contempt

was founded as well on the sufficiency of their own wealth, in which at that time they equalled the richest of the Greeks, as on the superiority of their military force. Their insolence became greater in time with the enlargement of their navy, and they assumed glory to themselves in a naval character as succeeding the Phæacians in the possession of Corcyra. This was their chief incentive to furnish themselves with a naval strength, and in it they were by no means inconsiderable: for they were masters of a hundred and twenty triremes, when they began this war. Upon all these reasons the resentments of the Corinthians rising high against them, they undertook with pleasure the relief of Epidamnus; encouraging all who were so disposed, to go and settle there, and sending thither a garrison of Ambraciots and Leucanians and their own people. These marched by land to Apollonia, which is a colony of the Corinthians, from a dread of the Corcyreans, lest they should have hindered their passage had they attempted it by sea.

As soon as the Corcyreans heard that the new inhabitants and garrison were got to Epidamnus, and that the colony was delivered into the hands of the Corinthians, they grew hot with indignation: and putting out immediately with twenty-five ships which were soon followed by another equipment, they command them "at their peril to receive their exiles;—for those who had been driven out of Epidamnus had already been at Corcyra, where, pointing to the sepulchres, and claiming the rights of consanguinity, they had entreated them to undertake their restoration:—and to send away the garrison and new inhabitants which they had received from Corinth." The Epidamnians were quite deaf to these haughty commands. And upon this the Corcyreans, with a squadron of forty ships, accompanied by the exiles whom they pretended to restore, and an aid of Illyrians, began hostilities. Having blocked up the city, they made proclamation, "that all Epidamnians who were willing and the strangers might depart without molestation, or otherwise they should be treated as enemies." But this having no effect, the Corcyreans beset the place, which is situated upon an isthmus, on all sides, in regular siege.

The Corinthians, upon the arrival of messengers from Epidamnus with an account of the siege, draw their forces together. They also gave public notice, "that a new colony was

going to Epidamnus, into which all that would enter should have equal and like privileges with their predecessors; that, if any one was unwilling to set out immediately, and yet chose to have the benefit of the colony, he might deposit fifty Corinthian drachmas, and be excused his personal attendance." The number of those who entered for immediate transportation, and of those who deposited their money, was large. They sent farther to the Megareans, requesting a number of ships to enlarge their convoy, that their passage might not be obstructed by the Corcyreans, from whom they received a supply of eight, and four more from Pale of the Cephallenians. The same request was made to the Epidaurians, who sent five. A single ship joined them from Hermione; two from Troezen; ten from the Leucadians; and eight from the Ambraciots. Of the Thebans and Phliasians they requested money; of the Eleans, empty ships and money. And the number of ships fitted out by themselves amounted to thirty and three thousand heavy-armed.

17 When the Corcyreans were informed of these preparations, they went to Corinth, purposely accompanied by ambassadors from Lacedemon and Sicyon. There they charged the Corinthians "to fetch away their garrison and new settlement from Epidamnus, as having no manner of pretensions there: that, if they had any thing to allege to the contrary, they were willing to submit to a fair trial in Peloponnesus before such states as both sides should approve; and to whichever party the colony should be adjudged, by them it should be held." They also intimated "their readiness to refer the point in dispute to the oracle at Delphos;—war, in their own inclinations, they were quite against: but if it must be so, on their sides, (they said) mere necessity would prescribe the measure; and if thus compelled to do it, they should for assistance have recourse to friends not eligible indeed, but better able to serve them than such as they already had." The Corinthians answered, that "if they would withdraw their fleet and their Barbarians from before Epidamnus, they would then treat of an accommodation: but, till this was done, their honour would not suffer them to submit to a reference, whilst their friends were undergoing the miseries of a siege." The Corcyreans replied, that "if they would recall their people from Epidamnus, themselves also would do the like; but were ready further to agree, that

both parties should remain in their present situation, under a suspension of arms, till the affair could be judicially determined."

¶ The Corinthians were not only deaf to every proposal, but so soon as ever they had manned their ships and their allies were come up, despatching a herald beforehand to declare war against the Corcyreans, and then weighing anchor with a force of seventy-five ships and two thousand heavy-armed, they stretched away for Epidamnus to make head against the Corcyreans. The commanders of this fleet were Aristeus the son of Pellicas, Callicrates the son of Callias, and Timanor the son of Timanthes; those of the land forces were Archotimus the son of Eurytimus, and Isarchidas the son of Isarchus.

¶ When they were come up as far as Actium in the district of Anactorium, where standeth the temple of Apollo, in the mouth of the gulf of Ambracia, they were met by a herald despatched expressly in a row-boat by the Corcyreans, forbidding them "at their peril to proceed." But at the same time the Corcyreans were busied at home in manning their own ships, repairing such as were old to make them fit for service, and equipping the rest with the utmost expedition. When the herald brought back nothing pacific from the Corinthians, and their squadron was now completed to eighty ships (for they had had forty employed in the siege of Epidamnus), they sailed in quest of the enemy, and drawing up against them came to an engagement. The victory fell beyond dispute to the side of the Corcyreans, and fifteen ships of the Corinthians were utterly destroyed.

¶ Their good fortune was such that on the very same day Epidamnus was surrendered to the besiegers upon a capitulation, by which "all the strangers in the place were to be sold for slaves, but the Corinthians to be detained prisoners at discretion."

¶ After the engagement at sea, the Corcyreans having erected a trophy¹ upon Leucimna a pro-

¹ This was constantly done by the Grecians upon a victory. Nay, when the victory was claimed on both sides, both sides erected trophies, of which several instances occur in Thucydides. The trophies for a victory at land were decked out with the arms they had taken; those for a victory at sea, with arms also and the shatters of the enemy's ships. "To demolish a trophy was looked on as unlawful, and a kind of sacrilege, because they were all consecrated to some deity; nor was it less a crime to pay divine adoration before them, or to repair

montory of Corcyra, put to death all the prisoners they had taken, except the Corinthians whom they kept in chains. And after this, as the Corinthians and allies having been vanquished in fight were forced to retire within their own harbours, they were quite masters of all the adjacent sea; and, sailing first to Leucas, a colony of the Corinthians, they laid its territory waste; and then burned Cyllene, a dock of the Eleans, because they had supplied the Corinthians with ships and money. In this manner they continued masters of the sea a long time after their naval victory, and in their cruises very much annoyed the allies of the Corinthians. It was not until the beginning of the summer, that a check was given them by a fleet and land army, who were commissioned, in order to relieve their harassed allies, to station themselves at Actium and round the Chimerium of Thesprotis. There they lay, to cover Leucus and other places which were in friendship with them from the ravage of the enemy. The Corcyreans, upon this, with a naval and land force stationed themselves over-against them at Leucimna. But, neither party venturing out to attack the other, they lay quiet in their opposite stations the whole summer; and, on the approach of winter, both sides withdrew to their respective homes.

During the remainder of the year, after the engagement at sea, and all the following, the Corinthians, whose indignation was raised in this their war against the Corcyreans, were building new ships, and sparing neither labour nor cost to get a strong armament ready for sea, and sent throughout Peloponnesus and the other parts of Greece to hire marines into their service. The Corcyreans, hearing of these great preparations, were terribly alarmed, and with reason; for at that time they were in no alliance with any of the Grecians, nor comprehended either in the Athenian or Lacedæmonian league. And hence, they thought it quite expedient to go and sue for the alliance of the Athenians, and endeavour to obtain some succour from them. The Corinthians gaining in-

telligence of their design, despatched an embassy at the same time to Athens, instructed by any means to prevent the junction of the Athenians to the naval strength of the Corcyreans, which might hinder them from bringing this war to a successful issue. The Athenians being met in general assembly,² both embassies rose up to plead their own cause; and the Corcyrean spoke as follows:

"It is quite proper, Athenians, that those who address themselves to a neighbouring power imploring their succour, which is now our case, without being able to plead the merit of prior good services or an old alliance in their

² The *ekklesia* or assembly of the people. In this the sovereignty was vested; and it is proper the English reader should grow acquainted with this particular form in the Athenian democracy.

The people of Athens were divided into ten tribes, which presided by rotation. The year was divided into ten courses, and each tribe presided about five weeks. The tribe in course elected fifty persons to manage by their authority and in their name: these were called Prytanes. These being too large a number for business they were subdivided into tens, each of these divisions presiding for a week; and these were called Proedri. One of the Proedri presided or was in the chair for a day, and was styled Epistates. For that day, and he never enjoyed this pre-eminence a second time in his life, he was invested with the highest trust in the government. He kept the public seal and the keys of the citadel and treasury. In the assembly of the people he ordered all the proclamations, regulated proceedings, put the question, and declared the majority.

The assemblies of the people were of two kinds, ordinary and extraordinary. Of the first kind, four were regularly held during each presidency of the tribes, and at the third of them ambassadors from foreign states had public audience. The latter were occasionally convened by the presidents in courses or by the general of the state. Some days beforehand, notice was publicly given by the senate or council of five hundred upon what subjects they were to deliberate; but this could not be observed upon sudden emergencies.

They met early in the morning, generally, in the Pnyx, at the summons of the public crier. At the second summons they were obliged to attend at their peril. For then the proper officers ran along the forum with a rope stretched across and rubbed over with vermilion, and all upon whom a mark was found were fined; but those who attended early and regularly, received half a drachma each for attendance. The number which attended generally amounted to five or six thousand.

The assembly opened with the sacrifice of a young pig to Ceres, and the blood was sprinkled round by way of purification. Then a prayer was pronounced aloud by the crier for the prosperity of the commonwealth of Athens; which ended, a curse was next pronounced on every citizen who did any thing to the prejudice of his country. Then the presidents of the week opened the points upon which they were convened, and the assembly proceeded to business.

them when decayed, as may be likewise observed of the Roman triumphal arches; this being the means to revive the memory of forgotten quarrels, and engage posterity to revenge the disgrace of their ancestors; for the same reason, those Grecians, who first introduced the custom of erecting pillars for trophies, incurred a severe censure from the ages they lived in."—*Potter's Archaeologia*, vol. ii. c. 12.

own behalf, should previously convince them, chiefly, that a compliance with such requests must turn to their advantage; at least, that it will cause no manner of inconvenience; and then, that the favor will be returned with effectual gratitude. If they are unable to give satisfactory conviction in any of these particulars, they can have no reason to be angry if their suit be rejected. The Corcyreans, confident that they can clear up these points beyond the reach of scruple, have sent us hither to request your alliance.

3 y "The method, indeed, which hitherto we have fondly observed, hath proved in fact absurd towards you in this our exigency, and prejudicial to our own affairs in our present situation. In preceding times, we never chose to grant our alliance to any, yet now are we come to sue for alliance from others, being through our own maxims quite destitute of friends in this our war against the Corinthians: and that which before appeared the conduct of refined prudence, to keep clear of danger by shunning the entanglements of a foreign alliance, we now find by the event to have been both impolitic and weak.

31 "Once already we have engaged the Corinthians at sea, and repulsed them merely by our own strength. But since, with a greater force collected from Peloponnesus and the rest of Greece, they are again preparing to attack us; since we perceive ourselves unable to resist them merely with our own domestic strength; since further with our subjection the danger will spread abroad; we are necessitated to apply to you and everywhere else for succour; and though now emboldened to act in opposition to our former inactive maxims, yet we deserve your pardon, as they were not the result of bad designs, but of mistaken judgments: and could we but obtain redress from you, this incidental necessity of ours will turn out highly to your honour upon several accounts.

6 "In the first place, you will favour those with your assistance who have felt but never committed injustice. In the next place, by protecting those whose lives and liberties are at stake, you will confer so vast an obligation that the memory of it can never be abolished. We are now masters of the greatest naval force except your own. Consider therefore how fair an occasion, very seldom to be met with, of the greatest advantage to yourselves, of the greatest vexation to your enemies, now lieth before you; when that very power, the accession of

which you would readily have purchased with ample sums of money and a weight of obligation, cometh here to invite your acceptance and make a tender of itself without any danger or expense to you; nay, what is more, enabling you to gain the praise of the world, the grateful acknowledgments of those you defend, and an increase of power to yourselves. Few people, in preceding ages, have ever had at any one time so many fine opportunities within their reach. And few there are, who, suing for alliance, do it not rather from a view of receiving than conferring security and reputation by their suit.

32 "If there be any one amongst you, who imagineth that war will never happen in which we may do you service, in such imagination he is quite mistaken. He doth not penetrate the designs of the Lacedemonians, who, alarmed at your power, are intent on war; nor those of the Corinthians, who, powerful of themselves, and your enemies, have begun with us to open the way for attacking you; that, united by common resentments, we might not stand up in our mutual defence against their violence; nor they be disappointed at least in one of their views, either effectually to humble us, or securely to establish their own power. It is your interest to prevent them, by accepting that alliance which we offer, and rather to anticipate their designs than counterplot them when ripening into act.

33 "If farther, they tax with a breach of justice your presuming to interfere with their colonies; let them learn, that every colony, whilst used in the proper manner, payeth honour and regard to its mother-state, but, when treated with injury and violence, is become an alien. They are not sent out to be the slaves, but to be the equals, of those who remain behind. Their violence and injustice require no proofs. For, invited by us to submit the business of Epidamnus to a judicial trial, they chose rather to prosecute their claims at war than at equity. And let such behaviour towards us their relations put you timely on your guard, that you may not be over-reached by their collusions, nor hesitate one moment to grant our petitions. For he who findeth the least room to repent of having gratified his enemies, is most likely to persevere in uninterrupted security.

34 "You will not break your treaty with the Lacedemonians by our admission, who are allied to neither of you. By that treaty it is

expressly stipulated, that "If any of the states of Greece be not at present in alliance with either of the contracting parties, permission is given them to go into either league, at their own discretion."—And terrible indeed it is, if they must be at liberty to man their fleets out of places in their alliance, nay, more than that, out of Greece at large, and to small amount, even out of your dependents: and we must be debarred not only your most inviting alliance, but every possible expedient of succour: then after all, they must raise a cry of injustice, if we offer our requests to you and have them granted. But much greater reasons of complaint will lie with us, if we cannot prevail upon you. For then you will throw at a distance those who are beset with dangers, and never were your enemies; you will not only not restrain the encroachments of enemies and invaders, but will behold them through your negligence assuming strength out of your dominions, which you ought never to endure. You ought either to hinder them from seducing your subjects into their pay, or send an immediate succour to us, in what manner you may be persuaded is the most expedient; but the course you ought principally to take is, to form with us a defensive alliance, and to act immediately.

"The advantage of such a measure, as we premised at first, we are clearly proving. But that which carrieth the greatest weight is this, that our enemies are enemies also to you (a point too clear to require proof), and enemies by no means despicable, but able to make revolvers feel their vengeance. The bad consequences of rejecting a land cannot be equal to those of rejecting a naval alliance, especially to you, who should exert your utmost efforts to let none be masters of a fleet beside yourselves; or, if that be not feasible, to make the most powerful in that respect your fast allies. And who-soever, allowing the plain advantage of these our arguments, may yet dread a rupture if their influence prevail,—let such a one know, that the event he feareth, accompanied by strength, will strike greater dread into all your enemies, but that the zeal of him who would have us now rejected, since it is founded on a weak presumption of their strength, must the sooner encourage those enemies to attack you. The present consultation is not confined to Corcyra, but very nearly concerneth Athens also:—let him therefore be assured, that he doth not

provide the best for the welfare of Athens, when, directly foreseeing a war fast approaching and only not on foot, he hesitateth the least about gaining a people provided with all the necessary means of being a most serviceable friend or a most prejudicial foe;—a people opportunely situated in the course to Italy and Sicily, so capable to hinder the accession of any naval force from thence to the Peloponnesians, and to secure a passage from hence to any of those coasts, not to mention the commodiousness of it in many other respects.

"To reduce the whole to one short point, wherein all and every individual of you is concerned, learn from hence that we are not to be abandoned: there are but three naval powers amongst the Grecians of any consideration, your own, our own, and that of the Corinthians. If you indolently suffer two of these to be incorporated, by leaving us a prey to the Corinthians, you must for the future make head against the Corcyreans and Peloponnesians both: but, if you grant your alliance to us, the contest will lie against them alone, and your own naval strength be considerably augmented."

In this manner the Corcyreans spoke: and when they had concluded, the Corinthians took their turn as followeth:—

"Since these Corcyreans have not confined their discourse merely to solicit the favour of your alliance, but have enlarged it with invectives against our injustice in making war upon them, we also lie under a necessity to make some previous observations on both of those points, before we proceed to other matters. By this means you will perceive your own great security in complying with our demands, and what weighty reasons you have to reject their importunate solicitations.

"They allege it as a maxim of prudence that they have been hitherto averse to any foreign alliance: but their motives in this were founded upon malice, and not upon virtue. They would have no ally to be a witness of the wrongs they do; they declined the society of such as might put them to the blush. Their very island farther, which is finely situated for such arbitrary tempers, suffereth them alone to judge those outrages they themselves commit: exempting them from fair and equitable trials, because they seldom go abroad to visit their neighbours, as their harbours are the constant and necessary resort of others. Here then

lieth the modesty of their unassociating maxim: it was designed to prevent their having any partners in violence, that they might have it all to themselves; that, when they were superior, they might oppress without control, when there was none to watch them they might engross the spoil, and might enjoy their rapine without danger of a blush. Had they been those virtuous souls they proclaim themselves, then, clear of every bad imputation from their neighbours, they had a fine opportunity to manifest their integrity to the world by doing and by submitting to justice.

§ “But such neither we nor any other people have in fact experienced them. For, though planted by us, they have ever disowned their allegiance to us, and now wage open war against us, pleading that they were not sent abroad to be maltreated and oppressed. We also aver in our own behalf, that neither did we send them to receive their injurious requitals, but to retain them in lawful dependence, and to be honoured and revered by them. Such dutiful returns the rest of our colonies punctually make us, and by such no other people are so well respected as ourselves. From the great satisfaction therefore we give to all the rest, it plainly appeareth, that we afford no reasonable disgust to these alone, and that without some glaring injury, we should have had no inclination to declare war against them. But, though we had actually transgressed, it would have been quite decent on their part to have shown condescension when we were angry; and then it would have been base in us to have pressed too far on such moderation. To their pride and the insolence of wealth their many transgressions against us are justly to be ascribed. Hence it was, that they laid no claim to Epidamnus, which belongeth to us, whilst harassed with intestine feuds; but when we came to its redress, then by force they seize and detain it. And now they pretend that previous to that they were willing to have submitted to a fair arbitration.—Such pleas are not to be regarded, when offered by men who are already masters in possession, and on that security make appeal to justice: they are only of weight, when facts and words are equitably to be judged, before the point hath been decided by arms. And it was not before they had besieged that city, but when they thought that we were intent on saving it, that they had recourse to the specious

pretence of a fair arbitration. And here they are at present, by no means content with the wrongs they have there committed, presuming to ask conjunction from you, not in league but in violence, and on the merit of being rebels against us to beg your protection. Then was the proper time for such an address to you, when their affairs securely flourished; not now when we have been outraged by them, and they are beset with dangers; not when you, who have shared no benefit from their former power, are to relieve their distress, and by no means their accomplices in crimes are to come in for an equality of censure from us. A prior conjunction of force justly entitleth to a share of what may be the event: but those who had no participation in the guilt ought to be exempted from the consequences of it.—And thus we have clearly shown, that we have addressed ourselves before you with all the requisites of a rightful cause, and that their proceedings are violent and rapacious.

§ “It is now incumbent upon us to convince you, that you cannot with justice receive them into alliance. For, granting it to be expressly stipulated in the treaty that any of the states not particularly mentioned may go into either league at their own discretion, yet the intent of the stipulation reacheth not to those who join one party to the prejudice of another, but to such as having withdrawn from neither are in need of protection—to such as bring war instead of peace to those who receive them,—if they know their interest. And yet the latter must be your portion, if our arguments lose their influence: for you will only become auxiliaries to them, but enemies also to us who are your allies by treaty. Of necessity, if you join with them, our vengeance must be levelled at them without sparing you. Right above all things it would be for you to keep yourselves at a distance from both;—if that will not please, to reverse your proceedings, and join with us in opposition to them. For, to the Corinthians you are bound by firm and lasting treaties, with the Corinthians you have never yet transacted even a truce, and by no means to establish a new league for receiving revoltors from the other league. We ourselves did not, upon the Samian revolt, give our suffrage against you, when the rest of the Peloponnesians were divided upon the question—whether they ought to be supported; but we openly maintained, that every state

ight to proceed against its own dependents. If you receive and undertake the defence those who have behaved amiss, the event will show that the greater number will come over to our side, and that you establish a law judicial to yourselves much more than to us. The points of justice we have thus sufficient cleared up to you, according to the general sense of Greece. We have only to add a word of advice and the claim of a favour, such a one we now affirm upon a principle of gratitude that not to be denied us, who are neither your enemies so far as to hurt you, nor ever your friends so far as to burden you. When formerly before the invasion of the Persians, you were in want of long ships in your war against the Æginets, you were supplied by the Corinthians with twenty. The service which we then did you, and that other more recent about the Samians, when we prevented their receiving any support from the Peloponnesians, enabled you in their turns to vanquish the Æginets and to chastise the Samians. And these services were done you at a season when your human attention, fixed entirely on war, resembled nothing but what tendeth to victory. Whoever forwardeth this, men esteem their friend, though he was before their foe; and him who checketh it, their foe, though perhaps he may be their real friend. For even domestic quarrels are sorrowfully conducted at a time when the mind is inflamed by contention.

Recollect these things. Let the young man learn the truth of them from his elders, and acknowledge that we ought to be properly requited. Let him not entertain the thought, that what we say is agreeable to equity, but that in the course of a war interest inclineth another way: interest is most surely to be found there where the least injustice is committed. The exigency of that war, from the dread of which the Corcyreans encourage you to act unadvisedly, lieth yet in obscurity, and ought not to throw you into open and immediate hostilities with the Corinthians. It would be prudent, however, to lessen that jealousy we have already conceived from the proceedings at Megara. A later obligation, by the favour of time, though of less weight in itself, is able to cancel the charge of greater moment. Neither suffer yourselves to be allured with the promise of a powerful conjunction of naval force: for never set unjustly against equals is a firmer security of power than to be elevated upon pre-

sent plausibilities, and enlarge it through a series of dangers. Our present circumstances resemble those concerning which we explicitly declared at Lacedæmon, that every state had a right to proceed against its own dependents: and now we beg that liberty from you; and that you, who have reaped the benefit of such a suffrage from us, would not prejudice us by yours. Render us for it the just requital; remembering that this is the critical season, in which he who aideth is the best of friends, and he that opposeth the greatest foe. And, as for these Corcyreans, take them not into your alliance in despite of us, nor abet them in the injuries they have done us. By acting in this manner you will discharge the obligations incumbent upon you, and will take those measures which are most for your own advantage."

This is the substance of what was said by the Corinthians.

The Athenians having heard both parties, met twice in full assembly on this occasion. At the first meeting they thought there was validity in the arguments of the Corinthians; but, at the second, they came to a different resolution—not indeed to form such an alliance with the Corcyreans as to have the same enemies and the same friends (for then, if the Corcyreans should summon them to join in an

¹ Here the English reader should be informed, in what manner business went on when difficulties, diversities of opinion, and consequently debates ensued.

When it appeared that the point proposed would not pass unanimously, the crier, at the command of the president in the chair, proclaimed aloud, "What citizen above fifty years of age hath a mind to speak?" When such had been heard, the crier made a second proclamation, that "any Athenian whatever had liberty to speak." The debate being ended, the president in the chair bade the crier put the question. It was decided by holding up of hands. The chairman distinguished the numbers in the affirmative and negative, and declared the majority. Then the resolution or decree was drawn up in form: and the Archon's name who gave title to the year, the day of the month, and the name of the presiding tribe, were prefixed.

The public decorum of the Athenians is worthy observation. The sentiments of age and experience were first to be heard, and then the spirit and resolution of the younger were called in to assist at the public consultation. Nay, they carried it farther; no person convicted of profaneness, debauchery, cowardice, or public misdemeanour, was suffered to speak in this assembly. From them they expected no sound instruction, no disinterested advice. If any such offered to speak, the *presidents* of the assembly immediately enjoined them silence: or, if they were refractory, ordered their officers to pull them down and turn them out of the assembly.

expedition against Corinth, their treaty with the Peloponnesians would be broke;) but an alliance merely defensive, for the reciprocal succour of one another, if either Corcyra or Athens, or any of their respective allies should be assaulted. A war with the Peloponnesians seemed to them unavoidable; and they had no mind to leave Corcyra, which had so great a naval force, for a prey to the Corinthians; but, to break them to the utmost of their power against one another, that upon occasion they might be the better able to war with the Corinthians, thus weakened to their hands, though joined by other states of Greece which had power at sea. At the same time that island appeared to them most conveniently situated in the passage to Italy and Sicily. Upon these motives the Athenians received the Corcyreans into their alliance: and, not long after the departure of the Corinthians, sent ten ships to their aid under the command of Lacedemonius the son of Cimon, Diotimus the son of Strombichus, and Proteas the son of Epicles. Their orders were, "by no means to engage the Corinthians, unless they stood against and endeavoured to make a descent at Corcyra, or any of its dependent places; if they did so, to resist them with all their efforts." These orders were given with a view of not infringing the treaty: and this their aid of shipping arriveth at Corcyra.

The Corinthians, when they had completed their preparations, set sail for Corcyra with a fleet of one hundred and fifty ships. Of these, ten belonged to the Eleans, twelve to the Megareans, ten to the Leucadians, twenty-seven to the Ambraciots, one to the Anactorians, and the other ninety were their own. The quotas from the allied cities had each of them their respective commanders; but the Corinthian squadron was commanded by Xenoclides the son of Euthycles, with four colleagues. So soon as they were all assembled at that part of the continent which looks towards Corcyra, they set sail from Leucas, and arrive at the Chimerium in Thesprotis. A harbour openeth itself here, and above it is the city of Ephyre, at a distance from the sea, in Eleatis, a district of Thesprotis: near it is the outlet into the sea of the lake of Acherusia, into which the river Acheron, having run through Thesprotis, is at last received; from which also it deriveth its name. The river Thyamis also runneth here, dividing Thesprotis from Ces-

trine, and between these two rivers cape of Chimerium. The Corinthians arrive at this part of the continent their station there. But the Cor soon as ever advised of their sail manned a hundred and ten ships command of Miciades, Æsimides, batus, took their station at one of which are called the Sybota, accor the ten Athenian ships. Their lane left at the promontory of Leucimn: aid of a thousand heavy-armed Ze The Corinthians had also ready up tinent a numerous aid of barbarian people on that coast ever conti friends. When every thing was in o the Corinthians, taking in provision days, they weigh by night from (with a design to fight; and having s till break of day, they discover the s Corcyreans already out at sea, and against them. When thus they had of each other, both sides form into of battle. In the right wing of the (were the Athenian ships; the rest o was all their own, ranged into three: each of which was respectively under of the three commanders: in this m the order of the Corcyreans formed right of the Corinthians were the sh Megareans and Ambraciots; in the other allies in their several arrange Corinthians formed the left wing tl as their ships were the best sailers, the Athenians and the right of the C When the signal flags were hoisted

1 To give the English reader, once for a light into their method of beginning an eng shall quote the following paragraph from Potter's *Archæologia*, vol. ii. c. 21.

"Before they joined battle, both parties i gods to their assistance by prayers and saci the admirals, going from ship to ship in : lighter vessels, exhorted their soldiers in a st behave themselves like men; then all thin readiness, the signal was given by hanging admiral's galley a gilded shield, as we read f or a red garment or banner, which was ter σημεία. During the elevation of this the fight and by its depression or inclination towards left, the rest of the ships were directed in w to attack their enemies, or retreat from then was added the sound of trumpets, which w the admiral's galley, and continued round th vy; it was likewise usual for the soldiers best to sing a psalm or hymn to Mars, and afte another to Apollo."

sides, they ran together and began the engagement; both sides having stowed their decks with bodies of heavy-armed, with many further that drew the bow or tossed the javelin. Their preparations still retained something of the awkward manner of antiquity. The engagement was sharply carried on, yet without exertions of skill, and very much resembling a battle upon land. When they had laid one another close, they were not easily separated again, because of the number and hurry of the vessels. The greatest hope of victory was placed in the heavy-armed fighting on the decks, who fixed to their post engaged hand to hand, whilst their ships continued without any motion. They had no opportunity to make their charges and tacks, but fought it out by dint of strength and courage without any dexterity. The tumult was great on all sides, and the whole action full of disorder: in which the Athenian ships relieved the Corcyrean wherever they were pressed too hard, and did what they could to intimidate the enemy; but their commanders refrained from any direct attack, remembering with awe the orders of the Athenians. The right wing of the Corinthians suffered the most; for the Corcyreans with twenty ships, having put them to flight, chased them when dispersed to the continent, and continuing the pursuit to their very camp, landed immediately, where they set fire to their abandoned tents and carried off all the baggage: in this part therefore the Corinthians and their allies were vanquished, and the Corcyreans were plainly superior. But in the left, where the Corinthians personally engaged, they easily prevailed, as twenty ships of the Corcyreans, and those too from a number at first inferior, were gone off in the pursuit. But the Athenians, seeing the Corcyreans thus distressed, now came up to their support more openly than before, having hitherto refrained from any direct attack. And when the chase was clearly begun, and the Corinthians followed their success, then every one amongst them applied himself to action. There was no longer any time for discretion: Corinthians and Athenians were forced by absolute necessity to engage one another.

The chase being thus begun, the Corinthians towed not after them the hulks of the vessels they had sunk, but turned all their attention to the men who were floating about, and cruized at large more to slaughter than take alive.

And, having not yet discovered the defeat of their right, they slaughtered through ignorance their own friends. For the number of ships being large on either side, and covering a wide extent of sea, after the first confusion of the engagement they were not able easily to distinguish which were the victors or which the vanquished: since Grecians against Grecians had never at any time before engaged at sea with so large a number of vessels. But after the Corinthians had pursued the Corcyreans to land, they returned to look after their shattered vessels and their own dead. And most of these they took up and carried to Sybota, where also lay the land-force of their barbarian auxiliaries: this Sybota is a desert haven in Thesprotis. Having performed this duty, they gathered together again into a body and went in quest of the Corcyreans, who with those damaged vessels that yet could swim, and with all that had no damage, together with the Athenians, came out to meet them, fearing lest they might attempt to land upon their shore. It was now late in the day, and they had sung their pæan as going to attack, when on a sudden the Corinthians¹ slackened their course, having descried a reinforcement of twenty sail coming up from Athens. This second squadron the Athenians had sent away to support the former ten, fearing (what really happened) lest the Corcyreans might be vanquished, and their own ten ships be too few for their support. The Corinthians, therefore, having got a view of them, and suspecting they came from Athens, and in a larger number than they yet discovered, began gradually to fall away. They were not yet descried by the Corcyreans (for the course kept them more out of their ken), who were surprised to see the Corinthians thus slacken their course, till some, who had gained a view, informed them that such ships are coming up, and then they also fell back themselves: for now it began to be dark, and the Corinthians being turned about had dissolved their order. In this manner they were separated from one another: and the naval engagement ended with the night.

The Corcyreans having recovered their sta-

¹ The original is *περὶ τὸν ἑκπλοῦν*, they knocked the hind deck, a phrase elegantly applied by Thucydides to those that retreat fighting, and still facing their enemies. It was done by running their ships backwards upon their hind decks in order to tack about. See Potter's *Archæologia*, vol. II. c. 20.

tion at Leucymna, those twenty ships from Athens, under the command of Glauco the son of Leager, and Andocides the son of Leogoras, having passed through floating carcasses and wrecks, came up to the station, not long after they had been descried. Yet the Corcyreans (for now it was night) were in great consternation lest they should be enemies: but they were soon known, and then came to an anchor.

Next morning the thirty Athenian ships, accompanied by such of the Corcyreans as were fit for sea, weighed away and made over for the haven at Sybota where the Corinthians lay, designing to try whether or no they would engage again. The Corinthians, putting their ships from off the shore and drawing up into order in the deeper water, remained there without advancing. They had no design or inclination to begin another engagement, as they were sensible of the junction of the fresh Athenian ships, and of the numerous difficulties with which they were beset, about the custody of the prisoners whom they had on board, and the want of necessary materials to repair their ships upon this desert coast. Their thoughts were more employed upon their return home, and the method to accomplish it, from the apprehension lest the Athenians, judging the league to be broke as they had come to blows, might obstruct their passage. For this reason they determined beforehand to despatch a boat with proper persons, though without the solemn protection of a herald, and so to sound their intentions. The message to be delivered was this:

"You are guilty of injustice, ye men of Athens, in beginning war and violating treaties: for you hinder us from taking due vengeance upon our enemies, by lifting up your arms against us. If you are certainly determined to hinder our course, either against Corcyra or any other place whither we are willing to go, and so violate treaties, take us first who are here in your power, and treat us as enemies."

The persons sent thus delivered their message: and the whole company of the Corcyreans who heard it, shouted out immediately to "apprehend and put them to death." But the Athenians returned this answer.

"We neither begin war, ye men of Peloponnesus, nor violate treaties. We are come hither auxiliaries to these Corcyreans our allies. If therefore you are desirous to sail to

any other place, we hinder you not. But, if you go against Corcyra or any other place belonging to it, we shall endeavor to oppose you, to the utmost of our power."

Upon receiving this answer from the Athenians, the Corinthians prepared for their return home, and erected a trophy at Sybota on the continent. But the Corcyreans were employed in picking up the wrecks and bodies of the dead, driving towards them by favour of the tide and the wind, which blowing fresh the night before had scattered them all about; and, as if they too had the victory, erected an opposite trophy at Sybota in the island. The reasons upon which each side thus claimed the victory, were these. The Corinthians erected a trophy, because they had the better of the engagement till night, and so were enabled to pick up most of the shatters and the dead; they had, further, taken a number of prisoners, not less than a thousand, and had disabled about seventy ships of the enemy.—The Corcyreans did the same: because they also had disabled about thirty; and, upon the coming up of the Athenians, had recovered all the wreck and dead bodies driving towards them; and because the Corinthians tacking about had retired from them the night before, so soon as they descried the Athenian ships; and when they came to offer them battle at Sybota, durst not come out against them. In this manner did both sides account themselves victorious.

The Corinthians, in their passage homewards, by stratagem seized Anactorium, which lieth in the mouth of the gulf of Ambracia. It belonged in common to the Corcyreans and themselves. They put it entirely into the hands of the Corinthian inhabitants, and then retired to their own home. Eight hundred of their Corcyrean prisoners who were slaves, they sold at public sale. Two hundred and fifty they reserved in safe custody, and treated them with extraordinary good usage, that after their ransom they might serve them in their design of gaining Corcyra: for the majority of them were persons of the greatest authority in that state. Thus, therefore, is Corcyra preserved in the war of the Corinthians; and the ships of the Athenians after such service left them. But this was the first ground of war to the Corinthians against the Athenians, because they had assisted the Corcyreans in a naval engagement against themselves, who were in treaty with them.

Immediately after this transaction, other misunderstandings also happened between the Athenians and Peloponnesians, tending to a war. For all the schemes of the Corinthians aiming at revenge, the Athenians, jealous of their enmity, sent an order to the inhabitants of Potidæa situated upon the isthmus of Pallene, (and, though a Corinthian colony, yet allied with and tributary to them,) "to demolish that part of their wall which faceth the Pallene, to give them hostages, to send away the *epidemiurgi*, and not to receive those magistrates for the future, who were annually sent them from Corinth." They were apprehensive of a revolt at the instigation of Perdiccas and the Corinthians, and their seducing into the same defection the other dependents of Athens in Thrace. These steps the Athenians thought proper to take with the people of Potidæa, immediately after the sea-fight of Corcyra. For the Corinthians were manifestly at variance with them, and Perdiccas the son of Alexander king of the Macedonians was now become their enemy, who before had been their ally and friend. His enmity was occasioned by an alliance the Athenians had formed with his brother Philip and Derdas, who were jointly in opposition against him. Alarmed at this, he sent proper persons to Lacedæmon to stir up against them a Peloponnesian war, and to draw over the Corinthians into his interest, in order to bring about the revolt of Potidæa. He had also been tampering with the Chalcidians of Thrace and the Bottians to persuade them to revolt at the same time; concluding, that if he could bring about a junction of the adjacent people, he might venture a war against them with greater probability of success. The Athenians perceived his scheme, and were desirous to prevent the revolt of the cities. They had begun an expedition against his territories with a fleet of thirty ships and a thousand heavy-armed, under the command of Archestratus the son of Lycomedes associated with ten others in this service. They gave particular orders to the commanders to take hostages from the Potidæans and to demolish their walls, and to keep a watchful eye over the neighbouring cities that they might not revolt. The Potidæans had already sent ambassadors to the Athenians, to dissuade them if possible from the execution of any new designs against them: and had at the same time despatched an embassy to Lacedæmon

along with the Corinthians, instructed to procure a promise of redress if there should be occasion. But, when their long negotiation at Athens proved quite ineffectual, and the fleet was gone out to sea both against Macedonia and themselves; when, farther, the regency at Lacedæmon had given a promise to make an irruption into Attica, if the Athenians should attempt any thing against Potidæa; upon this encouragement, without loss of time, they revolt in conjunction with the Chalcidians and Bottians, all combined by an oath of mutual defence and support. Perdiccas, farther, prevaileth with the Chalcidians to abandon and demolish all their towns upon the sea-coast, and then to remove to Olynthus and fortify that town by a junction of all their strength. And to these people, thus abandoning their own homes, he made a cession of that part of Mygdonia which lieth round the lake of Bolbe, for their subsistence during the war with the Athenians. Having thus demolished their own cities, they went to another place of residence, and were employed in preparations for the war.

The thirty ships of the Athenians, arriving on the coasts of Thrace, find Potidæa and the other cities already revolted. The commanders, judging it impossible with their present strength to act against Perdiccas and the revolted cities both, turn their course towards Macedonia, pursuing the first design of the expedition. Landing there they joined in the war with Philip and the brothers of Derdas, who with an army had made an irruption from the inland country.

In the mean time, Potidæa being now in revolt and the Athenian fleet on the Macedonian coasts, the Corinthians, anxious for the security of that place, and making the danger their own, despatched thither some volunteers of their own people and other Peloponnesians taken into their pay, in all sixteen hundred heavy-armed¹ and four hundred light-armed. The command of this body of men was given to Aristæus the son of Adamantus; since, out of their own private affection to him who had

¹ The heavy-armed wore a complete suit of armour, and engaged with broad shields and long spears. They were the flower and strength of the Grecian armies, and had the highest rank of military honour. The light-armed were designed for skirmishes and fighting at a distance: their weapons were arrows, darts, or slings. The targeteers mentioned often in this history, were a middle sort of soldiery, armed with targets or narrow shields and spears, neither large nor heavy.

ever been a steady friend to Potidæa, most of the volunteers from Corinth had undertaken the service; and the time of their arrival in Thrace was the fortieth day after the revolt of Potidæa.

An express soon arrived at Athens with the news of the revolt of the cities, and when afterwards they heard of the arrival of that body under Aristæus, they send away two thousand of their heavy armed, and forty ships under the command of Callias the son of Calliades, and four colleagues, to reduce the revolted. These, arriving first of all in Macedonia, find the former thousand employed in besieging Pydne, having a little before got possession of Therme. They sat down with them for a time to carry on the siege of Pydne; but afterwards, making with Perdicas a composition and alliance the best they could in their present exigency, since Potidæa and the arrival of Aristæus were very urgent points, they evacuate Macedonia. They marched next to Berræa; and turning from thence, after having first made an unsuccessful attempt upon the place, they marched by land towards Potidæa. Their army consisted of three thousand heavy-armed of their own, without including a large body of auxiliaries, and six hundred Macedonian horse, who had served with Philip and Pausanias; seventy ships at the same time sailed along the coast. And thus, by moderate marches, they came up in three days to Gigonus, and there encamped.

The Potidæans, with the body of Peloponnesians commanded by Aristæus, excepting the Athenians, had formed a camp near Olynthus, within the isthmus, and had a market kept for them without the city. The command of the infantry had been given to Aristæus by the voice of the confederates, and that of the cavalry to Perdicas; for now again he had abruptly broken with the Athenians and joined the Potidæans, deputing Iolaus to command in his absence. It was the design of Aristæus, by encamping the body under his own command within the isthmus, to observe the motions of the Athenians if they advanced, whilst without the isthmus, the Chalcidians and allies, and two hundred horse belonging to Perdicas, should continue at Olynthus, who, when the Athenians came forwards against them, were to throw themselves in their rear, and thus shut up the enemy between the two bodies. But Callias, the general of the Athe-

nians, in concert with his colleagues, detaches the Macedonian horse, and a few of their allies, to Olynthus, to prevent any sally from thence; and then, breaking up their camp, they marched directly for Potidæa. But, when they were advanced as far as the isthmus, and saw their enemies drawn up in order to fight, they also formed; and in a little time they came to an action. The wing under Aristæus, Corinthians and the very flower of their strength, who engaged with him, soon compelled their enemies to turn their backs, and pursued execution to a great distance; but the rest of the army, composed of Potidæans and Peloponnesians, were defeated by the Athenians, and chased to the very walls of Potidæa. Aristæus, returning from his pursuit, perceived the rout of the rest of the army, and knew not whither, with the least hazard, to retreat, whether to Olynthus or Potidæa. But, at last, he determined to embody together those he had about him, and, as Potidæa lay at the smallest distance, to throw himself into it with all possible speed. This, with difficulty, he effected, by plunging into the water near the abutments of the pier, amidst a shower of missive weapons, with the loss, indeed, of some of his men, but the safety of the larger number.

Those who should have come to succour the Potidæans from Olynthus, which is at no greater distance than sixty stadia,¹ and situated in view, at the beginning of the battle, when the colours were elevated,² advanced, indeed, a little way, as designing to do it, and the Macedonian horse drew up against them as designing to stop them. But, as the victory was quickly gained by the Athenians, and the colours were dropped, they retired again within the walls, and the Macedonians marched away to the Athenians: so that the cavalry of neither side had any share in the action. After the battle the Athenians erected a trophy, and granted a suspension of arms to the Potidæans for fetching off their dead. There were killed of the Potidæans and allies very near three

¹ About six miles.

² The elevation of the colours or ensigns, was the signal of joining battle, and they were kept up during the whole continuance of it: the depression of them, was a signal to desist, or the consequence of a defeat. The depression of the colours in this instance, was a proof to the Macedonian cavalry, that all was over. The Athenians in their colours bore an owl, as sacred to Minerva, the tutelary goddess of Athens. See Potter's *Archæologia Græca*, vol. ii. c. 9.

undred, and of the Athenians one hundred and fifty, with Callias their general.

The Athenians without loss of time, throwing up a work against the wall which faceth the isthmus, blockaded the place on that side, but the wall towards the Pallene they left as they found it. For they thought their number was by no means sufficient to keep the guard within the isthmus, and to pass over to the Pallene side, and block it up also there. They were apprehensive, that thus divided, the Potidæans and their allies might fall upon them. And the Athenians at home, hearing there was no work on the Pallene side, sent thither a thousand and six hundred heavy-armed of their own people, under the command of Phormio the son of Asophius, who arriving upon the Pallene, and having landed his men at Leptis, marched forward to Potidæa, advancing slowly and laying waste the country as he moved along. And, as nobody ventured out to give him opposition, he also threw up a work against that side of the wall which faceth the Pallene. By these methods was Potidæa closely blocked up on either side, and also by the ships which lay before it at sea.

The blockade being thus perfected, Aristæus, destitute of any means of saving the place, unless some relief should arrive from Peloponnesus, or some miracle should happen, proposed it as his advice, that "all excepting five hundred men should lay hold of the first favourable wind to quit the place, that the provisions might for a longer time support the rest;" declaring his own readiness to be one of those who staid behind." Though he could not prevail with them, yet willing in this juncture to do what could be done, and to manage affairs abroad in the best manner he was able, he made his escape by sea undiscovered by the Athenian guard. Continuing now amongst the Chalcideans, he made what military efforts he could, and killed many of the inhabitants of Sermyle by an ambuscade formed before that city; and endeavoured to prevail with the Peloponnesians to send up timely relief. Phormio, also, after completing the works round Potidæa, with his sixteen hundred men ravaged Chalcidica and Othrea; and some fortresses he took by storm.

These were the reciprocal causes of dissension between the Athenians and Peloponnesians. The Corinthians were enraged at the blockade of Potidæa, a colony of their

own, in which were shut up both Corinthians and other Peloponnesians. The Athenians resented the proceedings of the Peloponnesians, in seducing to a revolt a city in alliance with and tributary to them, and siding openly, by a voluntary expedition, with the warring rebels of Potidæa. Yet a war, open and avowed, had not yet broke out between them; hostilities were suspended for a time. Hitherto it was merely a private quarrel of the Corinthians.

But when once the blockade of Potidæa was formed, the Corinthians could hold no longer. In it their own people were shut up, and they were at the same time in anxiety about the place. They summoned their allies to repair immediately to Lacedæmon, and thither they went themselves, with loud accusations against the Athenians, "that they had violated the treaty, and injured Peloponnesus." The Æginetæ, indeed, from a dread of the Athenians, did not openly despatch their embassy; but underhand they had a great share in fomenting the war, asserting, that "they were restrained in the privilege of governing themselves, which had been allowed them by the treaty."

The Lacedæmonians, summoning to appear before them, not barely their allies, but whoever had any manner of charge to prefer against the Athenians, assembled in grand council, as usual, and commanded them to speak; others who were present laid open their respective complaints, but the Megareans preferred the largest accusations, in particular, that, "they had been prohibited the use of all the harbours in the Athenian dominions, and the market of Athens, contrary to the treaty." The Corinthians were the last who stood forth. Having first allowed sufficient time to others to exasperate the Lacedæmonians, they preferred their own charge as followeth:—

"That faith, ye Lacedæmonians, which ever both in public conduct and in private life, you so punctually observe, rendereth what others, what we ourselves, may have to say, more difficult to be believed. By it you have gained indeed the reputation of probity, but contract a prejudicial ignorance in regard to remote occurrences. For, though we have frequently suggested to you, what wrongs we were apprehensive of receiving from the Athenians, yet have you not deigned to make inquiry into the grounds of those suggestions, but rather have suspected our ingenuity as speaking from selfish

views and private resentments. And it is not to prevent our sufferings, but now, when we already feel their weight, that you convene these confederates together; before whom, we ought to be indulged in a larger share of discourse, as we have by much the largest share of complaints to utter; wronged as we have been by the Athenians, and by you neglected.

10

"If indeed by treachery, lurking and unobserved, they had violated the peace of Greece, those who had not discerned it might justly have demanded explicit proofs. But now, what need can there be of multiplying words, when some you already see enslaved; against others, and those not the meanest of your allies, the same fate intended; and the aggressors fully prepared to receive you, if at length a war should be declared? With other views, they had not clandestinely laid hands on Corcyra and forcibly detained it from us, nor had they dared to block up Potidæa; of which places, this latter lieth the most convenient for extending our power in Thrace, the former could supply Peloponnesus with the greatest navy. But to your account these events are to be charged, who after the invasion of the Medes first suffered the strength of Athens to be increased, and afterwards their long walls to be erected. Ever since you have connived at liberty overthrown, not only in whatever communities they have proceeded to enslave, but now where even your own confederates are concerned. For not to the men who rivet on the chains of slavery, but to such as, though able, yet neglect to prevent it, ought the sad event with truth to be imputed; especially when assuming superior virtue they boast themselves the deliverers of Greece.

"With much ado we are now met together in council, but not even now upon the plain and obvious points. We ought not to be any longer debating whether we have been injured, but by what measures we should avenge ourselves. The aggressors, having long since planned out their proceedings, are not about to make, but are actually making attacks upon those, who are yet come to no resolution. Nor are we unexperienced by what steps, what gradual advances, the Athenians break in upon their neighbours. Imagining themselves to be still undiscovered, they show themselves the less audacious because you are insensible. But when once they know you alarmed and on your guard, they will press more resolutely forwards.

For you, Lacedæmonians, are the only people of Greece, who sit indolently at ease, protecting not with present but with promised succour: you alone pull down, not the commencing but the redoubled strength of your foes. You have indeed enjoyed the reputation of being steady, but are indebted for it more to report than fact. We ourselves know, that the Persians had advanced from the ends of the earth quite into Peloponnesus, before you exerted your dignity in resistance. Now also you take no notice of the Athenians, not remote as he was but seated near you; and, instead of invading them, choose rather to lie upon your defence against their invasions; and, to expose yourselves more to the hazards of war, against a grown augmented power. And all this while you know, that the Barbarian was guilty of many errors in his conduct: and the very Athenians frequently, in their contests with us, have been defeated more through their own blunders than the vigour of your resistance; for their confidence in you hath caused the destruction of some, who upon that very confidence were taken unprepared.

"Let no one in this assembly imagine, that we speak more from malice than just grounds of complaint. Complaint is just toward friends who have failed in their duty; accusation is against enemies guilty of injustice. And surely, if any people ever had, we have good reason to think we have ample cause to throw blame upon our neighbours; especially, when such great embroilments have arose, of which you seem to have no manner of feeling, and ever once to have reflected, in regard to the Athenians, with what sort of people, how big, and how in every point unlike yourselves, yet must soon contend. They are a people fond of innovations, quick not only to contrive, but to put their schemes into effectual execution: your method is, to preserve what you already have, to know nothing further, and when in action to leave something needful ever unfinished. They again are daring beyond their strength, adventurous beyond the bounds of judgment, and in extremities full of hope: your method is, in action to drop below your power, never resolutely to follow the dictates of your judgment, and in the pressure of calamity to despair of a deliverance. Ever active as they are, they stand against you who are habitually indolent: ever roaming about against you who think it misery to lose sight

your homes. Their view in shifting place is to enlarge their possessions: you imagine, that foreign attempts you may lose your present æsthetic enjoyments. They, when once they have gained superiority over enemies, push forward as far as they can go; and if defeated, dispirited the least of all men. More than that, they are as lavish of their lives in the public service, as if those lives were not their own, whilst their resolution is ever in their power, ever ready to be exerted in the cause of their country. Whenever in their schemes they meet with disappointments, they reckon they have lost a share of their property: when their schemes are successful, the acquisition seems small in comparison with what they have farther in design: if they are baffled in executing a project, invigorated by reviving hope, they catch at fresh expedients to repair the damage. They are the only people who simultaneously project, and hope, and acquire; and expeditious are they in executing whatever they determine. Thus, through toils and dangers they labour forwards so long as life continues, never at leisure to enjoy what they nearly have, through a constant eagerness to acquire more. They have no other notion of festival, than of a day whereon some needful thing should be accomplished; and inactive it is more a torment to them than laborious employment. In short, if any one, abridging their characters, should say, they are formed by nature never to be at quiet themselves, nor suffer others to be so, he describeth them truly.

"When such a state hath taken the lists of position against you, do ye dally, O Lacedæmonians! do you imagine that those people will not continue longest in the enjoyment of peace, who timely prepare to vindicate themselves, and manifest a settled resolution to do themselves right whenever they are wronged? We, indeed, are so far observers of equity, as never to molest others, and stand on your guard merely to repel damage from yourselves; points you would not without difficulty secure, though this neighbouring state were governed by the same principles as you are; and now, as we have already shown you, your customs, compared with them, are quite obsolete; whereas, those which progressively improve, must, like all the works of art, be ever the best. Were, indeed, the continuance of peace ensured, unvarying manners would cer-

tainly be preferable; but such people as are liable to frequent vicissitudes of foreign contest, have need of great address to vary and refine their conduct. For this cause, the manners of the Athenians, improved by a long tract of experience, are formed in respect of yours upon a model entirely new. Here, therefore, be the period fixed to that slow-moving policy you have hitherto observed. Hasten to the relief of others, to that of the Potidæans, as by contract you are bound. Invade Attica without loss of time, that you may not leave your friends and your relations in the mercy of their most inveterate foes, and constrain us, through your sloth, to seek redress from a new alliance. Such a step, if taken by us, could neither scandalize the gods who take cognizance of solemn oaths, nor men who own their obligation; for treaties are not violated by those who, left destitute by some, have recourse to others, but by such as, being sworn to give it, withhold their assistance in the time of need. Yet, if you are willing and ready to perform your parts, with you we firmly abide. In changing then, we should be guilty of impiety; and we never shall find others so nicely suited to the disposition of our own hearts. Upon these points form proper resolutions; and exert yourselves, that the honour of Peloponnesus be not impaired under your guidance, who have received from your ancestors this great preeminence."

To this effect the Corinthians spoke. And it happened, that at this very juncture an Athenian embassy was at Lacedæmon, negotiating some other points; who, so soon as they were advertised of what had been said, judged it proper to demand an audience of the Lacedæmonians. It was not their design to make the least reply to the accusations preferred against them by the complainant states, but in general to convince them, that "they ought not to form any sudden resolutions, but to consider matters with sedate deliberation." They were further desirous "to represent before them, the extensive power of their own state, to excite in the minds of the elder a recollection of those points they already knew, and to give the younger information in those of which they were ignorant;" concluding, that "such a representation might turn their attention more to pacific measures than military operations." Addressing themselves, therefore, to the Lacedæmonians, they expressed their desire to speak

in the present assembly, if leave could be obtained. An order of admittance being immediately sent them, they approached, and delivered themselves as followeth :

“ It was not the design of this our embassy to enter into disputations with your confederates, but to negotiate the points for which our state hath employed us. Yet, having been advertised of the great outcry raised against us, hither we have repaired : not to throw in our plea against the accusations of the complainant states ; for you are not the judges before whom either we or they are bound to plead : but, to prevent your forming rash and prejudicial resolutions, upon concerns of high importance, through the instigation of these your confederates. Our view is, farther, to convince you, notwithstanding the long comprehensive charge exhibited against us, that we possess with credit what we have hitherto obtained, and that the state of Athens is deserving of honour and regard.

“ And what need is there here to go back to remote antiquity, where hearsay tradition must establish those facts to which the eyes of the audience are utter strangers? This we shall waive ; and call forth first to your review the Persian invasions, and those incidents of which you are conscious, without regarding that chagrin which the remembrance of them will constantly excite in you. Our achievements there were attended with the utmost danger : the consequence was public benefit, of which you received a substantial share : and though the glory of that acquisition may not be all our own, yet of a beneficial share we ought not to be deprived. This shall boldly be averred ; not with a view of soothing you, but doing justice to ourselves, and giving you to know against what a state, if your resolutions now are not discreetly taken, you are going to engage. For we aver, that we alone adventured to engage the barbarian in that most dangerous field of Marathon. And when, upon the second invasion, we were not able to make head by land, we threw ourselves on shipboard with all our people, to fight in conjunction with you by sea, at Salamis ; which prevented his sailing along the coasts of Peloponnesus, and destroying one by one your cities, unable to succour one another against that formidable fleet. The truth of this, the barbarian himself hath undeniably proved : for, thus defeated at sea, and unable to gather together again so

large a force, he hastily retired with the part of his army. In this so wonderful event, where beyond dispute the presee of Greece was achieved at sea, the three advantageous instruments were contributed us—the largest number of shipping—a of the greatest abilities to command—a most intrepid courage. For the number of ships, amounting in all to four hundred nearly two-thirds were our own. Them was the commander, to whom principally was owing that the battle was fought in straits, which was undeniably the means that great deliverance : and you yourself him extraordinary honour on that very account more than ever to any stranger who appeared amongst you. We ourselves, further, on this occasion, the most courage ; since, though none before us up to our succour, and every state already enslaved had opened the road against us, bravely determined to abandon even us to destroy our own effects, nor, like the reality of those who were yet undemolished desert the common cause, or disperse themselves to become useless to our allies, but embark at once, to face the urgent danger without the least resentment against y

¹ Herodotus relates, that after the great victory at Salamis, “ the Grecians sailed to the Isthmus, to the prize upon him who had deserved best of them by his behaviour in the war. But upon their assembling, when the commanders gave in their billets on that of Neptune, in which they had wrote the names of those who had behaved best, and of him who was judged to have given the preference to his own, but most of them agreed in awarding the second prize to Themistocles. Thus, while each competitor only honoured with his own single voice for the first place, Themistocles was clearly adjudged to be the second. Envy prevented the Grecians from making a just declaration, and they broke up separated, leaving the point undecided. Themistocles, however, was celebrated and honoured as the man who in prudence far surpassed all the Grecians alive. Thus denied the honour due to him, for he undoubtedly excelled them all in the affair of Salamis, he immediately repaired to Lacedemon, desirous of justice done him there. The Lacedemonians received him nobly, and honoured him abundantly. They indeed, to Euribiades the crown of olive, as first in valor, but for wisdom and dexterity they bestowed a second crown of olive on Themistocles. They presented him further with the first chariot in Sparta. And as much applause, he was conducted, in his return, to the frontier of Tegea, by three hundred picked Spartans who composed the royal guard. He was the only person ever known to have received such a compliment from the Spartans.” Herodotus in Urania.

your preceding backwardness of aid. So that we aver the service we then did you, to be no less than what we afterwards received. For to our aid, indeed, at last you came, from cities yet inhabited, from cities you ever designed should still be inhabited, when once you were alarmed for your own safety much more than for ours. So long as we were safe, your presence was in vain expected: but we, launching forth from a city no longer our own, and hazarding our all for a place we almost despaired of recovering, effected our own preservation, and with it in a great measure yours. Had we, overcome with fear, gone over early to the Mede, as others did, to save our lands; had we afterwards not dared, as men undone beyond recovery, to throw ourselves on board; you had never been obliged to fight at sea, as not having sufficient strength to do it; but the invader without a struggle would have leisurely determined the fate of Greece.

27
 "Do we then deserve, Lacedemonians, that violence of envy with which the Grecians behold us, for the courage we manifested then, for our judicious resolution, and the superior power we now enjoy? That power, superior as it is, was by no means the effect of violent encroachments. You would not abide with us to glean away the relics of the Barbarian war. To us the associated states were obliged to have recourse, and entreat us to lead them to its completion. Thus, by the necessary exigence of affairs, obliged to be in action, we have advanced our power to what it now is: at first, from a principle of fear; then from the principle of honour; and at length, from that of interest. When envied by many, when obliged to reduce to their obedience some who had revolted, when you, no longer well disposed towards us, were actuated by jealousy and malice; we thought it not consistent with our security to endanger our welfare by giving up our power, since every revolt from us was an accession of strength to you. No part of mankind will fix any reproach on men who try every expedient to ward off extremities of danger. Nay, it is your own method also, Lacedemonians, to manage the states of Peloponnesus as suits your own interest best, and to prescribe them law. And, had you abided with us, and persevered in that invidious superiority as we have done, we are well convinced that you would soon have grown no less

odious to your allies; and so obliged either to have ruled with rigour, or to have risked the loss of your all. It followeth, therefore, that we have done nothing to raise surprise, nothing to disappoint the human expectation, in accepting a superiority voluntarily assured, in firmly maintaining it thus accepted, upon those most prevailing principles of honour, and fear, and interest.

"The maxim by which we have acted was not first broached by us, since it hath been ever allowed, that inferiors should be controlled by their superiors. To be the latter we thought ourselves deserving: you thought so till now, when private interests engaging your attention, you begin to cry out for justice, which no people ever yet so studiously practised, as, when able to carry a point by strength, to check their inclination and let it drop. And worthy, farther, are they of applause, who pursuing the dictates of human nature, in gaining rule over others, observe justice more steadily than their scope of power requireth from them. And so far we have reason to conclude, that were our power lodged in other hands, plain evidence would soon decide with what peculiar moderation we use it: though, so hard indeed is our lot, that calumny and not applause hath been the consequence of such our lenity. In suits of contract against our dependents we are often worsted; and though ever submitting to fair and impartial trials in our own courts, we are charged with litigiousness. Not one of them reflecteth, that those who are absolute in other places, and treat not their dependents with that moderation which we observe, are for that very reason exempted from reproach: for, where lawless violence is practised there can be no room for appeals to justice. But our dependents, accustomed to contest with us upon equal footing, if they suffer never so little damage where they fancy equity to be along with them, either by a judicial sentence or the decision of reigning power, express no gratitude for the greater share of poverty they yet enjoy, but resent with higher chagrin the loss of such a pittance, than if at first we had set law aside, and seized their all with open violence; even in this case, they could not presume to deny, that inferiors ought to submit to their superiors. But mankind, it seemeth, resent the acts of injustice more deeply than the acts of violence: those, coming from an equal, are looked upon as rapines:

these, coming from a superior, are complied with as necessities. The far more grievous oppression of the Medæ they bore with patience, but our government they look upon as severe; it may be so; for to subjects the present is always grievous. If you therefore by our overthrow should gain the ascendant over them, you would soon perceive that good disposition towards you, which a dread of us hath occasioned, to be vanishing away; especially should you exert your superiority according to the specimens you gave during your short command against the Medæ. For the institutions established here amongst yourselves have no affinity with those of other places: and more than this, not one Spartan amongst you, when delegated to a foreign charge, either knoweth how to apply his own, or make use of those of the rest of Greece.

"Form your resolutions therefore with great deliberation, as on points of no small importance. Hearken not so far to the opinions and calumnies of foreign states as to embroil your own domestic tranquility. Reflect in time on the great uncertainty of war, before you engage in it. Protracted into long continuance, it is generally used to end in calamities, from which we are now at an equal distance; and to the lot of which of us they will fall, lieth yet to be determined by the hazardous event. Men who run eagerly to arms are first of all intent on doing some exploits, which ought in point of time to be second to something more important; and when smarting with distress, they have recourse to reason. But since we are by no means guilty of such rashness ourselves, nor as yet perceive it in you, we exhort you, whilst healing measures are in the election of us both, not to break the treaty, not to violate your oaths, but to submit the points in contest to fair arbitration, according to the articles subsisting between us. If not, we here invoke the gods, who take cognizance of oaths, to bear us witness, that we shall endeavour to revenge ourselves upon the authors of a war, by whatever methods yourselves shall set us an example."

80 These things were said by the Athenian embassy. And when the Lacedæmonians had thus heard the accusations of their allies against the Athenians, and what the Athenians had urged in their turn, ordering all parties to withdraw, they proceeded to serious consultation amongst themselves. The majority agreed in

the opinion, that "the Athenians were already guilty of injustice, and that a war ought to be immediately declared." But Archidamus their king, esteemed a man of good understanding and temper, standing forth, expressed his own sentiments thus:

"I have learned myself by the experience of many wars, and I see many of you, ye Lacedæmonians, as great proficient in years as I am, that no one should be fond of an enterprise because it is new, which is a vulgar weakness, judging it thence both advisable and safe. The war, which is at present the subject of your consultation, you will find, if examined discreetly, to bode a very long continuance. Against Peloponnesians, it is true, and borderers upon ourselves, we have ever a competent force in readiness, and by expeditious steps can advance against any of them. But against a people whose territories are far remote, who are further most expert in naval skill, who with all the expedients of war are most excellently provided, with wealth both private and public, with shipping, with horses, with arms, and with men, far beyond what any other state in Greece can singly pretend to; who, more than this, have numerous dependent states upon whom they levy tribute—where is the necessity sanguinely to wish for war against such a people? and wherein is our dependence, if thus unprepared we should declare it against them? Is it on our naval force? But in that we are inferior: and if to this we shall apply our care, and advance ourselves to an equality with them, why this will be a work of time. Or, is it on our wealth? In this we are yet much more deficient; and neither have it in any public fund, nor can readily raise it from private purses. But the confidence of some may perhaps be buoyed up with our superiority in arms and numbers, so that we may easily march into their territory and lay it waste: yet other territories, and of large extent, are subject to their power, and by sea they will import all necessary supplies. If, further, we tempt their dependents to a revolt, we shall want a naval strength to support them in it, as the majority of them are seated upon islands. What therefore will be the event of this our war? For if we are unable either to overpower them at sea, or divert those revenues by which their navy is supported, we shall only by acting prejudice ourselves. And in such a situation to be forced to give it up will be a blemish

on our honour; especially if we shall be thought to have been the authors of the breach. For let us not be puffed up with idle hope that this war must soon be over, if we can lay their territory waste; I have reason on better grounds to apprehend, that we shall leave it behind as a legacy to our children. It is by no means consistent with the spirit of Athenians either to be slaves to their soil, or, like unpractised soldiers, to shudder at a war. Nor again, on the other hand, am I so void of sensibility as to advise you to give up your confederates to their outrage, or wilfully to connive at their encroachments; but only not yet to have recourse to arms, to send ambassadors to prefer our complaints, without betraying too great an eagerness for war, or any tokens of pusillanimity. By pausing thus, we may get our own affairs in readiness, by augmenting our strength through an accession of allies, either Grecian or Barbarian, wheresoever we can procure supplies of ships or money. And the least room there cannot be for censure, when a people in the state we are in at present, exposed to all the guiles of the Athenians, endeavour to save themselves not merely by Grecian but even by Barbarian aid. And at the same time let us omit no resource within the reach of our own ability.

"If, indeed, upon our sending an embassy, they will hearken to reason, that will be the happiest for us all. If not; after two or three years' delay, then better provided, we may, if it be thought expedient, take the field against them. But in good time, perhaps, when they see our preparations and the intent of them clearly explained by our own declarations, they may make each requisite concession, before their territory is destroyed by ravage, and whilst yet they may save their property from utter devastation. Regard their territory, I beseech you, in no other light than as a hostage for their good behaviour, and the more firmly such the better may be its culture. Of this we ought to be sparing as long as possible, that we drive them not into desperate fury, and render more unpracticable their defeat. For if, thus unprovided as we are, and worked up to anger by the instigations of our confederates, we at once begin this ravage, reflect whether we shall not taint its reputation, and the more embroil Peloponnesus; since accusations as well of states as private persons it is possible to clear away; but in a war, begun by

general concurrence for the sake of a single party, which it is impossible to see how far it will extend, we cannot at pleasure desist, and preserve our honour.

"Let no one think it a mark of pusillanimity, that many as we are we do not rush immediately upon one single state. That state has as large a number of dependants who contribute to its support: and a war is not so much of arms as of money, by which arms are rendered of service; and the more so, when a landed power is contending against a naval. Be it therefore our earliest endeavour to provide amply for this, nor let us prematurely be too much fermented by the harangues of our allies. Let us, to whose account the event, whatever it be, will be principally charged—let us, with sedate deliberation, endeavour in some degree to foresee it; and be not in the least ashamed of that slow and dilatory temper for which the Corinthians so highly reproach you. For through too great precipitancy you will come more slowly to an end, because you set out without proper preparations. The state of which we are the constituents, hath ever been free and most celebrated by fame: and that reproach can at most be nothing but the inborn sedateness of our minds. By this we are distinguished, as the only people who never grow insolent with success, and who never are abject in adversity. And when again they invite us to hazardous attempts by uttering our praise, the delight of hearing must not raise our spirits above our judgment. If any, farther, endeavour to exasperate us by a flow of invective, we are not by that to be provoked the sooner to compliance. From tempers evenly balanced it is, that we are warm in the field of battle, and cool in the hours of debate: the former, because a sense of duty hath the greatest influence over a sedate disposition, and magnanimity the keenest sense of shame: and good we are at debate, as our education is not polite enough to teach us a contempt of laws, and by its severity giveth us so much good sense as never to disregard them. We are not a people so impertinently wise, as to invalidate the preparations of our enemies by a plausible harangue, and then absurdly proceed to a contest; but we reckon the thoughts of our neighbours to be of a similar cast with our own, and that hazardous contingencies are not to be determined by a speech. We always presume that the projects of our ene-

mies are judiciously planned, and then seriously prepare to defeat them. For we ought not to found our success upon the hope that they will certainly blunder in their conduct, but that we have omitted no proper step for our own security. We ought not to imagine, there is so mighty difference between man and man; but that he is the most accomplished who hath been regularly trained through a course of needful industry and toil.

"Such is the discipline which our fathers have handed down to us; and by adhering to it, we have reaped considerable advantages. Let us not forego it now, nor in a small portion of only one day precipitately determine a point wherein so many lives, so vast an expense, so many states, and so much honour, are at stake. But let us more leisurely proceed, which our power will warrant us in doing more easily than others. Despatch ambassadors to the Athenians concerning Potidæa; despatch them concerning the complaints our allies exhibit against them; and the sooner, as they have declared a readiness to submit to fair decisions. Against men who offer this we ought not to march before they are convicted of injustice. But, during this interval, get every thing in readiness for war. Your resolutions thus will be most wisely formed, and strike into your enemies the greatest dread."

Archidamus spoke thus. But Sthenelaidas, at that time one of the ephori, standing forth the last on this occasion, gave his opinion as followeth:

"The many words of the Athenians, for my part, I do not understand. They have been exceeding large in the praise of themselves; but as to the charge against them, that they injure our allies and Peloponnesus, they have made no reply. If, in truth, they were formerly good against the Medes, but are now bad towards us, they deserve to be doubly punished; because, ceasing to be good, they are grown very bad. We continue the same persons both then and now; and shall not, if we are wise, pass over the injuries done to our allies, nor wait any longer to revenge them, since they are past waiting for their sufferings. But—other people, forsooth, have a great deal of wealth, and ships, and horses—we too have gallant allies, whom we ought not to betray to the Athenians, nor refer them to law and pleadings, since it was not by pleadings they were injured: but we ought, with all expedition and with all our

strength, to seek revenge. How we ought to deliberate when we have been wronged, let no man pretend to inform me: it would have better become those who designed to commit such wrongs, to have deliberated a long time ago. Vote then the war, Lacedæmonians, with a spirit becoming Sparta. And neither suffer the Athenians to grow still greater, nor let us betray our own confederates; but, with the gods on our side, march out against these authors of injustice."

Having spoke thus, by virtue of his office as presiding in the college of ephori,¹ he put the question in the Lacedæmonian council. But, as they vote by voice and not by ballot, he said, "he could not amidst the shout distinguish the majority;" and, being desirous that each of them, by plainly declaring his opinion, might show they were more inclined to war, he proceeded thus—"To whosoever of you, Lacedæmonians, the treaty appeareth broke, and the Athenians to be in the wrong, let him rise up and go thither," pointing out to them a certain place: "but whoever is of a contrary opinion, let him go yonder." They rose up and were divided; but a great majority was on that side which voted the treaty broke.

Upon this, calling in their confederates, they told them, "They had come to a resolution that the Athenians were guilty of injustice; but they were desirous to put it again to the vote in a general assembly of all their confederates, that by taking their measures in concert, they might briskly ply the war, if determined by common consent."

Matters being brought to this point, they departed to their respective homes, and the Athenian ambassadors, having ended their negotiations, staid not long behind. This decree of the Lacedæmonian council that "the treaty was broke," was passed in the fourteenth year of the treaty concluded for thirty years after the conquest of Eubœa. But the Lacedæmonians voted this treaty broke and a war necessary not so much out of regard to the arguments

¹ The college of Ephori (or inspectors) at Sparta consisted of five. They were annually elected by the people from their own body, and were designed to be checks upon the regal power. They never forgot the end of their institution, and in fact quite lorded it over the kings. In a word, the whole administration was lodged in their hands, and the kings were never sovereign but in the field at the head of their troops. One of the Ephori had the honour to give its style to the year, in the same manner as the first archon did at Athens.

urged by their allies, as from their own jealousy of the growing power of the Athenians. They dreaded the advancement of that power, as they saw the greatest part of Greece was already in subjection to them.

Now the method by which the Athenians had advanced their power to this invidious height was this.¹

After that the Medes, defeated by the Grecians both at land and sea, had evacuated Europe, and such of them, as escaped by sea, were utterly ruined at Mycale, Leotychides king of the Lacedæmonians, who commanded the Grecians at Mycale, returned home, drawing away with him all the confederates of Peloponnesus. But the Athenians, with the confederates of Ionia, and the Hellespont, who are now revolted from the King, continuing in those parts, laid siege to Sestus then held by the Medes; and pressing it during the winter season, the Barbarians at length abandoned the place. After this they separated, sailing away from the Hellespont, every people to their own respective countries.

But the Athenian community, when the Barbarians had evacuated their territory, immediately brought back again from their places of refuge their wives and children and all their remaining effects, and vigorously applied themselves to rebuild the city of Athens and the walls: for but a small part of these had been left standing; and their houses, most of them, had been demolished, and but a few preserved by way of lodgings for the Persian nobles. The Lacedæmonians, informed of their design, came in embassy to prevent it; partly, to gratify themselves, as they would behold with pleasure every city in Greece unwall'd like Sparta; but more to gratify their confederates, inviting them to such a step from the jealousy of the naval power of the Athenians, now greater than at any time before, and of the courage they had so bravely exerted in the war against the Medes. They required them to desist

The series of history on which Thucydides now enters, though not strictly within the compass of his subject, yet most needful to give it light, and to show how present events are connected with, and how far they resulted from, preceding, is excellent in its kind. He states important facts in the clearest and most orderly manner; he opens before us the source of the Athenian power; and by a neat and concise enumeration of notable events, conducts it to that height, which excited the jealousy of other states, and was the true political cause of the succeeding war.

from building their walls, and rather to join with them in levelling every fortification whatever without Peloponnesus. Their true meaning and their inward jealousy they endeavoured to conceal from the Athenians by the pretence that "then the Barbarian, should he again invade them, would find no stronghold from whence to assault them, as in the last instance he had done from Thebes;" alleging farther, that "Peloponnesus was a place of secure retreat and certain resource for all." To these representations of the Lacedæmonians, the Athenians, by the advice of Themistocles, made this reply, that "they would send ambassadors to them to debate this affair;" and so without further explanation dismissed them. Themistocles next advised, that "he himself might be despatched forthwith to Lacedæmon, and by no means hastily to send away the others who were to be joined in the commission with him, but to detain them till the walls were carried up to a height necessary at least for a defence; that the work should be expedited by the joint labour of all the inhabitants without exception of themselves, their wives, and their children, sparing neither public nor private edifice from whence any proper materials could be had, but demolishing all." Having thus advised them, and suggested farther what conduct he designed to observe, he sets out for Lacedæmon. Upon his arrival there, he demanded no public audience, he protracted matters and studied evasions. Whenever any person in the public administration demanded the reason why he asked not an audience, his answer was, that "he waited for the arrival of his colleagues, who were detained by urgent business: he expected that they would speedily be with him, and was surprised they are not yet come." As they had a good opinion of Themistocles, they easily acquiesced in such an answer. But other persons afterwards arriving and making clear affirmation that "the wall is carrying on, and already built up to a considerable height," they had it no longer in their power to be incredulous. Themistocles, knowing this, exhorts them, "not rashly to be biased by rumours, but rather to send away some trusty persons of their own body, who from a view might report the truth." With this proposal they comply; and Themistocles sendeth secret instructions to the Athenians how to behave to these delegates:—"to detain them, though with as little appearance

of design as possible, and by no means to dismiss them before they received again their own ambassadors: for his colleagues were by this arrived, Abronychus the son of Lysicles, and Aristides the son of Lysimachus, who brought him an assurance that the wall was sufficiently completed. His fear was, that the Lacedæmonians, when they had discovered the truth, would put them under arrest. The Athenians therefore detained the delegates according to instruction. And Themistocles, going to an audience of the Lacedæmonians, there openly declared, "that Athens was now so far walled, as to be strong enough for the defence of its inhabitants: for the future, when the Lacedæmonians or confederates sent ambassadors thither, they must address themselves to them as to a people who perfectly knew their own interest and the interest of Greece; since, when they judged it most advisable to abandon their city and go on ship-board, they asserted their native courage without Lacedæmonian support; and, in all subsequent measures taken in conjunction, had shown themselves not at all inferior in the cabinet or the field: at present therefore they judge it most expedient to have Athens defended by a wall, and thus to render it a place of greater security for their own members and for all their allies: it would not be possible, with strength inferior to that of a rival power, equally to preserve and evenly to balance the public welfare of Greece." —From hence he inferred, that "either all cities of the states which formed the Lacedæmonian league should be dismantled, or it be allowed that the things now done at Athens were just and proper." The Lacedæmonians, upon hearing this, curbed indeed all appearance of resentment against the Athenians:—they had not sent their embassy directly to prohibit, but to advise them to desist upon motives of general good: at that time also, they had a great regard for the Athenians, because of the public spirit they had shown against the Medæ:—but however, thus baffled as they were in their political views, they were inwardly provoked; and the ambassadors on each side returned home without farther embroilments.

By this conduct the Athenians in a small space of time walled their city around: and the very face of the structure sheweth plainly to this day that it was built in haste. The foundations are laid with stones of every kind, in some places not hewn so as properly to fit,

but piled on at random. Many pillars also from sepulchral monuments and carved stones were blended promiscuously in the work. For the circuit of it was every where enlarged beyond the compass of the city, and for this reason collecting the materials from every place without distinction, they lost no time.

Themistocles also persuaded them to finish the Piræus; for it was begun before this, during that year in which he himself was chief magistrate at Athens.¹ He judged the place to be very commodious, as formed by nature into three harbours; and that the Athenians, grown more than ever intent on their marine, might render it highly conducive to an enlargement of their power. For he was the first person who durst tell them, that they ought to grasp at the sovereignty of the sea, and immediately began to put the plan into execution. And by his direction it was, that they built the wall round the Piræus of that thickness which is visible to this day. For two carts carrying the stone passed along it by one another: within was neither mortar nor mud; but the entire structure was one pile of large stones, hewn square to close their angles exactly, and grappled firmly together on the outside with iron and lead: though in height it was not carried up above half so far as he intended. He contrived it to be, both in height and breadth, an impregnable rampart against hostile assaults; and he designed, that a few, and those the least able of the people, might be sufficient to man it, whilst the rest should be employed on board the fleet. His intention was chiefly confined to a navy; plainly discerning, in my opinion, that the forces of the king had a much easier way to annoy them by sea than by land. He thence judged the Piræus to be a place of much greater importance than the upper city. And this piece of advice he frequently gave the Athenians, that "if ever they were pressed hard by land, they should retire down thither, and with their naval force make head against all opponents." In this manner the Athe-

¹ The number of the Archons or Rulers was nine. They were annually elected by lot, and were required to be of noble birth, of a pure Attic descent, irreproachable both in moral and political character, dutiful to their parents, and perfectly sound in body. The first of the nine gave its style to the year, and was therefore called Eponymus or the Namer: the second was styled King; the third Polemarch; the other six in common Thesmothete. All the civil and religious affairs of the state belonged to their apartment.

nians, without losing time, after the retreat of the Medes, fortified their city, and prepared all the necessary means for their own security.

Pausanias the son of Chembrotus was sent out from Lacedæmon, as commander-in-chief of the Grecians, with twenty sail of ships from Peloponnesus, joined by thirty Athenian and a number of other allies. They bent their course against Cyprus, and reduced most of the towns there. From thence they proceeded to Byzantium, garrisoned by the Medes, and blockaded and carried the place under his directions.

But, having now grown quite turbulent in command, the other Grecians, especially the Ionians and all who had lately recovered their liberty from the royal yoke, were highly chagrined. They addressed themselves to the Athenians, requesting them "from the tie of consanguinity to undertake their protection, and not to leave them thus largely exposed to the violence of Pausanias." This request was favourably heard by the Athenians, who expressed their willingness to put a stop to their grievances, and to re-settle the general order, to the best of their power.—But during this, the Lacedæmonians recalled Pausanias, that he might answer what was laid to his charge. Many of the Grecians had carried to them accusations against him for an unjust abuse of his power, since in his behaviour he resembled more a tyrant than a general. And it so fell out, that he was recalled just at the time when the confederates, out of hatred to him, had ranged themselves under the Athenian orders, excepting those troops which were of Peloponnesus. Upon his return to Lacedæmon, he was convicted upon trial of misdemeanours towards particulars, but of the heaviest part of the charge he is acquitted; for the principal accusation against him was an attachment to the Medish interest; and it might be judged too clear to stand in need of proof. Him therefore they no longer intrust with the public command, but appoint in his stead Dorcis with some colleagues to command what little force of their own remained. To these the confederates would no longer yield the supreme command; which so soon as they perceived, they returned home. And here the Lacedæmonians desisted from commissioning any others to take upon them that post; fearing, lest those who should be sent might by their behaviour

still more prejudice the Lacedæmonian interest, a case they had reason to dread from the behaviour of Pausanias. They were now grown desirous to rid themselves of the Medish war: they acknowledged the Athenians had good pretensions to enjoy the command, and at that time were well affected towards them.

The Athenians having in this manner obtained the supreme command, by the voluntary tender of the whole confederacy in consequence of their aversion to Pausanias: they fixed by their own authority the quotas whether of ships or money which each state was to furnish against the Barbarian. The colour pretended was "to revenge the calamities they had hitherto suffered, by carrying hostilities into the dominions of the king." This gave its first rise to the Athenian office of General Receivers of Greece,¹ whose business it was to collect this tribute: for the contribution of this money was called by that title. The first tribute levied in consequence of this amounted to four hundred and sixty talents. Delos was appointed to be their treasury; and the sittings were held in the temple there.

Their command was thus at first over free and independent confederates, who sat with them at council, and had a vote in public revolutions. The enlargement of their authority was the result of wars, and their own political management during the interval between the invasion of the Medes and the present war, when the contests were against the Barbarian, or their own allies endeavouring at a change, or those of the Peloponnesians who interfered on every occasion on purpose to molest them. Of these I have subjoined a particular detail, and have ventured a digression from my subject, because this piece of history hath been omitted by all preceding writers. They have either confined their accounts to the affairs of Greece prior in time,

¹ This nice and difficult point was adjusted by Aristides, to the general satisfaction of all parties concerned. Greece conferred upon him this most important trust, he was called to this delicate commission by the united voice of his country; "Poor (says Plutarch) when he set about it, but poorer when he had finished it." The Athenian state was now furnished with a large annual fund, by which it was enabled not only to annoy the foreign enemies of Greece, but even those Greeks who should at any time presume to oppose the measures of Athens. They soon found out that their own city was a more convenient place for keeping this treasure than the isle of Delos, and accordingly took care to remove it thither.

or to the invasions of the Medes. Hellanicus is the only one of them, who hath touched it in his Attic history; though his memorials are short, and not accurately distinguished by proper dates. But this, at the same time, will most clearly show the method in which the Athenian empire was erected.

In the first place, under the command of Cimon son of Miltiades,¹ they laid siege to Eion a town upon the Strymon possessed by the Medes, which they carried, and sold all found within it for slaves.—They afterwards did the same by Scyros an island in the Egean Sea, inhabited by the Dolopes, and placed in it a colony of their own people.—They had, farther, a war with the Carysthians singly, in which the rest of the Euboeans were unconcerned, who at length submitted to them upon terms.—After this they made war upon the Naxians who had revolted, and reduced them by a siege. This was the first confederate state, which was enslaved to gratify their aspiring ambition; though afterwards all the rest, as opportunity occurred, had the same fate.

The occasions of such revolts were various; though the principal were deficiencies in their quotas of tribute and shipping, and refusal of common service. For the Athenians exerted their authority with exactness and rigour, and laid heavy loads upon men, who had neither been accustomed nor were willing to bear oppression. Their method of command was soon perverted; they no longer cared to make it agreeable, and in general service disallowed an equality, as it was now more than ever in their power to force revolters to submission. But these points the confederates had highly facilitated by their own proceedings. For, through a reluctance of mingling in frequent expeditions, a majority of them, to redeem their personal attendance, were rated at certain sums of money, equivalent to the expense of the ships they ought to have furnished. The sums paid

on these occasions to the Athenians, were employed by them to increase their own force; and the tributaries thus drained, whenever they presumed to revolt, had parted the needful expedients of war, and were without resource.

After these things it happened, that Athenians and their confederates fought against the Medes, both by land and sea, at the Eurymedon in Pamphylia. Cimon, the son of Miltiades commanded; and the Athenians were victorious the very same day in all elements. They took and destroyed the cities of the Phœnicians, in the whole about hundred.

Later in time than this, happened a war of the Thasians, arising from disputes in places of trade on the opposite coasts of Thrace and the mines which they possessed. The Athenians with a sufficient force went against Thasus; and, after gaining a victory by sea, landed upon the island.—About the same time, they had sent a colony, consisting of about ten thousand of their own and confederate people, towards the Strymon, where to settle in a place called the Nine-ways, but now Amphipolis. They became masters of the Nine-ways, by dispossessing the Thracians. But advancing farther into the land parts of Thrace, they were all cut off by Drabescus of Edonia, by the united forces of the Thracians, who were all enemies to the new settlement now forming at the Nine-ways.—But the Thasians, defeated in a battle, besieged, implored the succour of the Lacedæmonians, and exhorted them to make a diversion in their favour by breaking into Asia. This they promised unknown to the Athenians, and were intent on the performance, but prevented by the shock of an earthquake. Helots,² farther, had seized this opportu-

¹ Cimon was a great general, a worthy patriot, brave, open, and ingenious, upright in his political conduct like Aristides, and though an able politician, yet not so mischievously refined as to discard honesty and sincerity from public measures. His father Miltiades, after performing most signal services to his country, was heavily fined, thrown into prison, because unable to pay, and there ended his days. Cimon afterwards paid the fine, is now going also to perform great services to the state, is afterwards banished, but recalled, and again employed in foreign commands, dying at last in the service of his country, highly regretted not only at Athens, but throughout Greece.

² Helots was the name given in general to the slaves of the Lacedæmonians. The first of the kind were inhabitants of Helos in Messenia, who were conquered and enslaved by the Lacedæmonians; and all their slaves in succeeding times had the same denomination. tillage of the ground, the exercise of trades, all manual labour, and every kind of drudgery, was thrown upon them. They were always treated by their masters with great severity, and often with the most barbarity; at their caprice, or sometimes for no state, they were wantonly put to death or cruelly butchered. There is a remarkable instance of this in the fourth book of this history. According to the proverb, it was a common saying in Greece, "The

concert with the neighbouring Thuriatsæ and Ithæans, to revolt and seize Ithome. Most of the Helots were descendants of the ancient Lacedæmonians, then reduced to slavery, and on this account all of them in general were called Lacedæmonians. This war against the revolted Ithome, gave full employ to the Lacedæmonians. And the Thasians, after holding out six years' blockade, were forced to surrender on terms to the Athenians:—They were "to demolish their walls, to give up their shipping, to pay the whole arrear of their tribute, to advance annually for the future, and to quit all pretensions to the continent and the mines."

The Lacedæmonians, as their war against the rebels in Ithome ran out into a length of time, demanded the assistance of their allies, and amongst others of the Athenians. No small number of these were sent to their aid, under the command of Cimon. The demand for assistance from them, was principally owing to the reputation they then were in for their superior skill in the methods of approaching and attacking walls. The long continuance of the war convinced them of the necessity of such methods, though they would fain have taken Ithome by storm. The first open enmity between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians broke out in this expedition. For the Lacedæmonians, when the place could not be carried by storm, being jealous of the daring and innovating spirit of the Athenians, and regarding them as aliens, lest by a longer stay they might be conspiring with the rebels in Ithome, and so expose them to fresh embarrassments, gave a disinclination to them alone of their allies. They were, indeed, to conceal their suspicions, by saying, "they have no longer any need of your assistance." The Athenians were convinced, that their dismission was not owing to any more plausible colour, but to some latent jealousy. They reckoned themselves aggrieved; and thinking they had merited better usage

from the hands of the Lacedæmonians, were scarcely withdrawn, than in open disregard to the league subsisting between them against the Medes, they clapped up an alliance with their old enemies, the Argives; and in the same oath and in the same alliance, the Thesaliars were also comprehended with them both.

The rebels in Ithome, in the tenth year of the siege, unable to hold out any longer, surrendered to the Lacedæmonians on the following conditions—that "a term of security be allowed them to quit Peloponnesus, into which they shall never return again; that if any one of them be ever found there, he should be made the slave of whoever apprehended him." The Pythian oracle had already warned the Lacedæmonians "to let go the suppliants of Jupiter Ithometes." The men therefore, with their wives and children, went out of Ithome, and gained a reception from the Athenians, who acted now in enmity to the Lacedæmonians, and assigned them Naupactus for their residence, which they had lately taken from the Locrians of Ozoli.

The Megareans also deserted the Lacedæmonians, and went over to the Athenian alliance, because the Corinthians had warred upon them in pursuance of a dispute about settling their frontier. Megara and Pegæ were put into the hands of the Athenians, who built up for the Megareans the long walls that reach down from Megara to Nisæa, and took their guard upon themselves. This was by no means the least occasion of that violent enmity now beginning to arise between the Corinthians and Athenians.

Inarus the son of Psammetichus, a Libyan, and king of the Libyans, bordering upon Egypt, taking his route from Marea, a city beyond the Pharos, had seduced the greatest part of Egypt into a revolt from king Artaxerxes. He himself was constituted their leader, and he brought over the Athenians to associate in the enterprise. They happened at that time to be employed in an expedition against Cyprus, with a fleet of two hundred ships of their own and their allies: but relinquishing Cyprus, they went upon this new design. Being arrived on that coast, and sailed up the Nile, they were masters of that river, and two thirds of the city of Memphis, and were making their attack upon the remaining part, which is called the white wall. It was defended by the Per-

mean at Sparta was the freest, and a slave the greatest slave in the world."—Thus miserably oppressed, they seized an opportunity of revolt. The earthquake here mentioned was so violent, that (according to Plutarch) it demolished all the houses in Lacedæmon, except five. The Helots rose at once effectually against those Spartans too, who were not buried in ruins. But Archidamus had already, by way of precaution, sounded an alarm, and got them together in readiness. The Helots thus prevented, marched off, and were met at Ithome, where they made a long and obstinate resistance.

sians and Medes who had resorted thither for refuge, and by those Egyptians who had stood out in the general defection.

The Athenians, further, having made a descent at Halis, a battle ensued against the Corinthians and Epidaurians, in which the victory was on the Corinthian side.—And afterwards the Athenians engaged at sea near Cecryphæa with a fleet of Peloponnesians, and completely gained the victory.—A war also breaking out after this between the Æginetæ and Athenians, a great battle was fought at sea by these two contending parties near Ægina. Both sides were joined by their respective confederates; but the victory remained with the Athenians; who having taken seventy of their ships, landed upon their territory, and laid siege to the city. under the command of Leocrates the son of Stræbus. The Peloponnesians, then desirous to relieve the Æginetæ, transported over to Ægina, three hundred heavy-armed, who before were auxiliaries to the Corinthians and Epidaurians. In the next place they secured the promontory of Geranea. The Corinthians now with their allies made an incursion into the district of Megara, judging it impossible for the Athenians to march to the relief of the Megareans, as they had so large a force already abroad in Ægina and in Egypt; or, if they were intent on giving them relief, they must of necessity raise their siege from Ægina. The Athenians however recalled not their army from Ægina, but marched away all the old and young that were left in Athens to the aid of Megara, under the command of Myronides: and having fought a drawn battle against the Corinthians, both sides retired, and both sides looked upon themselves as not worsted in the action. The Athenians, however, upon the departure of the Corinthians, as being at least so far victorious, erected a trophy. The Corinthians at their return heard nothing but reproaches from the seniors in Corinth; so, after bestowing an interval of about twelve days to recruit, they came back again; and, to lay their claim also to the victory, set about erecting a trophy of opposition. Upon this, the Athenians sallying with a shout out of Megara, put those who were busy in erecting this trophy to the sword, and routed all who endeavoured to oppose them. The vanquished Corinthians were forced to fly; and no small part of their number, being closely pursued

and driven from any certain route, were chased into the ground of a private person, which happened to be encompassed with a ditch as deep as to be quite impassable, and there was no getting out. The Athenians, perceiving this, drew up all their heavy-armed to front them, and then forming their light-armed in a circle round them, stoned every man of them to death. This was a calamitous event to the Corinthians; but the bulk of their force got home safe again from this unhappy expedition.

About this time also, the Athenians began to build the long walls reaching down to the sea, both towards the Phalerus, and towards the Piræus.

The Phocians were now embroiled with the Dorians, from whom the Lacedæmonians are descended. Having made some attempts on Bœon, and Cytinium, and Erineus, and taken one of those places, the Lacedæmonians marched out to succour the Dorians with fifteen hundred heavy-armed of their natives, and ten thousand of their allies, commanded by Nicomedes the son of Cleombrotus in the right of Pleistionax son of Pausanias their king, who was yet a minor; and having forced the Phocians to surrender upon terms the town they had taken, were preparing for their return. Now, in case they attempted it by passing over the sea in the gulf of Crissa, the Athenians having got round with a squadron were ready to obstruct it. Nor did they judge it safe to attempt it by way of Geranea, as Megara and Pegæ were in the hands of the Athenians; and the pass of Geranea is ever difficult, and now was constantly guarded by the Athenians; and should they venture this route, they perceived that the Athenians were there also ready to intercept them. They determined at last to halt for a time in Boeotia, and watch for an opportunity to march away unmolested. Some citizens of Athens were now clandestinely practising with them, to obtain their concurrence in putting a stop to the democracy and the building of the long walls. But the whole body of the Athenian people rushed out into the field against them, with a thousand Athenians and the respective quotas of their allies, in the whole amounting to fourteen thousand. They judged them quite at a loss about the means of a retreat; and the design also to overthrow the popular government began to be suspected. Some Thessalian horsemen came also up

join the Athenians, in pursuance of treaty, who afterwards in the heat of action revolted to the Lacedæmonians.

They fought at Tanagra of Bœotia, and the victory rested with the Lacedæmonians and allies: but the slaughter was great on both sides. The Lacedæmonians afterwards took their route through the district of Megara; and having cut down the woods, returned to their own home through Geranea and the Isthmus.

On the sixty-second day after the battle of Tanagra, the Athenians had taken the field against the Bœotians, under the command of Myronides.¹ They engaged them, and gained a complete victory at Oenophyta;² in consequence of which, they seized all the territories of Bœotia and Phocis, and levelled the walls of Tanagra. They took from the Locrians of Opus one hundred of their richest persons for hostages; and had now completed their own long walls at Athens.

Soon after, the Æginetæ surrendered to the Athenians upon terms. They "demolished their fortifications, gave up their shipping, and submitted to pay an annual tribute for the future."

The Athenians, farther, in a cruise infested the coast of Peloponnesus, under the command of Tolmidas, the son of Tolmæus. They burnt a dock of the Lacedæmonians, took Chalcis, a city belonging to the Corinthians, and landing their men, engaged with and defeated the Sicyonians.

During all this interval, the army of Athenians and allies continued in Egypt, amidst various incidents and events of war.—At first,

the Athenians had the better of it in Egypt. Upon this, the king³ despatcheth to Lacedæmon Megabazus, a Persian noble, furnished with great sums of money, in order to prevail upon the Lacedæmonians to make an incursion into Attica, and force the Athenians to recall their troops from Egypt: when Megabazus could not prevail, and some money had been spent to no manner of purpose, he carried back what was yet unexpended with him into Asia. He then sendeth Megabazus, the son of Zopyrus, a Persian noble, against them with a numerous army, who marching by land, fought with and defeated the Egyptians and their allies; then drove the Grecians out of Memphis; and at last shut them up in the isle of Prosopis. Here he kept them blocked up for a year and six months; till having drained the channel by turning the water into a different course, he stranded all their ships, and rendered the island almost continent. He then marched his troops across, and took the place by a land assault. And thus a war, which had employed the Grecians for six continued years, ended in their destruction. Few only of the numbers sent thither, by taking the route of Libya, got safe away to Cyrene; the far greater part were entirely cut off. Egypt was now again reduced to the obedience of the king: Amyrteus alone held out, who reigned in the fenny parts. The large extent of the fens prevented his reduction; and besides, the Egyptians of the fens are the most remarkable of all for military valour. Inarus king of the Libyans, the author of all these commotions in Egypt, was betrayed by treachery, and fastened to a cross. Besides this, fifty triremes from Athens and the rest of the alliance, arriving upon the coast of Egypt to relieve the former, were come up to Medasium, a mouth of the Nile, quite ignorant of their fate. These, some forces assaulted from the land, whilst a squadron of Phœnicians attacked them by sea. Many of the vessels were by this means destroyed, but some few had the good fortune to get away. And thus the great expedition of the Athenians and allies into Egypt was brought to a conclusion.

But farther, Orestes, son of Echekratidas king of the Thessalians, being driven from Thessaly, persuaded the Athenians to undertake his restoration. The Athenians, in conjunction with the Bœotians and Phocians now

¹ Plutarch in his *Apothegm* relates, that when Myronides was putting himself at the head of the Athenians on this occasion, his officers told him "they were not all come out yet into the field:" he replied briskly, "All are come out that will fight," and marched off.

² This battle is represented by some as more glorious to the Athenians than even those of Marathon or Plataea. In the latter they fought, accompanied by their allies, against Barbarians; but here with their own single force, they defeated a far more numerous body of the choicest and best-disciplined troops in Greece. Plato hath marked it in his *Funeral Oration*, and told us those who fell in this battle were the first who were honoured with a public interment in the Ceramicus. "These brave men, (says he, as translated by Mr West) having fought against Grecians for the liberties of Grecians, and delivered those whose cause they had undertaken to defend, were the first after the Persian war upon whom the commonwealth conferred the honour of being buried in this public cemetery."

³ Alexander Longimanus.

their allies, marched up to Pharsalus of Thessaly. They became masters of the adjacent country, so far as they could be whilst keeping in a body; for the Thessalian cavalry prevented any detachments. They took not that city, neither carried any one point intended by the expedition, but were obliged to withdraw, and carry Orestes back again with them, totally unsuccessful.

Not long after this, a thousand Athenians going on board their ships which lay at Pegæ, for Pegæ was now in their possession, steered away against Sicyon, under the command of Pericles¹ the son of Xantippus. They made a descent, and in a battle defeated those of the Sicyonians who endeavoured to make head against them. From thence they strengthened themselves by taking in some Achæans; and stretching across the gulf, landed in a district of Acarnania, and laid siege to Oenias; yet, unable to carry it, they soon quitted, and withdrew to their own homes.

Three years after this, a peace to continue for five years was clapped up between the Peloponnesians and Athenians. Upon this, the Athenians, now at leisure from any war in Greece, engaged in an expedition against Cyprus, with a fleet of two hundred ships of their own and allies, commanded by Cimon. Sixty of these were afterwards detached to Egypt, at the request of Amyrteus king of the fenny part; but the rest of them blocked up Citium. Yet, by the death of Cimon, and a violent famine, they were compelled to quit the blockade

of Citium; and being come up to the mouth of Salamis in Cyprus, they engaged at an united force of Phœnicians, and Cilicians both by land and sea. They gained the victory in both engagements, being rejoined by the detachment they sent to Egypt, they returned home.

After this, the Lacedæmonians engaged in a war which is known by the name of the Peloponnesian war; and having recovered the temple of Delphi, delivered it up to the Delphians. Soon after this, the Athenians and their allies, sooner were they withdrawn, than the Peloponnesians marched out in their turn, and delivered it into the hands of the Phœnicians.

At no great interval of time from this, the Athenians took the field against the Peloponnesians, who had seized Orchomenus and other cities of Bœotia, and some other cities of Bœotia. A force, sent out upon this service, consisting of a thousand heavy-armed of their own and allies, and a proportional quotas from their allies, was commanded by Tolmidas the son of Themistocles. Having taken and enslaved Chæronea, he placed a fresh garrison in it, and so withdrew. But upon their march, they are attacked at Coronea by a body of men, consisting of Peloponnesian exiles sallying out of Orchomenus, joined by Locrians, and the exiles from other cities, and others of their partizans. After a great slaughter of the Athenians, and the taking of many prisoners. Upon this, the Athenians evacuated Bœotia, and, to get the prisoners released, consented to a peace. The Peloponnesians, and all others in the same circumstances, were by this resettled in their old habit, and recovered their former liberty and rights.

It was not a great while after these circumstances that Eubœa revolted from the Athenians. And Pericles was no sooner informed of it, than he sent an Athenian ambassador to chastise them, than news was brought him that Megara also had revolted; that the Peloponnesians were going to make an incursion into Attica; that the Athenian garrison had been put to the sword by the Megareans;² etc.

¹ Here the name of Pericles first occurs, and a hint should be given to those who are not well acquainted with him, to mark a person that was a true patriot, a consummate statesman, a good general, and a most sublime speaker. He was born of one of the most illustrious families in Athens. He was educated in the best manner, and learned his philosophy or the knowledge of nature from Anaxagoras, whose doctrines agreed so little with the superstitious practices and tempers of the Athenians, that the master and all his disciples were charged with atheism, for which many of them were prosecuted, and the divine Socrates most injuriously put to death. He engaged early in public affairs, gained the ascendancy over all his competitors, became at length, and continued to his death, master of the affections and liberties too of the Athenian people, and though master, yet guardian and increaser of the latter. In short, according to writers of the best authority and the gravest historians, he was one of the most able and most disinterested ministers that Athens ever had, Athens the most democratical state that ever existed, so fertile in every thing great and glorious, and so overrun at the same time with faction, licentiousness, and wild tumultuary caprice.

² This revolt of Megara, a little republic almost surrounded by the dominions of Athens, learned with her, and under her protection, gave rise to a decree which excluded the Megareans from the markets of Athens. Others add, that they sent an Athenian herald, who was sent to expostulate with them on this account. Could such outrages be committed by Athenians? could Pericles dissuade the pe-

those who had thrown themselves into Nisæa; and that the Megareans had effected this revolt by a junction of Corinthians, and Sicyonians, and Epidaurians." Upon hearing this, Pericles re-embarked with the utmost expedition, and brought back his army from Eubœa. And soon after, the Peloponnesians, marching into Attica, as far as Eleusis and Thria, laid the country waste, under the command of Pleistionax,³ the son of Pausanias king of Sparta: and then, without extending the ravage any farther, they withdrew to their own homes. Now, again the Athenians transported a military force into Eubœa, under the command of Pericles, and soon completed its reduction. The tranquility of the rest of the island was re-established upon certain conditions; but they wholly ejected all the inhabitants of Hestîæa, and re-peopled it with a colony of their own.—And not long after their return from Eubœa, they concluded a peace for thirty years, with the Lacedæmonians and their allies, in pursuance of which they restored them Nisæa and Chalcis, and Pegæ and Træzene; all which places, though belonging to the Peloponnesians, were in the hands of the Athenians.

In the sixth year of this peace⁴ a war broke

Athens from showing resentment? They decreed farther, though not explicitly mentioned by Thucydides, that the generals of the state should swear at their election, to make an incursion twice a year into the Megaris. We shall soon see that the Peloponnesians made it a pretext for the ensuing war, and that Pericles justified the decree, and persuaded the Athenians to hazard a war rather than repeal it. This is the true history of the point, though comedy, and raillery, and libelling, strangely vary the account.

³ As Pleistionax on this occasion evacuated Attica on a sudden, he was banished from Sparta, as having been bribed by the Athenians, to quit their territory. Diodorus Siculus relates, that he did it by the advice of Cleandridas his guardian, who attended him in the field on account of his youth; and that Pericles, afterwards passing his accounts at Athens, charged "ten talents properly laid out for the service of the state," which passed without farther explanation or exception.

⁴ Pericles here performed a great and signal service to his country. The motives to this war are, according to our historian, sufficiently strong, upon the scheme now carrying on by Pericles, to extend the sovereignty of Athens by sea. Yet the comic poets, and writers of memoirs and private history, give another account of the affair, which it is surprising to find the authors of the Universal History, inclined to think as well founded as what is given by Thucydides, that "Pericles engaged the republic in this war, merely to gratify the resentment of Aspasia, who was a native of Miletus, against the Samians." As this Aspasia had all the honour of Pericles's merit imputed to herself, and he hath suffered

out between the Samians and Milesians about Priene. The Milesians, having the worst in the dispute, had recourse to the Athenians, to whom they bitterly exclaimed against the Samians. Nay, even some private citizens of Samos joined with them in this outcry, whose scheme it was to work a change in the government. The Athenians, therefore, putting to sea with a fleet of forty sail, landed upon Samos, where they set up a democracy; and exacted from them fifty boys and as many grown men for hostages, whom they deposited at Lemnos. They had farther, at their departure, left a garrison behind to secure that island. But a body of Samians, who would not submit to the new form of government, and therefore had refuged themselves upon the continent, having gained the correspondence of the most powerful persons abiding in Samos, and the alliance of Pissuthnes, son of Hyaspes, at that time governor at Sardis, and collected a body of seven hundred auxiliaries, passed over by night into Samos. They first exerted their efforts against the popular party, and got a majority of them into their power: in the next place, they conveyed away the hostages from Lemnos by stealth; they openly declared a revolt; and delivered up the Athenian garrison, with their officers whom they had seized, to Pissuthnes; and then immediately prepared to renew their war against Miletus. The Byzantines farther joined with them in the revolt.

a weight of reproach in her behalf, the reader will accept a short account of this famous lady. She is allowed on all hands to have been a woman of the greatest beauty, and the first genius; but averred by some to have been a libertine, a prostitute, a bawd, nay, every thing scandalous and vile. Pericles was dotingly fond of her, and got divorced from a wife whom he did not love, to marry her. She taught him, it is said, his refined maxims of policy, his lofty imperial eloquence; nay, even composed the speeches on which so great a share of his reputation was founded. The best men in Athens frequented her house, and brought their wives to receive lessons from her of economy and right deportment. Socrates himself was her pupil in eloquence, and gives her the honour of that funeral oration which he delivers in the Menæxenus of Plato. There must have been some ground even for complimenting her in this extraordinary manner. And after every abatement, what must we think of a lady who was in such high esteem with the greatest men that ever lived at Athens, who taught force to orators, grace to philosophers, and conduct to ministers of state; in a word, who had Pericles for her lover, and Socrates for her encomiast? See Bayle's Dictionary under Pericles, and Universal History, vol. vi. p. 415, note.

No sooner were the Athenians informed of this, than they put out against Samos, with sixty sail, though sixteen of them were detached for other services. Some of the latter were stationed upon the coast of Caria, to observe the motions of a Phœnician fleet, and the rest were ordered to Chios and Lesbos, to give there a summons of aid. The remaining forty-four, commanded by Pericles¹ and nine colleagues, engaged near the isle of Tragia with the Samian fleet, consisting of seventy sail, twenty of which had land soldiers on board, and the whole was now on the return from Miletus; and here the Athenians gained a signal victory. Afterwards forty sail arrived from Athens to reinforce them, and twenty five from the Chians and Lesbians. With this accession of force they landed upon the island, overthrew the Samians in battle, invested their city with a triple wall, and at the same time blocked it up by sea.

But Pericles, drawing off sixty of the ships from this service, steered away with all possible expedition towards Caunus and Caria, upon receiving advice that "a Phœnician fleet is coming up against them." Stesagoras also and others had before been sent from Samos with five ships to meet that fleet. In this interval, the Samians launched out in a sudden sally, fell upon the unfortified² station

of the Athenians, sunk the vessels moored at distance by way of guard, and engaging who put out against them, victoriously executed their purpose, were masters of their seas for fourteen days' continuance, and whatever importations or exportations pleased: but, as Pericles then returned, were again blocked up by sea.³ He afterwards received fresh supplies from Ad forty ships under Thucydides, and Agon, Phormio, and twenty under Tiepolemus Anticles, besides thirty others from Chios and Lesbos. And though after this the Samians ventured a short engagement at sea, yet now found all farther resistance impracticable so that in the ninth month of the siege surrendered on the following terms—"To demolish their wall; to give hostages; to deliver up their shipping: and to reimburse by stated payments the expenses of war."⁴—The Byzantines also came in, the engagement of being held only to obedience as had formerly been required of them.

Not many years intervened between this period of time, and the rise of those differences above recited concerning Corcyra and Potidaea and all occurrences whatever, on which the progress of this Peloponnesian war were grounded. All these transactions in general, wars of Grecians against Grecians, or against Barbarians, fell out in the compass of years, between the retreat of Xerxes at the commencement of this present war; and the period the Athenians had established

¹ The Athenians in the assembly of the people chose ten generals every year, according to the number of their tribes. They were sometimes, as in the present instance, all sent out in the same employ. They rolled, and each in his turn was general of the day. Thucydides seldom gives more than the name of one, whom we may conclude to have been the person of the greatest weight and influence amongst them, in fact a general in chief. Philip of Macedon was used to joke upon this multiplicity of generals. "For my part (said he) I have never had the good fortune to find more than one general in all my life; and yet the Athenians find ten fresh ones every year." Not but that these generals were often re-elected, and continued years in commission. Pericles, 'tis plain, did so; and in latter times Phocion is said to have been elected five and forty times. Their power was great not only in the field, but at Athens. Every point that had relation to war came under their department. Pericles in a foreign employ was always first of the generals, and within the walls of Athens was the first or rather absolute minister of state.

² When the Grecians continued long on a station, or were apprehensive of being attacked by an enemy, they fortified their naval station and camp towards the land with a ditch and rampart, and towards the sea with a palisade. At other times a number of their ships lay out more to sea, by way of guard or watch to the rest, which were generally dragged ashore, whilst the soldiers lay round them in their tents. Sometimes they were only moored to the shore, or rode at anchor, that they

might be ready upon an alarm. See *Potter's History*, Vol. II. c. 20.

³ The manner of doing this, "was to environ the walls and harbour with ships, ranged in order from side of the shore to the other, and so closely joined together by chains and bridges, on which arms were placed, that without breaking their order could be no passage from the town to the sea." See *Potter's Archaeologia*.

⁴ Samos thus reduced, which in maritime power with Athens herself, and had well nigh defied the grand plan of being mistress of the sea, Pericles received upon his return with all the honours a people could give him, and was pitched upon to deliver the funeral oration for those slain in the war. He formed his part with high applause. The ladies particularly were loud in their acclamations, and were highly employed in caressing and crowning him with garlands. But for a smart piece of raillery from one of them, on this occasion, and his smarter repartee, under may consult the *Universal History*, vol. vi. for the note. In the latter part of that note, he seems willing both to deny and to allow Pericles the merit of having served his country in the reduction of it.

their dominion on a solid basis, and had rose to a high exaltation of power. The Lacedæmonians were sensible of it, yet never opposed them, except by some transient efforts; and for the most part of the time were quite easy and indifferent about it. That people had never been known in a hurry to run to arms; their wars were indispensably necessary; and sometimes they were entangled in domestic broils. Thus they looked on with indolent unconcern till the Athenian power was manifestly established, and encroachments were made upon their own alliance. Then indeed they determined to be no longer patient; they resolved upon a war, in which their utmost force should be exerted, and the Athenian power, if possible, demolished.

125—
On these motives was formed the public resolution of the Lacedæmonians—that “the treaty was violated, and the Athenians were guilty of injustice.” They had also sent to Delphi, to inquire of the god, “Whether their war would be successful?” He is reported to have returned this answer, that “if they warred with all their might, they should at last be triumphant, and he himself would fight on their side, invoked or uninvoked.”

They had now again summoned their confederates to attend, and designed to put it to a general ballot, “Whether the war should be undertaken?” The ambassadors from the several constituents of their alliance arrived, and assembled in one general council. Others made what declarations they pleased, the majority inveighing against the Athenians, and insisting upon war; but the Corinthians (who had beforehand requested every state apart to ballot for war), alarmed for Potidæa, lest for want of some speedy relief it might be utterly destroyed, being present also at this council, stood forth the last of all, and spoke to this effect:

“We can no longer, ye confederates, have any room to complain of the Lacedæmonians, since their own resolution is already engaged for war, and they have summoned us hither to give our concurrence. For it is the duty of a governor and leading state, as in private concerns they observe the equitable conduct, so ever to keep their view intent upon the general welfare, suitably to that superior degree of honour and regard, which in many points they pre-eminently receive.

“For our parts, so many of us as have

quitted Athenian friendship for this better association, we require no farther trials to awaken our apprehensions. But those amongst us, who are seated up in the inland parts, at a distance from the coast, should now be convinced, that unless they combine in the defence of such as are in lower situations, they will soon be obstructed in carrying out the fruits of the lands, and again in fetching in those necessary supplies which the sea bestoweth upon an inland country. Let them by no means judge erroneously of what we urge, as not in the least affecting them; but looking upon it as a certainty, that if they abandon the guard of the maritime situations, the danger will soon advance quite upon them, and they of course no less than we are concerned in the issue of our present determinations. For this reason they ought, without the least hesitation, to make the timely exchange of peace for war.

“It is indeed the duty of the prudent, so long as they are not injured, to be fond of peace. But it is the duty of the brave, when injured, to throw up peace, and to have recourse to arms: and, when in these successful, to lay them down again in peaceful composition; thus never to be elevated above measure by military success, nor delighted with the sweets of peace to suffer insults. For he who, apprehensive of losing this delight, sits indolently at ease, will soon be deprived of the enjoyment of that delight which interesteth his fears; and he whose passions are inflamed by military success, elevated too high by a treacherous confidence, hears no longer the dictates of his judgment. Many are the schemes which, though unadvisedly planned, through the more unreasonable conduct of an enemy turn out successful; but yet more numerous are those which, though seemingly founded on mature counsel, draw after them a disgraceful and opposite event. This proceeds from that great inequality of spirit, with which an exploit is projected, and with which it is put into actual execution. For in council we resolve, surrounded with security; in execution we faint, through the prevalence of fear.

“We now, having been grossly injured, and in abundant instances aggrieved, are taking up arms; and, when we have avenged ourselves on the Athenians, shall at a proper time lay them down again. Success, upon many considerations, we may promise ourselves; in the first place, as we are superior in numbers and mili-

tary skill; in the next, as we all advance with uniformity to accomplish our designs. A naval force, equal to that in which their strength consists, we shall be enabled to equip, from competent stores we separately possess, and the funds laid up at Delphi and Olympia.¹ If we take up those upon interest for immediate service, we are able, by enlarging their pay, to draw away all the foreigners who man their fleets. The Athenian power is not supported by a natural but a purchased strength. And our own is less liable to be injured by the same method, as we are strong in our persons more than in our wealth. Should we gain the victory but in one single engagement at sea, in all probability we have done their business; or, in case they continue the struggle, we shall then have a longer space to improve our naval practice: and when once we have gained an equality of skill, our natural courage will soon secure us the triumph. For that valiant spirit which we enjoy by nature, it is impossible for them to acquire by rules: but that superiority with which at present their skill invites them, we may easily learn to overmatch by practice.

"Those sums of money by which these points are chiefly to be compassed, we will respectively contribute. For would it not in reality be a grievous case, when their dependents are never backward to send in those sums which rivet slavery on themselves, if we, who want to be revenged on our foes, and at the same time to secure our own preservation—if we should refuse to submit to expenses, and should store up our wealth to be plundered by them, to purchase oppressions and miseries for ourselves?

"We have other expedients within our reach to support this war,—a revolt of their dependents; and, in consequence of that, a diminution of their revenue, the essence of their strength; erecting forts within their territory; and many others not yet to be foreseen. For war by no means yields to the direction of a pre-determined plan; but of itself, in every present exigence, confines and methodizeth its own course. In war, who moves along with a temper in proper command, hath got the firmest support;

but he who hath lost his temper is, for that reason, more liable to miscarry.

"Let us remember, that if any one single state amongst us had a contest with its foes about a frontier, there would be need of perseverance. But now, the Athenians are a match for us all united, and quite too strong for any of us separately to resist: so that unless we support one another with our collective forces, unless every nation and every state unanimously combine to give a check to their ambition, they will oppress us, apart and disunited, without a struggle. Such a triumph, how galling soever the bare mention of it may be to any of your ears, yet, be it known, can end in nothing else but plain and open slavery. To hint in mere words so base a doubt, that so many states may be enslaved by one, is disgrace to Peloponnesus. In such a plunge we should either be thought justly to have deserved it, or through cowardice to suffer it, the degenerate offspring of those ancestors who were the deliverers of Greece. And yet we have not spirit enough remaining to defend our own liberty. We suffer one single state to erect itself into a tyrant, whilst we claim the glory of pulling down monarchs in particular societies. We know not by what methods to extricate ourselves from these three, the greatest of calamities, from folly, or cowardice, or sloth. For exempt from these in fact you are not, by taking up the plea of contempt of your enemies, for which such numbers have suffered. The many misfortunes arising from this have changed the sense of the word, and caused it to stand for arrant folly.

"But on the past what necessity is there to enlarge? or to blame any farther than may be necessary for the present? To prevent worse events for the future we ought, by immediate efforts, with toil and perseverance, to seek for redress. Through toil to acquire virtues, is hereditary to Peloponnesians. This custom is not to be dropped, though now in wealth and power you have made some petty advancements: for it never can become you to let go in affluence what was gained in want. It becomes you rather, upon many accounts, with manly confidence, to declare for war. The oracle of a god prescribeth it;—that god himself hath promised his assistance;—and the rest of Greece is ready to join you in the contest, some from a principle of fear, and some from a principle of interest. Neither can

¹ In the temple of Apollo at Delphi, and that of Jupiter at Olympia. The wealth repositd in these places must have been very large, considering the great veneration universally paid these deities, and the numerous and valuable offerings sent annually to these famous temples.

you will the first breach of the peace be charged. The god who adviseth war plainly judgeth that to be already broke: you will only act to redress its violation. For the breach is not to be charged on those who arm to revenge it; but on those who were the first aggressors.

"Since then war, considered in every light, appears honourable in regard to you, ye Lacedæmonians; since we, with united voices, encourage you to it, as most strongly requisite for our general and separate interests,—defer no longer to succour the Potideans, Dorians by descent, and besieged by Ionians, (the reverse was formerly the case,) and to fetch again the liberty of others. The business will admit of no longer delay, when some already feel the blow; and others, if it once be known that we met here together, and durst not undertake our own defence, will in a very little time be sensible of the same. Reflect within yourselves, confederates, that affairs are come to extremities, that we have suggested the most advisable measures, and give your ballot for war. Be not terrified at its immediate dangers; but animate yourselves with the hope of a long lasting peace to be procured by it. For a peace produced by war is ever the most firm; but from tranquility and ease to be averse to war, can by no means abate or dissipate our danger. With this certain conclusion, that a state in Greece is started up into a tyrant, and aims indifferently at the liberty of us all, her arbitrary plan being partly executed and partly in agitation, let us rush against and at once pull her down. Then shall we pass the remainder of our lives exempt from dangers, and shall immediately recover liberty for those Grecians who are already enslaved."

In this manner the Corinthians spoke: and the Lacedæmonians, when they had heard them all deliver their several opinions, gave out the ballots to all the confederates that were present, in regular order, both to the greater and lesser states: and the greatest part of them balloted for war. But, though thus decreed, it was impossible for them, as they were quite unprepared, immediately to undertake it. It was agreed, therefore, that "every state should get in readiness their several contingents, and no time to be lost." However in less than a year, every thing needful was amply provided: and, before its expiration, an irruption was made into Attica, and the war openly on foot. But within this interval was employed in send-

ing embassies to Athens, charged with accusations, that reasons strong as possible for making war might appear on their side, if those should meet with disregard.

By the first ambassadors therefore whom the Lacedæmonians sent, they required the Athenians "To drive away the pollution of the goddess." And the pollution was this:

There was one Cylon an Athenian, who had been victor at the Olympic games, a person of noble descent, and of great consequence in his own person. He married a daughter of Theagenes, a Megarean, who in those days was tyrant of Megara. This Cylon, asking advice at Delphi about a scheme he had projected, was directed by the god "To seize the citadel of Athens upon the greatest festival of Jupiter." In pursuance of this, being supplied by a party of men by Theagenes, and having obtained the concurrence of his own friends, upon the day of the Peloponnesian Olympics, he seized the citadel as instrumental to his tyranny. He imagined that to be the greatest festival of Jupiter, and to bear a particular relation to himself, who had been an Olympic victor. But whether the greatest festival meant was to be held in Attica, or any other place, he had never considered, nor had the oracle declared. There is a festival of Jove observed by the Athenians, which is called the greatest festival of Jupiter the propitious. This is celebrated without the city, in full concourse of the people, where many sacrifices are offered, not of real victims, but of artificial images of creatures peculiar to the country. Concluding, however, that he had the true sense of the oracle, he put his enterprise in execution. The Athenians, taking the alarm, ran out of the country in one general confluence to put a stop to these attempts, and investing the citadel, quite blocked them up. But in process of time, being wearied out with the tediousness of the blockade, many of them departed, leaving the care of it to the nine archons, with a full power of "acting in whatever manner they should judge most expedient:" for at that time most parts of the public administration were in the management of the archons. The party with Cylon, thus closely invested, were reduced very low through scarcity of bread and water. Cylon, therefore, and his brother privately escape. But the rest, reduced to extremities, and some of them had already perished by famine, sit themselves

down as suppliants by the altar in the citadel. The Athenian guard, having ordered them to arise, as they saw them just ready to expire in the temple, to avoid the guilt of profanation, led them out and slew them. But some of the number, who had seated themselves at the venerable goddesses, at the very altars, they murdered in¹ the act of removal. And for this action, not only the persons concerned in it, but their descendants also, were called the sacrilegious and accursed of the goddesses. The Athenians, indeed, banished those sacrilegious persons out of the city; Cleomenes, the Lacedæmonian, drove them out again, when he was at Athens, on account of a sedition; nay, on this occasion they not only drove away the living, but even dug up the bones of the dead, and cast them out; yet, in process of time, they returned again, and some of their posterity are still in Athens.

This was the pollution which the Lacedæmonians required them to drive away; with a face, indeed, of piety, as vindicating the honour of the gods; but knowing, at the same time, that Pericles, the son of Xantippus, was tainted with it by the side of his mother; and thence concluding, that if he could be removed, the Athenians would more easily be brought to an accommodation with them. They could not carry their hopes so far as actually to effect his banishment, but to raise against him the public odium, as if the war was partly owing to the misfortune they suffered in him. For, carrying with him the greatest sway of any Athenian then alive, and presiding entirely in the administration, he was most steady in opposition to the Lacedæmonians, dissuading the Athenians from any concession, and exciting them to war.

The Athenians, in return, required the Lacedæmonians "to drive away the pollution contracted at Tænarus;" for the Lacedæmonians, some time ago, having caused their suppliant Helots to rise out of Neptune's temple at Tænarus, and led them aside, and slew them. And to this action they themselves impute the

great earthquake which happened afterwards at Sparta.

They further required them "to drive away the pollution of the Chalcidæan Pallas," the nature of which was this;

¶ When Pausanias, the Lacedæmonian, upon his being first recalled by the Spartans from his command in the Hellespont, and brought to his trial before them, was acquitted of the charge of mal-administration, but was no longer intrusted with the public commission; fitting out a Hermionian trireme on his own private account, he arriveth in Hellespont, without any authority from the Lacedæmonians. He gave out that he did it for the service of the Grecian war; but his intention was to carry on his negotiations with the king, which, aspiring to the monarchy of Greece, he had begun before. He had formerly conferred an obligation upon the king, from which the whole of his project took its date. When, after the return from Cyprus, during his first appearance there, he took Byzantium, which was possessed by the Medes, and in it some favourites and relations of the king were made his prisoners, he releaseth them all, to ingratiate himself with the king, without the privity of the other confederates, giving it out in public that they had made their escape. He transacted this affair by means of Gongylus, the Eretrian, to whose keeping he had intrusted Byzantium and the prisoners. He also despatched Gongylus to him with a letter, the contents of which, as was afterwards discovered, were these:

"Pausanias, general of Sparta, desirous to oblige you, sends away these his prisoners of war. And by it I express my inclination, if you approve, to take your daughter in marriage, and to put Sparta and the rest of Greece into your subjection. I think I have power sufficient to effectuate these points, could my scheme be communicated with you. If therefore any of these proposals receive your approbation, send down to the coast some trusty person, through whom for the future we may hold a correspondence."

Thus much was contained in the letter; and, on the reception of it, Xerxes was delighted, and sends away Artabazus the son of Pharnacæ, down to the coast, with an order to take upon him the government of Dascyliis, having first dismissed Megabates who was the governor. To him he intrusted a letter for Pausanias at Byzantium, with an injunction to for-

¹ When these suppliants were ordered to come out, they tied a string round the altar in the citadel, and keeping hold of it, were come as far as the altars of the venerable goddesses. Just there the strings happened to break, upon which the archons rushed in to seize them, as if Minerva had thrown them out of her protection. Some of the number sat instantly down for fresh protection at the altars of the venerable goddesses; it was an unavailing resource, and they were immediately slain upon the spot. Plutarch in Solon.

ward it with all possible expedition, and to let him see his signet; and that, if Pausanias should charge him with any affairs, he should execute them with all possible diligence and fidelity. Artabazus being arrived, obeyed all the other injunctions with exactness, and forwarded the letter, which brought this answer :

“ Thus saith king Xerxes to Pausanias.— The kindness done me in those persons whom from Byzantium you delivered safe on the other side the sea, shall be placed to your account in our family, eternally recorded : and with the other contents of your letter I am delighted. Let neither night nor day relax your earnest endeavours to effectuate those points you promise me : nor stop at any expense of gold or silver, or greatness of military force, if such aid be any where requisite. But confer boldly with Artabazus, a trusty person, whom I have sent to you, about mine and your own concerns, that they may be accomplished in the most honourable and most advantageous manner for us both.”

Upon the receipt of this letter, Pausanias, who before had been in high credit with the Grecians, through the lustre of his command at Plataea, was elevated much more than ever, and could no longer adjust his demeanour by the modes and customs of his native country. He immediately dressed himself up in Persian attire, and, quitting Byzantium, travelled through Thrace, attended with Persian and Egyptian guards, and refined his table into Persian elegance. His ambition he was unable any longer to conceal, but by short sketches manifested too soon, what greater schemes he had formed in his mind for future accomplishment. He then showed himself difficult of access, and let his anger loose so violently and so indiscriminately upon all men, that no one could approach him. And this was not the least motive to the confederacy for going over to the Athenians. But the Lacedæmonians, informed of this, recalled him the first time upon the account of such behaviour ; and, when he was returned again in the Hermionian vessel without their permission, he plainly appeared to have re-assumed again his former practices. And when forced to remove from Byzantium by the opposition raised against him by the Athenians, he went not back to Sparta ; but withdrawing to Colona of Troas, information was given that “ he was negotiating

with the Barbarians, and had fixed his residence there for very bad designs.” Upon this they could no longer be patient, but the ephori despatched him a herald and the Scytale,¹ with an order “ Not to stay behind the herald ; if he did, war was proclaimed against him by the Spartans.” And he, desirous to clear himself as much as possible from suspicion, and confident that with money he could baffle any accusation, returned the second time to Sparta. The first treatment he met with there was, to be thrown into prison by order of the ephori : for the ephori have so large an authority, even over a king. But afterwards, by some private management, he procured his enlargement, and offers to submit to a trial against any who were willing to accuse him. The Spartans indeed had no positive evidence against him, not even his private enemies, nor the general community—none, to support them in proceeding capitally against a person of the royal descent, and at that time invested with the regal dignity : for, being uncle to Pleistarchus the son of Leonidas, their king, though yet in minority, he was regent guardian. But, by his disregard of the laws, and his affectation of the Barbarian manners, he afforded them strong reasons to suspect, that he would never conform to the equality then in vogue. They called to remembrance those other passages of his behaviour, in which he had at any time deviated from the institutions of his country ; and that further upon the tripod at Delphi, which the Grecians offered as the choicest part of the Persian spoils, he had formerly presumed, by his own authority, to place this inscription :

¹ The Scytale is a famous instrument peculiar to the Lacedæmonians, and used by them for the close conveyance of orders to their ministers abroad. It was a long black stick, and the contrivance was this—“ When the magistrates gave commission to any general or admiral, they took two round pieces of wood exactly equal to one another ; one of these they kept, and the other was delivered to the commander ; to whom when they had any thing of moment to communicate, they cut a long narrow scroll of parchment, and rolling it about their own staff, one fold close upon another, they wrote their business upon it ; then taking it off, despatched it away to the commander, who applying it to his own staff, the folds exactly fell in one with another, as at the writing and the characters, which, before it was wrapped up, were confusedly disjointed and unintelligible, appeared very plain.” *Potter's Archaeologia*, vol. ii. c. 13.

If it be asked (says the Scholiast) how Pausanias came to have the Scytale with him now, as he was abroad without the public commission? the answer is, He had kept it ever since his former employments.

For Persia's hosts o'erthrown, and Greece freed,
To Phoebus thus Pausanias hath decreed,
Who led the Grecians in the glorious deed.

These verses indeed the Lacedæmonians immediately defaced from the tripod, and placed in their stead the names of the several states which had joined in the overthrow of the Barbarian, and in making this oblation. This therefore was now recollected to the prejudice of Pausanias; and, in his present situation, it was interpreted, from the circumstances of his late behaviour, as an argument that he had been equally guilty long before. They had moreover got an information that he was tampering with the Helots, which in fact was true: for he promised them their liberty and the privilege of citizens of Sparta, if they would rise at his command and co-operate with him in the whole of his project. But even this would not prevail: they disdained to place so much confidence in the informations given by Helots, as to run into irregularities to punish him. They adhered to the custom ever observed amongst them, never to be hasty in forming a sentence never to be recalled against a citizen of Sparta, without unquestionable evidence. At length, they obtained the fullest conviction, as it is said, by means of an Argyllian, an old minion of his, and the person most in his confidence, who was to convey to Artabazus the last letter he wrote to the king. This man, alarmed by the recollection that no person sent on these errands before him had ever returned again, having already counterfeited the seal, to the end that if he was deceived in his suspicions, or Pausanias should demand them again to make any alteration, he might avoid discovery, breaks open the letters. He found by them, that he was going on the errand his fears foreboded, and that his own murder was expressly enjoined. He carried upon this the packet to the ephori, who were now more than ever convinced, but still were desirous to hear themselves from the mouth of Pausanias, an acknowledgment of the truth. They therefore contrived, that this person should go to sanctuary at Tænarus as a suppliant, and refuge in a cell built double by a partition. In the inner part of this cell he hid some of the ephori: and, Pausanias coming to him and demanding the reason of his supplication, they heard distinctly all that passed. The man complained bitterly to him about the clause in

the letters relating to himself, and consulted with him about every part "why he, who had been so trusty to leading the whole course of his negotiation the king, should now be so highly liable as to be murdered upon an equal with the meanest of his tools?" Pausanias confessed the truth of all that he alleged him, "not to be exasperated with the present appeared;" assured him, "I will not be hurt if he would leave his arms and earnestly entreated him, "with all possible speed to go the journey, and instruct the schemes that were then in hand. The ephori, having exactly heard him draw: and now, beyond a scruple, they determined to apprehend him in the city. But it is reported, that at the instant of his arrest, as he was walking along, at the countenance of one of the ephori preaching towards him, he immediately covered his business: and another of kindness intimating the matter by a sign, took to his heels, and fled away fast, so that they could pursue him. The Chalcidæan temple was near, and into a little house on the verge of that temple he betook himself, and sat quietly down to avoid the incursions of the outward air. They, who had started, came too late in the pursuit. Afterwards, they stripped the house of its doors; and, watching their opportunity, when he was within, they encompassed him about,¹ immured him within, and placed a constant guard around, kept him beset, might perish with hunger. When ready to expire, and they found in a state he lay within the house, they broke out of the verge, yet breathing a little being thus brought out, he immediately expired. They next intended to cast his body into the Cæada, where they are used to throw the malefactors; but afterwards changed their minds, and put him into the ground, where thereabouts. But the god Delphi warned the Lacedæmonians, afterward by an oracle, "to remove his body to the place he died:"—And now it lies in the area before the temple, as the inscription on the wall sheweth:—"and, as in what they had

¹ Alcithæa, the mother of Pausanias, is said to have brought the first stone on this occasion: such was the spirit of the ladies at Lacedæmon.

they had violated the laws of sanctuary, to restore two bodies to the Chalciecan for that one." To this they so far conformed, as to dedicate there two statues of brass, as atonements for Pausanias.

(The Athenians, upon the principle that the god himself had judged this a pollution, required of the Lacedæmonians, by way of retaliation, to clear themselves of it.)

The Lacedæmonians, at that time sent ambassadors to Athens, to accuse Themistocles also of carrying on the same treasonable correspondence with the Medæ, as Pausanias, which they had discovered from the papers, which had been evidence against Pausanias, and demanded that "he should be equally punished for it." The Athenians complied with this demand. But, as he then happened to be under the ostracism,¹ and residing chiefly at Argos, though he frequently visited other parts of Peloponnesus, they send a party along with the Lacedæmonians, who readily joined in his pursuit, with orders to seize him, wherever they could find him. Themistocles, advised in time, flieth out of Peloponnesus into Corcyra, to which people he had done a signal kindness.² The Corcyreans expressing their

¹ The ostracism was a compliment of an extraordinary kind paid by the people of Athens to superior merit. When a person had done them great services, and they grew apprehensive they might possibly show him too much gratitude, to the prejudice of their own liberties, they banished him for ten years. On some particular day each citizen gave in the name of a person, wrote upon an *ostracum* (a shell, or piece of tile), who he desired should be sent into retirement. Six thousand of these votes carried the point; and he, who had thus a legal number of votes, was obliged to quit Athens within ten days. The most disinterested patriot, and most successful commander, received, for the most part, this public acknowledgement of their services. At length, a scoundrel fellow, one Hyperbolus, was thus honourably distinguished by the public voice. The Athenians thought afterwards they had profaned the ostracism by treating him like a Themistocles, an Aristides, or a Cimon, and therefore abolished this strange injurious privilege, by which wanton liberty was enabled to triumph over its best friend, public spirit. Other republics in Greece had something of the same nature amongst them. Authors vary much about the circumstances of the ostracism; I have mentioned those points only which are universally agreed.

² At the time of the Persian invasion, the Corcyreans had refused to join in the common cause of Greece. The Grecians, therefore, had afterwards a design to fall upon and destroy them. But Themistocles interposed, and saved them by remonstrating, that by such proceedings Greece would be plunged into greater calamities, than it would have suffered under the despotic power of Xerxes.

fear of giving him refuge, lest it might expose them to the resentment both of Lacedæmonians and Athenians, he is conveyed away by them to the opposite continent. Now, pursued by those who were appointed to do it, and who had by inquiry discovered his route, he is compelled, by mere distress, to turn in to Admetus king of the Molossians,³ who was by no means his friend. It happened that Admetus was not at home; and Themistocles, the suppliant, addressing himself to the wife, is by her directed to take their child in his hand, and sit himself down upon the hearth. Admetus returning soon after, he tells him who he was, and conjures him—"though he had formerly opposed him in a suit he had preferred to the people of Athens, not to take revenge upon an exile; to make him suffer now, would be taking those advantages over a man in distress, which he ought to disdain; the point of honour consisted in equals revenging themselves upon equal terms; he had, it is true, stood in opposition to him, but merely in a point of interest, and not where life was at stake; but if he now gave him up" (telling him by whom, and why, he was persecuted) "he deprives him of the only resource he had left to preserve his life." Admetus, having heard him, bids him rise, together with the child whom he held as he sat down; for this was the most pathetic form of supplication. And when, not long after, the Lacedæmonians and Athenians arrived, and pressed him earnestly to do it, he refuseth to give him up, and sends him under a guard, as he had declared his intention to go to the king, to the other sea, by a journey over land, as far as Pydne, a town belonging to Alexander. He here met with a trading vessel bound to Ionia; and going on board, is driven by a storm into the Athenian fleet, which then lay before Naxos. Alarmed at his danger, he discovereth himself to the master, for not one person on board suspected who he was, and telleth him the occasion of his flight; and unless he will undertake his preservation, threatens "to inform against him, as one who had been bribed to further his escape:—preserved he still might be, provided no person was suffered, during the voyage, to stir out of the vessel;—if he would comply, the favour

³ Admetus had formerly negotiated an alliance at Athens, but was rejected by the influence of Themistocles.

should be acknowledged with effectual gratitude."—The master of the vessel promiseth his service, and keeping out at sea a day and a night to windward of the fleet, he afterwards landeth him at Ephesus. Themistocles, to recompense his care, made him a handsome present in money, for there he received those sums which he had ordered secretly to be conveyed thither from his friends at Athens, and from Argos; and, travelling upwards from thence, in company with a Persian of the maritime provinces, he gets a letter to be delivered to king Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes, who had lately mounted the throne, the purport of which was this:

"I Themistocles am coming to you, who of all the Grecians have done the greatest mischiefs to your family, so long as I was obliged by necessity to resist the invasion of your father. Yet the good services I did him were much more numerous, when my own preservation was secured, and his retreat became full of hazards. My former generosity calls for a requital;" (here he inserted the message he had sent to Xerxes about the retreat from Salamis; and that, out of regard to him, he had prevented the breaking down of the bridges, which was mere fiction;) "and now, able to perform great services for you, I am near at hand, having been persecuted by the Grecians for my friendship to you. I beg only a year's respite, that I may notify to you in person, those points which are the subject of my journey hither."

The king, it is said, was surprised at the spirit of the man,¹ and ordered him to act as he desired. The time of respite he had thus obtained, he spent in making all possible progress

¹ The boldness and intrepidity of Themistocles hath been the subject of admiration, in throwing himself on the protection of the Persian monarch, who had fixed a price on his head. And yet he was so high in his esteem, that the night after first giving him audience, he cried aloud thrice in his sleep, "I have got Themistocles the Athenian." He afterwards acknowledged himself two hundred talents (near 40,000*l.* sterling) in his debt; "for so much I promised the man that brought you to me." Themistocles soon gave him a specimen of his fine understanding. He was desired by the king to speak his mind freely in relation to the affairs of Greece: he answered by his interpreter, that "discourse, like a Persian carpet, had in it a variety of figures, which never appeared to advantage unless it was quite unfolded, but were not to be apprehended, when wrapped up in the piece." By this ingenious plea, he obtained a year's respite to learn the Persian language, that he might be enabled to deliver explicitly his own senti-

ments in the Persian language, and in learning the manners of the country. When the year was elapsed, appearing at court, he became a favourite with the king, a greater than any Greek had ever been before, as well on account of the former lustre of his life, as the hope he suggested to him of enslaving Greece; but above all by the specimens he gave of his fine understanding; for in Themistocles, the strength of nature was most vigorously shown; and by it he was so highly distinguished above the bulk of mankind, as to deserve the greatest admiration. By the mere force of his natural genius, without any improvement from study, either in his youth or more advanced age, he could give the best advice upon sudden emergencies with the least hesitation, and was happy in his conjectures about the events of the future. Whatever he undertook, he was able to accomplish; and wherein he was quite unexperienced, he had so prompt a discernment that he never was mistaken. In a matter of ambiguity, he foresaw with extraordinary acuteness the better and the worse side of the question. Upon the whole, by the force of natural genius, he was most quick at all expedients, and at the same time excellent, beyond competition, at declaring instantly the most advisable measures of acting upon every occurrence.—But, being seized with a fit of sickness, his life is at an end. Some, indeed, report, that he put an end to his own life by taking poison, when he judged it impossible to perform what he had promised the king. His monument, however, is at Magnesia in Asia, in the forum. Of this province he was governor through the bounty of the king, who assigned him Magnesia, (which yielded him ^afifty talents yearly,) for his bread, Lampascus, for his wine, (which place was in the greatest repute for wine,) and Myus for his

meats to the king, in his own words and method. He became afterwards so great a favourite, that the most engaging promise, in future times, that the Persian monarch could make to a Greek, whom he had a mind to inveigle into his service, was, "that he should live with him as Themistocles did with Artaxerxes." And yet no attachment to his royal friend, ever made him an enemy to his country; nor did his disinterested patriotism, of which never man had more, ever render him ungrateful to his benefactor. Through his bounty, he lived the remainder of his life in pomp and affluence, and was used to say humorously to his children, "We had been undone, my children, if we had not been undone."

^a 9687*l.* 10*s.* sterling.

meat. His bones are said to have been conveyed home by his relations, in pursuance of his own desire, and to have been interred in Attica without the privity of the Athenians. For it was against law to bury him there, as he had been outlawed for treason.¹

Such an end had the lives of Pausanias the Lacedæmonian, and Themistocles the Athenian, who in their own age made the greatest figure of any Grecians.

The Lacedæmonians, by their first embassy, had enjoined, what was as amply, in turn, required of them, to do as hath been above recited, concerning the expulsion of the sacrilegious. But, coming a second time to the Athenians, they commanded them "to quit the blockade of Potidæa;" and "to permit Ægina to govern itself at its own discretion;" and, above all other points, insist upon this, declaring most expressly, that in this case war should not be made—"If they would revoke their decree concerning the Megareans, in which they had been prohibited from entering any harbour whatever in the dominion of Athens, and from the Attic markets.

But the Athenians listened to none of these demands, nor would revoke the decree, but reproached the Megareans for tilling land that was sacred, land not marked out for culture, and for giving shelter to runaway slaves.

At last, the final ambassadors arrived from Lacedæmon, namely, Ramphias, and Melesippus, and Agesander, who, waving all other

points which they had formerly required, said thus:—"The Lacedæmonians are desirous of peace, and peace there may be, if you will permit the Grecians to govern themselves at their own discretion."

The Athenians summoned an assembly, where every one was invited to deliver his opinion. They determined, after deliberate consultation on all the points in contest, to return one definitive answer. Several others spoke on this occasion, and were divided in their sentiments; some insisting on the necessity of a war; others, that peace should not be obstructed by that decree, which ought to be repealed. At length Pericles, the son of Xantippus, standing forth, who was at that time the leading man at Athens, and a person of the greatest abilities both for action and debate, advised them thus:

"I firmly persevere, Athenians, in the same opinion that I have ever avowed—to make no concessions to the Lacedæmonians—though at the same time sensible, that men never execute a war with that warmth of spirit through which they are at first impelled to undertake it, but sink in their ardour as difficulties increase. I perceive it, however, incumbent upon me, to persist in the same uniform advice; and I require those amongst you who are influenced by it, as they concur in the measures, either to unite their efforts for redress, if any sinister event should follow; or else, upon a series of success, to make no parade of their own discernment. It is usually enough for accidents, unforeseen, to baffle the best concerted schemes; since human intentions are by nature fallible. And hence it comes to pass, that whatever falls out contrary to our expectations, we are accustomed to throw all the blame upon fortune.

"The treacherous designs of the Lacedæmonians, formerly, against us, were visible to all; nor are they, this very moment, less clear than ever. For, notwithstanding that express stipulation, that, upon controversies between us, we should reciprocally do, and submit to justice, each party remaining in their present possessions; yet, they have never demanded justice, nor accept the offer of it from us. Their allegations against us they are determined to support by arms, and not by evidence, and here they come no longer to remonstrate, but actually to give us law. They command us to quit the blockade of Potidæa, to permit

¹ Some authors have related, that his countrymen afterwards honoured him with a cenotaph in the Piræus. Plutarch, however, disbelieves the fact, and thinks it merely a presumption, formed on the following verses of Plato the comic poet:

To thee, Themistocles, a tomb is due,
Placed in the most conspicuous point of view;
Merchants from every port, with just acclaims,
Should shout thy honour, and confess thy fame;
Each fleet returned, or setting out, should join
In owning all the naval glory thine;
It should command, high raised, yon watery plain,
And point that fight which gave us all the main.

I cannot end this note about Themistocles, without begging the reader to accept a translation of an epigram in the Anthologia, which appears to have been written with a spirit worthy of this illustrious Athenian:

Be Greece the monument; and crown the height
With all the trophies of the naval fight.
Let Persia's Mars and Xerxes swell the base;
Such forms alone Themistocles can grace.
Next, like a column of majestic aim,
His acts inscribed, let Salamis arise.
Swell every part, and give the hero room,
For nothing small should scandalize the tomb.

Ægina to govern itself by its own model, and to repeal the decree against the Megareans; nay, this their last and peremptory embassy, authoritatively enjoins us to restore the Grecians to their former independence. But, let not one of you imagine, that we excite a war for a trifling concern, if we refuse to repeal that decree against the Megareans. The stress they lay upon it, that, if it be repealed, a war shall not ensue, is nothing but a colour; nor think there will be any ground for self-accusation, though for so trifling a concern you have recourse to arms; since that concern, trifling as it is, includes within it the full proof and demonstration of Athenian spirit. If, for instance, you condescend to this demand, you will immediately be enjoined some other condescension of greater consequence, as if this your compliance was owing to the prevalence of your fear. But, if at once you strenuously refuse to hearken to them, you will convince them in a manner clearly to be understood, that they must treat with you for the future as with men who are their equals.

"From the present crisis I exhort you therefore to form a resolution, either timely to make your submission before you begin to suffer; or, if we shall determine for war (which to me seemeth most expedient), without regarding the pretext of it, be it important or be it trifling, to refuse every the least concession, nor to render the tenure of what we now possess precarious and uncertain. For not only the greatest, but the most inconsiderable demand, if authoritatively enjoined by equals upon their neighbours, before justice hath decided the point, hath the very same tendency to make them slaves. But, from the posture in which the affairs of both parties are at present, that we may risk a war with a prospect of success as fine and as inviting as our rivals can—suffer me distinctly to set the reasons before you, and be convinced of their weight.

"The Peloponnesians are a people, who subsist by their bodily labour, without wealth either in the purses of individuals, or in any public fund. Again, in wars of long continuance, or wars by sea, they are quite unpractised; since the hostilities in which they have been embroiled with one another have been short and transient, in consequence of their poverty. Such people can neither completely man out a fleet, nor frequently march land-armies abroad, abandoning the care of their

domestic concerns, even whilst from them they must answer a large expense, and, more than this, are excluded the benefit of the sea. Funds of money are a much surer support of war, than contributions exacted by force. And men who subsist by the labour of their hands, are more ready to advance a service with their bodies than with their money; since the former, though exposed, they strongly presume will survive the danger, but the latter they apprehend must be too speedily exhausted, especially if the war run out into a greater length than they expect, which will probably be the case. In a single battle, it is true, the Peloponnesians and their confederates are able to make head against united Greece; but they are not able to support a war of continuance against an enemy, in all respects provided better than themselves; since by one general council they are not guided, but execute their momentary schemes in sudden and hasty efforts: and farther, having all of them an equality of suffrage, and being of different descents, each of them is intent on the advancement of a separate interest. In such circumstances no grand design can ever be accomplished. Some of them are eager to obtain a speedy vengeance on a foe; others are chiefly intent on preserving their substance from unnecessary waste. It is long before they can meet together to consult; and then, with great precipitancy, they form their public determinations, as the largest part of their time is devoted to domestic concerns. Each thinks it impossible, that the public welfare can be prejudiced by his own particular negligence, but that others are intent on watching for himself to share the benefit; and, whilst this error universally prevails amongst all the several members, the general welfare insensibly drops to ruin. But the greatest obstruction to them will be a scarcity of money, which as they can but slowly raise, their steps must needs be dilatory; and the urgent occasions of war can never tarry.

"As for any forts they can erect within our territory, or their application to a navy, it is beneath us to form any apprehensions from thence. To effectuate the former, would be difficult for a people of equal strength, in a season of tranquillity: much more so must it be, upon the lands of an open enemy, and when we are empowered to put the same expedients in execution against them. And, if they should fix a garrison in Attica, they might by accu-

sions or desertions from us annoy some part of our territory; but, whatever works they can raise will be insufficient to block us up, to prevent our descents upon their coasts, and making reprisals upon them by our fleets, wherein we are superior. For we are better qualified for land-service by the experience we have gained in that of the sea, than they for service at sea by the experience at land. To learn the naval skill they will find to be by no means an easy task. For even you, who have been in constant exercise ever since the Persian invasion, have not yet attained to a mastery in the science. How then shall men, brought up to tillage and strangers to the sea, whose practice farther will be ever interrupted by us, through the continual annoyance which our larger number of shipping will give them, effect any point of eclat? Against small squadrons they might indeed be sometimes adventurous, emboldening their want of skill by multiplying their numbers: but, when awed by superior force, they will of necessity desist; and so, by practice interrupted, the growth of their skill will be checked, and in consequence of it their fears be increased. The naval, like other sciences, is the effect of art. It cannot be learned by accident, nor usefully exercised at starts; or rather, there is nothing which so much requir-eth an uninterrupted application.

"If, farther, they should secrete the funds laid up at Olympia and Delphi, and endeavour, by an increase of pay, to seduce from our service the foreigners who are on board our fleets;—in case we were not their equals in strength, and they themselves and such foreigners could entirely apply themselves to the work—this then might be terrible indeed. But nought would it avail them now, whilst—what is our peculiar advantage—we have commanders Athenian born and seamen to man our fleets, in larger number and of greater skill than all the rest of Greece together. Besides, in so dangerous a crisis, not one of these foreigners would think of bartering an exile from his own settlement, and a desertion to that side where the prospect of victory is not near so inviting, for an enlargement of his pay of few days' continuance.

"The state of the Peloponnesians I judge to be such, or very nearly such, as I have described it; whereas, our own is exempt from

those defects which I have pointed out in them, and enjoys other great advantages far beyond their competition. Grant, that they may invade our territories by land: we too shall make descents upon theirs. And—whether is the greatest damage, only some part of Peloponnesus, or all Attica put to fire and sword—will admit of no comparison. In the former case, they will have no other land to repair the damage, but what they must earn by dint of arms: whilst we have large tracts already in our power, both in the islands and on the main. —Of vast consequence indeed is the dominion of the sea. But—consider it with attention. For, were we seated upon an island, which of us would be subdued with greater difficulty? —And now, you ought to think, that our present situation is as nearly as possible the same; and so, to evacuate your lands and houses here, to confine your defence to the sea, and to Athens itself; and not, exasperated against the Peloponnesians for the sake of those, to hazard a battle against superior numbers. Should we be thus victorious, we must fight it over again with another body not inferior; and, should we be vanquished, at that instant we lose all our dependents, the very essence of our strength. For the moment we cease to be able to awe them by our forces, they will be no longer obedient to our commands. We ought not to wail and lament for the loss of our houses or our lands, but for the lives of our people: because lands and houses can never acquire men, but are by men acquired.

"Durst I presume on a power to persuade, I would exhort you to march out yourselves, with your own hands to execute the waste, and let the Peloponnesians see that for things of such value you will never think of compliance. I have many other inducements to hope for victory, if, intending this war alone, you will forbear the ambition of enlarging your dominions, and not plunge into voluntary superfluous hazards. For, in truth, I am more afraid of our own indiscretions than the schemes of the enemy. But the explanation of what at present I only hint at, shall be reserved till due occasions offer in the course of action. Let us now dismiss the ambassadors with the following answer:

"That we will open our market and harbours to the Megareans, provided the Lacedæmonians, in their prohibition of foreigners, ex-

cept us and our confederates: for neither was that act in us, nor will this act in them be contrary to treaty.

"That we will suffer the states to govern themselves at their own discretion, if they were possessed of that right when the treaty was made, and so soon as ever they relax the necessity they lay upon the states in their own league of governing themselves by that model which suits best the Lacedæmonian interest, and allow them the choice of their own polity.

"That, farther, we are willing to submit to a judicial determination according to treaty.

"That a war shall not begin, but will retaliate upon those that do.

"Such an answer is agreeable to justice, and becomes the dignity of the Athenian state. But you ought to be informed, that a war unavoidably there will be; that the greater alacrity we show for it, the more shall we damp the spirits of our enemies in their attacks; and, that the greatest dangers are ever the source of the greatest honours to communities as well as individuals. It was thus that our fathers withstood the Medes, and rushing to arms with resources far inferior to ours, nay abandoning all their substance, by resolution more than fortune, by courage more than real strength, beat back the Barbarian, and advanced this state to its present summit of grandeur. From them we ought not to degenerate, but by every effort within our ability avenge it on our foes, and deliver it down to posterity, unblemished and unimpaired."

In this manner Pericles spoke; and the Athenians, judging that what he had advised was most for their interest, decreed in conformity to his exhortation. They returned a particular answer to the Lacedæmonians, according to his directions, nay in the very words of his motion; and in fine concluded—that "they would do nothing upon command, but were ready to submit the points in contest to a judicial determination, according to treaty, upon a fair and equal footing." Upon this, the ambassadors departed; and here all negotiations came to a conclusion.

Such were the pretexts and dissensions on both sides previous to the war, and which took their first rise from the business of Epidamnus and Coreyra. These however never interrupted their commercial dealings nor mutual intercourse, which still were carried on without the intervention of heralds, but not without

suspensions. For such incidents manifestly tended to a rupture, and must infallibly end in war.¹

¹ As the Athenians were a free people, they made use of their liberty on all occasions to asperse, calumniate, and ridicule the great men amongst them. They were at this time exhibited on the stage by name; and Aristophanes, whose plays were acted during the Peloponnesian war, hath ridiculed the cotemporary statesmen and commanders with the utmost petulance and virulence. The Athenians afterwards thought proper to restrain this licentiousness of their comic poets; but it may not be amiss in the course of the notes to quote occasionally some passages from him, to show my countrymen how much writing libels differs from writing history; and that where liberty is abused, no public merit nor private worth can defend its owners from the malice of faction or the petulance of buffoons.

Our historian hath laid open the true and pretended causes of the Peloponnesian war. Let us now see, how affairs were represented on the stage of Athens. His comedy of *The Acharnians* was exhibited by Aristophanes at Athens in the sixth year of this war, after the death of Pericles. The decree against Megara is the ground-work of it: one *Dicæopolis* of the borough of *Acharnæ* is the droll of the play, and amply ridicules it to a set of his neighbours.

"Do not be angry," says he, "if though a beggar I presume to talk to Athenians about affairs of state, and for once play tragedian. It is the province of tragedy to give a just representation of things; and I am going to speak in a just manner of very sad things indeed. Cleon will not be able to catch me this bout, for traducing my countrymen in the hearing of strangers. We are here by ourselves, and to-day is the festival of *Bacchus*. The strangers are not yet come, nor the tributes, nor the confederates from other states: we are here snug by ourselves, all of us true-blooded Athenians. Those odd creatures the sojourners, I look upon as the chaff of Athens. And now to speak sincerely, I hate the Lacedæmonians from the bottom of my soul; and I heartily wish that Neptune, the god adored at *Tenarus*, would give them an earthquake, and tumble down all their houses upon their heads. They have made sad work with me, all my vineyards are quite destroyed by the rogues. But, my dear friends and countrymen here present, why do we blame the Lacedæmonians for this? And mind, Sirs, I cast no aspersion on our own state; I aim at nobody employed in the affairs of the administration, but at a parcel of sad rascals, scurvy, low, infamous scoundrels, who are eternally bringing informations against a Megarean pair of paniers. If they once set eye but on a cucumber, a leveret, a sucking-pig, a sprig of parsley, or a grain of salt, they swear at once they belonged to Megareans, and were sold that very day. These things, however, though the general practice, are of small signification. A parcel of jolly fellows, deep in their cups, had stole away from Megara that jade *Simætha*. The Megareans, exasperated at the loss of their wench, made reprisals by carrying off a brace of strumpets that belonged to *Aspasia*. And thus this cursed war, which plagues all Greece, took its rise from three strumpets. Ay, on account of three whores, Olympian Pericles began to storm, he lightened, he thundered, roused all Greece to arms; he made new

fast as so many ballads, that the poor dogs of must be found neither in the fields, nor the , nor by sea, nor by land. Upon this, being just , starve, away they go to Lacedæmon, to get ce reversed which had been made on account whores. It would not do, embassy after em- id no avail, and then immediately rose all this g of shields."

ny hath a dart always left in her quiver, and er comedy of Aristophanes we find another t Pericles. This was, his being an accomplice idias in secreting some of the gold issued from ic treasury for the statue of Minerva in the cit- s workmanship of that celebrated artist. In dy called *The Peace*, Mercury says—"Ye wise men, attend to my words, if you have a mind how things came into this sad confusion. Phi- s the first cause of it by cheating the public. ericles helped it forward, for fear he should e fate of Phidias. He stood in awe of your ; he was afraid of falling under your censure; revent his own personal danger, he set the omunity in a flame, by lighting up first that ark of the decree against Megara. He then that spark into this mighty war, the smoke of ath fetched tears from all the eyes of Greece, ecians on both sides."

les had employed Phidias in adorning Athens. e taste of the patron and fine execution of the ve been universally acknowledged. An accu- owever was preferred against Phidias by one

of his workmen, that he had secreted some gold. By the advice of Pericles he had laid it on so artfully, that it might be taken off without prejudicing the statue. The trial accordingly was made, and the gold found to answer weight. It seems however that Phidias was banished; because, as the enemies of Pericles attacked him at the same time, for impiety, in the persons of his beloved Aspasia and his preceptor in philosophy Anaxagoras, and for a cheat in that of his favourite artist, he had only influence enough to save the former, by pleading earnestly for her, and softening his plea with abundant tears.

Both Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos have recorded a third story of Pericles in relation to this war. It is this —Alcibiades, then a youth, saw him in a very pensive and melancholy mood, and demanded the reason of it. Pericles told him, "great sums of public money had passed through his hands, and he knew not how to make up his accounts." "Contrive then," replied Alcibiades, "to give no account at all." And in pursuance of this advice he is said to have involved the state in the Peloponnesian war. But is not Thucydides more to be depended upon than a whole host of writers of scandal, memoirs, private history, and satire? If we listen to the latter, there never was and never will be any truth in history; there never was, nor is there this moment, any true worth or merit in the world. A buffoon can degrade a hero, a spiteful satirist cloud every good quality in others, and the ears and hearts of men will be filled with nothing but detraction and slander.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

BOOK II.

YEAR I. Hostilities begin. The Thebans by night surprise Plataea, but are afterwards repulsed and slaughtered. The Peloponnesians invade Attica: the Athenians in their turn cruise and make descents on the coast of Peloponnesus. A public funeral solemnized at Athens, for those who fell in the first campaign, and the oration spoke on that occasion by Pericles.—II. Early the next year Attica again invaded. The plague breaks out in Athens. Its symptoms, progress, and mortality described. The Athenians being greatly dejected, murmur against Pericles; his justification. The Ambraciots war against the Amphiloehians. The surrender of Potidæa.—III. In the beginning of the third year the Peloponnesians appear before Plataea; a parley without effect: the siege is begun and carried on with great industry and art. The Peloponnesians beaten at sea by Phormio in the gulf of Crissa; and when reinforced beaten by him a second time before Naupactus. A project to seize the Piræus quite disconcerted. War between Thracians and Macedonians. Motions in Acarnania, with an account of that country.

Hence instantly commenceth the war between the Peloponnesians and Athenians,¹ and the confederates on both sides—during which they had no kind of intercourse with one another without the herald; and now once engaged, carried it on without intermission. The particular incidents of it are orderly related by the Summer and the Winter.

The thirty-years peace, which was made after the conquest of Eubœa, had now lasted fourteen: but in the fifteenth year, when Chryse had been forty-eight years priestess at Argos, when Ænesias was Ephorus at Sparta, and Pythodorus ten months Archon at Athens, in the sixth month after the battle at Potidæa, and in the very beginning of the spring—a body of Thebans, somewhat above three hundred, under the command of Pythangelus the son of Phylidas, and Diemporus the son of Onetoridas, two of the rulers of Bœotia, about the first sleep, got into Plataea² of Bœotia with

their arms, which place was then in alliance with the Athenians. They were induced to this attempt, and had the gates opened to them, by Naucrides and associates, citizens of Plataea, who had formed a design for the sake of aggrandizing themselves, to destroy all their fellow-citizens averse to their schemes, and to gain the city for the Thebans. But the affair was managed by Eurymachus, the son of Leontiades, a person of the greatest authority among the Thebans. For the Thebans, foreseeing a war unavoidable, had, even now while peace was actually subsisting and the war not yet declared, a strong desire to get possession of Plataea, which had been at eternal enmity with them. No regular watch was as yet kept in it, which was a means of facilitating their entrance. When they had gained admission, they drew themselves up in order of battle on the public forum, contrary to the scheme proposed by the conspirators, of marching imme-

¹ Before Christ 431.

² Plataea was a city and petty state in Bœotia, on the confines of Attica. The inhabitants of it had ever been so firmly attached to the liberties of Greece, that it drew upon them the lasting rancour of the Thebans, who had joined the Persians when they invaded Greece, and persuaded them to burn down Plataea. The Plata-

ans engaged with the Athenians on the side of Greece, in the famous battle fought within their own territory. The Athenians, to show their gratitude, gave them a place in the fine battle-piece painted in the Pæcile in honour of the victory, made them all citizens of Athens, and ever after concluded their religious solemnities with a prayer for the prosperity of the Plateans.

diately to the houses of their enemies, and putting them to the sword. Their own design was, publicly to offer some fair proposals, and gain the city by an amicable composition. With this view, their herald proclaimed aloud, that—"All who were willing to enter into league, according to the ancient custom of all Bœotians,¹ should come and join their arms with them." By this method they thought the city would easily be brought to an accommodation.

The Plateans, when they found that the Thebans were already got in and had surprised the town, being in great consternation, and thinking the enemy more numerous than they really were, for the night prevented a view of them, came soon to a composition; and accepting what terms they offered, made no resistance; especially as they found that violence was offered to no man. Yet, by means of the parley, they had discovered that the Thebans were few in number; and judged, should they venture an attack, they might easily overpower them:—for the bulk of the Plateans had not the least inclination to revolt from the Athenians. It was at length concluded, that this point should be attempted, after having conferred together, by digging through the partition walls of one another's houses, to avoid the suspicion which going through the streets might have occasioned. Then along the streets they arranged carriages without the oxen, to serve them instead of a rampart, and made a proper disposition for every thing necessary for immediate execution. When they had got every thing ready in the best manner they were able, watching till night began to vanish and the first dawn appear, they marched from their houses towards the Thebans, that they might fall upon them before the full light should embolden their resistance, and give them equal advantages in the fight, and that they might be more intimidated by being charged in the dark, and sensible of disadvantage from their ignorance of the city.

¹ Bœotia was one large republic formed by the union of several little states. The sovereignty (as Thucydides informs us, book the fifth) was lodged in four councils, composed of deputies sent from every city in the union. These were the states general, and sat at Thebes, the principal city of Bœotia. The executive and military were lodged in eleven persons, chosen annually, and styled Rulers of Bœotia, in whose election each city had a share. They rolled, and at the battle of Delium, Pagondas was in this chief command, in right of Thebes. Plateæ had no share in this union, but was closely allied with and under the protection of Athens.

The attack was immediately begun, and both sides soon came to action. The Thebans, when they found themselves thus circumscribed, threw themselves into an oval, and wherever assaulted, prevented impression. Twice or thrice they beat them back with success; and when the assaults were again with a loud noise repeated, when the very women and maid servants were shouting and screaming from the houses all around, and throwing stones and tiles amongst them, incommoded further by the rain which had fallen plentiful that night, they were seized with fear, and abandoning their defence, fled in confusion about the city. The greatest part of them running in the dark and the dirt, knew not any of the passages by which they could get out, (for this affair happened upon the change of the moon,) and were pursued by men who, knowing them all, prevented their escape, so that many of them perished. The gates by which they entered, and which only had been opened, one of the Plateans had barred fast by thrusting the point of a spear into the staple instead of a bolt, so that they could not possibly get out there. Thus pursued about the city, some of them got upon the walls, and threw themselves over, but most of these were killed by the fall: some of them found a gate unguarded, and a woman supplying them with a hatchet, they cut the bolt in pieces unperceived, though few only escaped by this means, for they were soon discovered. Others were separately slain in the different quarters of the city. But the greatest part, and chiefly those who had kept in a body, thrust themselves into a great house contiguous to the walls, the doors of which happened to be open, imagining the doors of this house to be the only gates and a certain passage to a place of safety. When the Plateans saw them thus shut up, they consulted together, whether they should fire the house and burn them all in the inclosure, or reserve them for some other punishment. But at last these, and all the other Thebans yet surviving, who were scattered about the city, agreed to give up their arms, and surrender themselves to the Plateans prisoners at discretion. Such was the issue of this attempt on Plateæ.

The other Thebans, who ought during the war to have come up with all their strength, to reinforce the first body in case they miscarried, were still upon the march, when the news of this defeat met them, advanced with all possible

ble expedition. Plataea is distant from Thebes about seventy stadia, and the rain which fell that night had retarded their march; for the river Asopus was so much swelled by it that it was not easily fordable. It was owing to the march in such a rain and the difficulty of passing this river, that they came not up till their men were either slain or made prisoners. When the Thebans were convinced of that event, they cast their attention towards the Plataeans who were still without; for the people of Plataea were scattered about the adjacent country with their implements of husbandry, because annoyance in time of peace was quite unexpected. They were desirous to catch some of these as exchange for their own people within the city, if any were yet living and prisoners there. On this they were fully bent; but in the midst of their project the Plataeans, who suspected the probability of some such design, and were anxious for their people yet without, despatched a herald to the Thebans representing to them "the injustice of the attempt already made; since, treaties subsisting, they had endeavoured to surprise the city;" and then warned them "to desist from any violence to those without. If not, they positively declared they would put all the prisoners yet alive to the sword; whereas, in case they retired peaceably out of their territory, they would deliver them up unhurt." This account the Thebans give, and say farther it was sworn to. The Plataeans disown the promise of an immediate discharge of the prisoners, which was reserved for terms to be agreed on in a subsequent treaty, and flatly deny that they swore. The Thebans however retired out of their territory, without committing any violence. But the Plataeans, when they had with expedition fetched into the city all their effects of value that were out in the fields, immediately put all their prisoners to the sword. The number of those that were taken was one hundred and eighty. Eurymachus was amongst them, with whom the traitors had concerted the surprise. And this done, they despatched a messenger to Athens: and restored to the Thebans their dead under truce. And then they regulated the affairs of the city in the manner most suitable to their present situation.

The news of the surprisal of Plataea had soon reached the Athenians, who immediately

apprehended all the Boeotians then in Attica, and despatched a herald to Plataea with orders "to proceed no farther against the Theban prisoners, till they should send their determination about them;" for they were not yet informed of their having been actually put to death. The first messenger had been sent away immediately upon the irruption of the Thebans—the second so soon as they were defeated and made prisoners—as to what happened afterwards, they were utterly in the dark. Thus ignorant of what had since been done, the Athenians despatched away their herald, who upon his arrival found them all destroyed. Yet after this, the Athenians marching a body of troops to Plataea, carried thither all necessary provisions, left a garrison in the place, and brought away all the hands that would be useless in a siege, with the women and children.

After this business of Plataea, and so manifest a breach of peace, the Athenians made all necessary preparations for immediate war. The Lacedaemonians also and their confederates took the same measures. Nay, both sides were intent on despatching² embassies to the king,³ and to several other Barbarian powers, wherever they had hope of forming some effectual interest for themselves, and spared no pains to win those states over to their alliance, which had hitherto been independent. In the Lacedaemonian league, besides the ships already furnished out for them in Italy and Sicily, the confederates there were ordered to prepare a new quota, proportioned to the abilities of the several states, that the whole number of their shipping might be mounted to five hundred.—They were farther to get a certain sum of money

² By this means the intestine quarrels of Greece were going to throw a power into the hands of the Persian monarch, which he could not obtain by force. Each partly could cringe to the common enemy, in order to obtain subsidies from him to enable them to distress each other. And thus the balance of power rested at last in his hands, and he became for a time supreme arbiter of Greece. Aristophanes, in his comedy of *The Acharnians*, hath described these embassies and the Persian monarch too, with excessive buffoonery, but quite too low and ridiculous to quote. He hears hard upon the Athenian ambassadors for lengthening out the time of their employ as much as possible, for the lucre of the salary paid them by the state, which is there mentioned at two drachmas a day. Was it either avarice or public rapine—this exorbitant salary of 15*d.* a day to an ambassador from the republic of Athens to the great king of Persia?

³ Artaxerxes Longimanus.

¹ About seven English miles.

in readiness; but in other respects to remain quiet, and till their preparations could be completed, never to admit more than one Athenian vessel at a time within their ports.—The Athenians made a careful survey of the strength of their own alliance, and sent pressing embassies to the places round about Peloponnesus, to Corcyra, to Cephallene, to the Acarnanians, and to Zacynthus; plainly seeing, that if these were in their interest, they might securely attack Peloponnesus on all sides.—The minds of both parties were not a little elated, but were eager after and big with war. For it is natural to man in the commencement of every important enterprise, to be more than usually alert. The young men, who were at this time numerous in Peloponnesus, numerous also at Athens, were for want of experience quite fond of the rupture. And all the rest of Greece stood attentively at gaze on this contention between the two principal states. Many oracles were tossed about, the soothsayers sung abundance of predictions, amongst those who were upon the point to break, and even in the cities that were yet neutral. Nay, Delos had been lately shook with an earthquake, which it had never been before in the memory of the Greeks. It was said, and indeed believed, that this was a prognostic of something extraordinary to happen: and all other accidents of an uncommon nature whatever were sure to be wrested to the same meaning.

The generality of Greece was indeed at this time much the best affected to the Lacedæmonians, who gave out the specious pretence, that “they were going to recover the liberty of Greece.” Every one made it both his private passion and his public care, to give them all possible succour both in word and act; and every one thought that the business certainly flagged in those places where he himself was not present to invigorate proceedings. So general an invasion was there at this time formed against the Athenians, when some were passionately desirous to throw off their yoke, and others apprehensive of falling under their subjection.—With such preparations and such dispositions did they run into the war.

The states in league with either party, upon the breaking out of the war, were these.—In confederacy with the Lacedæmonians, were all Peloponnesians within the Isthmus, except the Argives and Achæans, for these had treaties subsisting with both parties. But of the

Achæans the Pellonians singly were who went over, though they were joined by all the rest. Without Peloponnesus were the Megareans, Locrians, Bœotians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, &c. Of these they were supplied with soldiers the Corinthians, Megareans, Sicyonians, Eleans, Ambraciots, Leucadians, horse by the Bœotians, Phocians, and the other states furnished them. This was the confederacy of the Lacedæmonians.—With the Athenians were the Lesbians, Platæans, the Messenians, most of the Acarnanians, the Zacynthians, and other states that were in so many nations: namely, the people of Caria, the Dorians¹ that bordered the Carians, Ionia, Hellespont, the coast of Thrace, all the islands to the east between Peloponnesus and all the Cyclades, except Melos and Tenos. These, they were supplied with ships the Chians, Lesbians, Corcyreans; they supplied them with foot and with money was the alliance on both sides, and for the war.

The Lacedæmonians, immediately upon the attempt on Platæa, sent circular orders to the states both within and without Peloponnesus to draw their quotas of aid together, and every thing in readiness for a foreign expedition, as intending to invade Attica. The Athenians were ready, they assembled on the Isthmus, with two-thirds of the force of the Peloponnesians at the Isthmus. When the whole Peloponnesian force thus² drawn together, Archidamus king of the Lacedæmonians, who commanded in chief, convened the commanders from the auxiliary states, with all those that were in authority, and most fitting to be present, and dressed them as follows:

“Peloponnesians and allies, many expeditions in which our fathers have been engaged both within and without Peloponnesus. Even some of us, who are more advanced in years, are by no means unexperienced in the business of war. Yet, never before did we enter the field with a force so great as this. But, numerous and formidable in arms

¹ These were the Dorians, who were at the time on the islands of Rhodes, Cos, and Cnidus, according to the scholiast.

² Plutarch informs us that the number was sixty thousand men.

now appear, we are however marching against a most powerful state. Thus it is incumbent upon us to show ourselves not inferior in valour to our fathers, nor to sink below the expectations of the world. The eyes of all Greece are fixed attentively on our motions.—Their good will to us, their hatred of the Athenians, make them wish for our success in all our undertakings. It is therefore our business, without placing too great confidence in superior numbers, or trusting to the presumption that our enemies dare not come out to fight us—for no reasons like these, to relax our discipline, or break the regularity of our march—but, the commander of every confederate body and every private soldier ought to keep within himself the constant expectation of being engaged in action. Uncertain are the turns of war; great events start up from a small beginning, and assaults are given from indignation. Nay, frequently an inferior number engaging with caution hath proved too hard for a more numerous body, whom contempt of their enemy exposeth to attacks for which they are not prepared. Upon hostile ground, it is always the duty of soldiers to be resolutely bold, and to keep ready for action with proper circumspection. Thus will they be always ready to attack with spirit, and be most firmly secured against a surprise.

“We are not marching against a people who are unable to defend themselves, but excellently well qualified for it in every respect; so that we may certainly depend upon their advancing against us to give us battle;—nor yet perhaps in motion, so long as no enemy appears; but most assuredly so when once they see us in their territory, wasting and destroying their substance. All men must kindle into wrath, when uncommon injuries are unexpectedly done them, when manifest outrage glares before them. Reflection then may indeed have lost its power, but resentment most strongly impels them to resistance. Something like this may more reasonably be looked for from Athenians than from other people. They esteem themselves worthy to command others, and their spirit is more turned to make than to suffer depredations. Against so formidable a people as we now to march; and by the event, whatever it be, shall we acquire the greatest glory or disgrace, for our ancestors and ourselves.—Let it therefore be the business of every man to follow his commander, observant in every point of discipline and the rules of

war, and obeying with expedition the orders you receive. The finest spectacle and the strongest defence is the uniform observation of discipline by a numerous army.”

When Archidamus had finished his oration and dismissed the assembly, the first thing he did was sending to Athens Melesippus a Spartan, the son of Diacritus, to try whether the Athenians were grown any thing more pliant, since they found an army upon the march against them. But they would not allow him to come into the city, nor grant him a public audience. For the advice of Pericles had before this gained the general assent, that “no herald or embassy should be received from the Lacedæmonians so long as they were in the field against them.” They send him back therefore unheard, and ordered him “to quit their territories that very day; that farther, the Lacedæmonians should retire within their own frontier; and then, if they had any thing to transact with them, should send their ambassadors for the purpose.” They even commission some persons to guard Melesippus back, that he might have no conference with any person whatever. When he was brought to the borders, and received his dismissal, he parted from them with these words, “This day is the beginning of great woes to the Grecians.” Upon his return to the camp, Archidamus was convinced that the Athenians were inflexible as ever, so that he immediately dislodged and advanced with his army into their territories.—The Bœotians sent their quota of foot and their horse to join the Peloponnesians in this expedition, but with the rest of their forces they marched towards Platea, and laid the country waste.

Whilst the Peloponnesians were yet assembling at the Isthmus, or yet on the march, before they had entered Attica, Pericles the son of Xantippus, who with nine others had been appointed to command the Athenian forces, when he saw an irruption from the Peloponnesians unavoidable, had conceived a suspicion that Archidamus, whom the hospitable¹ inter-

¹ The tie of hospitality was sacred and inviolable amongst the ancients. It was a necessary exertion of humanity at first from the want of inns and lodging-houses, and was frequently improved into friendship and endearment. This between Pericles and Archidamus was merely of a private nature, between the royal family of Sparta and a principal one in the republic of Athens. The family of Alcibiades was the public host of the Spartan state, and entertained their ambas-

course had made his friend, from a principle of good-nature willing to oblige him, would leave his lands untouched, or, might be ordered to do so by the policy of the Lacedæmonians, as they had already demanded an excommunication on his account; by which means he must certainly incur the public jealousy. He declared therefore to the Athenians, in a general assembly of the people—that “though Archidamus was his friend, he should not be so to the prejudice of the state; and that if the enemy spared his lands and houses in the general ravage, he made a free donation of them to the public; so that for any accident of that nature he ought not to fall under their censure.” He then exhorted all who were present, as he had done before—“to prepare vigorously for war, and to withdraw all their effects from out of the country,—by no means to march out against the enemy, but keep within the walls and mind the defence of the city;—to fit out their navy, in which their strength principally consisted, and keep a tight rein over all their dependents. By the large tributes levied upon these, he said, their power was chiefly to be supported, since success in war was a constant result from prudent measures and plentiful supplies.”¹ He exhorted them by no means to let their spirits droop, since, besides their certain revenue, six hundred talents were annually paid them by their tributary states, and they had still in the citadel six thousand talents of silver coined.” Their primary fund was nine thousand seven hundred talents, out of which had been taken what defrayed the expense of refitting the gates of the citadel, of other public works, and the exigen-

sadors and public ministers. The state of Athens had likewise in all places a public host who lodged their ministers. Yet amongst private persons it was a frank disinterested tie; when once they had eat salt together, or sat at the same table, they regarded themselves as under mutual obligations, which small point sought not to abolish. They who swerved from this laudable custom through caprice or ingratitude were looked upon as infamous execrable persons.

¹ The account here given sheweth Athens at this time to have been a very opulent state. Reduced to English money it stands thus—The tribute paid them annually amounted to £116,250 sterling. The fund yet remaining in the citadel was £1,162,500 sterling. They had expended lately on their public works 3,700 talents, which is equal to £716,875 sterling. The weight of the gold on the statue of Minerva was 40 talents, which, computing the talent only at 65lb. Troy, to avoid fractions, and the gold at £4 sterling an ounce, amounts in value to £124,800 sterling.

cies of Potidæa.—“That, besides this, they had gold and silver uncoined, both in public and private repositories, many valuable vases destined for religious uses and their public solemnities, and the Persian spoils, the whole value of which would not amount to less than five hundred talents.”—He mentioned further, “the great wealth that was stored up in other temples, which they had a right to use; and if this right should be denied them, they might have recourse to the golden ornaments of the goddess herself.” He declared “that her image had about it to the weight of forty talents of gold without alloy, all which might be taken off from the statue.—That, for the preservation of their country it might lawfully be employed;” but added, “that it ought afterwards to be amply replaced.” In this manner did he render them confident that their sums of money would suffice.—He told them further, that “they had thirteen thousand men that wore heavy armour, exclusive of those that were in garrisons, and the sixteen thousand on the guard of the city;”—for so large a number, draughted from the youngest and oldest citizens and sojourners, who wore the heavy armour, was employed in this service upon the first invasion of their enemies. For the length of the Phalerian wall to the place where it joined the circle of the city was ²thirty-five stadia, and that part of the circular wall which was guarded was ³forty-three in length; but that which lay between the long wall and the Phalerian had no guard. The long walls continued down to the Piræus are ⁴forty stadia, but the outermost of them only was guarded. The whole compass of the Piræus, including Munichia, is ⁵sixty stadia, but then only one half of this had a guard.⁶—He then assured them, that “they had, including the archers, that were mounted, twelve hundred horsemen, sixteen hundred archers, and three hundred triremes fit for sea.”—So great in general, and no less in any one article, were the military provisions of the Athenians, when the Peloponnesians had formed the design of invading them, and both sides began the war.—These, and such like arguments, was

^a About 3½ English miles. ⁵ Above 4 miles.

⁴ About 4 English miles. ⁶ About 6 English miles.

³ The whole compass of the walls of Athens was 178 stadia, or above 22 Attic miles. But, according to Dr Arbuthnot, the Attic mile consisted of but 805 paces, whereas the English is 1056. Hence, the compass of Athens appears to have been about 17 English miles.

Pericles continually employing, to convince them that they were well able to carry on a successful war.

The Athenians heard him with attention, and followed his advice. They withdrew from the country their children, their wives, all the furniture of their houses there, pulling down with their own hands the timber of which they were built. Their flocks and their labouring-cattle they sent over into Eubœa and the adjacent islands. But this removal was a very grievous business to them, since it had been the ancient custom of many of the Athenians to reside at large in the country.

This method of living had been more habitual to the Athenians than to any other Greeks, from their first commencement as a people. From the time of Cecrops and their first series of kings down to Theseus, Attica had been inhabited in several distinct towns, each of which had its own archons¹ and its own prytaneum; and, unless in times of danger, had seldom recourse to the regal authority, since justice was administered in every separate borough, and each had a council of its own. Sometimes they even warred against one another; for instance, the Eleusinians, when they sided with Eumolpus against Erechtheus. But when the regal power devolved upon Theseus, a man of an extensive understanding, and who knew how to govern, in several respects he improved the whole territory; and besides, dissolving all the councils and magistracies of the petty boroughs,² he removed them to the metropolis, as it is at present, and constituting one grand senate and prytaneum, made it the point of union in which all concentrated. Their private properties he left to them entire, but made them rest contented with Athens alone for their city: which when all its subjects were now jointly contributing to its support, was quickly enlarged, and delivered so by Theseus to the succeeding kings. In memory of this, from the days of Theseus quite down to the present time, the Athenians have held an anniversary solemnity to the goddess, which they call *Synœcia* or *Cohabitation*. Before this, that which is now the citadel, and that part which lies on the south side of the citadel, was all the

city. The temples built either within the citadel or without sufficiently show it. For in the south part of the city, particularly, stand the temples of the Olympian Jove, of the Pythian Apollo, of Terra, and of Bacchus in Limnæ, in honour of whom the old Bacchanalian feasts are celebrated on the twelfth day of the month Anthesterion:³ which custom is still retained to this day by the Ionians of Attic descent. All the other ancient temples are seated in the same quarter. Near it also is the fountain now called the Enneakrounos or Nine-pipe, from the manner in which it was embellished by the tyrants;⁴ but formerly, when all the springs were open, called Callirrhoe; and which, as near at hand, they perferred on the most solemn occasions. And that ancient custom is to this day preserved, by making use

* The English reader may perhaps call this a hard word, but I hope will not be frightened. The names of other Attic months will occur in the sequel, which I shall leave as I find them, because no exact correspondence hath been found out between the Attic months, which were lunar, and those now in use. Monsieur Tourell, the celebrated French translator of Demosthenes, hath made it a very serious point. "I have long doubted (says he) whether in my translation I should give the months their old Greek names, or such as they have in our language. The reason that made me balance is the impossibility of computing the months so that they shall answer exactly to our French.—My first determination was to date in our own manner: I chose to be less exact, rather than frighten the greatest part of my readers by words to which they are not accustomed. For what French ears would not be appalled at the words, Thergolion, Boedromion, Elaphebolion?" &c. He then gives reasons for retaining Greek ones, and adds, "I declare then once for all, that I am far from pedantically affecting the terms of an old calendar conceived in a language barbarous to numbers of people, who, shocked at the sound, would perhaps impute to me a taste which, thank God, I have not. I protest that to my ear, no less than to theirs, the French name of the word would be more pleasing and would sound better. But neither false delicacy nor vicious complaisance hath been able to prevail with me to expose myself to reproaches, for knowingly leading others into mistake, and using words appropriated to Roman and solar months, which have no correspondence with the lunar or Attic." He says a deal on the subject so little affecting his countrymen, that since his death, they have again thrown all the Greek terms into the margin, and placed in the text the incongruous modern ones for the sake of familiar sounds. If the English reader be as delicate, he may read April or May at his option. The ablest chronologers are unable to exchange them into currency with any tolerable exactness. A great deal of learning might be also displayed about the days of the month and the Grecian method of counting them: but as it is exceeding easy to translate these right, learning may be excused in a point where no light is wanting.

4 The *Pisistratide*.

¹ That is—Magistrates of its own, and a common hall, in which those magistrates performed the duties of their office in administering justice, and offering sacrifices, and where they had their diet at the public expense.

² The number of the boroughs in Attica was one hundred seventy four.

of the same water in connubial and many other religious rites. And further, it is owing to such their ancient residence in the citadel, that it is eminently called by the Athenians to this very day, *The City*.

In the manner above-mentioned, were the Athenians for a long series of time scattered about the country, in towns and communities at their own discretion. And as not only the more ancient, but even the latter Athenians quite down to the present war, had still retained the custom of dwelling about the country with their families, the general removals into the city, after they were formed into one body, were attended with no small embarrassment; and particularly now, when they had been refitting their houses, and resettling themselves after the Persian invasion. It gave them a very sensible grief and concern to think, that they must forsake their habitations and temples, which, from long antiquity, it had been their forefathers' and their own religious care to frequent; that they must quite alter their scene of life, and each abandon as it were his native home. When they were come into the city, some few had houses ready for their reception, or sheltered themselves with their friends and relations. The greater part were forced to settle in the less frequented quarters of the city, in all the buildings sacred to the gods and heroes, except those in the citadel, the Eleusinian, and any other from whence they were excluded by religious awe. There was indeed a spot of ground below the citadel, called the *Pelasgic*, which to turn into a dwelling-place, had not only been thought profaneness, but was expressly forbid by the close of a line in a Pythian oracle, which said,

——“*Best is Pelasgic empty.*”

Yet this sudden urgent necessity constrained them to convert it to such a use. To me, I own, that oracle seems to have carried a different meaning from what they gave it. For the calamities of Athens did not flow from the profane habitation of this place, but from the war which laid them under the necessity of employing it in such a manner. The oracle makes no mention of the war, but only hints that its being some time inhabited would be attended with public misfortune. Many of them, further, were forced to lodge themselves within the turrets of the walls, or wherever they could find a vacant corner. The city was

not able to receive so large a conflux of people. But afterwards, the long walls, and a great part of the *Piræus*, were portioned out to them for little dwellings. At the same time they were busied in the military preparations, gathering together the confederate forces, and fitting out a fleet of one hundred ships to infest *Peloponnesus*. In affairs of such great importance were the Athenians engaged.

The *Peloponnesian* army, advancing forwards, came up first to *Oenoe*, through which they designed to break into *Attica*. Encamping before it, they made ready their engines, and all other necessities for battering the walls. For *Oenoe*, being a frontier-town between *Attica* and *Boeotia*, was walled about, since the Athenians were used, upon the breaking out of war, to throw a garrison into it. The enemy made great preparations for assaulting it, and by this and other means spent no little time before it.

This delay was the occasion of drawing very heavy censures on *Archidamus*. He had before this been thought too dilatory in gathering together the confederate army, and too much attached to the Athenians, because he never declared warmly for the war. But after the army was drawn together, his long stay at the *Isthmus*, and the slow marches he had made from thence, exposed him to calumny, which was still heightened by the length of the siege of *Oenoe*: for, in this interval of delay, the Athenians had without molestation withdrawn all their effects from the country, though it was the general opinion, that, had the *Peloponnesians* advanced with expedition, they might undoubtedly have seized them, were it not for these dilatory proceedings of *Archidamus*. Under such a weight of resentment did *Archidamus* still lie with his army before *Oenoe*. His remissness was said to be owing to his presumption, that the Athenians, if their territory was spared, would make some concessions, and that they dreaded nothing more than to see it destroyed. But after this assault on *Oenoe*, and the successive miscarriage of all the methods employed to take it, the Athenians still resolutely refraining from the least show of submission, they broke up the siege and marched into *Attica*, in the height of summer, when the harvest was ripe, about eighty days after the *Thebans* had miscarried in the surprise of *Platæa*. They were still commanded by *Archidamus* son of *Zeuxidamus*, king of the *La-*

, and having formed their camp devastations. They first of all usis and the plain of Thriasia. they encountered and put to flight thenian horse. Then they advanced to the country through Cecropia, at Ægaleon on their right, till they Acharnæ, the greatest of all those called the boroughs of Athens. When before it, and having fortified continued a long time there, laying out country waste.

Archidamus in stopping thus Acharnæ, keeping there his army ready and not marching down there this into the plains, is said to be this. He said that the Athenians, who at that time in a numerous youth, never before had been so well prepared, would probably march out, and would not sit quiet whilst they were ravaged before their eyes. He had advanced to Eleusis and the Thriasia without any resistance, he tried to try whether laying siege to Acharnæ would provoke them to come out. He seemed further to him a convenient long encampment. Besides, he persuaded himself, that the Acharnians, a body amongst the citizens (for three thousand of them in heavy armour), could see with their own properties ruined by horsemen, without inciting all their fellows to rush out to battle. And if they could not come out against them, he might another campaign with which to extend his devastation even to the plains of Athens. He thought it not of the Acharnians, when all their lands were ruined in this manner, would cheerless hazards to prevent the losses of what hence much dissension might

Archidamus wrote his comedy of The Acharnians, and abundantly ridiculed the public conduct to the citizens of Athens. Though it is at upon the stage till the sixth year of the war shows us, how the Acharnians resented as exposed to the ravage of the enemy; the poets, that lived upon the public passions, were to exasperate them, and misrepresent the ablest politicians, and who persecuted and aimed at the general welfare of the community, as weak, corrupt, and mischievous; to redress, and no commiseration for the Dicaeopolis hints, who was one of that

be kindled up amongst them. Of these imaginary schemes was Archidamus full, whilst he lay before Acharnæ.

The Athenians, so long as the enemy remained about Eleusis and the plain of Thriasia, conceived some hopes that they would advance no farther. They put one another in mind, that Pleistoanax son of Pausanias king of the Lacedæmonians, when fourteen years before this war he invaded Attica with an army of Peloponnesians, came only as far as to Eleusis and Thrias, and then retreated without penetrating any farther—that upon this account he had been banished Sparta, because it looked as if he had been bribed to such an unseasonable retreat. But when they saw the enemy advanced to Acharnæ, which was distant but sixty² stadia from Athens, they thought their incursions were no longer to be endured. It appeared, as it reasonably might, a heavy grievance, to have all their lands thus ravaged within their sight;—a scene like this the younger sort never had beheld; nor the elder but once—in the Persian war. The bulk of the people, but especially the younger part, were for sallying out and fighting, and not to stand tamely looking upon the insult. Numbers of them assembled together in a tumultuous manner, which was the rise of great confusion, some loudly demanding to march out against the enemy, and others restraining them from it. The soothsayers gave out all manner of predictions, which every hearer interpreted by the key of his own passions. The Acharnians, regarding themselves as no contemptible part of the Athenian body, because their lands had been wasted, in a most earnest manner insisted upon a sally. The whole city was in a ferment, and all their resentments centred on Pericles. They quite

borough—“ And what? it will be said, Can this possibly be helped? Be helped, do you say? why not? Tell me, if you can. Suppose only, that a Lacedæmonian had stood across in his skiff to Seriphus, and after killing a favourite lap-dog got off again safe:—Would ye now in this case sit still? Quite the contrary. You would immediately be putting out to sea with three hundred sail of ships; Athens would roar with the tumult of soldiers; the captains of vessels would be shouting, pay delivering, and our gold flying about. What a bustle would there be in the long portico! what distribution of provisions, skins, thongs, casks full of olives, ~~and~~ in nets, &c. &c. &c. All the decks would be crowded with seamen. What a dashing of oars, music ~~and~~ boatswains hawling; nothing but hurry and confusion. Such, I am well assured, would then be the case.”

² About six English miles.

forgot the prudent conduct he had formerly planned out for them.—They reproached him as a general that durst not head them against their enemies, and regarded him as author of all the miseries which their city endured.

Pericles seeing their minds thus chagrined by the present state of their affairs, and in consequence of this, intent upon unadvisable measures, but assured within himself of the prudence of his own conduct in thus restraining them from action, called no general assembly of the people, nor held any public consultation, lest passion which was more alive than judgment, should throw them into indiscretions. He kept strict guard in the city, and endeavoured as much as possible to preserve the public quiet. Yet he was always sending out small parties of horse, to prevent any damage that might be done near the city, by adventurous stragglers from the army. By this means, there happened once at Phrygii a skirmish between one troop of the Athenian horse accompanied by some Thessalians, and the horsemen of Bœotia, in which the Athenians and Thessalians maintained their ground, till some heavy-armed foot reinforced the Bœotian horse. Then they were forced to turn about, and some few both Thessalians and Athenians, were slain. However, they fetched off their bodies the same day without the enemy's leave, and the next day the Peloponnesians erected a trophy.—The aid sent now by the Thessalians was in consequence of an ancient alliance between them and the Athenians. These auxiliaries consisted of Larisseans, Pharsalians, Parasiens, Cranonians, Peirasians, Gyrtonians, Phereans. Those from Larissa were commanded by Polymedes and Aristonous, each heading those of this own faction; those from Pharsalus by Menon; and those from the rest of the cities had their respective commanders.

The Peloponnesians, when the Athenians made no show of coming out against them, broke up from Acharnæ, and laid waste some other of the Athenian boroughs, which lay between the mountains Parnethus and Brilissus.

During the time of those incursions, the Athenians sent out the hundred ships they had already equipped, and which had on board a thousand heavy-armed soldiers and four hundred archers, to infest the coast of Peloponnesus. The commanders in the expedition were Carcinus son of Xenotimus, Proteas son of Epicles, and Socrates son of Antigenes. Under

their orders, the fleet so furnished out, went to anchor and sailed away.

The Peloponnesians, continuing in till provisions began to fail them, retired the same route they came in, but marched through Bœotia. And passing by Oropu, wasted the tract of ground called Piræice, was occupied by the Oropians, who were subject to Athens. On their return into Peloponnesus, the army was dispersed into their several cities.

After their departure, the Athenians settled the proper stations for their guards both by land and sea, in the same disposition as they were to continue to the end of the war. They also made a decree, that "a thousand talents should be taken from the fund of the treasure in the citadel, and laid up by itself; that this sum should not be touched, but the expense of the war be defrayed from the remainder—and, that if any one moved or voted for converting this money to any other use than the necessary defence of the city, in case the enemy attacked it by sea, he should suffer the penalty of death." Besides this, they selected constantly every year an hundred of their best triremes, with the due number of able commanders. These also they made it capital to use upon any other occasion, than that extremity for which the reserve of money was destined.

The Athenians on board the fleet of one hundred sail on the coasts of Peloponnesus, being joined by the Corcyreans in fifty ships and by some other of their confederates in those parts, hovered for a time and infested the coast, and at length made a descent and assaulted Methone, a town of Laconia, whose walls were but weak and poorly manned. It happened that Brasidas¹ the son of Tellis a Spartan had then the command of a garrison

¹ Here the name of Brasidas first occurs, and I must beg the reader to note him as one who is to make no ordinary figure in the sequel. Trained up through the regular and severe discipline of Sparta, he was brave, vigilant and active. He was second to none of his countrymen, in those good qualities which did honour to the Spartans; and was free from all the blemishes which their peculiarity of education was apt to throw upon them, such as haughtiness of carriage, ferocity of temper, and an arrogance which studied no deference or condescension to others. He serves his country much by his valour and military conduct, and more by his gentle, humane, and engaging behaviour. In a word, the distinguishing excellencies both of the Spartan and Athenian characters seem to have been united in this Brasidas.

ewhere near Methone. He was sensible of danger he was in, and set forwards with hundred heavy-armed to its relief. The Lacedæmonian army was then scattered about the country, and their attention directed only to walls; by which means, making a quick march through the midst of their quarters, he threw himself into Methone, and, with the help of but a few who were intercepted in the passage, effectually secured the town. For bold exploit, he was the first man of all who signalized themselves in this war, that received the public commendation at Sparta. At this time the Athenians re-embarked and sailed away, and coming up to Pheia, a town in Elis, they ravaged the country for two days and a night. A body of picked men of the lower class, with some other Eleans, that were gathered from the adjacent country, endeavoured to stop their devastations, but coming to a battle, were defeated by them. But a storm rising, and their ships being exposed to danger in the open coast, they went immediately on shore, and sailing round the cape of Icthyus, entered the harbour of Pheia. The Messenians in the meantime, and some others who had been able to gain their ships, had marched on land and got possession of the place. After the ships, being now come about, and entering into the harbour, took them on board, quitting the place put out again to sea. At this time a great army of Eleans was drawn near to succour it, but the Athenians were sent away to other parts of the coast, where they carried on their depredations. At the same time, the Athenians had a fleet of thirty sail to infest the coast of Locris, and at the same time to guard the straits. This fleet was commanded by Clearchus, the son of Clinias, who making several descents, plundered many maritime places, and Thronium. He carried from thence hostages, and at Alopecus defeated a body of Spartans, who were marching to its relief. At the same summer, the Athenians transported the Ægina all the inhabitants, not only men but the children and the women, regarding them as the principal authors of the present war. And judging they might securely have possession of Ægina, which lay so near Peloponnesus, if they peopled it with many of their own—with this view, notwithstanding, they fixed some of their own people in possession of it. The Lacedæmonians re-

ceived the Æginetæ on their expulsion, and assigned them Thyrea for their place of residence, and the country about it for their subsistence, not only on account of their own enmity to the Athenians, but the particular obligations they lay under to the Æginetæ, for the succour they had given them in the time of the earthquake and the insurrection of the Helots. The district of Thyrea lies between Argia and Laconia, declining quite down to the sea. Here some of them fixed their residence, but the rest were dispersed into other parts of Greece.

The same summer, on the first day of the lunar month, at which time alone it can possibly fall out, there was an eclipse of the sun in the afternoon. The sun looked for a time like the crescent of the moon, and some stars appeared, but the full orb shone out afterwards in all its lustre.

The same summer also, the Athenians, who had hitherto regarded as their enemy Nymphodorus, the son of Pythes of Abdera, whose sister was married to Sitalces, and who had a great influence over him, made him their public friend and invited him to Athens. They hoped by this to gain over Sitalces the son of Teres king of Thrace to their alliance. This Teres, father of Sitalces, was the first who made the kingdom of Odryse the largest in all Thrace; for the greater part of the Thracians are free, and governed by their own laws. But this Teres was not in the least related to Tereus, who married from Athens Procne the daughter of Pandion, nor did they belong both to the same part of Thrace. Tereus lived in Daulia, a city of that province which is now called Phocis, and which in his time was inhabited by Thracians. Here it was that the women executed the tragical business of Itys: and many poets who make mention of the nightingale, do it by the name of the Daulian bird. And it is more probable that Pandion matched his daughter to a person at this lesser distance from him, from the view of mutual advantage, than to one seated at Odryse, which is many days' journey further off. But Teres, whose name is not the same with Tereus, was the first king of Odryse, and compassed the regal power of violence. This man's son Sitalces the Athenians admitted into their alliance, hoping he might gain over to their side the cities of Thrace and Perdiccas. Nymphodorus arriving at Athens finished the alliance with Sitalces,

and made his son Sadocus an Athenian. He also undertook to bring the war now in Thrace to an end, and to persuade Sitalces to send to the Athenians a body of Thracian horsemen and targeteers. He also reconciled Perdiccas to the Athenians by procuring for him the restitution of Therme; immediately after which, Perdiccas joined the Athenians and Phormio in the expedition against the Chalcideans. Thus was Sitalces the son of Teres a Thracian king, and Perdiccas the son of Alexander a Macedonian king, brought into the Athenian league.

The Athenians in the fleet of one hundred sail, still continuing their cruise on the coast of Peloponnesus, took Solium a fort belonging to the Corinthians, and delivered the place with the district of land belonging to it to the Palirensians, exclusively of other Acarnanians. They took also by storm Astocus, of which Evarchus was tyrant, whom they forced to fly away, and added the town to their own association. Sailing from hence to the island Cephallene, they reduced it without a battle. Cephallene lies towards Acarnania and Leucas, and hath four cities; the Pallensians, Cranians, Samseans, Pronseans. Not long after this the fleet sailed back to Athens.

In the autumn of this summer, the Athenians, with all their forces, citizens and sojourners, made an incursion into the territories of Megara, under the command of Pericles the son of Xantippus.—Those also who had been cruising about Peloponnesus in the fleet of one hundred sail (for they were now at Ægina,) finding upon their return that all their fellow citizens were marched in the general expedition against Megara, followed them with the fleet and came up to them. By this means, the army of the Athenians became the largest they had ever at any time got together, the city being now in its most flourishing state, and as yet uninfected with the plague: for there

were of Athenian citizens only no less than thousand heavy-armed, exclusive of the thousand who were now at Potidea: the sojourners of Athens who marched out along with were not fewer than three thousand heavy-armed: they had besides a very large number of armed soldiers. They laid waste the greatest part of the country, and then returned to Athens. Every succeeding year of the war the Athenians constantly repeated these incursions into the territory of Megara, sometimes with cavalry, and sometimes with all their main force, till at last they made themselves masters of Nisæa.

In the close also of the summer, Athlæa an island lying near the Locrians of Opus, till now uninhabited, was fortified and garrisoned by the Athenians, to prevent the pirates of Opus, and other parts of Locria, from harassing Eubœa.—These were the transactions of the summer, after the departure of the Peloponnesians out of Attica.

The winter following, Evarchus the Acarnanian, who had a great desire to recover Astocus, prevailed with the Corinthians to carry him thither, with a fleet of forty ships, and a force of fifteen hundred heavy-armed, and he endeavoured to re-establish him. He himself also hired some auxiliaries for the same purpose. This armament was commanded by Euphemidas son of Aristonymus, Timoxenus son of Timocrates, and Eumachus son of Chryseus, who sailing thither executed their business. They had a mind to endeavour the reduction of some others of the maritime towns of Acarnania, but miscarrying in every attempt they made, they returned home. But in their passage touching at Cephallene, and debarking upon the lands of the Cranians, they were treacherously inveigled into a conference, where the Cranians, falling suddenly upon them, killed some of their men. It was not without difficulty that they drew the others safely off, and gained their own ports.

But the same winter the Athenians in conformity to the established custom of their country, solemnized a public funeral for those who had been first killed in this war, in the manner as follows:

The bones of the slain are brought to a tabernacle erected for the purpose three days before, and all are at liberty to deck out the remains of their friends at their own discretion. But when the grand procession is made, the

¹ Macedonia at this time was not reckoned a part of Greece, and both king and people were regarded as Barbarians. Alexander, father of this Perdiccas, was obliged to plead an Argive pedigree, in order to assist at the Olympic games. And Perdiccas now himself, whose successor Alexander the Great, not many years after, was leader of Greece and conqueror of Asia, was at this time balancing between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, important to either merely as a neighbour to their colonies in Thrace. The Greek generals will be sometimes seen in this history to use the monarch of Macedonia very cavalierly.

cypress coffins are drawn on carriages, one for every tribe, in each of which are separately contained the bones of all who belonged to that tribe. One sumptuous bier is carried along empty for those that are lost, whose bodies could not be found among the slain. All who are willing, both citizens and strangers, attend the solemnity; and the women who were related to the deceased, stand near the sepulchre groaning and lamenting. They deposit the remains in the public sepulchre, which stands in the finest suburb of the city;—for it hath been the constant custom here to bury all who fell in war, except those at Marathon, whose extraordinary valour they judged proper to honour with a sepulchre on the field of battle. As soon as they are interred, some one selected for the office by the public voice, and ever a person in great esteem for his understanding, and of high dignity amongst them, pronounces over them the decent panegyric—and this done, they depart. Through all the war, as the occasions recurred, this method was constantly observed. But over these, the first victims of it, Pericles the son of Xantippus was appointed to speak. So, when the proper time was come, walking from the sepulchre, and mounting a lofty pulpit erected for the purpose, from whence he might be heard more distinctly by the company, he thus began :

“Many of those who have spoken before me on these occasions, have commended the author of that law which we are now obeying, for having instituted an oration to the honour of those who sacrifice their lives in fighting for their country. For my part, I think it sufficient, for men who have approved their virtue in action, for action to be honoured for it—by such as you see the public gratitude now performing about this funeral; and that the virtues of many ought not to be endangered by the management of any one person, when their credit must precariously depend on his oration, which may be good and may be bad. Difficult indeed it is, judiciously to handle a subject where even probable truth will hardly gain ascent. The hearer, enlightened by a long acquaintance, and warm in his affection, may quickly pronounce every thing unfavourably expressed, in respect to what he wishes and what he knows,—whilst the stranger pronounceth all exaggerated, through envy of those deeds which he is conscious are above his own achievement. For the praises bestowed upon

others, are then only to be endured, when men imagine they can do those feats they hear to have been done: they envy what they cannot equal, and immediately pronounce it false. Yet, as this solemnity hath received its sanction from the authority of our ancestors, it is my duty also to obey the law, and to endeavour to procure, as far as I am able, the good will and approbation of all my audience.

“I shall therefore begin first with our forefathers, since both justice and decency require we should on this occasion bestow on them an honourable remembrance. In this our country they kept themselves always firmly settled, and through their valour handed it down free to every since-succeeding generation. Worthy indeed of praise are they, and yet more worthy are our immediate fathers; since, enlarging their own inheritance into the extensive empire which we now possess, they bequeathed that their work of toil to us their sons. Yet even these successes, we ourselves here present, we who are yet in the strength and vigour of our days, have nobly improved, and have made such provisions for this our Athens, that now it is all-sufficient in itself to answer every exigence of war and of peace. I mean not here to recite those martial exploits by which these ends were accomplished, or the resolute defences we ourselves and our fathers have made against the formidable invasions of Barbarians and Greeks—your own knowledge of these will excuse the long detail. But by what methods we have risen to this height of glory and power, by what polity and by what conduct we are thus aggrandized, I shall first endeavour to show; and then proceed to the praise of the deceased. These, in my opinion, can be no impertinent topics on this occasion; the discussion of them must be beneficial to this numerous company of Athenians and of strangers.

“We are happy in a form of government which cannot envy the laws of our neighbours;—for it hath served as a model to others, but is original at Athens. And this our form, as committed not to the few, but to the whole body of the people, is called a democracy. How different soever in a private capacity, we all enjoy the same general equality our laws are fitted to preserve; and superior honours just as we excel. The public administration is not confined to a particular family, but is attainable only by merit. Poverty is not a hindrance,

since whoever is able to serve his country, meets with no obstacle to preferment from his first obscurity. The offices of the state we go through without obstructions from one another; and live together in the mutual endearments of private life without suspicions; not angry with a neighbour for following the bent of his own humour, nor putting on that countenance of discontent, which pains though it cannot punish—so that in private life we converse without diffidence or damage, whilst we dare not on any account offend against the public, through the reverence we bear to the magistrates and the laws, chiefly to those enacted for redress of the injured, and to those unwritten, a breach of which is allowed disgrace. Our laws have further provided for the mind most frequent intermissions of care by the appointment of public recreations and sacrifices¹ throughout the year, elegantly performed with a peculiar pomp, the daily delight of which is a charm that puts melancholy to flight. The grandeur of this our Athens causeth the produce of the whole earth to be imported here, by which we reap a familiar enjoyment, not more of the delicacies of our own growth, than of those of other nations.

"In the affairs of war we excel those of our enemies, who adhere to methods opposite to our own. For we lay open Athens to general resort, nor ever drive any stranger from us whom either improvement or curiosity hath brought amongst us, lest any enemy should hurt us by seeing what is never concealed. We place not so great a confidence in the preparatives and artifices of war, as in the native warmth of our souls impelling us to action. In point of education, the youth of some people are inured by a course of laborious exercise, to support toil and exercise like men; but we, notwithstanding our easy and elegant way of life, face all the dangers of war as intrepidly as they. This may be proved by facts, since the Lacedæmonians never invade our territories barely with their own, but with the united strength of all their confederates. But, when we invade the dominions of our neighbours, for the most part we conquer without difficulty in an enemy's country those who

fight in defence of their own habitations. The strength of our whole force no enemy yet hath ever experienced, because it is divided by our naval expeditions, or engaged in the different quarters of our service by land. But if any where they engage and defeat a small party of our forces, they boastingly give it out a total defeat; and if they are beat, they were certainly overpowered by our united strength. What though from a state of inactivity rather than laborious exercise, or with a natural rather than an acquired valour, we learn to encounter danger?—this good at least we receive from it, that we never droop under the apprehension of possible misfortunes, and when we hazard the danger, are found no less courageous than those who are continually inured to it. In these respects our whole community deserves justly to be admired, and in many we have yet to mention.

"In our manner of living we show an elegance tempered with frugality, and we cultivate philosophy without enervating the mind. We display our wealth in the season of beneficence, and not in the vanity of discourse. A confession of poverty is disgrace to no man, no effort to avoid it is disgrace indeed. There is vanity in the same persons an attention to their own private concerns and those of the public; and in others engaged in the labours of life, there is a competent skill in the affairs of government. For we are the only people who think him that does not meddle in state-affairs—not indolent, but good for nothing. And yet we pass the soundest judgments, and are quick at catching the right apprehensions of things, not thinking that words are prejudicial to actions, but rather the not being duly prepared by previous debate, before we are obliged to proceed to execution. Herein consists our distinguishing excellence, that in the hour of action we show the greatest courage, and yet debate beforehand the expediency of our measures. The courage of others is the result of ignorance; deliberation makes them cowards. And those undoubtedly must be owned to have the greatest souls, who, most acutely sensible of the miseries of war and the sweets of peace, are not hence in the least deterred from facing danger.

"In acts of beneficence, further, we differ from the many. We preserve friends not by receiving but by conferring obligations. For he who does a kindness hath the advantage over him who by the law of gratitude becomes

¹ Besides the vast number of festivals, which were celebrated at Athens with pompous processions, costly sacrifices, and sometimes public games, the presidents in course offered up sacrifices every morning constantly for the public welfare.

debtor to his benefactor. The person obliged is compelled to act the more insipid part, conscious that a return of kindness is merely a payment and not an obligation. And we alone splendidly beneficent to others, not so much from interested motives, as for the credit of our liberality. I shall sum up what yet remains by only adding—that our Athens in general is the school of Greece; and, that every single Athenian amongst us is excellently fitted, by his personal qualification, for all the glorious scenes of active life, acting with a most becoming demeanor, and a most ready habit of speech.

“That I have not on this occasion made use of a pomp of words, but the truth of facts, at height to which by such a conduct this state hath risen, is an undeniable proof. For we are now the only people of the world who are found by experience to be greater than in report—the only people who, repelling the attacks of an invading enemy, exempts their state from the blush of indignation, and to their tributaries yields no discontent, as if subject to men unworthy to command. That we deserve our power, we need no evidence to manifest. We have great and signal proofs of this, which entitle us to the admiration of the present and future ages. We want no Homer to be the herald of our praise; no poet to deck our history with the charms of verse, where the opinion of exploits must suffer by a strict censure. Every sea has been opened by our fleets, and every land hath been penetrated by our armies, which have every where left behind them eternal monuments of our enmity and our friendship.

“In the just defence of such a state these claims of their own valour, scorning the ruin threatened to it, have valiantly fought and bravely died. And every one of those who survive is ready, I am persuaded, to sacrifice in such a cause. And for this reason have we enlarged so much on national points, to give the clearest proof that in the present war we have more at stake than men whose public advantages are not so valuable, and to illustrate the actual evidence, how great a commendation is due to them who are now my subject, and the greatest part of which they have already received. For the encomiums with which I have celebrated the state, have been earned for it by the bravery of these, and of men like these. And such compliments might be thought too

high and exaggerated, if passed on any Grecians but them alone. The fatal period to which these gallant souls are now reduced, is the surest evidence of their merit—an evidence begun in their lives and completed in their deaths. For it is a debt of justice to pay superior honours to men, who have devoted their lives in fighting for their country, though inferior to others in every virtue but that of valour. Their last service effaceth all former demerits,—it extends to the public; their private demeanors reached only to a few. Yet not one of these was at all induced to shrink from danger, through fondness of those delights which the peaceful affluent life bestows,—not one was the less lavish of his life, through that flattering hope attendant upon want, that poverty at length might be exchanged for affluence. One passion there was in their minds much stronger than these,—the desire of vengeance on their enemies. Regarding this as the most honourable prize of dangers, they boldly rushed towards the mark, to glut revenge, and then to satisfy those secondary passions. The uncertain event, they had already secured in hope; what their eyes showed plainly must be done, they trusted their own valour to accomplish, thinking it more glorious to defend themselves and die in the attempt, than to yield and live. From the reproach of cowardice indeed they fled, but presented their bodies to the shock of battle; when, insensible of fear, but triumphing in hope, in the doubtful charge they instantly dropped—and thus discharged the duty which brave men owe to their country.

“As for you, who now survive them—it is your business to pray for a better fate—but, to think it your duty also to preserve the same spirit and warmth of courage against your enemies; not judging of the expediency of this from a mere harangue—where any man indulging a flow of words may tell you, what you yourselves know as well as he, how many advantages there are in fighting valiantly against your enemies—but rather, making the daily-increasing grandeur of this community the object of your thoughts, and growing quite enamoured of it. And when it really appears great to your apprehensions, think again, that this grandeur was acquired by brave and valiant men; by men who knew their duty, and in the moments of action were sensible of shame; who, whenever their attempts were unsuccessful, thought it dishonour

their country should stand in need of any thing their valour could do for it, and so made it the most glorious present. Bestowing thus their lives on the public, they have every one received a praise that will never decay, a sepulchre that will always be most illustrious—not that in which their bones lie mouldering, but that in which their frame is preserved, to be on every occasion, when honour is the employ of either word or act, eternally remembered. This whole earth is the sepulchre of illustrious men: nor is it the inscription on the columns in their native soil alone that show their merit, but the memorial of them, better than all inscriptions, in every foreign nation, repositing more durably in universal remembrance than on their own tomb. From this very moment, emulating these noble patterns, placing your happiness in liberty, and liberty in valour, be prepared to encounter all the dangers of war. For, to be lavish of life is not so noble in those whom misfortunes have reduced to misery and despair, as in men who hazard the loss of a comfortable subsistence, and the enjoyment of all the blessings this world affords, by an unsuccessful enterprise. Adversity, after a series of ease and affluence, sinks deeper into the heart of a man of spirit, than the stroke of death insensibly received in the vigour of life and public hope.

“For this reason, the parents of those who are now gone, whoever of them may be attending here, I do not bewail,—I shall rather comfort. It is well known to what unhappy accidents they were liable from the moment of their birth; and, that happiness belongs to men who have reached the most glorious period of life, as these now have who are to you the source of sorrow,—these, whose life hath received its ample measure, happy in its continuance, and equally happy in its conclusion. I know it in truth a difficult task, to fix comfort in those breasts, which will have frequent remembrances in seeing the happiness of others, of what they once themselves enjoyed. And sorrow flows not from the absence of those good things we have never yet experienced, but from the loss of those to which we have been accustomed. They who are not yet by age exempted from issue, should be comforted in the hope of having more. The children yet to be born will be a private benefit to some, in causing them to forget such as no longer are, and will be a double benefit to their country

in preventing its desolation, and providing for its security. For those persons cannot in common justice be regarded as members of equal value to the public, who have no children to expose to danger for its safety.—But you, whose age is already far advanced, compute the greater share of happiness your longer time hath afforded for so much gain, persuaded in yourselves, the remainder will be but short, and enlighten that space by the glory gained by these. It is greatness of soul alone that never grows old: nor is it wealth that delights in the latter stage of life, as some give out, so much as honour.

“To you, the sons and brothers of the deceased, whatever number of you are here, a field of hardy contention is opened. For him who no longer is, every one is ready to commend, so that to whatever height you push your deserts, you will scarce ever be thought to equal, but to be somewhat inferior to these. Envy will exert itself against a competitor, whilst life remains: but when death stops the competition, affection will applaud without restraint.

“If after this it be expected from me to say any thing to you who are now reduced to a state of widowhood, about female virtue, I shall express it all in one short admonition;—It is your greatest glory not to be deficient in the virtue peculiar to your sex, and to give the men as little handle as possible to talk of your behaviour, whether well or ill.

“I have now discharged the province allotted me by the laws, and said what I thought most pertinent to this assembly. Our departed friends have by facts been already honoured. Their children from this day till they arrive at manhood shall be educated at the public expense of the state¹ which hath appointed so beneficial a meed for these and all future relics of the public contests. For wherever the greatest rewards are proposed for virtue, there the best of patriots are ever to be found.—Now, let every one respectively indulge the decent grief for his departed friends, and then retire.”

Such was the manner of the public funeral solemnized this winter, and with the end of which, the first year of this war was also ended.

¹ The law was, that they should be instructed at the public expense, and when come to age presented with a complete suit of armour, and honoured with a seat in all public places.

YEAR II.

very beginning of summer, the Peloponnesians and allies, with two-thirds of their aid, made an incursion as before into Attica, under the command of Archidamus son of King Pausanias, king of the Lacedæmonians, and razed their camp, ravaged the country. It had not been many days in Attica, before sickness began first to appear amongst the Athenians, such as was reported to have done before this in other parts, as about Lemnos and other places. Yet a plague so great and so dreadful a calamity, in human history could not be paralleled. The physician could administer no relief, through ignorance; nay, they died the faster, the more their attendance on the sick, and all hu-

man art was totally unavailing. Whatever supplications were offered in the temples, whatever recourse to oracles and religious rites, all were insignificant; at last, expedients of this nature they totally relinquished, overpowered by calamity. It broke out first, as it is said, in that part of Æthiopia which borders upon Egypt; it afterwards spread into Egypt and Libya, and into great part of the king's dominions, and from thence it on a sudden fell on the city of the Athenians. The contagion showed itself first in the Piræus, which occasioned a report that the Peloponnesians had caused poison to be thrown into the wells, for as yet there were no fountains there. After this it spread into the upper city, and then the mortality very much increased. Let every one, physician or not, freely declare his own sentiments about it; let him assign any credible account of its rise, or the causes strong enough in his opinion to introduce so terrible a scene—I shall only relate what it actually was; and as, from an information in all its symptoms, none may be quite at a loss about it, if ever it should happen again, I shall give in exact detail of them; having been sick of it myself, and seen many others afflicted with it.

historian in the funeral oration hath given us a good idea of the Athenian state, and the distinctions of that humane and polite people. The plague, which now broke out, enables him to connect the events, and give his history a most agreeable coherence. It is now going to be exceeding solemn, pathetic. It is as an historian and not as a physician that he gives us the relation of it: a relation, in general hath been esteemed an elaborate and elegant performance. He professeth to give an accurate account of it. The accuracy hath generally been thought of it hath been blamed as too minute. Lucretius hath transferred all the circumstances by Thucydides into his own poem, l. 6. and more minutely upon them; and yet, this is but ornament, and certainly the least exception of his poem. Lucretius, an excellent poet, writes with the precision of a philosopher; Thucydides, the historian, always composed with the precision of a poet. Hippocrates hath left some cases of the plague, which he hath recited as a physician; but his poem is dated at Athens. Thucydides hath nothing of his practising there, much less of his success. He says on the contrary, "human art was totally unavailing;" and his Lucretius, that, "Mussabat tacito mœnina læta letters of Hippocrates, which mention are certainly spurious: the facts they would recite without any grounds, as Le Clerc hath observed in his *Histoire de la médecine*, l. 3. that the plague had broken out first in Egypt, and had spread from thence into the dominions of Persia. This is quite contrary to the Thucydides; and to the experience of every plague and infectious distempers have had in Africa. Need I say more than that Dr. Sydenham proved it? But whether his account of this plague be duly succinct, not too minute, setting; and, whether Thucydides hath well used the opportunity it gave him to moralize like Lucretius, and good sense, every reader will judge. The translator hath chiefly endeavoured to give a solemn air, which he thought the prime of the original.

man art was totally unavailing. Whatever supplications were offered in the temples, whatever recourse to oracles and religious rites, all were insignificant; at last, expedients of this nature they totally relinquished, overpowered by calamity. It broke out first, as it is said, in that part of Æthiopia which borders upon Egypt; it afterwards spread into Egypt and Libya, and into great part of the king's dominions, and from thence it on a sudden fell on the city of the Athenians. The contagion showed itself first in the Piræus, which occasioned a report that the Peloponnesians had caused poison to be thrown into the wells, for as yet there were no fountains there. After this it spread into the upper city, and then the mortality very much increased. Let every one, physician or not, freely declare his own sentiments about it; let him assign any credible account of its rise, or the causes strong enough in his opinion to introduce so terrible a scene—I shall only relate what it actually was; and as, from an information in all its symptoms, none may be quite at a loss about it, if ever it should happen again, I shall give in exact detail of them; having been sick of it myself, and seen many others afflicted with it.

This very year, as is universally allowed, had been more than any other remarkably free from common disorders; or, whatever diseases had seized the body, they ended at length in this. But those who enjoyed the most perfect health were suddenly, without any apparent cause, seized at first with head-aches extremely violent, with inflammations, and fiery redness in the eyes. Within—the throat and tongue began instantly to be red as blood; the breath was drawn with difficulty and had a noisome smell. The symptoms that succeeded these were sneezing and hoarseness; and not long after, the malady descended to the breast, with a violent cough: but when once settled in the stomach, it excited vomitings, in which was thrown up all that matter physicians call discharges of bile, attended with excessive torture. A great part of the infected were subject to such violent hiccups without any discharge, as brought upon them a strong convulsion, to some but of a short, to others of a very long continuance. The body, to the outward touch, was neither exceeding hot, nor of a pallid hue, but reddish, livid, marked all over with little pustules and sores. Yet inwardly it was scorched with such excessive heat, that it could not

bear the lightest covering or the finest linen upon it, but must be left quite naked. They longed for nothing so much as to be plunging into cold water; and many of those who were not properly attended, threw themselves into wells, hurried by a thirst not to be extinguished; and whether they drank much or little, their torment still continued the same. The restlessness of their bodies, and an utter inability of composing themselves by sleep, never abated for a moment. And the body, so long as the distemper continued in its height, had no visible waste, but withstood its rage to a miracle, so that most of them perished within nine or seven days, by the heat that scorched their vitals, though their strength was not exhausted; or, if they continued longer, the distemper fell into the belly, causing violent ulcerations in the bowels, accompanied with an incessant flux, by which many, reduced to an excessive weakness, were carried off. For the malady beginning in the head, and settling first there, sunk afterwards gradually down the whole body. And whoever got safe through all its most dangerous stages, yet the extremities of their bodies still retained the marks of its violence. For it shot down into their privy-members, into their fingers and toes, by losing which they escaped with life. Some there were who lost their eyes; and some who, being quite recovered, had at once totally lost all memory, and quite forgot not only their most intimate friends, but even their own selves. For as this distemper was in general virulent beyond expression, and its every part more grievous than had yet fallen to the lot of human nature, so, in one particular instance, it appeared to be none of the natural infirmities of man, since the birds and beasts that prey on human flesh either never approached the dead bodies, of which many lay about uninterred; or certainly perished if they ever tasted. One 'proof

¹ This passage is translated close to the letter of the original. It was intended by the author to show the excessive malignancy of the plague, as the very flesh of the dead bodies was so fatally pestilential to carnivorous animals:—"Either they never tasted; or, if they tasted, died." One proof of this is presumptive, arising from the disappearance of all birds of prey. The second was certain, and an object of sensible observation. Every body could see that dogs, those familiar animals who live with and accompany men abroad, either never tasted; or, if hunger at any time forced them to it, they certainly lost their lives. Lucretius literally translates the *circumstance* itself, but hath enlarged in the *proofs*, and intimates that the distemper raged amongst those

of this is the total disappearance then birds, for not one was to be seen, either other place, or about any one of the. But the dogs, because of their familiarity with man, afforded a more notorious proof event.

The nature of this pestilential disease in general—for I have purposely omitted many varied appearances, or the circumstances particular to some of the infected in relation to others—such as hath been described. None of the common maladies incident to human nature prevailed at that time; never disorder any where appeared, it was this. Some died merely for want of care, some, with all the care that could be taken; nor was any one medicine derived from whence could be promised any relief, since that which gave ease to one was judicial to another. Whatever difference was in bodies, in point of strength or of weakness, it availed nothing; equally swept away before it, in spite of the most liberal diet and studied prescriptions. Yet the affecting circumstances of this calamity—that dejection of mind, which accompanied the first attack; for the moment at once into despair, they threw themselves up without a struggle—mutual tenderness, in taking care of one another, which communicated the contagion, and made them drop like sheep.² The latter case caused the mortality to be so great. For if fear withheld them from going

to visit the sick, animals, even without eating the flesh of the dead, was general to every living species.

Multaque humi cum inhumata jacerent corpora sepulchris,
Corporibus, tamen alitum genus atque ferarum,
Aut procul abellebat, ut acrem exiret odorem,
Aut, ubi gustaret, languebat morte propinqua.
Nec tamen omnino temere illis solibus ulla
Comparebat avis, nec noctibus sæcla ferarum
Exibat sylvis: languebat pleraque morbo,
Et moriebantur: cum primis fida canem vis
Strata viis animam ponebat in oculis ægram;
Extorquebat enim vitam vis moribida membris.

² This passage is thus translated upon the authority of Dr. Mead, in his treatise on *the Plague*, "I am convinced me that the comma should be omitted after *σπερμα*, and *Σεισμερίας*; he governs Lucretius has given it a different turn, as if blance to sheep was not in their dying fast, forlorn and solitary manner in which they died; and he hath put before it what follows in Thucydides.

Nam quicunque suos fugabant visere ad ægram,
Vitalium cupidi, mortisque timentes,
Peribant paulo post turpi morte malaque
Desertos, opes expertes, incuria mactant,
Lanigeros tanquam pecudes, et buccora sæcla.

ther, they died for want of help, so that many houses became quite desolate for want of faithful attendance; and if they ventured, they were gone. This was most frequently the case of the kind and compassionate. Such persons were ashamed, out of a selfish concern for themselves, entirely to abandon their friends, and their menial servants, no longer able to endure the groans and lamentations of the dying, had been compelled to fly from such a sight of calamity. But those especially, who had safely gone through it, took pity on the dying and the sick, because they knew by experience what it really was, and were now secure themselves; for it never seized any one a second time so as to be mortal. Such were regarded upon as quite happy by others, and regarded themselves at first overjoyed in their late escape, and the groundless hope that hereafter the pestilence would prove fatal to them. But this reigning calamity, the general removal of the country into the city was a heavy burden, more particularly to those who had been necessitated to come thither. For as many had no houses, but dwelled all the summer in booths, where there was scarce room to breathe, the pestilence destroyed with the most disorder, so that they lay together in the streets, the dying upon the dead, and the dead upon the dying. Some were tumbling one upon another in the public streets, or lay expiring about every fountain, whither they crept to assuage their immoderate thirst. Temples, in which they had erected tents for reception, were full of the bodies of those who had expired there. For in a calamity so outrageously violent, and universal destruction of things sacred and holy had quite lost its distinction. Nay, all regulations observed in matters of sepulture were quite neglected, since every one buried wherever he could find a place. Some, whose sepulchres were already filled by the numbers which had perished in their own families, were shamefully obliged to seize those of others. They surd on a sudden the piles which others had raised for their own friends, and burned their bodies upon them; and some, whilst one body was burning on a pile, tossed another body upon it, and dragged thither upon it, and went away.

Thus did the pestilence give their first rise to those iniquitous acts which prevailed more and more in Athens. For every one was now

more easily induced openly to do what for decency they did only covertly before. They saw the strange mutability of outward condition, the rich untimely cut off, and their wealth pouring suddenly on the indigent and necessitous; so that they thought it prudent to catch hold of speedy enjoyments and quick gusts of pleasure; persuaded that their bodies and their wealth might be their own merely for the day. Not any one continued resolute enough to form any honest or generous design, when so uncertain whether he should live to effect it. Whatever he knew could improve the pleasure or satisfaction of the present moment, that he determined to be honour and interest. Reverence of the gods or the laws of society laid no restraints upon them; either judging that piety and impiety were things quite indifferent, since they saw that all men perished alike; or, throwing away every apprehension of being called to account for their enormities, since justice might be prevented by death; or rather, as the heaviest of judgments to which man could be doomed, was already hanging over their heads, snatching this interval of life for pleasure, before it fell.

With such a weight of calamity were the Athenians at this time on all sides oppressed. Their city was one scene of death, and the adjacent country of ruin and devastation. In this their affliction they called to mind, as was likely they should, the following prediction, which persons of the greatest age informed them had been formerly made:

Two heavy judgments will at once befall,
A Doric war without, a plague within your wall.

There had indeed been a dispute before, whether their ancestors in this prediction read *λοιμός* a plague, or *λιμός* a famine. Yet in their present circumstances all with probability agreed that *λοιμός* a plague, was the right: for they adapted the interpretation to what they now suffered.—But in my sentiments, should they ever again be engaged in a Doric war, and a famine happen at the same time, they will have recourse with equal probability to the other interpretation. It was further remembered by those who knew of the oracle given to the Lacedæmonians, that when they inquired of the god, “whether they should engage in this war,” his answer was, that—“if they carried it on with all their strength, they should be victorious, and he himself would fight on their side;”—and therefore they concluded that what now

befell was the completion of the oracle. The pestilence broke out immediately upon the irruption of the Peloponnesians, and never extended itself to Peloponnesus, a circumstance which ought to be related. It raged the most, and for the longest time, in Athens, but afterwards spread into the other towns, especially the most populous. And this is an exact account of the plague.

The Peloponnesians, after they had ravaged the inland parts, extended their devastations to those which are called The Coast, as far as Mount Laurium,¹ where the Athenians had silver-mines. And here they first ravaged the part which looks towards Peloponnesus, and afterwards that which lies towards Eubœa and Andros. But Pericles, who was then in the command, persisted in the same opinion as before in the former incursion, that "the Athenians ought not to march out against them." Yet, whilst the enemy was up in the country, before they had advanced as far as the coast, he had equipped a fleet of a hundred ships to invade Peloponnesus: and when every thing was ready, he put to sea.² On board these ships he had embarked four thousand heavy-armed Athenians; and in vessels for transporting horse, now first fitted up for this service out of old ships, three hundred horsemen. The Chians and the Lesbians joined in the expedition with fifty sail. At the very time this fleet went to sea from Athens, they left the Peloponnesians on the coast of Attica. When they

were arrived before Epidaurus, a city of Peloponnesus, they ravaged great part of the country about it, and making an assault on it, had some hopes of taking it, but did not succeed. Leaving Epidaurus, they returned to the country about Trœzene, Halia, and Ithaca. All these places are situated on the coast of Peloponnesus. But sailing he came before Prasîæ, a fort of Laconia, upon the sea, around which they laid siege, but they could not try waste; and having taken the fort, they demolished it. After these performances, they returned home, and found the Peloponnesians no longer in Attica, but retired within their own dominions.

The whole space of time that the Peloponnesians were upon the lands of the Athenians, and the Athenians employed in their expedition, the plague was making havoc among the troops of the Athenians, and in the city. This occasioned a report that the Peloponnesians, for fear of the infection, had been informed by deserters that it was necessary to retire from the city, and been witnesses themselves of frequent interments, retired out of the country with some precipitation. Yet they were not severed in this incursion longer than they had ever done before, and had made the country one continued devastation during the time of their continuance in Attica forty days.

The same summer, Agnon the son of Alcibiades, and Cleopompus the son of Clinias, and Cleopompus the son of Clinias, in the command with Pericles, set themselves at the head of the force which they had employed before, carried them without delay against the Chalcidians of Thracian Chalcidice, when they were come up to Potidaea, which was still besieged, they played their artillery against it, and left no method untried to take it. But the success in this did not answer expectation, nor indeed event in any respect the least proportion to their great preparations; for the plague had followed them even hither, and making havoc among the Athenians, destroyed a great part of the army; so that even those soldiers who had been there before, and had from the beginning of the siege been in perfect health, contracted the infection from the troops brought to them by Agnon.—Phormio, and the body of about a hundred men under his command, who had fore this quitted Chalcidice, so that they sailed back with the ships to Athens.

¹ The silver-mines at Laurium originally belonged to private persons, but were united to the public domain by Themistocles. A great number of slaves were employed in working them, and the produce paid amply for all the labour bestowed upon them. Whether the state was much enriched by them, is a question; the undertakers and proprietors of the slaves who wrought them drew great wealth from them, as we are told by Xenophon in his treatise of revenue.

² Plutarch relates in the life of Pericles, that on this occasion, when all was ready, "when the forces were shipped, and Pericles himself had just gotten on board his trireme, the sun was eclipsed. It soon grew so dark, that all men were astonished at so dreadful a prodigy. Pericles, seeing his own pilot quite terrified and confounded, threw a cloak over his face, and wrapping him up in it, asked, Whether he saw any thing dreadful or any thing that portended danger? The pilot answering in the negative, What difference then (he went on) between this affair and that, unless that what hath darkened the sun is bigger than a cloak? Pericles had easily learned of his preceptor Anaxagoras how to account for eclipses. But whether Plutarch hath placed this incident in right time, is a question: for Thucydides, who is exact in these things, mentions no eclipse of the sun this summer.

12 thousand men the plague having swept away one thousand and fifty in about forty days : the soldiers who were there before were left to carry on the siege of Potidæa.

After the second incursion of the Peloponnesians, the Athenians whose lands were now a second time laid waste, who felt the double affliction of pestilence and war, had entirely changed their sentiments of things. The blame was universally thrown on Pericles, as if at his instigation they had engaged in this war, and as he had been plunged in all these calamities. They desired with impatience to make up the quarrel with the Lacedæmonians ; but though they despatched an embassy for this purpose, no terms could be agreed on. Thus grievously distressed, and no method of resource occurring to their minds, their resentments fell still heavier on Pericles. He, seeing them quite dissatisfied with their present misfortunes, and intent on such projects as he had reason to expect they would, called a general assembly of the people, which, by continuing in the command of the army, he was authorized to do. He had intended to encourage them, to soothe the hot resentments fermenting in their breasts, and bring them into a more calm and confident temper. He presented himself before them, and spoke as follows :—

“ I fully expected, I freely own it, to become the object of your resentments. I am not ignorant of the causes of it ; and for this purpose I have convened this assembly, to expostulate with you, nay, even to reprimand you, if without reason you make me the mark of your disapprobation, or cowardly sink under the weight of your misfortunes : for it is my firm opinion, that by the full health and vigour of a state the happiness of its constituents is better secured, than when each separate member is thriving whilst the public welfare totters. Be the situation of any private person prosperous and fine as his heart can wish—if his country be ruined, he himself must necessarily be involved in that ruin. But he that is unfortunate in a flourishing community, may soon catch hold of expedients of redress. When therefore your country is able to support the misfortunes of its every member, and yet each of those members does not need to be enveloped in the ruin of his country, why will you not join and unite your efforts to prevent that ruin—and not (as you are now going to do, because confounded with your domestic misfortunes) basely desert the

public safety, and cast the most unjust censures upon me who advised this war, upon your own-selves also who approved this advice ? What—I am the man that must singly stand the storm of your anger !—I am indeed the man who I am confident is not inferior to any one amongst you in knowing what ought to be known, and in speaking what ought to be spoke, who sincerely loves his country, and is superior to all the sordid views of interest. For he who thinks aright, and yet cannot communicate his own thoughts, is just as insignificant as if he could not think at all. He that enjoys both these faculties in perfection, and yet is an enemy to his country, will in like manner never say any thing for his country’s good : or, though he love his country, and be not proof against corruption, he may prostitute every thing to his own avarice. If therefore you judged my qualifications in all these respects to be in some moderate degree superior to those of other men, and were thus drawn into a war by my advice, there can certainly be no reason why I should be accused of having done you wrong. Those indeed who are already in the fast possession of all the ends attainable by war, must make a foolish choice if they run to arms : but, if once under a necessity, either through tame submission to be enslaved by a neighbour power, or by a brave resistance to get the mastery over them—he who flies danger in such a case, is much more worthy of reproach than he who meets it with bold defiance.

“ I indeed am the man I was, and of the mind I was. It is you whose resolutions have wavered ;—you who, whilst unhurt, through my persuasion resolved on war, and repent so soon as you feel its strokes—who measure the soundness of my advice by the weakness of your own judgments, and therefore condemn it, because the present disasters have so entirely engaged the whole of your attention, that you have none left to perceive the high importance of it to the public. Cruel indeed is that reverse of fortune which hath so suddenly afflicted you, dejecting your minds and dispiriting your former resolutions ! Accidents sudden and unforeseen, and so opposite to that event you might reasonably have expected, enslave the mind ;—which hath been your case in all the late contingencies, and more particularly so in this grievous pestilence. Yet men who are the constituents of such a mighty state, and whose manners have been by educa-

tion formed for its support, ought never to want that inward fortitude which can stem the greatest of afflictions, nor by self-desertion utterly to efface their native dignity. The world will always have equal reason to condemn the person who sinks from a height of glory by his own pusillanimity, and to hate the person who impudently pretends to what he never can deserve. It must be therefore your duty to suppress this too keen a sensibility of your own private losses, and with united fortitude to act in the defence of the public safety. Let us therefore bravely undergo the toils of this war; and if the toil increaseth, let our resolution increase with it. And let these, added to all those other proofs of my integrity I have exhibited on other occasions, suffice to convince you that your present censures and suspicions of me are rash and groundless.

"I shall now lay before you a point, which, so far as I can judge, you have as yet never properly considered, nor have I in any former discourse insisted upon—the means within your reach of rising to supreme dominion. Nor should I meddle even now with a¹ point, pompous beyond poetic visions, did I not see you beyond measure fearful and dejected. You think you are only masters of your own dependents; but I loudly aver that you are greater masters now both at land and sea, those necessary spheres for carrying on the services of life, than any other power; and may be greater yet, if so inclined. There is not now a king, there is not any nation in the universal world, able to withstand that navy, which at this juncture you can launch out to sea. Why is not this extensive power regarded in balancing the loss of your houses and lands, those intolerable damages which you think you have suffered?—It is not so reasonable to grieve and despond under such petty losses, as to despise from the thought, that they are merely the trappings and

¹ Pericles here is about to convince the Athenians, that they may rise to supreme dominion in consequence of their naval superiority. It was his ambition to execute the grand extensive plan which was formed originally by Themistocles. And the words, in which he introduceth this topic, are so full of energy, that they bear hard upon a translator. He calls it a point—*Καμπύδιον ἔστιν ἡμῶν τὴν πρῶτην σφῆραν*. My first attempts at them were very faint and imperfect. I was soon convinced of it by the greatest Genius of the age, who did me the honour to read over this speech in manuscript, and who as he thinks and speaks like Pericles, could not endure that any of his words should be depreciated. I hope now I have expressed all the ideas which the original words include. Mr Hobbes hath entirely dropped them in his translation.

embellishments of wealth; to fix the firm remembrance within us, that liberty, in defence of which we are ready to hazard our all, will easily give us those trifles again; and that by tamely submitting to our enemies, the possession of all we have will be taken from us. We ought not in either of these respects to degenerate from our fathers. By toil, and toil alone, they gained these valuable acquisitions, defended themselves in the possession, and bequeathed the precious inheritance to us. And to lose the advantages we have possessed, will be much more disgraceful than to have miscarried in their pursuit. But we ought to encounter our enemies not with valour only, but with confidence of success. Valour starts up even in a coward, if he once prevails through lucky ignorance; but such a confidence must be in every mind, which is seriously convinced of its own superiority, as is now our case. Nay even when the match is equal, the certainty of what must be done arising from an invincible bravery, adds the greater security to courage. Confidence then is not built on hope which acts only in uncertainty, but on the sedate determination of what it is able to perform, on assurance of which is more guarded against disappointments.

"It is further your duty to support the public character (as in it to a man you pride yourselves) with which its extensive rule invests our community, and either not to fly from it, or never to aim at glory. Think not you have only one point at stake, the alternative of slavery instead of freedom; but think also of the utter loss of sovereignty, and the danger of vengeance for all the offences you have given in the practice of it. To resign it, is not in your power,—and of this let him be assured who refines through fear, and hopes to gain indemnity by exerting it no longer. In your hands it hath run out into a kind of tyranny. To take it up seems indeed unjust, but to lay it down is exceeding dangerous. And if such dastardly souls could persuade others, they would soon bring this state to utter ruin, or indeed any other, where they were masters, and enjoyed the chief administration of affairs. For the undisturbed and quiet life will be of short continuance without the interposition of a vigilant activity. Slavery is never to be endured by a state that once hath governed—such a situation can be tolerable only to that which hath ever been dependent.

"Suffer not yourselves therefore to be seduced by men of such mean and grovelling tempers, nor level your resentments at me—since, though I advised the war, it was not begun without your approbation—if the enemy hath invaded you in such a manner as you could not but expect from your own resolutions never to be dependent. What though beyond our apprehensions we have suffered the sad visitation of pestilence?—Such misfortunes no human foresight will be able to prevent—though I know that even this hath in some measure served to sharpen your aversion to me. But if this be just, I claim as my lawful right the glory of all those happy contingencies, which may ever befall you beyond your expectation. The evils inflicted by heaven must be borne with patient resignation; and the evils by enemies with manly fortitude. Such rational behaviour hath hitherto been habitual in Athens; let it now be reversed by you;—by you, who know to what a pitch of excellence the state hath rose in the esteem of the world, by not yielding to adversity; but, by braving all the horrors of war, and pouring forth its blood in the glorious cause, hath reached the highest summit of power, and ever since retained it. The memory of this, time itself will never be able to efface, even though we may suffer it to droop and perish in our hands—as what is human must decline—Our memory I say, who, though Grecians ourselves, gave laws to all other Grecians, stood the shock of most formidable wars, resisted them all when combined against us, conquered them all when separately engaged, and maintained ourselves in possession of the most flourishing and most powerful state in the world. These things let the indolent and sluggish soul condemn, but these let the active and industrious strive to emulate, for these they who cannot attain will envy.

"To be censured and maligned for a time, hath been the fate of all those whose merit hath raised them above the common level;—but wise and judicious is the man who, enjoying the superiority, despiseth the envy. An aversion so conceived will never last. His merit soon breaks forth in all its splendour, and his glory is afterwards handed down to posterity, never to be forgot. You, who have so clear a prospect before you, both of what will be some time glorious, and of what at present is not disgraceful, recollect your own worth and secure both. Sink not so low as to petition terms

from the Lacedæmonians; nor let them imagine that you feel the weight of your present misfortunes. The man whose resolution never sinks before it, but strives by a brave opposition to repel calamity, such—whether in a public or private capacity—must be acknowledged to be the worthiest man."

By arguments like these did Pericles endeavour to mollify the resentments of the Athenians against himself, and to divert their minds from their public calamities. In regard to the public, they seemed to be satisfied with all that he had urged; they desisted from soliciting an accommodation with the Lacedæmonians; and were more hearty than ever for continuing the war. Yet, in their own private concerns, they were grievously dejected under their present misfortunes. The poor citizens who had but little, could not bear with patience the loss of that little. The rich and the great regretted the loss of their estates, with their country-seats and splendid furniture;—but worst of all, that instead of peace they had the sad alternative of war. However, neither poor nor rich abated their displeasure to Pericles, till they had laid upon him a pecuniary fine.¹ And yet, no long time after—so unsteady are the humours of the people—they elected him general again, and intrusted him with the administration of affairs. The keen sense they had at first of their own private losses soon grew blunt and unaffecting, and they could not but allow him the most capable person to provide for all the urgent necessities of the public. For the supreme authority he enjoyed in times of peace he had exercised with great moderation; he was vigilant and active for the good of the community, which never made so great a figure as under his administration; and after the war broke out it is plain he best knew the reach of its ability to carry it on. He lived two years and six months from its commencement: and after his death,² his judicious

¹ Plutarch (in the life of Pericles) says, Authors are not agreed about the quantity of the fine at this time laid upon Pericles. Some lower it to fifteen talents, others mount it up to fifty. The demagogue, who incited the people to fine him, is also said by some to have been Cleon, with whose genius and character the reader will soon become acquainted.

² As the historian is here going to take his leave of Pericles, he adjoins a true representation of his patriotic spirit, his great abilities, his judicious foresight, and successful administration. And here, the reader may be informed of some points, which Thucydides either

foresight in regard to this war was more and more acknowledged. For he had assured them they could not fail of success, provided they would not meddle by land, but apply themselves solely to their navy, without being solicitous to enlarge their territories in this war, or exposing Athens itself to danger. But they had recourse to schemes quit opposite to these, nay even to some that had no connection at all with this war, wherein private ambition or private interest pushed them to such management as was highly prejudicial to themselves and their

thought needless when he wrote, or foreign to his subject.—Pericles had two sons by his former wife. The eldest of them proved a great vexation to his father, who was unable to support him in his expensive way of living. Pericles had no large estate, and he was not richer for fingering the public money. He laid it all out in adorning his Athens, and was rewarded for it by giving so many magnificent and lasting proofs of his fine taste in painting, sculpture, and building. For the city of Rome received not so much decoration from her foundation till the time of the Cæsars, as Athens did from Pericles alone. Yet economy was his passion at home, as that of his son Xantippus was luxury. This son however was taken off by the plague, as was afterwards a sister of Pericles, most of his intimates and relations, and his other son Paralus. This last was the heaviest blow; he felt it deeply: and all Athens did all that lay in their power to comfort him, since, contrary to a law of Pericles' own making, they enrolled his son Pericles, whom he had by Aspasia, an Athenian of the full blood. At length he was seized himself by the plague; and, after languishing a long time, in a manner different to most others, died of it. In his last moments he showed to a friend who was visiting him a charm which the women had hung about his neck, as if he was sick indeed when he could submit to such foolery. When several of them were sitting round his bed, and, thinking he did not hear them, were enumerating the great exploits of his life, the shining incidents of his administration, his victories, and the nine trophies he had erected, he interrupted them with these words, "I wonder you lay stress upon such actions, in which fortune claims a share along with me, and which many others have performed as well as myself, and yet pass over the highest glory and most valuable part of my character, that no citizen of Athens ever put on mourning through me." The wonderful man, though engaged for forty years in business, and constantly attacked by every furious, seditious, and turbulent Athenian, had never amidst all his power given way to the spirit of revenge. For this, as Plutarch finely observes, he in some measure deserved the lofty title of *Olympian*, too arrogant in any other light for man to wear; since gentleness of manners and the habits of mercy and forgiveness raise men to the nearest resemblance of the gods. Plutarch adds, that the Athenians never regretted any man so much, and with so much reason.—If the reader be willing to hear any more of Aspasia, the same writer tells us that after the death of Pericles, she married one Lysicles, a low and obscure man, and a dealer in cattle, whom however she improved into an Athenian of the first class.

allies. Wherever these politic schemes succeeded, private persons carried off all the honour and advantage;—whenever they miscarried, the hardships of the war fell more severely on the state. The reason was this—Pericles, a man of acknowledged worth and ability, and whose integrity was undoubtedly proof against corruption, kept the people in order by a gentle management, and was not so much directed by them as their principal director. He had not worked himself into power by indirect methods, and therefore was not obliged to soothe and honour their caprices, but could contradict and disregard their anger with peculiar dignity. Whenever he saw them bent on projects injurious or unreasonable, he terrified them so by the force of his eloquence, that he made them tremble and desist; and when they were quieted by groundless apprehensions, he animated them afresh into brave resolution. The state under him, though styled a democracy, was in fact a monarchy. His successors rose on a level with one another, and yet every one affecting to be chief, were forced to cajole the people, and so to neglect the concerns of the public. This was the source of many grievous errors, as must unavoidably be the case in a great community and possessed of large dominion;—but in particular of the expedition to Sicily; the ill conduct of which did not appear so flagrantly in relation to those against whom it was undertaken, as to the authors and movers of it, who knew not how to make the proper provision for those who were employed in it. For, engaged in their own private contests for power with the people, they had not sufficient attention to the army abroad, and at home were embroiled in mutual altercations. Yet, notwithstanding the miscarriage in Sicily, in which they lost their army with the greater part of their fleet, and the sedition which instantly broke out in Athens, they bravely assisted for three years together, not only their first enemies in the war, but the Sicilians also in conjunction with them, the greater part of their dependents revolted from them, and at length Cyrus the king's son, who, favouring the Peloponnesians, supplied them with ships for the service of their fleet;—nor would they last be conquered, till by their own intestine feuds they were utterly disabled from resisting longer. So much better than any other person was Pericles acquainted with their strength, when he marked out such a conduct to them

would infallibly have enabled the Athenian state to have continued the war longer than the Peloponnesians could possibly have done.

The Lacedæmonians, in junction with their allies, the same summer fitted out a fleet of one hundred ships against the island Zacynthus which lies over against Elis. They are a colony of the Achæans of Peloponnesus, and were then in league with the Athenians. On board this fleet were a thousand heavy-armed Lacedæmonians: and Cnemus the Spartan commanded in the expedition. Making a descent upon the island, they ravaged great part of the country,—but finding the entire reduction of it impracticable, they re-embarked and returned home.

In the close of the same summer, Aristeus the Corinthian, Aneristus, Nicolaus, Protodemus, and Timagoras of Tegea, ambassadors from the Lacedæmonians, and Polis the Argive, without any public character, travelling into Asia, to engage the Persian king to supply them with men and money for carrying on the war, on their journey stop first in Thrace and address themselves to Sitalces the son of Teris. They had a mind to try if they could prevail upon him to quit the Athenian alliance, to march to the relief of Potidæa, now besieged by the Athenians, to desist for the future from giving the latter any assistance, and to obtain from him a safe-conduct through his territory for the continuance of their journey beyond the Hellespont to Pharnaces son of Pharnabazus, who would afterwards conduct them in safety to the royal court. Learchus the son of Callimachus, and Ameiniades the son of Philemon, happening at that time to be with Sitalces, on an embassy from Athens, persuade the son of Sitalces, who had been made a citizen of Athens, to seize and deliver them up to them, that they might not go forward to the king, to the prejudice of that community of which he was a member. He, hearkening to their advice, arrests them just as they were going on ship-board to cross the Hellespont, after they had travelled through Thrace to the spot marked for their embarkation. He executed this by means of some trusty persons despatched purposely after them along with Learchus and Ameiniades, and expressly ordered to deliver them up to the latter: they, so soon as they had got them in their power, carried them to Athens. Upon their arrival there, the Athenians standing in great fear of Aristeus, lest

upon escape he might do them further mischief, since before this he had been the author of all the projects to their prejudice both at Potidæa and in Thrace, put them to death on the very day of their arrival, unjudged and suing in vain to be heard, and cast them into pits. This cruel usage of them they justified from the example of the Lacedæmonians, who had in the same manner put to death and cast into pits the Athenian merchants and those of their allies, whom they had seized in the trading vessels upon the coasts of Peloponnesus. For, in the beginning of the war, the Lacedæmonians had put to death as enemies all those whom they could take at sea—not those only who belonged to the states in alliance with the Athenians, but even such as were of the yet neutral communities.

About the same time in the end of summer, the Ambraciots in conjunction with many of the Barbarians, whom they had excited to take up arms, invaded Argos of Amphilochia, and made excursions over all its dependent territory. Their enmity against the Argives took its original from hence.—This Argos was first built, and this province of Amphilochia first planted, by Amphilochus the son of Amphiaras, immediately after the Trojan war, who on his return home, being dissatisfied with the state of affairs in that other Argos, founded this city in the gulf of Ambracia, and gave it the same name with the place of his nativity. It soon became the largest city of Amphilochia, and the inhabitants were most powerful of any thereabouts. Yet many generations after, being sunk by misfortunes, they prevailed upon the Ambraciots bordering upon Amphilochia to unite with them. This community of residence brought them to their present use of one common language, the Greek; but the rest of the Amphilochians are still Barbarians. Yet in process of time, the Ambraciots drive the Argives from amongst them, and keep possession of the city for themselves. Upon this event the Amphilochians threw themselves under the protection of the Acarnanians, and both together implored the succour of the Athenians, who sent thirty ships to their assistance under the command of Phormio. Upon Phormio's arrival they take Argos by storm, made all the Ambraciots slaves, and then both the Amphilochians and Acarnanians settle themselves together in the city. To these incidents was first owing the league

offensive and defensive between the Athenians and Acarnanians. The chief cause of the inveteracy which the Ambraciots bore to the Argives, was their having made them in this manner slaves; and which afterwards impelled them in the confusion of this war, to form this invasion with the junction of the Chaonians and some other neighbouring Barbarians. Advancing up to Argos, they were entire masters of the whole territory, but in vain endeavoured to take the town by assault; upon which they again returned home, and dispersed to their respective nations.—Such were the transactions of the summer.

On the first approach of winter, the Athenians sent out twenty ships to cruise on the coasts of Peloponnesus, under the command of Phormio; who, fixing his station before Naupactus, kept so strict a guard, that nothing durst pass in or out from Corinth and the gulf of Crissa.—Six other ships they sent to Caria and Lycia, under the command of Melesander, to levy contributions there, and to stop the excursions of the Peloponnesian privateers, harbouring in those parts, from molesting the course of their trading vessels from Phacelis, Phœnicia, and the adjacent continent. Melesander, with the Athenian and confederate force he had on board his ships, landed in Lycia, and was defeated in the first battle, in which he lost part of his army and his own life.

The same winter the Potidæans, as they were no longer able to hold out the siege; and as besides, the irruptions of the Peloponnesians into Attica had not induced the Athenians to raise it; their provisions being quite spent; and amongst other calamities to which their extremities had reduced them, having been forced to feed upon one another; they held a parley about their surrender with the Athenian officers, who commanded in the siege,¹ Xeno-

¹ In this siege of Potidæa, two persons served amongst the heavy-armed as private soldiers, one of whom was the glory of human nature; and the other the glory and bane of his country: I mean the divine Socrates, and at this time young Alcibiades. Plutarch (in the life of Alcibiades) says, they lay in the same tent, and fought always side by side. Once, in a sharp skirmish, both of them distinguished themselves above all their fellow-soldiers. Alcibiades at length was wounded, and dropped; Socrates stood over and defended him, and saved both him and his arms from the enemy. Socrates therefore had the justest right to the public reward, as the person who had behaved best in this action. But when the generals, on account of Alcibiades' quality, showed a great desire to confer honour upon him, Socrates, willing also to increase his ardour for gallant actions, turned

phon the son of Euripides, Hestiodorus the son of Aristoclideas, and Phanomachus the son of Callimachus. They, sensible of the hardships their troops suffered by long lying abroad in the winter season, and that the carrying on of the siege had already cost Athens two thousand talents,² granted them a composition. The terms agreed on were these—That they should quit the place with their wives, their children, and auxiliaries, every man with one suit of clothing, but the women with two; and with a certain sum of money to defray the expense of their departure.—By virtue of this composition they went away to Chalcis, where every one shifted for himself. But the Athenians called their generals to account for their conduct, because they had signed this composition without their privity (for they thought it in their power to have made them surrender at discretion,) and afterwards sent to Potidæa some of their people whom they settled in a colony there.—These things were done this winter, and so ended the second year of this war, the history of which hath been compiled by Thucydides.³

YEAR III.³

EARLY the next summer, the Peloponnesians and their allies, omitting the incursion as before into Attica, marched their forces against Platæa. Archidamus, son of Zeuxidamus king of the Lacedæmonians, commanded, who having encamped his army, was preparing to ravage the adjacent country. He was interrupted by an embassy from the Platæans, who addressed themselves to him in the following manner—

“The war, O Archidamus and Lacedæmonians, you are now levying on Platæa, is a flagrant breach of common justice, a blemish on your honour and that of your fathers. Potasias the Lacedæmonian, son of Cleombrotus, when—aided by those Grecians, who cheerfully exposed themselves with him to the danger of that battle which was fought on our land—he had delivered Greece from Persian slavery, at

witness in his favour, and procured him the wreath and the public present of a complete suit of armour. He craved no recompense for brave exploits but the consciousness of having performed them, and young Alcibiades was to be nursed up to virtue. He was capable of every degree either of virtue or vice; and Socrates always endeavoured to encourage him in the former, and gave his eager and enterprising soul the just direction.

² £387, 500 sterling,

³ Before Christ, 429.

a public sacrifice to Jupiter the deliverer, solemnized by him on that occasion in the public forum of Platæa, called all the confederates together, and there conferred these privileges on the Plateans—That they should have free possession of the city and territory belonging to it, to be governed at their own discretion;—that no one should ever unjustly make war upon them, or endeavour to enslave them; and in case of such attempts, all the confederates then present should avenge it to the utmost of their power.’—Such grateful returns did your fathers make us in recompense of our valour and the zeal we excited in the common dangers. Yet their generosity you are now reversing—you, with the Thebans our inveterate foes, are come hither to enslave us. But by the gods, who were then witnesses to the oath they swore, by all the tutelary deities both of your own and of our community, we adjure you to do no damage to Platean ground, nor to violate your oaths, but to retire and leave us in that state of independence which Pausanias justly established for us.”—To these words of the Plateans, Archidamus made this reply:

“What you have urged, ye men of Platæa, is just and reasonable, if it be found agreeable to your actions. Let the declarations of Pausanias be observed; be free and independent yourselves, and at the same time vindicate their own freedom to others, to those who, after participation of the same common dangers, made that oath in your favour, and yet are now enslaved by the Athenians. To rescue them and others from that slavery have our preparations been made, this war hath been undertaken. You who know what liberty is, and are such advocates for it, do you abide firmly by your oaths; at least, as we heretofore advised you, keep at quiet, enjoying only what is properly your own; side with neither party; receive both in the way of friendship, in the way of enmity, neither. To a conduct like this we never shall object.”

When the Platean ambassadors had heard this reply of Archidamus, they returned into the city, and communicating what had passed to the body of the citizens, they carried back in answer to him—“That they could not possibly comply with his proposals, without the consent of the Athenians, because their wives and children were in their power—that they were apprehensive a compliance might endanger

their whole community, since in such a case either the Athenians might not confirm the neutrality, or the Thebans, who were comprehended in the same neutral oath to the two principal powers, might again attempt to seize their city.”—Archidamus to remove their apprehensions spoke as follows: “Deliver up your city and your houses to us Lacedæmonians; let us know the bounds of your territory and the exact number of your trees, and make as true a calculation as you possibly can of all that belongs to you. Depart yourselves, and reside wherever you please, so long as the war continues; at the end of it we will restore every thing again. In the mean time, we will make the best use of every thing intrusted to us, and pay you an annual equivalent for your subsistence.” Upon hearing this, they again returned into the city, and the whole body of the people assisting at a general consultation, they returned for answer—“That they desired only to communicate the proposals to the Athenians, and then with their approbation would accept them. In the meantime they begged a suspension of arms, and to have their lands spared from depredation.” He granted them a truce for the time requisite to receive an answer, and forbore ravaging the country.

The ambassadors of Platæa, having been at Athens, and consulted with the Athenians, return again with this answer to their city: “The Athenians say that in no preceding time, ever since we entered into confederacy with them, did they ever suffer us in any respect to be injured; that neither will they neglect us now, but send us a powerful aid. And you they solemnly adjure by the oaths which your fathers have sworn, to admit no change or innovation in the league subsisting between you and them.”—When the ambassadors had thus delivered the answer of the Athenians, after some consultation, the Plateans resolved, “never to desert them, to bear any devastation of their lands, nay, if such be the case, to behold it with patience, and to suffer any extremities to which their enemies might reduce them;—that, further, no person should stir out of the city, but an answer be given from the walls—That it was impossible for them to accept the terms proposed by the Lacedæmonians.”

This was no sooner heard than Archidamus the king made this solemn appeal to all their tutelary heroes and gods.—“Ye gods and heroes,” said he, “who protect this region of

Platæa, bear witness to us, that it was not till after a violation of oaths already sworn, that we have marched into this country, where our fathers through the blessings you sent down upon their prayers overcame the Medes, and which you then made that fortunate field whereon the arms of Greece were crowned with victory—and that whatever we shall here undertake, our every step shall be agreeable to justice. We have offered many honourable conditions to them, which are all rejected. Grant therefore our supplications, that the first transgressors of justice may receive their punishment, and that those who fight with equity may obtain revenge." After this solemn address to the gods, he roused up his army into action.

He first of all formed an inclosure round about them with the trees they had felled, so that no one could get out of the city. In the next place, they raised a mount of earth before the place, hoping that it could not long hold out a siege against the efforts of so large an army. Having felled a quantity of timber on mount Cithæron, with it they framed the mount on either side, that thus cased it might perform the service of a wall, and that the earth might be kept from mouldering away too fast. Upon it they heaped a quantity of matter, both stones and earth, and whatever else would cement together and increase the bulk. This work employed them for seventy days and nights without intermission, all being alternately employed in it, so that one part of the army was carrying it on, while the other took the necessary refreshments of food and sleep. Those Lacedæmonians who had the command over the hired troops of the other states, had the care of the work, and obliged them all to assist in carrying it on. The Plateans, seeing this mount raised to a great height, built a counterwork of wood, close to that part of the city-wall against which this mount of earth was thrown up, and strengthened the inside of it with bricks, which they got for this use by pulling down the adjacent houses. The wooden case was designed to keep it firm together, and prevent the whole pile from being weakened by its height. They farther covered it over with sheep-skins and hides of beasts, to defend the workmen from missive weapons, and to preserve the wood from being fired by the enemy. This work within was raised to a great height, and the mount was raised with

equal expedition without. Upon this, the Plateans had recourse to another device. They broke a hole through the wall, close to which the mount was raised, and drew the earth away from under it into the city. But this being discovered by the Peloponnesians, they threw into the hole hurdles made of reeds and stuffed with clay, which being of a firm consistence could not be dug away like earth. By this they were excluded, and so desisted for a while from their former practice. Yet digging a subterraneous passage from out of the city, which they so luckily continued that it undermined the mount, they again withdrew the earth from under it. This practice long escaped the discovery of the besiegers, who still heaping on matter, yet the work grew rather less, as the earth was drawn away from the bottom, and that above fell in to fill up the void. However, still apprehensive, that as they were few in number, they should not be able long to hold out against such numerous besiegers, they had recourse to another project. They desisted from carrying on the great pile which was to counterwork the mount, and beginning at each end of it where the wall was low, they ran another wall in the form of a crescent along the inside of the city, that if the great wall should be taken this might afterwards hold out, might lay the enemy under the necessity of throwing up a fresh mount against it, and that thus the further they advanced the difficulties of the siege might be doubled, and be carried on with increase of danger.

When their mount was completed, the Peloponnesians played away their battering-engines against the wall; and one of them worked so dexterously from the mount against the great pile within, that they shook it very much, and threw the Plateans into consternation. Others they applied in different parts against the wall, the force of which was broken by the Plateans, who threw ropes around them; they also tied large beams together, with long chains of iron at both ends of the beams, by which they hung downwards from two other transverse beams inclined and extended beyond the wall;—these they drew along obliquely, and against whatever part they saw the engine of battery to be aimed, they let go the beams with a fall swing of the chains, and so dropped them down directly upon it, which by the weight of the stroke broke off the beak of the battering machine. Upon this the Peloponnesians, finding

all their engines useless, and their mount effectually counterworked by the fortification within, concluded it a business of no little hazard to take the place amidst so many obstacles, and prepared to draw a circumvallation about it.

But at first they were willing to try whether it were not possible to set the town on fire, and burn it down, as it was not large, by help of a brisk gale of wind; for they cast their thoughts towards every expedient of taking it without a large expense and a tedious blockade. Procuring for this purpose a quantity of faggots, they tossed them from their own mount into the void space between the wall and the inner fortification. As many hands were employed in this business, they had soon filled it up, and then proceeded to toss more of them into the other parts of the city lying beyond, as far as they could by the advantage which the eminence gave them. Upon these they threw fiery balls made of sulphur and pitch, which caught the faggots, and soon kindled such a flame as before this time no one had ever seen kindled by the art of man. It hath indeed sometimes happened, that wood growing upon mountains hath been so heated by the attrition of the winds, that without any other cause it hath broken out into fire and flame. But this was exceeding fierce; and the Plateans, who had baffled all other efforts, were very narrowly delivered from perishing by its fury; for it cleared the city to a great distance round about, so that no Platean durst approach it: and if the wind had happened to have blown along with it, as the enemy hoped, they must all unavoidably have perished. It is now reported, that a heavy rain falling on a sudden, attended with claps of thunder, extinguished the flames, and put an end to this imminent danger.

The Peloponnesians, upon the failure of this project, marched away part of their army; but, continuing the remainder there, raised a wall of circumvallation quite round the city, the troops of every confederate state executing a determinate part of the work. Both inside and outside of this wall was a ditch, and by first digging these they had got materials for brick. This work being completed about the rising of Arcturus,¹ they left some of their own men to guard half of the wall, the other half being left to the care of the Boeotians;

then marched away with the main army, and dismissed the auxiliary forces to their respective cities.—The Plateans had already sent away to Athens their wives, their children, their old people, and all the useless crowd of inhabitants. There were only left in the town during this siege, four hundred Plateans, eighty Athenians, and one hundred and ten women to prepare their food. This was the whole number of them when the siege was first formed; nor was there any other person within the wall, either slave or free.—And in this manner was the city of Plataea besieged in form.

The same summer, and about the time that the army appeared before Plataea, the Athenians, with a body of their own people, consisting of two thousand heavy-armed, and two hundred horsemen, invaded the Chalcideans of Thrace and the Bottiaeans. The corn was in the ear, when this army was led against them, under the command of Xenophon the son of Euripides and two colleagues. Coming up to Spartolus, a town in Bottiaea, they destroyed the corn, and hoped to get possession of the place by the management of a faction they had within. But a contrary party, having sent in good time to Olynthus, had procured from thence an aid of heavy-armed and other force for their protection. These even made a sally out of Spartolus, and forced the Athenians to a battle under the walls of the town. The heavy-armed Chalcideans, with some of their auxiliaries, are defeated by the Athenians, and retire into Spartolus. The horse and light-armed Chalcideans get the better of the horse and light-armed Athenians; but they had with them a small number of targeteers from the province called Crusis. On the first joining of battle other targeteers came to their assistance from Olynthus. The light-armed of Spartolus seeing this reinforcement just come up, and reflecting that they had received no loss before, with re-animated courage again charge the Athenians, in conjunction with the Chalcidean horse, and the fresh reinforcement. The Athenians retire to the two companies which they had left to guard the baggage. Here they drew up again, and whenever they thought proper to charge, the enemy fell back; when they retreated from the charge, the enemy pressed upon and infested them with missile weapons. The Chalcidean horse rode up where they thought they could break them, and falling in without fear of a repulse, put the Athenians to

¹ Beginning of September.

flight and pursued them to a great distance. The Athenians fly for refuge to Potidæa; and afterwards, obtaining a truce to fetch off their dead, return with their shattered army to Athens. In this action they lost four hundred and thirty men, and all their commanders. The Chalcidians and Bottians erected a trophy, and having taken proper care of their dead, separated to their own cities.

Not long after this, in the same summer, the Ambraciots and Chaonians, who aimed at the total reduction of Acarnania, and to compass a general defection there from the Athenians, prevailed upon the Lacedæmonians to supply them with shipping from their confederate cities, and to send a thousand heavy-armed into Acarnania. They told them, that—"if they would join them with a land and a naval force at the same time, it would be impossible for the Acarnanians to succour one another by sea; that hence they might easily get all Acarnania into their power, from whence they might become masters of Zacynthus and Cephallene, and a stop would then be made to the Athenian cruises on the coasts of Peloponnesus; nay, that there was even a hope of reducing Naupactus."—This scheme was pleasing to the Lacedæmonians, who ordered Cnemus (yet their admiral) to sail thither with a few ships, having on board the heavy-armed: and circulated orders to their confederates to fit out their ships, and repair with all expedition to Leucas. The Corinthians were those who showed most zeal for the Ambraciots, a colony of their own; and the shipping of Corinth, Sicyon, and the adjacent places, was prepared with all possible expedition; but that of Leucas, Anactorium, and Ambracia, was already at Leucas, and waiting for the rest. Cnemus and the thousand heavy-armed performed their voyage undiscovered by Phormio, who commanded the Athenian fleet of twenty sail, stationed round Naupactus, and immediately landed his men for the destined service. Besides the thousand Peloponnesians he brought with him, he was now joined by the Ambraciots, Leucadians, Anactorians, of the Grecians;—of the Barbarians, by a thousand Chaonians not subject to a regal government, but commanded by Photius and Nicanor, men of those families which had a right to command by annual election. With the Chaonians came the Thesprotians, who also had no king. Sabylinthus, guardian of their king Tharyps, yet a minor, led the

Melœsians and Antitanians. The Paræans were headed by their own king Ordæus, who had also the command of a thousand Orestians, subjects of Antiochus, which served with his troops by the permission of Antiochus. Perdiccas sent also a thousand Macedonians, of which the Athenians were ignorant, but these were not yet come up.

With these forces Cnemus began his march, without waiting the arrival of the ships from Corinth, and passing through Argia they destroyed Limnæa, a village unfortified. They march next for Stratus, the capital city of Acarnania, judging that if they first took this, all other places would readily submit. The Acarnanians, finding a large army broke in amongst them by land, and more enemies coming to attack them by sea, gave up all view of succouring one another, and stood separately on their own defence. They sent information to Phormio, and requested him to come up to their relief. He sent them word, "he could not possibly leave Naupactus without a guard, when a fleet was ready to sail from Corinth." The Peloponnesians and their allies, dividing themselves into three bodies, advanced towards the city of the Stratiens, with a design to appear before it, and if it did not surrender at once, to storm it without loss of time. The Chaonians and the rest of the Barbarians marched in the middle; to the right were the Leucadians, Anactorians, and their auxiliaries; to the left Cnemus with his Peloponnesians and Ambraciots; each body at so great a distance from the rest, that sometimes they were out of one another's sight. The Grecians, in their march, kept firm within ranks, and guarded all their motions, till they came up to the spot fit for their encampment. But the Chaonians, confident of their own bravery, and valuing themselves as the most martial people in that part of the world, could not bear the delay of encamping, but with the rest of the Barbarians rushing eagerly forwards, thought to take the town at a shout, and carry all the honour. The Stratiens finding them thus advanced, thought that, could they master them thus detached, the Grecians would become more averse to attack them. With this view, they place ambuscades in the approaches of the city; and when the enemy was near, rush up at once from the places of ambush, and out of the city; charging them on all sides. The Chaonians are thrown into consternation, and many of them

are slain. The rest of the Barbarians, when they saw them give way, durst not keep their ground, but fled immediately. Neither of the Grecian bodies knew any-thing of this engagement, so hastily had those advanced, and were supposed to have done it only to encamp with greater expedition. But when the Barbarians came running back to them in disorderly rout, they received them into shelter, and all closing firm together stood quiet the rest of the day. The Stratians durst not directly assault them, because the other Acarnanians were not yet come up to their assistance, but were continually slinging at them from a distance, thus harassing them abundantly, but unable, without better weapons, to make them dislodge: the Acarnanians only could have attacked them with effectual vigour.

By the favour of a dark night, Cnemus withdrew his army by a quick march to the river Anapus, which is eighty stadia¹ distant from Stratus. The next day he obtains a truce to fetch off the dead. And the Cœniads coming up in a friendly manner to his relief, he went to take refuge amongst them, before the Acarnanians could draw their succours together, and from thence the forces which composed his army marched to their own homes. But the Stratians erected a trophy on account of their victory over the Barbarians.

The fleet of Corinth and the other confederate states, that was to sail from the gulf of Crissa, to attend the orders of Cnemus, and prevent the Acarnanians on the coast from succouring those within the land, never arrives: for about the time of the action at Stratus, they had been compelled to fight the Athenian squadron of twenty ships, stationed at Naupactus under the command of Phormio. Phormio had watched their coming out of the gulf, intending to attack them so soon as ever they got out to sea. The Corinthians and their allies sailed out indeed, yet not so well prepared to fight by sea, as to forward the land-expedition on Acarnania. They never imagined that the Athenians with their twenty ships durst presume to attack them who had forty-seven. Yet when they saw them steering the same course on the opposite shore, they kept first along their own coast, and afterwards from Patræ of Achaia stretched over to the opposite

side in order to make for Acarnania. But now again they descried them standing directly against them from Chalcis and the river Evenus, and found they had observed their anchoring the night before. Thus are they compelled to come to an engagement in the midst of the open sea.² The ships of every state were under the command of those who had been appointed by their principals: over the Corinthians were Machon, Isocrates, and Agatharchidas. The Peloponnesians drew up their ships in form of a circle, as large as they possibly could, without leaving open a passage for the ships of the enemy. The heads of the ships stood to sea, the sterns were turned inwards. Within were ranged the small vessels that attended the fleet, and five ships that were prime sailers, which were to start out at narrow passages, wherever the enemy should begin the attack. The Athenians drawing up their ships in a line, and sailing quite round them, brushed along by them in their passage, and making successive feints of engaging, forced them to draw into a smaller compass. Phormio had beforehand given strict orders not to engage without the signal: for he hoped the enemy could not long preserve that order of battle like a land-army, but that the ships must fall foul upon one another, and the small vessels within give them no little embarrassment; that further, the wind would blow out of the gulf, as was usual every morning: in expectation of which he continued to sail round about them, and then they could not possibly keep firm in their stations for any time. He thought farther, that the time of engagement was entirely in his power, as his ships were best sailers, and that it was most advisable to begin at such a juncture. As soon as that wind began to rise, and the greater ships, now contracted into a narrow circle, were

¹ Phormio was watching to catch them in the open sea, *ἐν τῇ ὑψηλῇ* as Thucydides words it above. They were now out of the gulf, stretching across the sea, in the midst of which Phormio came up to them, and engaged, *κατὰ μέσον τοῦ πορθίου*. The sea without the capes that form the mouth of the gulf of Crissa, is indeed a narrow sea, *ὀρθίος*, but then it was open sea in regard to the gulf within the capes, and gave Phormio all the advantages which more expert seamen knew how to use. As the Peloponnesian fleet stood out from Patræ in Achaia, and the Athenian from Chalcis in Etolia, the situation of those two places easily guides to the place of the engagement. Phormio got a deal of honour by this action, which Plutarch in his piece about the glory of the Athenians, reckons up amongst the most remarkable exploits related by our historian.

² About eight miles.

disordered both by the wind and the smaller vessels within, one falling foul upon another, the poles were applied to push them off again; amidst the noise caused by this confusion, calling out to take care, and cursing one another, they could no longer hear the orders of their commanders, or their masters; and the sea beginning to run so high as to render useless the oars of unexperienced mariners, as they were, they left the unmanageable ships to the pilot's art. Exactly at this juncture Phormio gives the signal. The Athenians engage, and at the first shock sink one of the admiral-ships, and several more afterwards in the different parts of the engagement. They pursued their success with so much fury, that amidst the general disorder not one durst think of resisting, but all, with the greatest precipitation, fled towards Patræ and Dyme of Achaia. The Athenians pursuing and taking twelve of their ships, and having slaughtered most of the crews, draw off to Molychrium: and having erected a trophy on the promontory, and consecrated a ship to Neptune, returned to their station at Naupactus.

The Peloponnesians, without loss of time, crept along the coast with the remnant of their fleet saved at Patræ and Dyme, to Cyllene, a dock belonging to the Eleans; whither, after the battle of Stratus, arrive also from Leucas, Cnemus and the ships of that station, which ought to have been joined by these other. The Lacedæmonians send thither Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron, to assist Cnemus in his naval conduct, ordering him to get ready for a more successful engagement, and not to leave the dominion of the sea to such a small number of ships. For their late defeat appeared to them quite unaccountable, especially as this was the first trial they had of an engagement at sea; nor could they think it so much owing to a want of skill in naval affairs, as to a want of courage, never balancing the long experience of the Athenians with their own short application to these matters. These persons therefore they sent away in anger, who coming to Cnemus, issued their circular orders to the states for new quotas of shipping, and refitted what was already there for another engagement. Phormio also sends messengers to Athens with an account of these preparations, and to report the victory they had already gained; and requesting a further reinforcement of as many ships as they could expeditiously despatch, since he was in daily expectation of another fight.

Twenty ships were the number they agree to send him, but they ordered him who was to carry them to touch by the way at Crete. For Nicias a Cretan of Gortys, a public friend of the Athenians, had persuaded them to appear before Cydonia, assuring them that this place, which had been an enemy to them, should soon be their own. This he insinuated merely to gratify the Polychnitæ, who bordered upon the Cydonians. The commander therefore with these ships went to Crete, and joining the Polychnitæ, ravaged the territory of the Cydonians; by which, together with adverse winds and weather unfit for sea, no little time was unseasonably wasted away.

The Peloponnesians at Cyllene, during the time that the Athenians lay weather-bound in Crete, having got every thing in readiness for another engagement, sailed along the coast to Panormus of Achaia, where the land-forces of the Peloponnesians were come to forward their attempts. Phormio, likewise, with the twenty ships which had fought the former battle, sailed up to cape Molychrium, and lay at anchor just without it. This cape belonged to the Athenian alliance, but¹ the other cape over-against it belonged to the Peloponnesians. The arm of sea which divides them is about seven² stadia over; and this is the mouth of the gulf of Oriens. The Peloponnesians with a fleet of seventy-seven ships rode also at anchor, under the cape of Achaia, which is not far distant from Panormus, where their land-forces lay. When they had here a sight of the Athenians, both parties lay for six or seven days over-against each other, intent on the needful preparations for engaging. The scheme on each side was this:—The Peloponnesians, struck with their former defeat, would not sail from without the capes into the open sea:—The Athenians would not enter into the straits, judging it would be an advantage to the enemy to fight in a narrow compass. At length Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other Peloponnesian commanders, desirous to come soon to an engagement, before the Athenian squadron should receive a reinforcement, called first their soldiers together, and seeing some of them not yet recovered from the terror occasioned by the former

¹ The cape on the Peloponnesian side was called Rhium, or the Rhium of Achaia; the opposite cape Antirrhium, or Molychrium.

² About three quarters of a mile.

defeat, and by no means eager to fight again, endeavoured to animate and rouse up their courage by the following harangue :

"If the former engagement, ye men of Peloponnesus, affects any of you with sad apprehensions about the event of another, know that it by no means affords you any reasonable ground for such desponding thoughts. That was owing, as you well know, to a deficiency in all needful preparations; for you were not then fitted out for service of sea, but for the service of land. We then were distressed in several respects by the adverse turns of fortune; and in some, we who fought for the first time at sea run into errors through want of skill. It thus happened that we were defeated, but not through any cowardice of our own. There can be no reason for men, who were not conquered by superior courage, but who can explicitly account for the means of their defeat, to let their spirits be sunk by a calamity merely accidental; but they ought to reflect, that though fortune may disconcert the human enterprises, yet that men can never be deserted by their own valour; and where true valour is, they ought not to catch a plea from want of experience to palliate what signs of cowardice they betray. Inferior skill in you is by no means a balance for your superior valour. The expertness of your enemies which you so much dread, if it be accompanied with valour, will indeed direct them in a performance of their duty, amidst all the hazards of war; but if it wants true valour, those hazards will be too hard for all human art. For fear bannisheth the remembrance of what ought to be done; and art without strength is quite unavailing. Place therefore your own superior valour in the balance against their superior skill; and remove the apprehensions flowing from your defeat by the recollection that you were not prepared to fight. You have now the advantage of a larger number of ships, and an opportunity of fighting on your own coasts, in sight of a land army of your own. Victory is generally obtained by those who are most in number and best provided. So that upon close examination, no reason appears why we should dread the event. Our former miscarriages make not against us; nay, the past commission of them will instruct us now. Let every master therefore and every mariner act his part with manly resolution; let each take care to perform his duty, nor quit the post to which he

is appointed. We shall take care to order the engagement, in no worse a manner than our predecessors have done; and shall leave no man any reason to excuse his cowardice. Yet—if any one will be a coward, he shall certainly receive the punishment he deserves; but the valiant shall be honoured with rewards proportioned to their merit."

In such terms did their commanders animate the Peloponnesians. But Phormio—who began to apprehend a depression of spirits in his own men, since he plainly saw that by keeping their ships close together they were afraid of the numerous ships of the enemy—had a mind by calling them together to re-inspire them with courage, and give them an exhortation suitable to their present condition. He had hitherto in all his discourses insisted, and induced them to give him credit, that "no number of ships could be got together large enough to make head against them." And his seamen had long since been elated with this presumption, that "as they were Athenians, they ought not to avoid any fleet of the Peloponnesians, however numerous." But, when he saw them intimidated by the formidable object before their eyes, he thought it high time to endeavour to revive their sinking courage. The Athenians being gathered round him, he harangued them thus :

"I have observed, my fellow-soldiers, that the number of your enemies hath struck you with fear,—I have therefore called you together, as I cannot bear to see you terrified with what is by no means dreadful. These enemies of yours whom you have already conquered, who in no wise think themselves a match for you, have got together a great number of ships and a superior force. In the next place they come confidently to attack you with the vain presumption, that valour is only peculiar to themselves. Their confidence is occasioned by their skill in the service of the land. Their frequent successes there induce them to suppose that they must also for certainty be victorious at sea. If they have any reason to presume so far upon their excellence at land, you have more to form presumptions in your own favour, since in natural courage they are not in the least superior to us, and if larger degrees of skill give either side an advantage, we have hence an argument to be more confident of success. The Lacedæmonians, now at the head of their league, merely to preserve their own reputation, have dragged

numbers hither to fight against their will; otherwise, they durst never have attempted to engage us a second time, after receiving so signal a defeat. Frighten not yourselves with extravagant suspicions of their courage—but rather strike a panic into them; a panic, for which they have more ample reason, as you have already gained a victory over them, and as they are certain you would not give them another opportunity to fight, unless you had some grand design to execute. An enemy, that like them exceeds in number, in action depends more on their strength than on their conduct. They who are far inferior in strength of numbers, and dare, though uncompelled, to fight, must do it through the prevalence of some extensive views. This they cannot but know, and hence dread more this our diminutive than they would an equal force. Large armies defeated, through defect of skill, or sometimes through defect of courage, by an inferior force, are cases that have often happened. Yet neither of these defects can be imputed to us. For my own part, I shall not willingly hazard the event within the gulf, nor will I sail into it. For I am not ignorant that want of searoom is very improper for a few ships that sail best, and are best managed, against a number which those on board them know not how to govern. In such a situation, no one can pour down to an attack in the proper manner for want of having a clear view of the enemy; nor, if he is forced to sheer off, can he do it with safety. There is no room to break through, or to tack at pleasure, which is the business of ships that are better sailers; but the fight must of necessity be the same with a battle at land, and in this case the greater number of ships must have the advantage. I shall take the greatest care I am able to prevent these inconveniences. And you I expect to stand regularly to your posts on board every ship. Receive your orders with alacrity, especially as we lie so near our enemy; and above all things, when we come to action, observe the rules of discipline without hurry and noise: for these are matters of great importance in every scene of war, and of not the least in a naval engagement; and charge your enemies with a spirit worthy of your former achievements. Great indeed are the points you are now to decide, the hopes of the Peloponnesians of making a figure at sea are now either to be totally demolished, or the power of the sea must become

precarious to the Athenians, even near their own homes. Once more I call to your remembrance that great part of these enemies you have already conquered—and the courage of enemies once conquered, is seldom equal to what it was, when unconscious of defeat."

In this manner Phormio encouraged his men.—But the Peloponnesians, when they found that the Athenians would not sail into the gulf and straits, had a mind to compel them to it against their inclinations. At break of day they began to move, their ships being ranged in lines, consisting of four, and stood along their own coasts within the gulf, the right wing leading the course in the same order as they had lain at anchor. In this way they had ranged twenty of their best ships, with a view that if Phormio should imagine they had a design upon Naupactus, and himself should hasten to its succour, the Athenians might not be able to out-sail them, and escape their outermost squadron, which composed the right wing, but be surrounded on all sides. He, just as they expected, being ordered for that place, which he knew was fenceless, no sooner saw them under sail, than against his will and in no little hurry he got on board and sailed along his own coast, and land forces of the Messenians marching along the adjacent shore to be ready with their assistance. The Peloponnesians seeing them march along in a line, ship after ship, and that they were now within the gulf and near the shore, which was what they chiefly wanted,—on signal given, at once altered their course, sailing down directly upon the Athenians, as fast as their ships could advance, in full expectation of intercepting the whole line. Eleven of the Athenian ships, which were the head of the rest, being too quick for the view of the Peloponnesians and their shifting their course ran safely off.¹ Yet intercep-

¹ The Latin translators, whose chief aim is a grammatical construction, have made a slip here in their chorography; they say, "*Subterfugerunt or fugerunt in apertum mare.*" But it is surprising that Mr. [unclear] should be guilty of so much inadvertence, as to make eleven Athenian ships "get out into open sea." The Peloponnesians made their tack towards the open sea on purpose to prevent them from getting out of the gulf, which gave opportunity to the foremost ships in the Athenian line to run away up the gulf towards Naupactus, for the sake of securing which, they had themselves obliged, though contrary to their judgment and inclination, to come within the capes. Had they run out to sea, they never could have reached Naupactus, but would have run directly from it.

the rest, they run them aground and so dis-
 ed them. The Athenians on board, who
 d not escape by swimming, were slaughter-
 to a man: some of these empty ships
 got off again and carried away in tow;
 one they had already took with the
 le crew on board. The Messenians got
 a to the succour of some of them. They
 ed with their arms through the water, and
 bing on board and fighting from the decks,
 d some which were already in tow.—In
 manner did the Peloponnesians defeat and
 oy the Athenian ships.

heir twenty ships which were of the right
 ; gave chase to the eleven Athenians,
 h, on the shifting of the course, had ran
 main. But all these, excepting one ship,
 iled them, and got safe into Naupactus.
 ng gained their harbour, they tacked about
 r the temple of Apollo, and stood ready to
 d themselves, in case the enemy should
 an attempt upon them so near the shore.

after, they appeared sailing along and
 ng their psan, as having gained a victory.
 ship belonging to Leucas was shot far
 d of the rest, giving chase to that only
 of the Athenians which was left behind.
 appened that a trading vessel was then
 ; out at anchor before the harbour. The
 nian ship came up first with this vessel,
 fetching a compass round her, runs directly
 at the Leucadian that was chasing, and
 ntly sinks her. By this accident so sud-
 and unexpected, the Peloponnesians are
 wn into consternation; and having besides
 ved the chase without any regular order,
 cure of victory, some of the ships now
 ging their oars, stopped further motion.
 was an unlucky expedient when so near
 enemy; but their design was to wait for
 greater number of ships that were yet
 ed. Some of them being ignorant of the
 , ran upon the shelves and were stranded.
 n the Athenians saw them suffer these dis-
 , their courage began to revive. Shout-
 out aloud with one voice, they encouraged
 another to attack. The miscarriages of
 h they were this moment sensible, and
 r irrecoverable disorder, prevented the
 s from making any long resistance. And
 soon were forced to run back again to-
 s the station of Panormus, from whence
 came. The Athenians chasing them
 ber, took the six ships that were most be-

hind, and recovered their own, which were in
 the enemy's hands by having been run ashore,
 and afterwards brought off in tow. Some
 men besides they killed, and made some pri-
 soners.

On board the Leucadian, which was sunk
 near the trading vessel, was Timocrates the
 Lacedæmonian, who, when the ship received
 the stroke that sunk her, immediately slew
 himself,¹ and floated afterwards into the har-
 bour of Naupactus. The Athenians returning
 thither again, erected a trophy near the place
 from whence they had pursued this victory.
 They took up their dead, and the shattered
 pieces of their ships, whatever they found on
 their own coasts, and by a truce gave permission
 to the Peloponnesians to fetch off theirs.

The Peloponnesians also erected a trophy,
 in token of a victory gained by forcing ashore
 and damaging some of the enemy's ships. The
 ship they took they consecrated on the Rhium
 of Achaia, near their trophy. Yet, after this,
 being in some dread of the reinforcement ex-
 pected from Athens, all of them, except the
 Leucadians, sailed away by favour of the night
 into the gulf of Crissa and Corinth. The
 Athenians, in the twenty ships from Crete,
 that ought to have been up with Phormio
 before the engagement, not long after the above
 retreat of the other ships arrived at Naupactus.
 And here this summer ended.

Before the separation of the fleet that with-
 drew into Corinth and the gulf of Crissa,
 Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other commanders
 of the Peloponnesians, by the advice of the
 Megareans, formed a design, in the beginning
 of this winter, to make an attempt on the
 Piræus, the haven of the Athenians. It was
 not guarded or secured in the usual manner;
 nor was this judged requisite, as the naval
 power of Athens was become so extensive.

¹ We have here a notable proof of the peculiar spirit
 and genius of the Spartans. They regarded the land as
 their own element, in which they were superior to the
 rest of the world. And yet now they were convinced,
 that without practice at sea, they should never be able
 to pull down the power of Athens. Their first attempts
 are awkward and unsuccessful. The art shown by the
 Athenians in tacking round, darting out again, and sink-
 ing a ship at one stroke, put them all to a stand; and it
 seems made so sudden and strong an impression on
 Timocrates, whose passion it was to die fighting, and
 with wounds all before, that he could not endure the
 thought of perishing in a whole skin, and therefore
 snatched the moment, and killed himself for fear he
 should be drowned.

Their project was, that every mariner carrying with him an oar, a cushion, and a leathern thong, should march over-land from Corinth, to the sea on which Athens is situated, and that, making the best of their way to Megara, and drawing out the forty ships that lay there in the Nisæan dock, they should immediately stand into the Piræus. For there was not so much as one ship appointed to its guard; nor was there the least suspicion at Athens that the enemy would attempt in this manner to surprise them: for, openly, and in a regular train, they durst not attempt it; nor could a project which required deliberate procedure have escaped discovery. But no sooner had they resolved upon, than they set out to execute, the present scheme. Arriving in the night, they drew the ships out of the Nisæan dock; but instead of making directly for the Piræus, as they at first intended, dismayed with the danger of the attempt, and, as it is said, forced by a contrary wind to steer another course, they went over to that promontory of Salamis which faceth Megara. Upon this promontory was a fort, and three ships were stationed below to prevent all importation and exportation at Megara. This fort they assaulted, and carried the three ships, though empty, away with them. Other parts of Salamis they plundered, as the inhabitants never dreamed of this invasion.

The lights,¹ that signify the approach of enemies, were however held up and waved towards Athens, which caused as great a consternation there as was known during all the series of the war. Those in the city imagined the enemy to be already within the Piræus. Those in the Piræus concluded the city of the Salaminians to be taken, and that the enemy was only not within their port, which indeed they might easily have been, had they not been hindered by their own fears and a contrary wind. At break of day, the Athenians ran down in general concourse to the Piræus. They got their ships afloat, and leaping on

board with the utmost expedition and tumult, sailed away for Salamis. What land-forces they had to guard them. When the Peloponnesians had notice of this succour, having now great part of Salamis, and got many and a large booty, beside the three stationed at Budorus, they made the best way back to Nisæa. They were trusting too much to their ships, which been long laid up were become leaky; thus getting back to Megara, they again over-land to Corinth. The Athenians finding they were gone from Salamis home again. But ever after this they the Piræus in a stricter manner, barring the mouth of the haven, and omitting no of securing it effectually for the future.

About the same time, in the beginning of this winter, Sitalces the Odrysian, Teres, a Thracian king, marched against Perdiccas, the son of Alexander of Macedonia, and the Chalcideans on Thrace, to enforce the execution of engagements, one made to and the other self. For Perdiccas, who had entered some engagement to him, for reconciled hard with war, and for not restoring his brother Philip, then at enmity with his throne, had not yet performed that ment. And he himself was under animent to the Athenians, since the late offensive and defensive made between that he would finish the war for them the Chalcideans of Thrace. On both accounts, he undertook the present expedition, carrying along with him Amyntas the Philip, to restore to him the kingdom of Macedonia, with the Athenian ambassadors, Agnon an Athenian general: though the Athenians had obliged themselves by to accompany the expedition with a fleet and a numerous land army.

Beginning the march himself from he summons to attend him first all his subjects that live within the mountains of Hæmus and Rhodope, quite down to the Hellespont and Euxine sea; next, the nations as lay between the river Ister quite down to the Euxine. The Getæ, nations so situated, border upon the Scythians.

¹ These, (according to the scholiast) were lighted torches, which persons on the wall reared aloft in the air, to notify to neighbouring and confederate places, that they discerned the approach of enemies, in order to put them on their guard. The same thing was also done at the approach of friends, to notify what succour was at hand. In the latter case, they held the light steady and unmoved; in the former they waved them to and fro, as an indication of fear.

wearing the same habiliments of war, and all like them drawing the bow on horseback. He procured also to join him many of the free Thracians that live upon the mountains, and make use of scimitars, who are distinguished by the name of Dians, and dwell most of them about Rhodope. Some of these he took into pay, but some of them voluntarily attended. He had levies also from amongst the Agrianians, Lemans, and the other nations of Pæonia subject to himself. These were the furthest people in his dominions, reaching up to the Grassans and Lemans of Pæonia and the river Strymon, which deriving its source from mount Scomius waters the Grassans and Lemans, and is the boundary of his empire from those Pæonians who still are free. Towards the Tribalians, who are also a free people, the boundary is formed by the Trerians and Tilateans. These live to the north of mount Scomius, and reach westerly as far as the river Oscius, which riseth out of the same mountain with the Nestus and the Heber, a great but barren mountain adjoining to the Rhodope.

The kingdom of Odrysæ is of this large extent along the coast, reaching from the city of Abdera to the mouth of the river Ister in the Euxine sea. The shortest cut round its coast requireth four days and as many nights for a trading-vessel, of the round built, sailing directly before the wind. A good walker will also be eleven days in going the nearest way by land from Abdera to the Ister. So large was its extent along the coast. But towards the continent, to go along it from Byzantium to the Lemans and the Strymon, for so far does it run upwards from the sea, would cost an expeditious walker thirteen days' continued journey. The yearly tribute exacted from this tract of Barbaric land, and his cities in Greece, by Seuthes, who succeeding Sitalces in these dominions, very much improved the revenue, amounted to four hundred talents of silver,¹ though it might be paid either in silver or gold. The presents constantly made to him either of gold or silver were not less in value, besides gifts of vestments both figured and plain, and all kinds of furniture, which were not only made to him, but to all his officers, and the noble Odrysians. The custom observed by them and general to all the Thracians, "of receiving rather than bestowing," was contrary

to that which prevails in the Persian court, where it was a greater shame to be asked and to deny, than to ask and be denied. Yet, as their power was great, this practice continued long in vogue amongst them; for nothing could be obtained by him who brought no present; and this afforded a large increase of power to his kingdom. It had the greatest revenue, and was in other respects the most flourishing, of all the kingdoms in Europe between the gulf of Ionia and the Euxine sea. But in military strength and numerous armies, it was the second, though at a great distance from the Scythians. For there is no one nation in Europe, nor even in Asia, that in these points can in any degree be a match for them; or when standing singly, nation against nation, is able to make head against the Scythians, united and in good harmony with one another. Yet, at the same time, in every point of conduct, and management of all the necessary affairs of life, they fall vastly short of other people.

Sitalces therefore, who was king of so large a country, got his army together; and, when every thing was ready, marched against Macedonia. He first of all passed through his own dominions; then over Cercine, a desert mountain, the boundary between the Sintians and Pæonians. He went over it by a passage he had, by cutting down the wood, made formerly himself, in an expedition against the Pæonians. In their march from Odrysæ over this mountain, they left the Pæonians on their right, but on their left the Sintians and Mædians. On their descent from it, they arrived at Doberus, a city of Pæonia. He lost none of his army in the march, but by sickness; notwithstanding which it was very much increased; for many of the free Thracians came daily in without invitation, and followed for the sake of plunder; so that the whole number is said at last to have amounted to a hundred and fifty thousand. Of these, the greater part were foot, but about a third of them were horse. The greatest share of the horse was provided by the Odrysians, and next to them by the Getæ. Of the foot the free Thracians that came from about mount Rhodope, and used scimitars, were the most valiant: all the rest that followed were a mixed crowd, formidable only in their number. All these therefore were got together at Doberus, and preparing to break into the lower Macedonia, subject to Perdiccas, under the ridge of the mountains. For

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¹ £78,940 sterling.

in the general name of Macedonians are comprised the Lyncestians and Helimiotians and other nations lying upwards, allied to and dependent upon the rest, yet governed as distinct kingdoms. The dominion over the maritime Macedonia was first obtained by Alexander, father of Perdiccas, and his ancestors the Temenidæ, who derived their original from Argos. These by a successful war had driven the Pierians out of Pieria, who afterwards fixed their residence at Phagres under mount Pangæus, on the other side the Strymon, and at other places; for which reason, the tract of ground lying under Pangæus towards the sea is still called the gulf of Pieria. From the region called Bottiæa they also expelled the Bottiæans, who now live upon the confines of the Chalcideans. And further, they seized in Pæonia, near the river Axius, a narrow tract of land running along from the mountains down to Pella, and the sea; and got possession of that which is called Mygdonia, lying between the Axius and the Strymon, by driving away the Edonians. They expelled the Eordians out of what is now called Eordia (of whom the greatest part were destroyed, but a small number dwell now about Physca;) and out of Almopia, the Almopians. These Macedonians also conquered other nations, of which they are still in possession, as Anthemus, Grestonia and Bisaltia, and a large part of the territories belonging to the other Macedonians. But this whole tract of country hath the general name of Macedonia, and Perdiccas, son of Alexander, reigned over them when Sitalces formed this invasion.

The Macedonians, unable to make head against the numerous army by which they were invaded, retired within the walled and fortified places of the country, which at this time were not many. But Archelaus, son of Perdiccas, succeeding his father in the kingdom, built those fortresses which are now there, opened the roads, and made many other regulations both in the military way about horses and arms, and in other public matters, more than all the eight preceding kings put together. The Thracian army from Doberus broke first into that part of the country, which was formerly in the possession of Philip. They took Eidomene by storm; and got Gortynia, Atalante, and some other places, by composition, which were readily brought to capitulate, out of their regard for Amyntas, whose son Philip now

appeared amongst them. They also laid siege to Europus, but were not able to reduce it. They afterwards advanced into the other Macedonia, lying to the left of Pella and Cyrrhus. Within these, they did not advance into Bottiæa and Pieria; but ravaged Mygdonia, Grestonia, and Anthemus. The Macedonians never once thought of being able to make head against them with their foot; but, sending for horse from their allies in the upper Macedonia, wherever by the advantage of ground a few could encounter with many, they made frequent attacks upon the Thracian army. They made so strong an impression, that nothing could resist such excellent horsemen and so completely armed. For this reason, the enemy inclosed them about with their numerous forces, and thus made it exceeding hazardous for them to fight against such manifold odds of numbers; so that at last they were forced to give over these skirmishes, judging it imprudent to run any hazards against so large an inequality of strength.

Sitalces, at a parley held with Perdiccas, imparted to him the motives of the war. And, as the Athenians were not yet come up with their fleet, because diffident of his punctuality to the engagement between them, and had only sent him presents and ambassadors, he detached part of his army against the Chalcideans and Bottiæans; where, by driving them into their fortresses, he ravaged the country. During his stay in these parts, the southern Thessalians, Magnetians, and other people subject to the Thessalians, and the Grecians as far as Thermopylæ, grew apprehensive that his army might be turned against them, and prepared for their defence. Under the same apprehensions were the northern Thracians beyond the Strymon that inhabit the plains, the Pansans, the Odomantians, the Droans, and the Dersseans, who are all of them free and independent. He further gave occasion for a rumour that spread amongst the Grecians, enemies to Athens, that this army, brought into Greece by virtue of an alliance with them, would invade them all in their turns. Yet, without advancing any further, he was at one and the same time continuing his ravage upon Chalcidica, and Bottiæa, and Macedonia. But unable to execute any of those points for which he formed this invasion, when his army began to want provisions, and to suffer by the rigour of the winter's cold, he

is persuaded by Seuthes the son of Sparadoxus, and his own cousin-german, who had a greater influence over him than any other person, to march back again with the utmost expedition. This Seuthes had been secretly gained by Perdiccas, who promised to give him his sister, and a large dower with her. Thus persuaded, after a stay upon the whole of but thirty days, and eight of these in Chalcidica, he retired precipitately into his own dominions. Perdiccas, according to promise, soon after gives his sister Stratonice in marriage to Seuthes. And to this end came this grand expedition of Sitalces.¹

The same winter, the Athenians at Naupactus, after the separation of the Peloponnesian fleet, coasting from thence under the command of Phormio, appeared before Astacus. Making there a descent, they pierced into the midland parts of Acarnania, with four hundred heavy-armed Athenians from on board the fleet, and four hundred Messenians; and expelled from Stratus, Coronta, and other places, the disaffected part of the inhabitants; and having re-established at Coronta Cynes the son of Theolytus, embarked again on board their ships. They judged it not advisable, in the winter season, to undertake any thing against the Oeniadæ, the only people of Acarnania who had persisted in continual hostilities against them. For the river Achelous, that takes its rise from mount Pindus, and runs through Dolopia, the provinces of the Agræans and the Amphilocheians, and all the plain of Acarnania, passing above by the city of Stratus,

¹ Sitalces, and his son Sadocus, who, as Thucydides relates above, was made a citizen of Athens, have not escaped the buffoonery of Aristophanes, in his comedy of 'The Acharnians.' Act I. Sc. 4. "Crier. Ambassador to Sitalces, come into court. *Ambass.* Here. *Dicæopolis.* Oh! here's another knave summoned to make his appearance. *Ambass.* We should not have staid so long in Thrace—*Dicæopolis.* I believe you, unless you had been well paid for it. *Ambass.* Had not a great snow fallen and covered all the country, and all the rivers at the same time been frozen over. When *Theognis* was contending here for glory, we were drinking all the time with Sitalces. He is an honest heart, and loves Athenians dearly. In good truth, he is dotingly fond of you all: he is for ever writing upon the wall, 'O rare Athenians!' And his son, whom we made an Athenian, longs mightily for some of your *delicious sausages*, and hath pressed his father to succour his dear countrymen. He, at a solemn sacrifice, swore he would; and hath got such a numerous army at his heels, that the Athenians cry out—What a vast swarm of gnats is coming along here!"

and discharging itself into the sea near the Oeniadæ, renders all the adjacent country one continued morass, and by a stagnation of water makes it impracticable for an army in the winter season. Most of the isles of the Echinades lie over-against the Oeniadæ, not greatly distant from the mouth of the Achelous; insomuch that the river, being great, causeth a continual afflux of sand, and by it some of these islands are already joined to the main-land; and it is expected that all the rest in a short time will be so too: for the current is large and rapid, and brings down with it great quantities of sand. The isles stand thick; and stopping, bind fast together from farther dissipation, the sands brought down by the current. They lie not in a line, but in an alternate situation one from another, preventing the straight course of the waters forwards into the sea. They are further uncultivated, and of no large extent. The tradition is—that Apollo, by an oracle, made a grant of this land to Alcmæon the son of Amphiaraus, when a vagabond, after the murder of his mother, telling him, that "he never should be freed from the terrors that haunted him, till he found a place for his residence, which at the time he slew his mother had never been seen by the sun, and then was not land;" because every other part of the earth was polluted by the parricide. After great perplexities, he at length, as it is said, discovered these rising heaps of sand at the mouth of the Achelous, and thought enough cast up to suffice for his support, after the long course of wandering about to which he had been necessitated ever since he murdered his mother. Fixing therefore his residence in the parts about the Oeniadæ, he grew powerful, and left to the whole country the name of Acarnania, from his son Acarnas. This account of Alcmæon we have given exactly as we have received it from tradition.

The Athenians and Phormio weighing from Acarnania, and touching again at Naupactus, very early in the spring returned to Athens. Thither they brought all the freemen whom they had made prisoners in the late naval engagements (these were afterwards exchanged man for man,) and the ships taken from the enemy.

And thus the winter ended, and with it the third year of the war, the history of which hath been compiled by Thucydides.

THE
PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

BOOK III.

Year IV. Attica invaded.—Lesbos revolts from the Athenians; the latter sent out a fleet to reduce them.—Continuation of the siege of Platæa.—The escape of a body of Platæans over all the works of the besiegers.—V. Attica invaded.—Surrender of Mitylene in Lesbos.—A bloody decree made at Athens against all the Mityleneans; but re-considered and repealed; though very near being put in execution.—Platæa surrenders: and the inhabitants are put to death.—The sedition at Corcyra.—The Athenians meddle in the wars of Sicily.—The plague rageth again at Athens.—VI. Earthquakes.—The affairs of Sicily.—Expedition of Demosthenes into Ætolia, where he receives a total defeat.—Delos purified by the Athenians.—Invasion of Argos in Amphiloehia: battle of Olpe: a second battle, or rather slaughter of the Ambraciots at Idomene.—Eruption of Mount Ætna.

YEAR IV.¹

IN the succeeding summer, the Peloponnesians and allies, when the corn was full-grown, made incursions into Attica, under the command of Archidamus son of Zeuxidamus king of the Lacedæmonians, and having fixed their camp ravaged the country. The Athenian cavalry at all convenient places skirmished with them as usual, and checked the greater number of the light-armed from advancing before the heavy-armed, and infesting the parts adjacent to the city. Having continued here till provisions began to fail, they retired and were disbanded to their respective cities.

Upon this irruption of the Peloponnesians, Lesbos immediately revolted from the Athenians, excepting Methymne. They were well inclined to such a step before the war broke out, but were discountenanced by the Lacedæmonians, and now were necessitated to make their revolt sooner than they intended. They would have been glad to have deferred it, till they had completed the works they were about for securing their harbour, perfecting their walls and the ships then upon the stocks—till they had received what they wanted from Pontus, both archers and corn, and whatever they had already sent for thither.

The reason was—the people of Tenedos

then at enmity with them, those of Methymne, and even some persons of Mitylene underhand, who in a civil broil had received the hospitable protection at Athens, had sent the Athenians advice—"That they are compelling all Lesbos to go into Mitylene, and are getting every thing in readiness for a revolt by the aid of the Lacedæmonians and their kindred Boeotians; and if timely prevention be not given, Lesbos will be lost."

The Athenians, at present miserably distressed by the plague and a war now grown very brisk and vigorous, knew that the accession of Lesbos to their enemies, possessed as it was of a naval force and fresh in strength, must be a terrible blow, and would not listen at first to the accusations sent, chiefly from the earnestness of their own wishes, that they might be groundless. But when they had in vain despatched an embassy to the Mityleneans to put a stop to the forced resort of the Lesbians thither and their other preparations, their fears were increased, and they became intent on some expedient of timely prevention—and ordered thither on a sudden forty sail that lay ready fitted out for a cruize on Peloponnesus. Cleipides, son of Deinias, with two colleagues, had the command of this fleet. Information had been given them, that the festival of Apollo Maloeis was soon to be celebrated without the city, at which solemnity the whole people

¹ Before Christ 428.

of Mitylene are obliged to assist.—It was therefore hoped, that they might surprise them on this occasion, and by one sudden assault complete the work. Should it so fall out, it would be a happy turn :—but, if this miscarried, they were to order the Mityleneans to deliver up their shipping and demolish their works, and, in case they refused, to make instant war.

With these instructions the fleet went to sea. And the Athenians seized ten triremes belonging to the Mityleneans, which happened at that time to be lying in their port as an auxiliary quota in pursuance of treaty, and cast into prison all the crews. But a certain person passing over from Athens to Eubœa, and hastening by land to Geræstus, finds a vessel there ready to put off, on board of which he gets a quick passage to Mitylene, and on the third day after his setting out from Athens, gives notice to the Mityleneans that such a fleet was coming to surprise them. Upon this they adjourned their festival, and patching up their half-finished walls and harbours as well as they could, stood ready on their guard. Not long after the Athenian fleet arrived, and finding the alarm had been given, the commanders notified to them the injunctions they brought; with which as the Mityleneans refused to comply they ranged themselves for action.

The Mityleneans, unprepared as they were, and thus suddenly necessitated to make some resistance, advanced on board their ships a little beyond the mouth of their harbour, as willing to engage. But being forced to retreat upon the approach of the Athenian fleet, they begged a parley with the commanders, from a view, if it were possible upon easy conditions, to rid themselves of that fleet for the present. And the Athenian commanders readily acceded, from the apprehension, that they had not sufficient strength to support the war against all Lesbos.

Hostilities having thus ceased for a time, the Mityleneans despatched their agents to Athens, and amongst the number one of those persons who had sent intelligence of their motions, but had now repented of the step—to procure if possible the recalment of the fleet, by assurances, that they were not bent on any innovation. But in the meantime, undiscovered by the Athenian fleet which lay at anchor in the road of Malea, to the north of the city, they send a trireme to carry an embassy to Lacedæmon; for they had no room to believe they should succeed in their negotiation at Athens. This embassy, after

a laborious and dangerous voyage, arriving at Lacedæmon, began to solicit a speedy success. And when their agents returned from Athens, totally unsuccessful, the Mityleneans and all the rest of Lesbos, excepting Methymne, prepared for war. This last place sent in aid to the Athenians, as did also the Imbrians and Lesbianians, and some few other of their allies.

The Mityleneans once indeed made a general sally with all their people against the station of the Athenians. Hereupon a battle ensued, after which the Mityleneans, though by no means worsted, yet durst not continue all night in the field, but diffident of their own strength retreated behind their walls. At this they kept themselves quiet, unwilling to run any more hazards, till they had got some additional strength from Peloponnesus, who were in other respects better provided. At this time Meleas a Lacedæmonian and Hermœondas a Theban are arrived among those who had been despatched on some business before the revolt, and unable to compass the return before the Athenian fleet came up, he now in a trireme got in undiscovered since the battle. It was the advice of these to despatch another trireme and embassy in company with them, which is accordingly done. But the Athenians, as the Mityleneans remained in quiet a posture, became more full of confidence than before, and sent summons of aid to the confederates, who came in with more than ordinary alacrity, as they saw such an appearance of weakness on the side of the Lesbians. Having now formed a station on the south side of the city they fortified by a wall two camps which invested the place on both sides, while their shipping was so stationed as to shut both the harbours. By this means the communication by sea was quite cut off from the Mityleneans. Of the land indeed the Mityleneans and other Lesbians, who had now fled to their aid, were for the most part made use of. The quantity which the Athenians had occupied by their camps was but inconsiderable, the station of their shipping and their main strength was held chiefly at Meleas: and in this posture stood the war against Mitylene.

About the same time this summer, the Athenians send out thirty sail of ships against Peloponnesus, under the command of Anaxibius the son of Phormio, in pursuance of some solicitations they had received from the Argives to send them either a son or some

lation of Phormio to command in those parts. These ships sailing along the coasts of Laconia ravaged all the maritime places. After this, Asopius sends back the greatest part of his ships to Athens, but with a reserve of twelve proceeds himself to Naupactus. And raising afterwards the whole force of the Acarnanians, he leads them against the Oeniadae. With his ships he sailed up the Achelous, and the army marching by land laid the country waste. But when this was found ineffectual, he dismissed the land-force, and stretching over himself to Leucas, and having made a descent upon Nericum, was intercepted in his retreat—by those of the adjacent country, who ran together for mutual aid, supported by a small party that lay there for guards,—with the loss of his own life and a part of his army. After this, the Athenians staid only to take up their dead by favour of a truce obtained from the Leucadians, and then steered homewards.

The ambassadors of Mitylene, who were sent in the first ship, having been ordered by the Lacedæmonians to repair to Olympia, that their applications might be addressed, and resolutions formed about them, in the grand resort of their whole alliance, arrive at that place. It was that Olympiad in which Dorieus the Rhodian was a¹ second time victor. So, when the solemnity was ended, and an² audience was granted them, they spoke as follows—

“Ye men of Lacedæmon, and you their con-

¹ Olympiad 88.

² In this manner for private ends and through party ends, was a most noble and sacred institution abused. All Grecians in general paid their attendance at the Olympic Games; and were obliged by all the ties of honour and religion to suspend their animosities and quarrels, and meet together as countrymen and brethren, with frank and open ingenuity. And yet, in the present instance, they are going to contrive the means of annoying one another, so soon as that solemnity is over, which was calculated to teach them union and concord, and a steady attachment to the interests of Greece their common mother. The policy however of the present proceeding is remarkable. The Athenians who assisted at the games could suspect nothing from the presence of the Mityleneans, who were equally bound in duty to attend. The Lacedæmonians and allies had thus an opportunity of assembling together to receive complaints, and to encourage revolts from Athens, without danger of suspicion or a detection of their counsels, till they were ripe for execution. “The Lacedæmonians, (it is a remark which will afterwards occur in this history,) amongst one another, and in paying all due regard to the laws of their country, gave ample proofs of honour and virtue, in regard to the rest of mankind, they reputed as honourable the things which pleased them, and as just the things which promoted their interest.”

federates, we are sensible of that method of procedure, which hath hitherto prevailed amongst the Grecians—Revolters, whilst a war is on foot, and deserters from a former alliance they readily receive, and so long as their own interest is furthered by it, abundantly caress them; yet, judging them traitors to their former friends, they regard them as persons who ought not to be trusted. To judge in this manner is certainly right and proper, where those who revolt, and those, from whom they break asunder, happen to be equal to one another in turn of principle, in benevolent affection, and well matched together in expedients of redress and military strength, and no just reason of revolt subsist.—But the case is quite different between us and the Athenians. And we ought not to be treated with censure and reproach, from the appearance of having deserted them in extremities, after having been honourably regarded by them in the season of tranquility. This our conduct to justify and approve, especially as we come to request your alliance, our words shall first be employed, as we know that friendship can be of no long continuance in private life, nor public associations have any stability, unless both sides engage with an opinion of reciprocal good faith, and are uniform in principle and manners. For out of dissonancy of temper, diversities of conduct continually result.

“An alliance, it is true, was formerly made between us and the Athenians, when you withdrew yourselves from the Median war, and they staid behind you to complete what was yet to be done. We grant it—we made an alliance with the Athenians—not to enslave the rest of Greece to Athenians, but to deliver Greece from the Barbarian yoke. And whilst they led us on in just equality, so long with alacrity we followed their guidance. But when once we perceived that they relaxed in their zeal against the Mede, and were grown earnest in riveting slavery upon allies, we then began to be alarmed. It was impossible, where so many parties were to be consulted, to unite together in one body of defence, and thus all the allies fell into slavery, except ourselves and the Chians. We indeed, left in the enjoyment of our own laws, and of nominal freedom, continued still to follow them to war: but, from the specimens we had hitherto seen of their behaviour, we could no longer regard these Athenians as trusty and faithful

leaders. For it was not in the least probable, that after enslaving those who were comprehended in the same treaty with ourselves, they would refrain from treating such as yet were free in the same tyrannic manner, whenever opportunity served. Had we all indeed been left in the free exercise of our own laws, we should then have had the strongest proof that the Athenians acted upon honest uninnovating principles. But now, when they have laid their yoke upon the greater number, though they still continue to treat us as their equals, yet undoubtedly it highly grates them; and they cannot long endure, when such numbers couch beneath their power, that our state alone should stand up and claim equality. Nor it cannot be! For the more their power hath swelled in bulk and strength, by so much are we become more desolate. The only secure pledge of a lasting alliance is that mutual awe, which keeps the contracting parties in proper balance. For then, if any be disposed to make encroachments, he finds he cannot act upon advantage, and is effectually deterred. Our preservation hitherto hath not been owing to their honesty, but their cunning. Their scheme hath been, gradually to advance their empire by all the specious colourings of justice, by the road of policy rather than of strength. And thus we have been reserved to justify their violence, and to be quoted as a proof, that unless those whom they have enslaved had deserved their fate, a state upon an equal footing with themselves would never have marched in conjunction with them to execute their vengeance. By the same strain of policy, their first step was to lead out those that were strongest against the weaker parties, designing to finish with them, when left destitute of any outward resource, by the prior reduction of the rest. Whereas, if they had begun with us, the confederate body remaining yet possessed of its strength, and able to make a stand, their enslaving project could not have equally succeeded. They were besides under some apprehension of our naval force, lest uniting with yours or any other state, such an accession might have endangered the whole of their plan. Some respite was also gained, from the respect we have ever shown to their whole community and to the series of magistrates who have presided amongst them. We knew, however, that we could not long hold out, had not this war come timely to our relief. We saw our own

fate in the examples which had been made of others.

"What friendship, therefore, what assurance of liberty could subsist, when, receiving each other with the open countenance, suspicion lay lurking within!—when, in war apprehensive of our power, to us they paid their court; and we, from the same principle, paid our court to them in the season of tranquility? The basis of union, which mutual good-will cemented others, was in us kept fast by fear. For through the prevalence of fear, and not of friendship, we have thus long persisted in alliance. And whichever side security had first emboldened, that side would first have begun encroachments upon the other. What therefore chargeth us with injustice for swerving, whilst they were only meditating our ruin, and before we actually felt the miseries descended us,—that person chargeth us without a reason. For had our situation been such, that we could have formed equal schemes to their prejudice, and disconcerted all their projects, what necessity did we lie under to resign equality and receive their law? But, as the power of attempting was ever within their reach, we ought certainly to lay hold of every expedient to ward off the blow.

"Such are the reasons, ye men of Lacedæmon, and you their confederates, such the grievances which induced our revolt;—reasons so clear, that all who hear them must judge our conduct—grievances so heavy, that it is time to be alarmed, and to look for some expedient of safety. We long since showed our inclination to find this expedient, when that the peace we sent you to negotiate was rejected, but by you rejected, were obstructed in our scheme. And now, no sooner did the Boeotians invite, than we without a pause obeyed the summons. Now we have determined to make a double revolt;—one from the Grecians, no longer in concert with the Athenians to force the harsh oppression upon them, but with you to vindicate their freedom—another from the Athenians, that we may not in the train of affliction undone by them, but timely vindicate our own safety.

"Our revolt, we grant it, hath been too precipitate and unprepared. But this lays a stronger obligation upon you to admit of an alliance, with the utmost expedition to send succours, that you may show your readiness to redress the oppressed, and at the same time

annoy your foes. Such a juncture for this was never known before. What with the plague and the exorbitant expense of the war, the Athenians are quite exhausted. Their fleet is divided, some to cruise upon your coast, others to make head against us. It is not probable they can have now the competent reserve of shipping, should you invade them a second time this summer both by land and sea; so that, either they must be unable, thus divided, to make head against you, if you singly attack them, or the union of us both they will not be able to face.

"Let no one amongst you imagine, that this will be endangering your own domestic welfare, for the sake of foreigners with whom you have no connexion. For though Lesbos lies apparently at a great distance from you, yet the conveniences of it will lie near at hand for your service. For the war will not be made in Attica, as such a one supposeth, but in those parts whence Attica deriveth its support. Their revenue ariseth from the tribute paid by their dependents. And that revenue will be increased, if they can compass the reduction of us. For then not a soul will dare to revolt, and their own will be enlarged by the addition of our strength, and more grievous burdens will be laid upon us, as being the last who have put on their yoke. On the other hand, if with proper alacrity you undertake our support, you will gain over a state possessed of a considerable navy, that acquisition you so greatly want; and you will more easily be enabled to demolish the Athenians, by withdrawing their dependents from them: for then, every one of that number will with assurance and confidence revolt—and you yourselves be cleared of the bad imputation you at present lie under, of rejecting those who fly to you for protection. If, added to this, you manifest your views to re-establish the general freedom, you will so considerably strengthen the sinews of war, that all resistance will be unavailing.

"Reverencing therefore as you ought, these hopes which Greece hath conceived of you;—reverencing further Olympian Jove, in whose temple we now stand, like supplicants distressed and suing for redress—grant to the Mityleneans the honour of your alliance, and undertake their protection. Reject not the entreaties of men, who have now indeed their lives and properties exposed to dangers merely their own, but whose deliverance from their present

plunge will reflect security and advantage upon all; and who, if you now continue to be deaf to their entreaties, must drop into such a ruin as will at length involve you all. At this crisis show yourselves to be the men, which the voice of Greece united in your praise and our dreadful situation require you to be."

In this manner the Mityleneans urged their plea; and the Lacedæmonians and confederates, having listened with attention, and owned themselves convinced, admitted the Lesbians into their alliance, and decreed an incursion into Attica. To put this in execution, orders were issued to the confederates then present, expeditiously to march with two-thirds of their forces to the Isthmus. The Lacedæmonians themselves arrived there first, and got machines ready at the Isthmus to convey their ships over-land from Corinth to the sea of Athens, that they might invade them at the same time both by land and sea. They indeed were eager and intent on the enterprise: but the other confederates were very slow in assembling together, as they were busy in getting in their harvest, and began to be sadly tired of the war.

When the Athenians found that such preparations were made against them, as an avowed insult on their imagined weakness, they had a mind to convince their foes that such imaginations were erroneous, and that they were well able, without countermanding their fleet from before Lesbos, to make head against any force that could come from Peloponnesus. Accordingly, they manned out a hundred ships, obliging all, as well sojourners as citizens (those excepted of the first and second class)¹, to go on board.

¹ The original is, "except those who were worth five hundred medimns, and the horsemen or knights." The Athenians were ranged into classes by Solon. Plutarch hath described the manner in the life of Solon, as thus translated in Potter's *Antiquities of Greece*, v. i. p. 14.

"Solon finding the people variously affected, some inclined to a monarchy, others to an oligarchy, others to a democracy, the rich men powerful and haughty, the poor men groaning under the burden of their oppression, endeavoured, as far as was possible, to compose all their differences, to ease the grievances, and give all reasonable persons satisfaction. In the prosecution of this design, he divided the Athenians into four ranks, according to every man's estate; those who were worth five hundred medimns of liquid and dry commodities he placed in the first rank, calling them *Pentacosomedimni*. The next were the horsemen, or *Ippicis*, being such as were of ability to furnish out a horse, or were worth three hundred medimns. The third class consisted of those that had two hundred medimns, who were called

Showing themselves first before the Isthmus in great parade, they displayed their force, and then made descents at pleasure all along the coast. The Lacedæmonians seeing them thus strong beyond what they had imagined, concluded that the Lesbians had purposely amused them with fictions; and being perplexed how to act, as their confederates were not yet come up to join them, and as information was brought them, that the first Athenian squadron, consisting of thirty sail, was laying waste the territory round about their city, they retired to their own homes.

Afterwards they set about the equipment of a fleet to be sent to Lesbos; and ordered the confederate cities to send in their contingents, the whole amounting to forty sail; and further appointed Alcidas to be admiral in chief, who was ready to put himself at the head of the expedition. The Athenians departed off the coast with their hundred sail, when they saw their enemies had retreated.

During the time this fleet was out at sea, though the Athenians at the commencement of the war had as large, if not a larger number of ships, yet they never had their whole navy so completely fitted out for service and with so much pomp as now. One hundred of their ships were stationed for guards round Attica, and Eubœa, and Salamis; and another hundred were coasting all along Peloponnesus, beside those that were at Potidæa, and in other parts,—insomuch that the whole number employed this summer amounted to two hundred and fifty sail. The expense of this, with that of

Zeugitæ. In the last he placed all the rest, calling them Thetes, and allowed them not to be capable of bearing any office in the government, only gave them a liberty to give their votes in all public assemblies; which, though at the first it appeared inconsiderable, was afterwards found to be a very important privilege; for it being permitted every man after the determination of the magistrates to make an appeal to the people assembled in convocation, hereby it came to pass, that causes of the greatest weight and moment were brought before them. And thus he continued the power and magistracy in the hands of the rich men, and yet neither exposed the inferior people to their cruelty and oppression, nor wholly deprived them of having a share in the government. And of this equality he himself makes mention in this manner:

What power was fit I did on all bestow,
Nor raised the poor too high, nor pressed too low;
The rich that ruled and every office bore,
Confined by laws they could not press the poor:
Both parties I secured from lawless might,
So none prevail'd upon another's right.¹

Mr Creech.

Potidæa, quite exhausted their treasure. For the pay of the heavy-armed who were stationed at Potidæa, was two drachmas a-day, each of them receiving a drachma¹ for himself and another for his servant. The number of the first body sent thither was three thousand, and not fewer than those were employed during the whole siege;—but the sixteen hundred who came with Phormio were ordered away before its conclusion. The whole fleet also had the same pay. In this manner was their public treasure now for the first time exhausted—and such a navy, the largest they ever had, completely manned.

The Mityleneans, during the time the Lacedæmonians lay at the Isthmus, with a body of their own and auxiliaries, marched by land against Methymne, expecting to have it betrayed to them. Having assaulted the place, and being disappointed in their expectations, they marched back by way of Antissa, and Pyra, and Eressus. In each of these places they halted for a while, to settle affairs in as firm order as possible, and to strengthen their walls, and then without loss of time returned to Mitylene.

Upon their departure, the Methymneans marched out against Antissa. The Antisseans with a party of Auxiliaries sallying out to meet them, gave them a terrible blow, so that many of them were left dead upon the spot, and those who escaped made the best of their way back.

The Athenians—advised of these incidents, and that further the Mityleneans were quite masters of the country, and that their own soldiers were not numerous enough to bridle their excursions—about the beginning of autumn, send a reinforcement of a thousand heavy-armed of their own people commanded by Paches the son of Epicurus. These having rowed themselves the transports which brought them, arrive; and build a single wall in circle quite round Mitylene, and on the proper spots of ground strengthened it by erecting forts. Thus was Mitylene strongly besieged on all sides, both by sea and land.—And by this time it began to be winter.

But the Athenians, wanting money to carry on the siege, determined now to tax themselves, and by their first contribution raised² two

¹ Seven pence three farthings.

² It was a voluntary contribution: the original term implieth it. The manner was no doubt the same as was observed in succeeding times, when the necessities of

hundred talents¹ for the present service; and at the same time despatched twelve ships under the command of Lysicles and four colleagues to levy money abroad. He, intent on raising contributions, made a visit for this purpose to several places; and, having landed at Myus in Caria, intending to pierce through the plain of Mæander as far as the hill of Sándius, he was attacked on his route by the Carians and Anæitans, where himself and a great part of his army perished.

This winter the Plateans—for they were still blocked up by the Peloponnesians and Bœotians—finding themselves much distressed by the failure of their provisions, giving up all hope of succour from the Athenians, and quite destitute of all other means of preservation, formed a project now in concert with those Athenians who were shut up with them in the blockade, “first of all to march out of the town in company, and to compass their escape, if possible, over the works of the enemy.” The authors of this project were Thæanetus the son of Timædes a soothsayer, and Eumolpidas the son of Daimachus, who was one of their commanders. But afterwards, half of the number, affrighted by the greatness of the danger, refused to have a share in the attempt. Yet the remainder, to the number of about two hundred and twenty, resolutely adhered to attempt an escape in the following manner:

They made ladders equal in height to the enemy's wall. The measure of this they learned from the rows of brick, where the side of the wall facing them was not covered over with plaster. Several persons were appointed to count the rows at the same time; some of them might probably be wrong, but the greater part would agree in the just computation; especially as they counted them several times over, and were besides at no great distance, since the part marked out for the design was plainly within their view. In this method, having guessed the measure of a brick from its thickness, they

found out what must be the total height for the ladders.

The work of the Peloponnesians was of the following structure: it was composed of two circular walls; one towards Platea, and the other outward, to prevent any attack from Athens. These walls were at the distance of sixteen feet one from the other; and this intermediate space of sixteen feet was built into distinct lodgments for the guards. These however, standing thick together, gave to the whole work the appearance of one thick entire wall, with battlements on both sides. At every ten battlements were lofty turrets of the same breadth with the whole work, reaching from the face of the inward wall to that of the outward; so that there was no passage by the sides of a turret, but the communication lay open through the middle of them all. By night, when the weather was rainy, they quitted the battlements, and sheltering themselves in the turrets, as near at hand and covered over-head, there they continued their watch. Such was the form of the work by which the Plateans were inclosed on every side.

The enterprising body, when every thing was ready, laying hold of the opportunity of a night tempestuous with wind and rain, and further at a dark moon, marched out of the place. The persons, who had been authors of the project, were now the conductors. And first they passed the ditch which surrounded the town; then they approached quite up to the wall of the enemy, undiscovered by the guards. The darkness of the night prevented their being seen, and the noise they made in approaching was quite drowned in the loudness of the storm. They advanced also at a great distance from one another, to prevent any discovery from the mutual clashing of their arms. They were further armed in the most compact manner, and wore a covering only on the left foot for the sake of treading firmly in the mud. At one of the intermediate spaces between the turrets they got under the battlements, knowing they were not manned. The bearers of the ladders went first, and applied them to the wall. Then twelve light-armed, with only a dagger and a breast-plate scaled, led by Ammeas the son of Chorsbus, who was the first that mounted. His followers, in two parties of six each, mounted next on each side of the turrets. Then other light-armed with javelins succeeded them. Behind came others holding

the state called for an extraordinary supply. In such occasions, the president of the assembly laid before the Athenians the present want of money, and exhorted them with cheerfulness and generosity to contribute towards the national support. Such as were willing rose up in turn saying, “I contribute so much,” and naming the sum. Such as, though rich, were niggardly and strangers to all public spirit, sat silent on these occasions, or, as fast as they could, stole out of the assembly.

¹ £38,750.

the bucklers of those above them, thus to facilitate their ascent, and to be ready to deliver them into their hands, should they be obliged to charge. When the greater part of the number was mounted, the watchmen within the turrets perceived it. For one of the Plateans, in fastening his hold, had thrown down a tile from off the battlements, which made a noise in the fall; and immediately was shouted an alarm. The whole camp came running towards the wall, yet unable to discover the reason of this alarm, so dark was the night, and violent the storm. At this crisis the Plateans, who were left behind in the city, sallied forth and assaulted the work of the Peloponnesians, in the part opposite to that where their friends were attempting to pass, from them to divert as much as possible the attention of the enemy. Great was the confusion of the enemy yet abiding in their posts, for not one durst leave his station to run to the place of alarm, but all were greatly perplexed to guess at its meaning. At last the body of three hundred, appointed for a reserve of succour upon any emergency, marched without the work to the place of alarm. Now the lighted torches, denoting enemies, were held up towards Thebes. On the other side, the Plateans in the city held up at the same time from the wall many of these torches already prepared for this very purpose, that the signals given of the approach of foes might be mistaken by their enemies the Thebans, who judging the affair to be quite otherwise than it really was, might refrain from sending any succour, till their friends who had sallied might have effectuated their escape, and gained a place of security.

In the meantime those of the Plateans, who having mounted first, and by killing the guards had got possession of the turrets on either hand, posted themselves there to secure the passage, and to prevent any manner of obstruction from thence. Applying further their ladders to these turrets from the top of the wall, and causing many of their number to mount, those now upon the turrets kept off the enemies, running to obstruct them both above and below, by discharging their darts; whilst the majority, rearing many ladders at the same time, and throwing down the battlements, got clean over at the intermediate space between the turrets. Every one, in the order he got over to the outward side, drew up upon the inner brink of the ditch, and from thence, with

their darts and javelins, kept off those who were flocking towards the work to hinder their passage. When all the rest were landed upon the outside of the work, those upon the turrets coming down last of all, and with difficulty, got also to the ditch. By this time the reserve of three hundred was come up to oppose them, by the light of torches. The Plateans by this means, being in the dark, had a clear view of them, and from their stand upon the brink of the ditch, aimed a shower of darts and javelins at those parts of their bodies which had no armour. The Plateans were also obscured; as the glimmering of lights made them less easy to be distinguished; so that the last of their body got over the ditch, though not without great difficulty and toil. For the water in it was frozen, not into ice hard enough to bear, but in a watery congelation, the effect not of the northern but eastern blasts. The wind blowing hard, had caused so much snow to fall that night, that the water was swelled to a height not to be forded without some difficulty. However, the violence of the storm was the greatest furtherance of their escape.

The pass over the ditch being thus completed, the Plateans went forward in a body, and took the road to Thebes, leaving on their right the temple of Juno built by Andocrates. They judged it would never be supposed, that they had taken a route which led directly towards their enemies: and they saw at the same time the Peloponnesians pursuing them with torches along the road to Athens, by Cythæron and the 'Heads of the Oak. For six or seven stadia they continued their route towards Thebes, but then turning short, they took the road to the mountains by Erythræ and Hysis; and having gained the mountains, two hundred and twelve of the number completed their escape to Athens. Some of them indeed turned back into the city, without once attempting to get over; and one archer was taken prisoner at the outward ditch.

The Peloponnesians desisted from the fruitless pursuit, and returned to their posts. But the Plateans within the city, ignorant of the real event, and giving ear to the assurances of those who turned back, that "they are all to a man cut off," despatched a herald as soon as it was day to demand a truce for fetching off the dead; but learning hence the true state of the

* Dryosephale.

• About half a mile.

affair, they remained well satisfied. And in this manner these men of Plataea, by thus forcing a passage, wrought their own preservation.

About the end of this winter, Salæthus the Lacedæmonian was despatched in a trireme from Lacedæmon to Mitylene; who being landed at Pyrrha, went from thence by land, and having passed the Athenian circumvallation by favour of a breach made in it by a torrent of water, gets undiscovered into Mitylene. His commission was, to tell the governors of the place, that "at the same time an incursion will be made into Attica, and a fleet of forty sail be sent to their relief, according to promise; that he himself was despatched beforehand, to assure them of these, and to take all proper care of other points." Upon this the Mityleneans resumed their spirits, and grew more averse to any composition with the Athenians.

The winter was now past, and in this manner ended the fourth year of the war, of which Thucydides hath compiled the history.

YEAR V.¹

IN the beginning of the ensuing summer—after that the Peloponnesians had despatched Alcidas, admiral appointed, and the forty-two ships under his command, to the relief of Mitylene, with the most pressing orders—they and their confederates invaded Attica. Their design was, by this diversion to give the Athenians so much employ on all sides, that they might be unable to give any obstruction to their squadron bound for Mitylene. This present invasion was led by Cleomenes, who was his father's brother, in the right of Pausanias son of Pleistionax the king, but yet in his minority. They now utterly destroyed those parts of Attica that had been ravaged already. Whatever again began to flourish, and whatever had been spared in former incursions, now fell before their fury. And this incursion, next to the second, was the sharpest they ever made upon the Athenians. For, having continued their stay so long, as to give time to their squadron to arrive at Lesbos, and send them news of their success, they had leisure to extend their devastations over almost all the country. But when all their expectations ended in disappointment, and forage began to fail, they withdrew and were disbanded to their respective cities.

In the meantime the Mityleneans, when they saw nothing of the squadron from Peloponnesus (which was loitering in the course,) and their provisions began to fail, are necessitated to capitulate with the Athenians upon this occasion—Salæthus, who had also himself given up all hopes of relief, causeth the populace, who were before light-armed, to put on heavy armour, with a design to make a sally on the Athenians. But they, so soon as they had received their armour, would no longer obey their governors, but assembling together in bodies, ordered those in authority either publicly to produce what provisions they had, and divide equally among them, or otherwise they would immediately make their own terms with the Athenians, and give up the city. Those in command being sensible that they had not force sufficient to hinder this, and that their own danger would be extreme, should they by standing out be excluded the capitulation, join with them in procuring the following terms from Paches and the Athenians:

"That it should be submitted to the people of Athens to determine as they please in relation to the Mityleneans.

"That the Mitylenians should immediately receive their army into the city—and despatch an embassy to them to know their pleasure.

"That sufficient respite should be indulged for this, during which Paches should put no one Mitylenean in chains, should make none a slave, should put none to death."

These were the terms of the surrender—But those of the Mityleneans who had been most active in all the negotiations with the Lacedæmonians, were thrown into the utmost consternation, and being quite in despair when the army took possession of the place, seat themselves down at the altars for refuge. Paches, having ordered them to arise with a promise of protecting them from insults, sends them over to Tenedos, till he could know the pleasure of the Athenians. Having further despatched some triremes to Antissa, he took it in, and made all other dispositions he judged expedient in regard to his army.

The Peloponnesians on board the squadron of forty ships, who ought to have made the utmost expedition, but instead of that had loitered upon the coast of Peloponnesus, and made the rest of the voyage in a leisurely manner, had proceeded so far as Delos, before their motions were known at Athens. Being advan-

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¹ Before Christ 427.

ced from Delos to Icarus and Myconus, they receive the first intelligence that Mitylene was taken. But being desirous of certain information, they sailed forwards to Embatus of Erythræa. Mitylene had been taken about seven days before they came up to Embatus. Here assured of the truth, they consulted what was now to be done; and Teutiplus an Elean, gave his opinion thus:

"To you, O Alcidas, and as many other Peloponnesians as are joined with me in the present command, I freely declare it to be my own opinion that we should sail to Mitylene, as we are, before the enemy is apprized of our arrival. It is probable, as they are so lately possessed of the city, we shall find it very remissly and imperfectly guarded: and towards the sea entirely neglected, as on that side they cannot in the least expect the approach of an enemy, and our strength in that element is superior. It is probable also that their land-force is dispersed, in that negligent manner which victory indulgeth, into the scattered houses of refreshment. If, therefore, we can come upon them by surprise and by night, I hope by the assistance of our friends within, if really within we have a friend remaining, to give a new turn to our affairs. Let us not be staggered at the danger of the attempt, but remember, that all the turns of war are owing to some such reverse as this: which that commander who is most on his guard against, and who can discern and seize such critical moments for assailing his enemies, must be most frequently successful."

He gave his opinion thus, but it had no effect upon Alcidas. Some other persons, exiles from Ionia, and some Lesbians who were also on board, advised him further—"That since he seemed to be discouraged by the apparent danger of that attempt, he should seize some city in Ionia, or Cyme in Ætolia; that by favour of such a hold for war, they might bring about the revolt of Ionia; that in such a step success might justly be hoped, as his presence would be highly acceptable there: that, if they could cut off the very great revenue which accrued thence to the Athenians, the loss, added to the expense of endeavouring a recovery, must drain their treasure—That they further thought they could prevail on Pisuthnes, to join with them in the war."

But Alcidas would not listen to these proposals, and got a majority to support his own

opinion—"That, since it was too late to sue for Mitylene, they should without loss of time return to Peloponnesus." Weighing therefore from Embatus, he put again to sea; and touching at Myonesus of the Teians, he there butchered in cold blood a number of prisoners, whom he had taken in the voyage. Putting afterwards into Ephesus, he was attended there by an embassy from the Samians of Anæa representing to him—"That it was no honourable method of vindicating the liberty of Greece, to butcher men who had not so much as lift up the hand against him, who were not enemies in heart, but of mere necessity dependent on the Athenians: that, unless he changed his conduct, he would bring over but few of his enemies into friendship, but turn a far greater number of friends into enemies."—He was wrought upon by this remonstrance, and set all the Chians and others, whom he had yet reserved, at liberty. For those who had at any time deserted this squadron, had never thought of flying, but boldly approached it as certainly Athenian. They really had no ground to imagine, that whilst the Athenians were masters of the sea, a Peloponnesian fleet should dare to put over to Ionia.

From Ephesus, Alcidas made the best of his way, or rather fled outright, for he had been discovered by the Salaminian and the Paralus, whilst he lay at anchor near Claros. These vessels happened at that time to be on a course from Athens. He was now apprehensive of a chase, and so stretched out to sea; determining, if possible, not to make any land again till he had reached Peloponnesus. Notice of him came first to Paches and the Athenians from Erythræa; it was then repeated from all parts. For as the country of Ionia is quite unfortified, the sight of the Peloponnesians on that coast had struck a panic, lest, though their intention was not to continue there, they should at once assault and destroy their cities. The Salaminian¹ also and Paralus, after they had descried

¹ These two vessels seem to have been the packets or yachts of the state of Athens. Their force was small in comparison of the ships of war, as they were chiefly designed for nimbleness and expedition. They carried ambassadors to and fro, went on all public errands whether of a civil or religious nature, and transported magistrates and generals to and from their posts. They were navigated only by free-born citizens of Athens, who besides receiving more pay, esteemed it also a greater honour to serve on board these vessels, which were sacred.

him at Claros, came voluntarily to notify the tidings. Paches set upon the chase with warmth, and pursued it as far as the isle of Latmos. But there giving up all hope of reaching him, he turned back again for his post; and since he had not been able to come up with them by sea, thought a great point was carried in not finding them refuged in any harbour, where they must have been under a necessity to fortify their station, and oblige him to a regular procedure and attack.

In sailing back he touched at Notium of the Colophonians, in which at this time the Colophonians resided, the upper city having been taken by Itamenes and the Barbarians who had broke in by favour of an intestine sedition. It was taken about the time that the Peloponnesians made their second incursion into Attica. But in Notium a second sedition broke out, between those who resorted thither for refuge and the old inhabitants. The latter having obtained an aid of Arcadians and Barbarians from Pisuthnes, kept within a part separated by a transverse wall, and the management of affairs was in the hands of some Colophonians of the upper city, who were in the Medish interest, and had been received amongst them as an aid. But the former, who had resorted hither for refuge, and were a body of exiles, apply to Paches for protection. He invited Hippias, the commander of the Arcadians within the transverse wall, to come out to a conference, assuring him, "if they came to no agreement, he would replace him within both safe and sound." Upon this Hippias came out: and Paches immediately put him under an arrest, but laid no bonds upon him. This done, he on a sudden assaults the wall; by favour of the surprise carries it: and puts all the Arcadians and Barbarians within to the sword. After this he replaceth Hippias within, in the same state he had promised; but when he had him there, immediately apprehends him again and shoots him to death with arrows. Notium he delivers into the hands of the Colophonians, excluding those only who were in the interest of the Mede. In process of time, the Athenians having sent leaders thither on purpose, and declared Notium an Athenian colony, settled in it the Colophonians that were any where to be found, under the accustomed regulations.

Paches, being returned to Mitylene, completed the reduction of Pyrra and Eressus; and having apprehended Salæthus the Lacedæmo-

nian who had been concealed in the city, sends him to Athens along with those citizens of Mitylene from Tenedos, whom he had kept in safe custody there, and all others who appeared to have been concerned in the revolt. As an escort to these he sends away also the greater part of his army. With the remainder he himself staid behind to regulate the affairs of Mitylene and the rest of Lesbos, to the best of his discretion.

When the authors of the revolt and Salæthus were arrived at Athens, the Athenians instantly put Salæthus to death. He made them many fruitless proposals to save his life; and amongst the rest, that the siege of Platea should be raised, which was still besieged by the Peloponnesians. They next entered into consultation, what should be done with the revoltors; and in the warmth of anger decreed—"That not only those who were now at Athens should be put to death, but the same sentence should extend to all the men of Mitylene who were adult; and the women and children be sold for slaves." They were exasperated against them not only because they had revolted, but because they had done it without the provocation which others had received in the rigour of their government. The Peloponnesian fleet added the greater impetuosity to this their resentment as they had dared to venture so far as Ionia in aid of the rebels. For it plainly appeared to them, that the revolt had not been made without much previous deliberation. In short, they despatch a trireme to notify their decree to Paches, with orders to see it put in immediate execution upon the Mityleneans.

The day following, repentance on a sudden touched their hearts, moved by the reflection, that they had passed a savage and monstrous decree in dooming a whole city to that destruction, which was due only to the authors of the guilt. This was no sooner perceived by the Mitylenean ambassadors then residing at Athens, and such of the Athenians as inclining to mercy had a mind to save them, than they addressed themselves to the magistrates, begging the decree might be again debated. Their request was the more easily granted, as the magistrates had discovered that the bulk of the city were desirous to have a second opportunity of declaring their sentiments. An assembly of the people is again convened, and various opinions were offered by different persons, till Cleon

the son of Cleanetus, who in the former assembly had proposed and carried the murdering sentence, who in all other respects was the most violent of all the citizens, and at this time had by far the greatest influence over the people, stood forth again and spoke as follows :—

“ Upon many other occasions my own experience hath convinced me, that a democracy is incapable of ruling over others; but I see it with the highest certainty now in this your present repentance concerning the Mityleneans. In security so void of terror, in safety so exempt from treachery, you pass your days within the walls of Athens, that you are grown quite safe and secure about your dependents. Whenever, soothed by their specious entreaties, you betray your judgment or relent in pity, not a soul amongst you reflects that you are acting the dastardly part, not in truth to confer obligations upon those dependents, but to endanger your own welfare and safety. It is then quite remote from your thoughts, that your rule over them is in fact a tyranny, that they are ever intent on prospects to shake off your yoke—that yoke, to which they ever reluctantly submitted. It is not forgiveness on your part, after injuries received, that can keep them fast in their obedience, since this must be ever the consequence of your own superior power, and not of gratitude in them.

“ Above all, I dread that extremity of danger to which we are exposed, if not one of your decrees must ever be carried into act, and we remain for ever ignorant—that the community which uniformly abides by a worse set of laws, hath the advantage over another, which is finely modelled in every respect, except in practice;—that modest ignorance is a much surer support than genius which scorns to be controlled;—and that the duller part of mankind in general administer public affairs much better than your men of vivacity and wit. The last assume a pride in appearing wiser than the laws; in every debate about the public good they aim merely at victory, as if there were no other points sufficiently important wherein to display their superior talents; and by this their conduct they generally subvert the public welfare: the former, who are diffident of their own abilities, who regard themselves as less wise than the laws of their country—though unable to detect the specious orator, yet being better judges of equity than champions in debate, for

the most part enforce the rational conduct. This beyond denial is our duty at present; we should scorn competitions in eloquence and wit, nor wilfully and contrary to our own opinion mislead the judgment of this full assembly.

“ For my part, I persist in my former declarations, and I am surprised at the men who proposed to have the affair of Mitylene again debated, who endeavour to protract the execution of justice, in the interest of the guilty more than of the injured. For by this means the sufferer proceeds to take vengeance on the criminal with the edge of his resentment blunted; when revenge, the opposite of wrong, the more nearly it treads upon the heels of injury, generally inflicts the most condign punishment. But I am more surprised at him, whoever he be, that shall dare to contradict, and pretend to demonstrate, that the injuries done by the Mityleneans are really for our service, and that our calamities are hardships on our dependents. He certainly must either presume upon his own eloquence, if he contends to prove that what was plainly decreed was never decreed; or, instigated by lucre, will endeavour to seduce you by the elaborate and plausible artifice of words. In such contentions, the state indeed awards the victory to whom she pleaseth, but she sustains all the damage herself. You are answerable for this, Athenians—you, who fondly dote on these wordy competitions—you, who are accustomed to be spectators of speeches and hearers of actions. You measure the possibility of future effects by the present eloquence of your orators; you judge of actions already past, not by the certain conviction of your own eyes, but the fallible suggestions of your ears, when soothed by the inveigling insinuating flow of words. You are the best in the world to be deceived by novelty of wit, and to refuse to follow the dictates of the approved judicious speaker,—slaves as you are to whatever trifles happen always to be in vogue, and looking down with contempt on tried and experienced methods. The most earnest wish that the heart of any of your body ever conceived is, to become a speaker; if that be unattainable, you range yourselves in opposition against all who are so, for fear you should seem in judgment their inferiors. When any thing is acutely uttered, you are ready even to go before it with applause, and intimate your own preconception of the point, at the same time dull at discerning whither it will tend. Your whole passion, in-

a word, is for things that are not in reality and common life; but of what passeth directly before your eyes you have no proper perception. And, frankly, you are quite infatuated by the lust of hearing, and resemble more the idle spectators of contending sophists, than men who meet to deliberate upon public affairs. From such vain amusements, endeavouring to divert you, I boldly affirm that no one city in the world hath injured you so much as Mitylene.

"Those who, unable to support the rigour of your government, or who, compelled to do it by hostile force, have revolted from you, I readily absolve. But for a people who inhabit an island, a fortified island; who had no reason to dread the violence of our enemies, except by sea; who even at sea, by the strength of their own shipping, were able to guard themselves against all attacks; who enjoyed their own model of government, and were ever treated by us with the highest honour and regard—for such a people to revolt in this manner is never to be forgiven. Is not their whole procedure one series of treachery? Have they not rather made war upon than revolted against us? for revolt can only be ascribed to those who have suffered violence and outrage. Have they not further sought out our implacable foes, and begged to participate with them in our destruction? This certainly is a much greater aggravation of guilt, than if merely on their own domestic strength they had rebelled against us. They would not be deterred by the calamities of their neighbours, who have frequently before this revolted, and been punished for it by a total reduction: nor would they so far acquiesce in present felicity, as not to hazard the dangerous reverse of misery. Audacious in regard to the future, presumptuous above their strength, but below their intention, they made war their choice, and in preferring violence to the just observance of duty have placed their glory. For, though uninjured and unprovoked, the first moment they saw a probability of prevailing, they seized it and rebelled.

"It is the usual effect of prosperity, especially when felt on a sudden, and beyond their hope, to puff up a people into insolence of manners. The successes of mankind, when attained by the rational course, are generally of much longer continuance than when they anticipate pursuit. And in a word, men are much more expert at repelling adversity than preserving

prosperity. By this ought we long ago to have adjusted our conduct towards the Mityleneans, never distinguishing them above others with peculiar regard; and then, they never would have been that insolent people we have found them now. For so remarkably perverse is the temper of man, as ever to condemn whoever courts him, and admire whoever will not bend before him.

"Let condign punishments therefore be awarded to their demerits. Let not the guilt be avenged upon the heads of the few, and the bulk of offenders escape unpunished. The whole people to a man have rebelled against us, when it was in their power to have been sheltered here, and now again to be reinstated in their former seats. But they judged the danger would be lessened by the general concurrence with the few, and so all revolted in concert.

"Extend further your regards to the whole body of your dependents; for if you inflict the same punishments on those who revolt by compulsion of enemies, and who revolt on pure deliberate malice, which of them, do you think, will not seize the least pretext to throw off your yoke; when, if he succeeds, his liberty is recovered, and, though he fails, the hurt is so easy to be cured? Besides this, our lives and fortunes will be endangered upon every single attempt which shall be made. Suppose we succeed, we only recover an exhausted ruined city, but shall for the future be deprived of the revenue arising from it, the essence of our strength: but if we cannot prevail, we shall enlarge the number of enemies we already have; and at a time when we ought to be employed in resisting our present adversaries, we shall be entangled in wars against our own dependents. We ought not therefore to encourage the hope, whether raised by the force of entreaty, or purchased by the force of corruption, that their errors are but the errors of men and shall therefore be forgiven. The damage they have done was not involuntary, but they have been deliberate determined villains: forgiveness is only for those who erred not by design.

"Moved by the ardency and zeal of my former plea, you made the decree; and now I earnestly conjure you, not to repent of your own determinations, not to plunge yourselves in inextricable difficulties, through pity, through delight of hearing, and soft forbearance, the three most prejudicial obstacles of power. It

is just to show pity to those who are its proper objects, and not to men who would never have felt compassion for us, nor to foes who of necessity must be implacable. The orators, those delights of your ears, will have room in debates of lesser moment to catch at your applause, but should be silenced here, where they only can give the public a short-lived pleasure, whilst they embroil it with perplexities not easy to be surmounted, and themselves alone, in requital of speaking well, will be well rewarded for it. Forbearance, further, may be shown to those who are willing to be, and will for the future prove themselves, our friends; but not to such inveterate souls as these, who, if suffered to live, will live only to wreak their malice against you.

"I shall wave enlargements, and give you only one short assurance, that if you hearken to my admonitions, you will at the same time do justice to the Mityleneans and service to yourselves; but if you resolve in any other manner, you will receive no thanks from them, and will establish the clearest evidence for your own condemnation. For, if these men had reason to revolt, it follows that you have tyrannically ruled them. Grant the injustice of such a rule, but yet that you have presumed to be guilty of it;—why then, upon the mere motive of interest, you ought now to chastise them beyond what is right, or immediately to forego your power, and dropping yourselves down into impotent security, to set about the practice of humanity and virtue. But adieu to this vain expedient! and at once resolve to make them feel that weight of misery they designed for us. Convince them that those who have escaped it can feel as strong resentments as those who projected the fatal blow. Determine now, by recollecting with yourselves what kind of usage you would have received from them, had they succeeded in their plots; they! the uninjured, unprovoked aggressors. It is an allowed truth, that men who without the least provocation have recourse to acts of malice, will be sated with nothing less than complete destruction, as they must ever be terrified at the sight of a surviving foe. For he who suffers from a quarter whence he never deserved it, will not so easily lay down his resentments, as when mutual enmity hath kindled the contention. Be not therefore traitors to your own selves. Figure to yourselves, as strongly as you can, the miseries they designed

you; remember how you wished for nothing in this world so much as to have them in your power, and now retaliate upon them. Relent not at the scene of horror imagination may present to your fancy, but fix your remembrance fast on that weight of misery which was just now suspended over your own heads. Punish these wretches according to their deserts; make them a notable example to the rest of your dependents, that death must be the portion of whoever dares revolt. For when once they are certain of this, your arms will be no more recalled from your foreign enemies, to be employed in the chastisement of your own dependents."

In this manner Cleon¹ supported the decree, and when he had concluded, Diodotus the son of Eucrates, who in the former assembly had most strenuously opposed the bloody sentence against the Mityleneans, stood forth, and thus replied:—

"I neither blame those who proposed the resumption of the decree against Mitylene, nor do I praise the men who inveigh against repeated consultations on points of the greatest importance. But I lay it down for certain,

¹ From the short sketch of Cleon's character given before by Thucydides, and the speech he hath now made, it is likely he can be no favourite with the reader. Cicero hath styled him "a turbulent but eloquent Athenian." By means of his eloquence, and an impudence that never could be dashed, he was now a prime favourite with the people, but the scorn and terror of all good men at Athens. He had ever been a snarler at Pericles, but so long as he lived could obtain no share in the public administration. He had now got the ascendancy by cajoling the people, and by his loud and daily invectives against their ministers and commanders. He will make a very splendid and very despicable figure in the sequel. Aristophanes, who had a particular grudge against him, hath exhibited him in the most disgraceful light. His comedy of the Horsemen or Knights is entirely employed to show him off. He calls him throughout the 'Paphlagonian,' to brand his low and brutal disposition, who, "quitting his original trade of selling leather, vile leather, since people rather swam than walked in the shoes made of it, was now become the leading politician, the scourge and pest of the republic." The chorus of the play salutes him with the most villainous titles. And an oracle is cooked up, which prophesieth that they shall never get rid of Cleon, till he is overpowered by a greater scoundrel than himself. A dealer in black-peddings is at last procured to be his competitor. The contest is carried on with all the ribaldry and scurrility that unbridled wit could forge for such characters, and Cleon is at length defeated. This is the event upon the stage, but was by no means so in the state of Athens. The wit of Aristophanes seldom hurt knaves and scoundrels; it wounded and was mischievous only to the ablest ministers and the warmest patriots.

that there are no two greater impediments of sound mature counsel than precipitation and anger; of which, the one is closely connected with madness, the other with raw inexperience and short liminary judgment.

"It may indeed be warmly asserted, that words are not the proper guides to actions. But the author of such an assertion is either wanting in discernment, or confines it only to his own selfish views. He is wanting in discernment, if he imagines there is any other possible method of putting light into things that are future or unseen; or confines it only to himself, if willing to recommend a scandalous measure, and conscious he hath not eloquence enough to support it openly, he launcheth out into plausible calumnies, to intimidate his opponents as well as his audience.

"But odious beyond all support is their procedure who prematurely condemn the advice of others as purchased and corrupt. For would they only acquiesce in the charge of ignorance, the defeated opponent goes off with the bare character of a man less enlightened indeed, but quite as honest. If he be charged with corruption, his point he may carry, but his honesty will ever be suspected: and if his point be lost, he must pass for knave and block-head both. Such methods can never be conducive to the public good. The men best able to advise, are by this means intimidated: though the public welfare would then be best secured, if every person of so disingenuous a temper was not able to open his mouth; for then, by his seducements, the public could never be misled. But it is the duty of every true patriot to despise the slanders of opponents, and on fair and impartial views to get his own advice accepted. It is the duty of every well-regulated public, not indeed to load a man with honours for having given the best advice, but, never to abridge him of his present portion; and if he cannot prevail, by no means to disgrace, much less to punish him: for then, neither would the successful debater, from a view of enhancing his own personal honours, ever speak against conscience, or aim merely at applause; nor would he, who hath been unsuccessful in his motions, be greedy of proposing whatever may cajole, and so earn popularity for himself. But the method in vogue with us is the reverse of this; and what is worse, if a person be suspected of corruption, though he advise the most prudent expedients, yet the

odium raised against him upon the weak suggestion of lucre, quite weighs him down, and we are deprived of the manifest service he could do to the state. Nay, such is our method, that even the best advice, if readily offered, can escape suspicion no more than the worst. And hence it is necessarily incumbent, as well upon him who would persuade the public into the most prejudicial measures, to seduce the people with art; as upon him who would advise the best, to disguise the truth in order to prevail. Amidst these jugglings, the public alone is debarred the service of its most able counselors, since in a plain and open method they cannot possibly act, and artifice must clear the way before them. For the man who openly bestows any benefit upon it, is constantly suspected of doing underhand a greater to himself.

"When affairs therefore of so high concern are before you, when the general temper is so over-run with jealousy, we, who presume to advise, must enlarge our prospect farther than you, who only assist at a transient consultation; because we are accountable for what we propose, and you are not accountable for the prejudices with which you hear. For if not only he who proposed, but he who complied, were equally answerable for events, your determinations would be better framed than they are at present. But now, hurried along as you are by your hasty resentments on any sinister event, you wreak your fury only upon the single opinion of the person who advised, and not upon your own joint opinions, by concurrence of which the miscarriage was incurred.

"For my part, I neither stand up to deny certain facts in favour of the Mityleneans, nor to waste the time in fruitless accusations. We are not debating now what wrongs they have done us, since that would be a reproach to sense; but what determination about them is best. For, though I can prove, beyond a scruple, that they have injured us in the most outrageous manner, yet I shall not for that reason advise you to butcher them, unless it be expedient; nor, were they objects of forgiveness, should I advise forgiveness, unless I judged it for the interest of the public. I apprehend, that our consultations turn more upon a future than a present view. And Cleon here most confidently asserts, that the surest expedient of your future welfare is, to prevent all other revolts by inflicting death in doom of this; but, equally confident of the just expedient of future

security, I declare quite on the other side. And I entreat you, by no means to reject the real advantage of mine for the specious colourings of his advice. Strict justice, I grant, may be with him; and, enraged as you are against the Mityleneans, may have a sudden influence upon you. But we meet not here in judgment upon them, and justly to decide is not now our employment; we are only to consult how to dispose of them best for our own advantage.

"In the public communities of men, death is the penalty awarded to several crimes, to such as are not enormous like this, but of a less guilty nature. Yet puffed up with hope, men run all hazards, and no one ever yet hath boldly incurred the danger, if self-convinced beforehand, that he could not survive the attempt. Where was the city so bent on revolt, that, when its own domestic strength, or the aid of others, were judged unequal to the work, durst ever attempt it? The whole of mankind, whether individuals or communities, are by nature liable to sin: and a law of infallible prevention will never be enacted. Men by repeated trials have enforced all kinds of punishment, attentive, if possible, to restrain the outrages of the wicked. And in the early age it is probable, that milder penalties were assigned for the most enormous wrongs; but, being found by experience ineffectual, they were afterwards extended generally to loss of life: this however is not yet effective. Some terror therefore must be invented, even more alarming than this, or this will never sufficiently restrain. But then there is a poverty which renders necessity daring; there is a power which renders pride and insolence rapacious. There are other contingencies, which, in the fervour of passions, as every human mind is possessed by some too stubborn to admit a cure, drive them on boldly to confront extremities. But the greatest incentives of all are hope and love: this points out a path, and that moves along according to direction: this thoughtlessly proposeth the scheme, and that immediately suggesteth a certainty of success. These are the sources of all our evils; and these invisible principles within us are too strong for all the terrors that are seen without. To these add fortune, who contributes her ample share to divest the mind of its balance. She shows herself by unexpected starts, and encourageth even the incompetent to venture dangers, and hath a greater influence over communities, as the ends proposed by them are

of the greatest concern, such as liberty or dominion, where every individual, amidst the universal ardour, unaccountably plumes himself up, and acts with a spirit above himself. But in truth, it is quite impossible; it is a proof of egregious folly to imagine, when human nature is impelled by its own impetuous passions towards such objects, that the force of laws or any intervening terror is strong enough to divert them from the mark. Hence therefore ariseth the strongest dissuasive to us from confiding in the penalty of death as the only pledge of our future safety, which must betray us into weak prejudicial measures, which must drive all revolvers into utter despair, by showing them plainly, that we shall never accept repentance, shall not give them one moment's indulgence to palliate their offences.

"Consider with yourselves, in the merciful light, that a revolted city, when for certainty assured that it cannot hold out, may submit upon our own conditions, whilst yet in a capacity to reimburse our expenses, and to advance the future tribute. But in the opposite case, can you imagine there is any city which will not better prepare itself for revolt than Mitylene hath done, and hold out a siege to the last extremity? Is there no difference between a quick and a slow submission? Shall not we be hurt, if forced through their despair to continue a tedious and expensive siege; and, when the place is taken, to be masters only of one heap of desolation, unable for the future to squeeze the least pittance or revenue from it? It is revenue alone which renders us a terror to our foes. We ought not therefore with the rigour of judges to inflict the exactest punishments upon these offenders. We ought rather to provide for futurity, and by moderate correction still to preserve those cities in a full capacity of paying us the needful tribute. To keep men firm in their duty, we should scorn the expedient of severe and sanguinary laws, since mild discretionary caution would better answer the purpose. This prudent conduct we are now reversing, if, when re-possession of a city stripped of its former liberty and ruled with violence, sufficient motives of revolt, that it may again become independent; if now we judge, that this ought to be avenged with a weight of severity. Men who have known what liberty is, ought not to be too severely chastised, if they have dared to revolt; but we ought to observe them with timely vigilance before they revolt,

to prevent their taking the least step towards it or even once entertaining a thought about it; at least, when we have quelled the insurrection, the guilt should be fastened upon as few as possible.

"Consider, I beseech you, with yourselves, how greatly you will err in this, and in another respect, if Cleon's advice be approved. For now, the populace of all the cities are generally well-affected towards us. They either refuse to concur with the few in their revolts; or, if their concurrence be forced, they instantly turn enemies to those who forced them;—and you proceed to determine the contest, assured that the populace of the adverse city will be active in your favour. But if you doom to general excision the people of Mitylene, those who had no share in the revolt—who, when once they had got arms into their hands, spontaneously delivered up the place;—you will be guilty, first, of base ingratitude, for murdering your own benefactors,—and you will, next, establish such a precedent, as the factious great above all things wish to see. For then, whenever the latter effect the revolt of cities, they will instantly have the people attached to their party; since you yourselves have enforced the precedent, that punishment must fall upon the heads, not only of the guilty, but even of the innocent. Whereas, indeed, though they had been guilty, we ought to have dissembled our knowledge of it, that we might not force the only party which ever takes our side into utter enmity and aversion. And I esteem it much more conducive to the firm support of empire, rather to connive at the wrongs we may have felt, than in all the severity of justice to destroy those persons whom in interest we ought to spare. And thus, that union of justice to others and duty to yourselves in this instance of punishing the Mityleneans, as alleged by Cleon, is plainly found to be grossly inconsistent, to be utterly impossible.

"Own yourselves therefore convinced, that the greatest advantages will result from the conduct which I have recommended; and, without giving too wide a scope to mercy or forbearance, by which I could never suffer you to be seduced, follow my advice, and in pursuance of it resolve—'To judge and condemn, at your own discretion, those guilty Mityleneans whom Paches hath sent hither to attend your decisions, and to let the others continue as they are.' These are expedients of your fu-

ture welfare, and of immediate terror to your foes. For they who can form the soundest deliberations, stand stronger up against hostile opposition, than the men who rush to action with indiscreet unpremeditated strength."

Diodotus ended here. And when these two opinions, diametrically opposite to one another, had been thus delivered, the Athenians had a stiff contest in support of each, and upon holding up of hands there seemed near an equality; but the majority proved at last to be along with Diodotus.

Upon this they immediately sent away another trireme, enjoining all possible despatch, lest this second, not coming in time, might find the city already destroyed, as the other had got the start of a day and a night. The Mitylenean ambassadors amply furnished them with wine and barley-cakes and promised them great rewards if they arrived in time. By this means they were so eager to accelerate the passage, that even whilst plying the oar they eat their cakes dipped in wine and oil; and whilst one half of the number refreshed themselves with sleep, the others kept rowing amain. So fortunate were they that not one adverse blast retarded their course. The former vessel, as sent on a monstrous errand, had not hastened its passage in the least; and the latter was most intently bent on expedition. That indeed got before to Mitylene, but only long enough for Paches to read over the decree, and give orders for its immediate execution. At that crisis the latter arriveth, and prevented the massacre. To such an extremity of danger was Mitylene reduced.

The other Mityleneans, whom Paches had sent to Athens as deepest concerned in the revolt,¹ were there put to death, according to the advice of Cleon. And the number of these amounted to somewhat above a thousand.

The Athenians, further, demolished the walls of Mitylene and took away their shipping. They did not for the future enjoin an annual tribute upon the Lesbians, but dividing the

¹ We hear no more in this history of Paches, who certainly in the reduction of Lesbos had done a great service to his country, and had behaved through the whole affair with great discretion and humanity. And yet Plutarch tells us in two passages, (in the lives of Aristides and Nicias) that at his return he was called to account for his conduct during his command, and finding he was going to be condemned, his resentment and indignation rose so high that he instantly slew himself in court.

whole island into shares (except what belonged to Methymne), three thousand in the whole, they set apart three hundred of these as sacred to the gods, and sent some of their own people, who were appointed by lot, to take possession of the rest, as full proprietors. The Lesbians, as tenants of these, were obliged to pay them two minæ¹ yearly for every share, in consideration of which they had still the use of the soil. The Athenians also took from them several towns upon the continent, which had belonged to the Mityleneans, and which continued afterwards in subjection to the Athenians. Thus ended the commotions of Lesbos.

The same summer after the reduction of Lesbos—the Athenians, commanded by Nicias² the son of Niceratus, executed a design upon

¹ £6 9s. 2d. sterling.

² Nicias is now for the first time in the chief command, who is to act parts of very great importance in the sequel of the war. We should therefore take some notice of him on his first appearance. Plutarch, who hath wrote his life, gives light into several circumstances, which fall not within the cognizance of a general historian. He was born of a noble family in Athens, and was one of the most wealthy citizens. Besides his estates, he had a large annual income from the silver mines at Laurium. Not that those mines belonged to him, as one would infer from Plutarch; for they were the patrimony of the state, annexed to it by Themistocles for the support of the navy: but, as Xenophon relates in his treatise of revenue, Nicias had a thousand slaves constantly employed in working these mines. He hired them out to Sosias the Thracian, who was undertaker of the work, on condition to receive a clear obole a-day for every one of them; and he always kept up the number. His income from hence was therefore near £2000 sterling a-year. He acted under Pericles so long as he lived, and after his death, was set up by the more sober and sensible Athenians as a balance to Cleon, who was the idol of the people. Nicias was a true lover of his country, of unblemished integrity, and very gentle and complacent in his manners. His good qualities were numerous and shining: his foibles were, a great diffidence of himself, and a dread of the people, which made him court them by laying out his wealth in public games and shows for their entertainment. He had an inward fund of real piety; but was superstitiously attached to the ceremonial of the religion of his country. His great wealth drew a great number of followers and parasites about him; and his benevolent disposition was always seeking occasions of doing good. In short, says Plutarch, "bad men had a sure fund in his pusillanimity, and good men in his humanity." Nobody could either hate or fear him at Athens, and therefore his interest there was great. He was always cautious, and always diffident, and under such an awe of the people in the general assemblies, that they would shout out to him by way of encouragement, as his modesty was amiable and engaging when opposed to the impudence of Cleon.—Thus much may suffice at present, since his military expeditions and the whole of his political conduct will be related by Thucydides.

Minoa, the island which lies before Megara. The Megareans, having built a fort upon it, used it as a garrison. But it was the scheme of Nicias, to fix the post of observation for the Athenians there, as being much nearer situated, and to remove it from Budorus and Salamis. This would prevent the sudden courses of the Peloponnesians, frequent from thence; would curb the piratical cruises; and, at the same time, stop all importations into Megara. Beginning therefore with the two forts detached from Nissæa, he took them by means of the engines he played against them from the sea; and having thus opened the channel between them and the island, he took in by a wall of fortification that part of the mainland from whence, only by crossing the morass and the help of a bridge, a succour could be thrown into the island, which lay at a very small distance from the continent. This work was completed in a few days, after which Nicias, leaving behind in the island a sufficient garrison to defend the works, drew off the rest of his army.

About the same time this summer, the Platæans, whose provisions were quite spent, and who could not possibly hold out any longer, were brought to a surrender in the following manner. The enemy made an assault upon their wall, which they had not sufficient strength to repel. The Lacedæmonian general being thus convinced of their languid condition, was determined not to take the place by storm. In this he acted pursuant to orders sent him from Lacedæmon, with a view that whenever a peace should be concluded with the Lacedæmonians, one certain condition of which must be reciprocally to restore the places taken in the war, Platæa might not be included in the restitution, as having freely and without compulsion gone over to them. A herald is accordingly despatched with this demand—"Whether they are willing voluntarily to give up the city to the Lacedæmonians, and accept them for their judges who would punish only the guilty, and contrary to forms of justice not even one of those."—The herald made this demand aloud. And the Platæans, who were now reduced to excessive weakness, delivered up the city.

The Peloponnesians supplied the Platæans with necessary sustenance for the space of a few days, till the five delegates arrived from Lacedæmon to preside at their trial. And yet, when these were actually come, no judicial

process was formed against them. They only called them out, and put this short question to them—"Whether they had done any service to the Lacedæmonians and their allies in the present war?"—Their answer was, "That they begged permission to urge their plea at large;" which being granted, they pitched upon Astymachus the son of Asopalaus, and Laco the son of Aemniestus, who had formerly enjoyed the public hospitality of the Lacedæmonians, to be their speakers, who stood forth and pleaded thus:

"Placing in you, O Lacedæmonians, an entire confidence, we have delivered up our city; but never imagined we should be forced to such a process as this, when we expected only to be tried by justice and laws—when we yielded to plead, not before other judges as is now our fate, but only before yourselves. Then indeed we thought that justice might be obtained.—But now we have terrible grounds for apprehending, that we have at once been doubly overreached. Strong motives occur to alarm our suspicions, that the point most in view is to deprive us of our lives, and that you will not prove impartial judges. We cannot but be too certain of this, when no manner of crime is formally objected, against which we might form our defence; when barely at our own entreaty we are heard, and your concise demand is such, that if we answer it with truth we condemn ourselves; if with falsehood, must be instantly refuted.

"Thus on all sides beset with perplexities, something of necessity must be said in our own behalf; nay, where the danger is so urgent, the only small glimpse of security appears in hazarding a plea. For persons like us distressed, in silence to abandon their own defence—this may with sad compunction torture them at last, as if their safety might have been earned by speaking for themselves—though never was persuasion so much to be despaired of as at present. Were we indeed, who are the persecuted party, entirely unknown to our judges, we might then allege such evidence as through ignorance you could not overturn, and so further our defence. But now we must speak before men who are informed of every point. Nor do our fears result from the prior knowledge you have had of us, as if you were now proceeding against us for having in valour been inferior to yourselves; but from our own sad forebodings, that we are cited to a tribunal

which hath already condemned us to gratify others. Yet, what we can justly say for ourselves in regard to all our differences with the Thebans, we shall boldly allege; the good services we have done to you and the rest of Greece we shall fairly recite—and strive, if possible, to persuade.

"To your concise demand—Whether we have done any good service in this war to the Lacedæmonians and their allies?—we answer thus: If you interrogate us as enemies, though we have done you no good, yet we have done you no harm; if you regard us as friends, you have offended more than we, in making war upon us.—In regard to the peace and against the Medæ, we have ever honestly performed our duty: the peace was not violated first by us against him; we alone of all the Bœotians attended you in the field to maintain the liberty of Greece. For, though an inland people, we boldly engaged in the sea-fight at Artemisium; and in the battle fought upon this our native ground, we assisted you and Pausanias; and whatever the danger to which Greece, in that troublesome period of time, was exposed, in all we bore a share beyond our strength. To you in particular, O ye Lacedæmonians, in that greatest consternation Sparta ever felt, when after the earthquake your rebellious Helots had seized upon Ithome, we immediately despatched the third part of our force for succour. These things you are bound in honour never to forget. For thus upon former, and those most critical occasions, we with honour showed ourselves your friends.—But at length we became your enemies!—For that blame only yourselves: because when we stood in great want of support against the violence and oppression of the Thebans, to you we applied, and by you were rejected. You commanded us then to address ourselves to Athens. Athens, you said, was near, but Sparta lay too remote to serve us. Yet, notwithstanding this, in the present war we have committed no one dishonorable act in regard to you, nor should ever have committed. You enjoined us indeed to revolt from the Athenians, and we refused to comply; but in this we have done no injustice. For they marched cheerfully to our succour against the Thebans, when you shrunk back; and to betray them afterwards had been base in us; in us, who were highly indebted to them, who at our own request were received into their friendship, and honoured by them with the

freedom of Athens. No, it was rather our duty boldly to advance wherever they pleased to order. And whenever either you or the Athenians lead out your allies into the field, not such as merely follow you are to be censured for any wrong you may respectively commit, but those who lead them out to its commission.

"Manifold and notorious are the instances in which the Thebans have injured us. But outrageous above all is the last, about which you need no information, since by it we are plunged into this depth of distress. A right undoubtedly we had to turn our avenging arms upon men, who, in the midst of peace, and what is more, upon the sacred monthly solemnity, feloniously seized upon our city. We obeyed herein that great universal law, which justifieth self-defence against a hostile invader; and therefore cannot with any appearance of equity, be now doomed to punishment at their own instigation. For, if your own immediate interest, and their present concurrence with you in war, is to prescribe and regulate your sentence, you will show yourselves by no means fair judges of equity, but partially attached to private interest. What though these incendiaries seem now a people well worth your gaining? there was a season, a most dangerous and critical season, when you yourselves, and the other Grecians, were in different sentiments. Now indeed, incited by ambition, you aim the fatal blow at others; but at that season, when the Barbarian struck at enslaving us all, these Thebans were then the Barbarian's coadjutors. And equitable certainly it is, that our alacrity at that season should be set in the balance against our present transgressions, if transgressors at present we have been. You then would find our greater merits quite outweighing our petty offences; and our merits to be dated at a time when it was exceeding rare to see Grecian bravery ranged in opposition to the power of Xerxes; when praise was ascribed, not to those who, intent on self-preservation, dropped all the means of withstanding his invasion, but who chose, through a series of danger, courageously to execute the most glorious acts. Of this number are we, and as such have been, pre-eminently, most honourably distinguished. And yet, from this original we fear our ruin now may have taken its rise, as we chose to follow the Athenians from a regard to justice, rather than you from the views of interest.

But so long as the nature of things continues to be the same, you also ought to convince the world, that your sentiments about them are not changed, that your principles still suggest it to you as your greatest interest, that whenever your gallant compatriots have laid upon you an obligation strong enough to be eternally in force, something on every present occurrence should be done for us by way of just acknowledgment.

"Reflect further within yourselves, that you are now distinguished by the body of Greece as examples for upright disinterested conduct. Should you therefore determine in regard to us what in justice cannot be supported—for the eyes of the world are now intent on your proceedings, and as judges applauded for their worth you sit upon us whose reputation is yet unblemished: take care that you do not incur the general abhorrence, by an indecent sentence against valuable men, though you yourselves are more to be valued; nor repose in her common temples those spoils you have taken from us the benefactors of Greece. How horribly will it seem for Plataea to be destroyed by Lacedæmonians; that your fathers inscribed the city upon the tripod of Delphos in justice to its merit, and that you expunged its very being from the community of Greece to gratify the Thebans! To such excess of misery have we been ever exposed, that if the Medes had prevailed we must have been utterly undone; and now must be completely ruined by the Thebans, in the presence of you who were formerly our most cordial friends! Two of the sharpest, most painful trials we are to undergo, who but lately, had we not surrendered our city, must have gradually perished by famine; and now stand before a tribunal to be sentenced to death. Wretched Plataeans, by all mankind abandoned! We, who beyond our strength were once the supports of Greece, are now quite destitute, bereft of all redress! Not one of our old allies to appear in our behalf; and even you, O ye Lacedæmonians, you our only hope, as we have too much reason to apprehend, determined to give us up.

"But, by the gods, who witnessed once the social oaths we mutually exchanged! by that virtue we exerted for the general welfare of Greece! by those we adjure you to be moved with compassion, and to relent, if with the Thebans you are combined against us! In

attitude to us, beg the favour of them, that they would not butcher whom you ought to love; demand such a modest requital from us for your base concurrence, and entail not harm upon yourselves, to give others a cruel infraction. To take away our lives will be short and easy task; but then, to efface the memory of it, will be a work of toil. You have colour to wreak your vengeance upon us as enemies, who have ever wished you well, and we arms against you in mere self-defence. Our decisions can in no wise be righteous, when you exempt us from the dread of death. recollect in time, that you received us, by free surrender, that to you we held forth our hands; a law forbids Grecians to put such to death; and that we have been from time immemorial benefactors to you. For cast your eyes there to the sepulchres of your fathers, who fell by the swords of the Medes, and were interred in this earth: these we have annually honoured with vestments, and all solemn decorations at our public expense. Whatever hath been the produce of our soil, to them we have offered the first-fruits of the whole; as lands, out of earth that was dear to them; as companions, to those who once fought together in the same field; and, lest all this by a wrong determination you instantly disannul, maturely reflect. For Pausanias interred them here, saying he had laid them in a friendly soil, and in the care of men with friendly dispositions. Therefore you put us to death, and turn this human into Theban soil, what is this but to give your fathers and relations in a hostile land, and in the power of those who murdered them, never again to receive the sepulchral honours? Will you further enslave the spot in which the Grecians earned their liberty? Will you lay desolate the temples of those to whom they addressed their vows before the battle against the Medes, and so were victorious? And will you abolish the solemn sacrifices, which those gallant patriots have founded and anointed?

"It cannot, O Lacedæmonians, be consistent with your glory, to violate the solemn institutions of Greece, the memory of your own forefathers, and your duty to us your benefactors, merely to gratify the malice of a hostile enemy, to put men to death who have never offended you. No; but—to spare, to relent, feel the just emotions of compassion, to reject the idea not only what miseries we are de-

signed to suffer, but what persons they are for whom they are designed; and to remember the uncertain attack of calamity; upon whom, and how, undeservedly, it may fall! To you, as in honour and necessity too obliged we address our entreaties; invoking aloud the gods whom Greece at her common altars and with joint devotion adores,—to accept our plea: alleging these oaths which your fathers have sworn,—to pay them reverence. We are suppliants now at the sepulchres of your fathers, we call upon the dead repositied there, to be saved from Thebans, that the kindest of friends, as we have been, may not be sacrificed to the most deadly foes. Again, we recall to memory that day, in which having performed the most splendid achievements in company with them, we are yet this day in danger of the most deplorable fate. Conclude we must—though it is hard for men in our distress to conclude; when the very moment their words are ended, their very lives are most imminently endangered: yet still we insist that we surrendered not our city to the Thebans, rather than that we should have chose the most miserable end by famine; but confiding in you, into your hands we gave it. And highly fitting it is, that if we cannot prevail, you should reinstate us in it, and leave us there at our own option to take our fate. But once more we conjure you, that we, who are citizens of Platæa, who have showed ourselves the most steady patriots of Greece, and now, O Lacedæmonians, your suppliants,—may not be turned over, out of your hands, out of your protection, to the Thebans, our unrelenting enemies;—that you would become our saviours, and not doom to utter destruction the men to whom all Greece is indebted for her freedom."

In this manner the Platæans spoke; and the Thebans, fearing lest their words might work so far upon the Lacedæmonians as to cause them to relent, stood forth, and declared a desire to be also heard; "since the Platæans, as they conceived, had been indulged in a much longer discourse, than was requisite to answer the question." Leave accordingly was given, and they proceeded thus:

"We should not have requested your attention to any thing we had to offer, if these Platæans had replied in brief to the question, and had not run out into slander and invective against us;—if they had not defended themselves in points quite foreign to the purpose, and not at all charged against them as crimes; and launched

forth into their own praise, uncensured and unprovoked. But now it is incumbent upon us, in some points to contradict and in some to refute, to prevent the bad effects which might result, either from the criminations uttered against us, or the pompous praise they have bestowed upon themselves; that you, under proper information with whom the greater truth remains, may fairly decide between us.

"Our enmity against them we openly avow, as it proceeded from just and honourable motives; since to us, who were the founders of Plataea, after we had gained possession of Boeotia and of other towns as well as Plataea, which, after being purged from extraneous mixtures, remained in our jurisdiction,—these men disdained to pay submission, and scorned original and fundamental laws. They wilfully divided from the other Boeotians, transgressing the laws of their country, and, when likely to be forced back into their duty, they went over to the Athenians, and in concert with them accumulated wrongs upon us, which have since been justly retaliated upon them.

"But, when the Barbarian invaded Greece, they were the only Boeotians who did not join the Mede.—This they allege, and hence they arrogate applause to themselves, and lavish their calumnies upon us. We grant indeed they did not join the Mede; and the reason was, because the Athenians did not join him. Yet afterwards, when with the same all-grasping ambition the Athenians invaded Greece, they were the only Boeotians then who joined those Athenians. But consider further the respective situation from which such conduct ensued in both. Our city at that time was not administered by the few who presided with an equal and steady rule, nor directed by the general voice of the people. Its state was such, as with laws and policy is quite incompatible; it bordered close upon a tyranny: the encroaching ambition of a handful of men held fast possession of it. These, with no other view than the strong establishment of their own private authority in the success of the Mede, by force overawed the people, and opened their gates to the invader. This was not the act of a whole city, of a city master of its own conduct; nor ought she to be reproached for offences committed in despite of her laws. But on the other hand, when the Mede was once repulsed and the city repossessed of her ancient polity, you ought then to consider—fresh invasions

being formed by the Athenians, projects attempted to bring the rest of Greece and our dominions also into their subjection, sedition fomented amongst us, by favour of which they seized the greater part—Whether in the field of Coronea we fought them and prevailed, recovered the liberty of Boeotia, proceed even now with all alacrity to regain their liberty for others, supplying them with horse and all other military provision, far beyond any other confederate. Such is the apology we make for all the charge against us in having joined the Mede. But—that you have been the most outrageous foes to Greece, and are most deserving of whatever punishment can be inflicted upon you, we shall next endeavour to demonstrate.

"In order to procure some revenge on us, it is your own plea, 'you became confederates and citizens of Athens.'—Be it so. You ought then to have marched in their company only against us; you ought not to have followed them in their expeditions against others. Had your own wills been averse to attend them on these occasions, it was always in your power to have recourse to that Lacedæmonian league, in which you concurred against the Mede, and about which you make at present the greatest parade. That would have been amply sufficient to turn aside our enmity from you; and, what is above all, had securely enabled you to rectify your measures. But it was not against your will, neither was it upon compulsion, that you have solely adhered to the Athenians.

"But, then you rejoin—'It was base to betray your benefactors.'—Yet it was much more base and more enormous to betray at once the whole body of Grecians, with whom you had sworn a mutual defence, than the single Athenians: the Athenians truly have enslaved your country; and the others would regain its freedom. You have not made your benefactors the requital which gratitude enjoined, or which is exempted from reproach.—'Injured and oppressed, you applied,' it is pretended, 'to them for redress;'—and then you co-operated with them in oppressing others. But it is not more dishonourable to be wanting in any act of gratitude, how justly soever it may be due, than to make the return in a manner in itself unjust. You yourselves by acting thus have afforded undeniable proofs, that you alone did not join the Mede from a zeal for the Grecians, but merely because the Athenians did not join him. You were desir-

to act in concert with the latter, but in addition to the former; and now modestly to be recompensed by your country, for the iniquitous services you have done to us. But justice will never suffer this. To men you gave the preference, strive to be foremost from them to obtain redress. Cease to allege the mutual oaths you once exchanged, as if they were obliged at present to give you:—you renounced, you violated those oaths, who rather concurred to enslave the Æginetsæ and some other people of the association, than endeavoured to prevent and all without compulsion; still happy in uninterrupted possession of your own rights, not compelled to receive law from others, as our fate. Nay, to the very last moment, when this blockade was formed against you, we calmly invited you to be quiet and rational, you insolently refused. Which therefore is the people, on whom all Greece may have her hatred more deservedly than on you, have made it a point to exert your bravery in saving your country? Those former good actions you have so largely boasted, you now shown plainly to be repugnant to genius. What your natural turn hath been, the event hath with truth ascertained. The Athenians took the road of violence, you attended them through all the journey. And thus, ample proof hath been exhibited, that against our wills we served the cause, and that you with most cheerful disposition have promoted the Athenian tyranny. But in regard to your finishing charge against us as guilty of excessive outrage and injustice:—that, contrary to every law, in the name of peace, on a day of sacred solemnity, seized upon your city—this great offence, in our opinion, is less to be imputed to us than to ourselves. Had we marched indeed against your city in a hostile manner, had we scaled your walls and put your property to fire and sword, your charge had then been just. But if men of your rank amongst you both for wealth and for merit, desirous to put a stop to your foreign incursions, and recall you to the common institutions of all Bœotians; if such at their own invitation invited our presence, wherein are we unjust? for the leaders, in all cases, are great-transgressors than the followers. Though, at present, neither are they in our judgment, nor are we, transgressors. They were as well as you; they had larger con-

cerns at stake; and therefore, opening their gate and receiving us within their walls as friends and not as foes, they intended to prevent the corrupted part of your body from growing worse, and protect the worthy and good according to their merit. They calmly studied the welfare of your minds and your bodies, not suffering your city to become an alien, but recovering it again to its duty and relations, exempting it from being the foe of any honest Grecian, and re-uniting it in the bonds of amity with them all.—There are proofs besides, that we did not intermeddle in a hostile manner. We did no manner of violence to any one: we proclaimed aloud, that “whoever was desirous to conform to the primitive institutions of all Bœotians, should come and join us.”—You heard our voice with pleasure; you came in and entered into articles with us; you remained for a time without disturbance; but at length, having discovered the smallness of our number, and then perhaps we were judged to have proceeded inhumanly in presuming to enter without the consent of your populace, you then returned us not such treatment as you had received from us, you made no remonstrances against innovations, nor persuaded us to depart, but in open breach of articles you rushed upon us. We lament not here so much the death of those whom you slew in this base attack upon us; some colour of law might be alleged for their destruction: but when, contrary to every law, in cold blood, you murdered men who had spread their arms for mercy, and had surrendered themselves prisoners on promise of their lives,—was not that a monstrous act? In one short interval of time you were guilty of three outrageous enormities, an infraction of articles, the succeeding butchery of our people, and a breach of the solemn promise made to us, that you would not kill them, provided we refrained from plundering your lands. Yet still you cry aloud, that we are the breakers of law; you still remonstrate, that you are not debtors to justice. It is false. The point, we presume, will soon be determined right: and for these, for all offences, you shall have your reward.

“We have thus distinctly run over this affair, for your sakes, O ye Lacedæmonians, as well as for our own; that you may be convinced with how much equity you are going to condemn them, and that we have pursued the offenders upon yet stronger obligations of jus-

tice. Let not the recital of their former virtues, if virtues truly they ever had, mollify your hearts. Virtue should be pleaded by men who have suffered; but, on those who have committed baseness, it should redouble their punishment, because they sin in foul contrariety to their former selves. Let them not save themselves by lamentations and pathetic complaints, though they cried out so movingly upon the sepulchres of your fathers, and their own destitute forlorn condition. For, to stop their cries, we have proved against them, that our youths, when butchered by them, met with a more cruel and unjust fate: those youths, some of whose fathers, reconciling Bœotia with you, died in the field of Coronea; the rest, now advanced in years, bereft of their children, their houses desolate, prefer a supplication far more just to you, to avenge them upon these Plateans. Those are most deserving of pity, who have suffered some great indignity; but when vengeance is duly inflicted on such men as these Plateans, the world hath cause to triumph. Their present destitute forlorn condition is the work of themselves. They wilfully rejected a better alliance; and, though uninjured, broke every law against us; executioners of hatred more than justice, though now about to suffer less than the precedent they set requireth. For they shall be executed by lawful sentence; not like men who with stretched-out hands obtained fair quarter, as they deserve themselves, but who surrendered on this condition—to submit to justice.

“Avenge therefore, O Lacedæmonians, the law of Greece, so grossly violated by them. Retaliate all the injuries we have suffered, requiring so that cheerful friendship we have ever shown you; and let not their flow of words overturn our just demands. Make now a precedent for Greece hereafter to follow. Show them, that decisions must be formed, not according to what men may say, but according to what they have done: if their actions have been right, that a short simple narration may at any time suffice; but, if those actions have been wrong, that all studied ornamental periods are intended to disguise the truth. If those who preside at judgments, as you at present, would proceed in a summary way, to a general determination against the guilty, little room would be left to disguise unjustifiable actions by plausible speeches.”

In this manner the Thebans replied; and

the Lacedæmonian judges agreed in the resolution, that the question,—“Whether they had received any good service from them in the war!”—was properly and fairly conceived. They grounded this, upon the former proposal made to them to remain neutral, according to the old treaty of Pausanias after the Medish invasion, and upon another more lately, which they had offered before they had blocked them up, to be common friends to both sides in conformity to the same treaty. But after this double refusal, looking upon themselves as no longer bound to observe those articles, which others had deliberately infringed to traverse their interest,—they now proceed again to bring them forwards man by man, and put the question—“Whether they had done good service to the Lacedæmonians and allies in the present war?”—and upon their answering ‘No,’ led them aside and slew them. Not one of the number did they exempt; so that in this massacre there perished of Plateans not fewer than two hundred, and twenty-five Athenians who had been besieged in their company; and all the women were sold for slaves. The Thebans assigned the city, for the space of a year, to be the residence of certain Megareans, who had been driven from home in the rage of a sedition, and to those surviving Plateans who had been friends to the Theban interest. But afterwards they levelled it with the earth, rooted up its whole foundation, and near to Juno’s temple erected a spacious inn, two hundred feet square, partitioned within both above and below into a range of apartments. In this structure they made use of the roofs and doors that had belonged to the Plateans; and of the other moveables found within their houses, of the brass and iron, they made beds, which they consecrated to Juno, in whose honour they also erected a fane of stone one hundred feet in diameter. The land being confiscated to public use, was farmed out for ten years, and occupied by Thebans. So much, nay, so totally averse to the Plateans were the Lacedæmonians become; and this, merely to gratify the Thebans, whom they regarded as well able to serve them in the war which was now on foot.¹

¹ Thucydides hath here been very sparing of his censure. Nothing bad enough can be said of the Lacedæmonian behaviour on this occasion. To put brave men to death coolly and deliberately, who had most gallantly defended themselves, and merely for their steady attachment to liberty and the Athenians, were hated by

thus was the destruction of Plataea commanded in the ninety-third year of its alliance with Athens.

he forty sail of Peloponnesians, which had been sent to the relief of Lesbos, after flying through the open sea to avoid the pursuit from the Lacedæmonians, were driven by a tempest on the coast of Crete; and from thence they separately sailed into Cyllene, a Peloponnesian harbour, where they find thirteen triremes of Leucadians and Ambraciots, with Brasidas the son of Alcidas sent thither purposely to assist Alcidas in his counsel. It was now the project of the Lacedæmonians, since they had miscarried at Lesbos, to augment their fleet, and sail immediately for Corcyra, now embroiled in sedition, as there were no Athenians in those parts, leaving only twelve ships which were stationed at Naupactus—and thus their design might fluctuate, before a fleet large enough to intercept them could be sent from Athens.—

It was their plan, and Brasidas and Alcidas were ordered for its execution. The Corcyreans were now embroiled in a civil war, excited by the return of the prisoners, among the Corinthians had taken in the naval engagements of Epidamnus. They had obtained their release, as was publicly given out, for the sum of eighty talents,² for the payment of which their former friends at Corinth had agreed in a security; but, in fact, for a secret use they had made the Corinthians, to put Corcyra into their hands. To fulfil their engagements they tampered with every single Corinthian in order to bring about a revolt from the Athenians. An Athenian and Corinthian ship arrived at the same time with ambassadors aboard. These were admitted together to audience, at which the Corcyreans decreed to maintain their alliance with the Athenians according to treaty,—but to be friends to the Peloponnesians as in preceding times." Py-

Thebans, shows the public spirit of Spartans at this to have been none at all.—The city of Plataea, thus almost demolished, was rebuilt after the peace of Alcidas, which put an end to the Peloponnesian war. Not long after, it was again demolished by the Thebans, for a refusal to join them against the Lacedæmonians.

However, Alexander the Great once more re-estimated it, in a generous acknowledgement of the service that little state had rendered to Greece; and the ruins continued even in the time of Plutarch, to celebrate the annual festival in honour of those, who at the famous battle of Plataea had died for the liberties of Greece.

² £15,500 sterling.

thias, who at that time was at the head of the people, entertained and lodged the Athenians without the public warrant. And therefore against him the accomplices prefer an accusation, as plotting how to subject Corcyra to Athenian slavery. Pythias being acquitted, in his turn exhibits a charge against five of the most considerable of their number, for having cut pales in the sacred grove of Jupiter and Alcimus. The fine for every pale was by law a stater.³ Being condemned to pay the whole, they fled into the temples and sat down as supplicants, in hope to obtain a mitigation of their fine, which was quite exorbitant. Pythias, who was also strong in the senate, gets a fresh order to have it levied in all the rigour of law. Thus debarred of any legal redress, and conscious further that Pythias, so long as he continued in the senate, would prevail upon the people to declare those their friends and those their foes who were so to Athens,—they rise up from the sanctuary, and seizing daggers rush suddenly into the senate-house, where they stab Pythias and others both senators and private persons, to the number of sixty. Some few indeed who were the adherents of Pythias, saved themselves on board the Athenian vessels which yet lay in the harbour.

After this bold assassination, they summoned the Corcyreans to assemble immediately, where they justified their proceedings "as most highly for the public good, and the only expedient of preventing Athenian slavery;"—advising them "for the future to receive neither of the rival parties, unless they came peacefully in a single vessel; if in more to declare them enemies;" and in conclusion they forced the ratification of whatever they had proposed. They also instantly despatch ambassadors to Athens, representing the necessity they lay under to act as they had done, and to persuade those who had fled for refuge thither, not to rush into such measures as might hurt the welfare of their country, from a dread of the miseries which might thence ensue.

When these ambassadors were arrived at Athens, the Athenians laid them and all their adherents under an arrest as enemies to the state, and sent them prisoners to Ægina.

In the meantime, those of the Corcyreans who had thus seized the government, animated by the arrival of a Corinthian trireme and a

³ £1 0s. 9d.

Lacedæmonian embassy, attack the people and overpower them in battle. The people, by favour of the night which approached, fly to the citadel and more elevated parts of the city, where they drew up together and secured their posts; they also got possession of the Hyllaic harbour. But their opponents seized the forum, where most of their own houses were situated, and the harbour which points towards the forum and the continent.

The day following they skirmished a little with their missive weapons, and both parties sent out detachments into the fields, to invite the concurrence of the slaves, upon a promise of their freedom. A majority of slaves came in to the assistance of the people, and the other party got eight hundred auxiliaries from the continent.

After one day's respite they come again to blows. The people get the better now, by the advantage of their strong posts and their numbers. The women with notable boldness assisted in the combat, by throwing tiles from the tops of the houses, and sustaining the tumult beyond their sex. About the close of the evening, the few were forced to fly, and then, apprehensive lest the people should rush down upon, and so at a shout seize the dock and put them to the sword, in order to stop their passage they set fire to the houses all round the forum and to such as were adjacent, sparing neither their own nor those of their enemies. The large effects of the merchants were consumed in the flames, and the whole city was in danger of being reduced to ashes, had a gale of wind arose to drive the flame that way. This put a stop to the contest, and brought on a cessation, when both sides applied themselves to strict guard for the night. The Corinthian vessel, after this victory on the side of the people, stole privately away; and many of the auxiliaries, who crept off unperceived, repassed to the opposite shore.

The day following, Nicostratus the son of Diotrepes, who commanded the Athenian squadron, comes up to their assistance with his twelve sail from Naupactus and five hundred heavy-armed Messenians. He forthwith negotiated an accommodation, and persuades them to make up the affair with one another, by instantly condemning the ten principal authors of the sedition (who immediately fled), and permitting all others to continue in the city, upon articles signed between both parties and

the Athenians—"To have the same friends and the same foes." Having so far carried his point, he was intent on immediate departure. But the managers for the people made him a proposal, to leave five ships of his squadron with them, to deter the enemy from any commotion, which should be replaced by ships of their own, which they would instantly send to attend him on his station. With this proposal he complied; and they named distinctly the mariners, who to a man were of the opposite party. Affrighted at this as a prelude to convey them to Athens, they sit down in the temple of the Diosuri. Nicostratus endeavoured to raise them up and to cheer their dependency. Yet all he could say was unavailing, and the people ran again to arms, pretending that such a refusal to put to sea was a plain proof, that their intentions were inimical throughout. Then they rifled their houses for all the arms they could find; and some of those who fell into their hands had immediately been butchered, if Nicostratus had not interposed.

A second party, terrified at these proceedings, take their seats also as suppliants in the temple of Juno. The number of these was not less than four hundred. The people, now apprehensive of some fatal turn, persuade them to leave their sanctuary; and having prevailed, transport them into that island which faceth the temple of Juno, whither every thing needful for their sustenance was carefully sent them.

The sedition continuing in this posture about the fourth or fifth day after the transportation of the latter body into that island, the Peloponnesian ships, which had assembled at Cyllene after the voyage of Ionia, appear in sight to the number of fifty-three. Alcibiades was commander-in-chief as before, and Brasidas attended as his council. They came to anchor in the harbour of Sybota on the main; and next morning, at break of day, steered directly for Corcyra.

Great was the tumult now at Corcyra: they were afraid of the malcontents within, and the hostile fleet approaching the city. They got sixty ships immediately on float, and each as fast as it was manned advanced to meet the fleet. The Athenians indeed proposed to put out first to sea themselves; and that the Corcyrans should afterwards come out and join them, when they had got all their ships together. But, as they advanced in a straggling manner

towards the enemy, two ships went directly over to them; and on board others the mariners were at blows with one another. In short, there was no manner of order in any of their motions. The Lacedæmonians, perceiving how it was, with twenty of their ships drew up to engage the Coreyreans, and opposed the remainder to the twelve Athenian, two of which were only the Salaminian and the Paralus.

The Coreyreans, who charged in this disorderly manner, and with few ships in a line, were on their side terribly distressed; while the Athenians, fearing lest the other, vastly superiour in number, might quite surround their little squadron, would not venture to attack them when altogether, nor to break upon the middle of the enemy's line; but, assailing them towards one of the extremities, sink one of their ships. Upon this, the Peloponnesians having formed a circle, the Athenians sailed round and round, and endeavoured to break their order. Those who pursued the Coreyreans perceiving this, and fearing what had happened formerly at Naupactus, steered away from thence to support their own squadron. And now, with their whole embodied strength, they designed to pour upon the Athenians. They, having already shifted the helm, fell gradually away. They were desirous to favour the flight of the Coreyreans beyond the possibility of a chase, and so they fell off entirely at their own leisure, keeping the enemy in their front still ranged in order. Such was this engagement, which at the setting of the sun was quite ended.

The Coreyreans were afraid lest the enemy, in prosecution of their victory, should immediately assault the city, or take up the persons in the island, or by some other method attempt to distress them. For this reason, they removed the prisoners again from the island, into the temple of Juno, and applied themselves to guard the city. But the enemy, though victorious at sea, durst not think of proceeding to attack the city; but satisfied with taking thirteen ships belonging to the Coreyreans, they returned to the main, from whence they had sallied to the engagement. The next day also, they refrained from making any attempt upon the city, where the disorder and consternation were as great as ever. Brasidas is reported urgently to have pressed it upon Alcidas, but in the council of war it was quite overruled.

They landed however at cape Leucymne, and plundered the country.

The Corcyrean people, whose fears were still suggesting that they should be attacked by the enemy's fleet, had conferred with the suppliants and others about the only means to preserve the city. And some of them they persuaded to join in navigating their ships; for by some means or other they had again manned thirty, expecting every moment the enemy's approach. But the Peloponnesians continued the ravage of their fields only till noon, and then repassed to their former stations. Yet before the dawn of the succeeding day, they saw sixty lights held up, to denote an equal number of Athenian ships advancing from Leucas. The Athenians, advertised of the sedition and the course of the fleet under Alcidas against Corcyra, had sent away this reinforcement under the command of Eurymedon the son of Thucles. Upon this the Peloponnesians, whilst yet it was night, crept homewards along the shore, and carrying their vessels over the isthmus of Leucas, lest they should be discovered in going round it, are safely retreated within their own confines.

When the Coreyreans had discovered the approach of the Athenian reinforcement, and the departure of the enemy, they received the Messenians within their walls, who till now had lodged without; and, having ordered the ships which they had manned to come about into the Hyllaic harbour, whilst they were going about in pursuance of this order, they put all the adverse faction whom they found to the sword. Those further, who had taken on in the ships at their persuasion, they threw into the sea and then retired. They afterwards went to Juno's temple, and persuaded a party of suppliants there, to the amount of fifty, to undergo a judicial trial, in which they were all condemned to die. The majority of suppliants, who refused to hear such persuasion, no sooner saw the fate of their brethren, than they either slew one another within the temple, or hung themselves up upon the trees within its verge: each finding some expedient for his own despatch. During those seven days that Eurymedon with his reinforcement continued at Corcyra, the people of that city extended the massacre to all whom they judged their enemies. The crime on which they justified their pro-

ceedings, was their attempt to overturn the democracy.

Some perished merely through private enmity; some for the sums they had lent, by the hands of the borrowers. Every kind of death was here exhibited. Every dreadful act usual in a sedition, and more than usual, was perpetrated now. For fathers slew their children; some were dragged from altars; and some were butchered at them. And a number of persons immured in the temple of Bacchus were starved to death. So cruel was the progress of this sedition, and so excessively cruel did it appear, because the first of so black a nature that ever happened. But afterwards the contagion spread, one may say, through the whole extent of Greece, when factions raged in every city, the popular demagogues contending for the Athenians, the aspiring few for the Lacedæmonians. In peace, it is true, they were void of all pretext, of all opportunity, to invite these rivals. But now, amidst declared hostilities, and the quest of alliance to afflict their enemies and add an increase of strength to themselves, opportunities were easily found by such as were fond of innovations to introduce the side they favoured. The consequence of this was sedition in cities, with all its numerous and tragical incidents. Such were now, and such things ever will be, so long as human nature continues the same; but under greater or less aggravations and diversified in circumstances, according to the several vicissitudes of conjunctures, which shall happen to occur. In the seasons of peace and affluence, communities as well as individuals have their tempers under better regulation, because not liable to that violence which flows from necessity. But war, which snatcheth from them their daily subsistence, is the teacher of violence, and assimilates the passions of men to their present condition.

By these means were cities harassed with seditions. And those to whose fate the later commotions fell, through inquiry what had happened in such instances before, grew enormously ambitious to suppress the machination of others, both in policy of attempts and extravagance of revenge. Even words lost now their former significance, since to palliate actions they were quite distorted. For truly, what before was brutal courage, began to be esteemed that fortitude which becomes a human and soci-

able creature; prudent consideration, to be specious cowardice; modesty, the disguise of the feminacy; and being wise in every thing, to be good for nothing. The hot fiery temper was judged the exertion of true manly valour; and cautious and calm deliberation, to be a plausible pretext for intended knavery. He who boiled with indignation was undoubtedly trusty; who presumed to contradict was ever suspected. He who succeeded in a roguish scheme was wise, and he who suspected such practices in others was still a more able genius. But was he so evident enough, so as never to be in need of such base expedients; he was one that would not stand to his engagements, and most abundantly awed by his foes. In short, he could prevent another in executing villainy, but could persuade a well-designing person to it, who sure to be applauded.

Men now, who were allied in blood, were less valued or caressed, than such as were connected by voluntary combination; and the latter, unscrupulous and uninquisitive, were more ready to embark in any scheme whatsoever. For now associations were not formed for mutual advantage as is consistent with, but for the execution of such rapines as are contrary to human laws. In mutual trust they perjured, not out of any regard to religious obligation, but from the bond of communicated guilt. To the fair and honest proposals of advantage they hearkened indeed when such by their strength could controul them, but never through candid ingenuity. Revenge upon another was a more valued possession than never to have suffered injury. Oaths, if ever made for present reconciliation, had a temporary force so long as neither knew how to break them; but never when either party had power to detect their violation. He who, at inviting opportunity, durst first incur the perjury, if the adversary was off his guard, executed his revenge with higher spirit than from enmity openly avowed. Such a step was thought most efficacious; and, because he had thus surmounted the guile, it was certainly extolled as a masterpiece of cunning. Large is the number of villains, and such obtain more easily the reputation of dexterity than their dupes can that of goodness; the latter are apt to blush; the former most impudently triumph.

The source of all these evils is a thirst of power, in consequence either of rapacious or

ambitious passions. The mind, when actuated by such, is ever ready to engage in party-feuds, For the men of large influence in communities avowing on both sides a specious cause, some standing up for the just equality of the popular, others for the fair decorum of the aristocratical government, by artful sounds, embarrassed those communities for their own private lucre. Both sides, intent on victory, carried on the contention with the keenest spirit. They most daringly projected, and then regularly executed, the most dreadful machinations. Their revenge was not limited by justice or the public welfare; it aimed at more ample satisfaction. Either side constantly measured it by such retaliation as was judged the sweetest, either by a capital condemnation through an iniquitous sentence, or by earning the victory with their own hands, in which they were always ready to glut the present rancour of their hearts. And hence it was, that the pious and upright conduct was on both sides disregarded. And, when any point of great importance was before them, to carry it by specious collusive oratory was the greatest enhancement of their credit. Yet all this while, the moderate members of such communities, either hated because they would not meddle, or envied for such obnoxious conduct, fell victims to both.

Seditions in this manner introduced every species of outrageous wickedness into the Grecian manners. Sincerity, which is most frequently to be found in generous tempers, was laughed out of countenance and for ever vanished. It was become the universal practice, to keep up a constant enmity of intention against one another, and never to believe. No promise was strong enough, no oath sufficiently solemn, to banish such mutual diffidence. Those who excelled in shrewd consideration resigned all hope of any lasting security, and stood ever on their guard against whom it was impossible for them to trust. But persons of meaner understandings took more effectual means for their preservation. Living in constant apprehensions, from their own inferiority and the craft of their opponents, lest by words they should be over-reached, or that such subtle heads might execute their treacheries upon them unawares, they boldly seized the present moment, and at once despatched the men they dreaded; who, presuming too much on their own penetration, and that it was superfluous to aim a blow at those whom they could at any

time supplant by cunning, despised them so far as to neglect a proper guard, and so contributed to their own destruction.

Many such daring outrages were now by way of precedent committed at Corcyra; nay, all whatever, that men, who are wreaking revenge upon such as before were their masters, and had exerted their superiority with savageness more than humanity, can in turn retaliate upon them, were executed there.—Some joined in these acts of violence to procure a discharge from their former poverty; but the greater number, through a passionate desire to seize the property of their neighbours: or, though they were not lured by the lust of rapine, but engaged in the contest upon fair and open views, yet hurried to wild extravagance through mad and undisciplined anger, they proceeded to cruel acts, and with inexorable fury. The whole order of human life was for a season confounded in this city. The human temper, too apt to transgress in spite of laws, and now having gained the ascendant over law, seemed pleased with exhibiting this public manifestation, that it was too weak for anger, too strong for justice, and an enemy to all superiority. Men could not otherwise have awarded the preference to revenge over righteous duty, and to lucre over that habit of justice in which envy never yet had power to annoy them. But more than this, when the point in view is revenge upon others, men haughtily make precedents against themselves, by infringing those laws which are binding by the ties of nature, and from which alone any hope of safety can be extracted for themselves in a plunge of misery, precluding thus all possibility of redress, should they be reduced in some future extremity to make the same appeal.

And thus the Corcyreans continued to execute the rage of such cruel passions, upon the heads of one another, within the precincts of their own city, of which this was the first example in Greece, till Eurymedon with the Athenian fleet under his command put out again to sea.

But, after his departure, they who by flight had preserved their lives, to the number of about five hundred, having seized their forts upon the opposite shore, got possession of their own land, on that side the water. Putting out hence, they plundered the Corcyreans in the island, and made such havoc that a violent famine ensued in the city. They further sent

a deputation to Lacedæmon and Corinth, to negotiate the means of their restoration. But nothing of this kind succeeding, they got together afterwards a body of auxiliaries and transports, and so passed over to the island of Corcyra, to the amount of six hundred men. Having now set fire to their transports, to preclude every other expedient but gaining firm footing where now they were, they marched up to the mountain Istone, and having fortified themselves there, made cruel war with those in the city, and were masters of the country round about.

About the end of the same summer, the Athenians sent out twenty sail for Sicily, under the command of Laches the son of Melanopus and Charœadas the son of Euphiletus. A war was now on foot between the Syracusans and Leontines. Confederate with the Syracusans were, excepting Camarina, all the Doric cities, which had formerly entered into alliance with the Lacedæmonians before this war broke out, but had yet no where effectually joined them. With the Leontines were the Chalcidic cities, and Camarina. Of Italy, the Locrines sided with the Syracusans: and the Rhegians, from the motive of consanguinity, with the Leontines. The allies therefore of the Leontines sent to Athens,¹ petitioning the Athenians in respect of their old alliance and their Ionic descent, to send them a succour of shipping: for the Syracusans had now blocked them up both by land and sea. The Athenians immediately sent one, giving out that they were bound in duty to take this step; but their real motive was, to prevent the exportation of corn from thence to Peloponnesus, and also to sound the possibility of bringing Sicily into their own subjection. Their squadron therefore arriving at Rhegium on the Italian shore, supported their

allies in the present war; and in this summer ended.

In the beginning of the winter the plague broke out a second time at Athens, not that during this whole interval of time it had wholly ceased, though its rage had very much abated. But now the mortality began again, and continued not less than a year: but the summer had raged for the space of two. There was nothing which lay upon the Athenians so hard as this, or so much impaired their strength. It appeared from the muster-rolls, that there perished four thousand and four hundred of the citizens who wore the heavy armour, and three hundred of the horsemen. The number of the lower people that died was not to be computed. —There happened at the same time many earthquakes; at Athens; in Eubœa; among the Bœotians, and especially at the Boeotian Orchomenus.

The same winter, the Athenians and Rhegians, on the coast of Sicily, form an expedition with thirty sail, against those which were called the isles of Æolus. This was not feasible in the summer season, for want of water. These isles are inhabited by the Liparæans, who were a colony from Cnidus. Their dependence was chiefly in one of them called Lipari, though by no means large. They go hence to the tillage of the others, Didymæ, Strongyle and Hiera. It is believed by the people, that Vulcan² keeps his forge in Hiera, because in the night it visibly throws forth a great quantity of fire, and in the day, of smoke. These isles are situated over-against the straits of the Siculi and the Messenians, and were allied with Syracuse. The Athenians having plundered the soil, and finding the inhabitants would not come in, put back again to Rhegium. —And here the winter ended, and the first year of this war, the history of which Thucydides hath compiled.

YEAR VI.

The following summer, the Peloponnesians and confederates assembled at the Isthmus,

¹ One of the persons, or the chief, employed on this occasion, is said to be Gorgias of Leontium. the first rhetorician of that or of any age. When he had his audience from the Athenians to deliver the reasons of his embassy, he made a speech so smooth and flowing, so new in the manner of its turns, so pretty in the expression, and so nicely diversified by a change and opposition of figures, that he won their hearts, and succeeded in his negotiation. Our historian indeed, who takes no notice of Gorgias, gives two political reasons just after the ready compliance of the Athenians on this occasion. It is a step which draws great consequences after it. Thucydides in the sequel will open all the plan, and give an exact detail of the operations of this new war, into which the Athenians are beginning to embark.

² So Virgil, l. viii. 416.

*Insula Sicælium juxta latus Æoliamque
Erigitur Liparum, fœmantibus ardua saxis:
Quam subter specus et Cycloppum excois camale
Antra Ætnæa tonant, validique incoedibus letus
Audit referunt gemitum, stridentque cavernas
Stricturæ Chalybium, et fornicibus ignis anhælet;
Vulcani domus, et Vulcania nomine tellus.*

³ Before Christ 426.

order to make the usual road into Attica; and Agis son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, was there ready for the command. But the frequent earthquakes which happened about this time, caused them to return back, and entirely put a stop to the designed incursion.

About the same space of time shocks of earthquakes were felt in Eubœa, where at Orobie the sea breaking over what was then land with impetuous swells, laid a part of that city under water: some of which stagnated there, though some washed its way back; however, a tract now continues sea which before was land. AH those who could not reach the higher grounds in time, by running before the surge, were drowned.—A similar inundation happened at the isle of Atalantas, amongst the Locrians of Opus, where it washed away the Athenian fort, and of two vessels that lay dry upon the beach, staved one to pieces.—At Peparethus also the surge of the sea rose very high, but did not overflow. An earthquake however demolished part of the fortification,¹ the townhouse, and some few dwelling-houses.—My solution of such effects is this: where the shock of the earthquake was most violent, it forcibly drove away the sea before it, which suddenly returning again occasioned these more violent swells. And without an earthquake I deem all such accidents impossible.

The same summer, many of the other nations, as they happened to be drawn into the quarrel, were engaged in the war of Sicily, as well as the Sicilians themselves, who took up arms one against another, and the Athenians together with their allies. Yet, the most memorable actions alone, either of the allies thus aided by the Athenians, or of the common enemy against the Athenians, shall I now relate.—Charceadas the Athenian commander having lost his life in the Syracusan war, Laches who had now the sole command of the fleet, in junction with the allies, appeared before Myle of the Messenians. The garrison of Myle consisted of two companies of Messenians; and these had formed an ambuscade to cut off the enemy when landed. But the Athenians and allies drive them from the place of ambush with great slaughter. Then they proceeded to assault the works, which necessitated the defendants to give up their citadel by capitulation,

¹ Pylæum.

and even to attend them against Messene. But after this, the Athenians and allies were no sooner approached, than the Messenians also compounded, giving hostages and all other securities required for their future behaviour.

The same summer, the Athenians with thirty sail of ships commanded by Demosthenes² the son of Alcisthenes and Procles the son of Theodorus, appeared upon the coast of Peloponnesus; whilst a larger armament of sixty, and two thousand heavy-armed, was employed against Melos, under the command of Nicias son of Niceratus. Melos is an island; and as the inhabitants of it were averse to the Athenian subjection, and had refused to accede to their alliance, they were now bent on its reduction. Having laid the island waste, and the Melians still refusing to submit, the Athenians put again to sea, and crossed over to Oropus on the opposite shore; where arriving at night, the heavy-armed were detached to march with all expedition by land towards Tanagra of Bœotia. Notice being given of their arrival there, they were instantly joined by the whole force of Athens, which had marched out of the city under the orders of Hipponicus the son of Callias and Eurymedon the son of Thucles. A camp they formed; and having for the space of a day laid the territory waste, they reposed themselves there the succeeding night. But the next morning, having gained a victory over the Tanagreans, who aided by a party of Thebans sallied out upon them, they only staid to gather up the arms and erect a trophy, and then marched away—these back again to the city; and those to the fleet. Nicias upon this, putting out again with his sixty sail, plundered all the sea-coast of Locris, and then returned into the harbour of Athens.

It was about this time that the Lacedæmonians founded the colony of Heraclea in Tra-

² This Demosthenes will make a considerable figure in the course of this war. The most celebrated orator of the same name hath ranked him amongst the greatest of his countrymen, with Aristides, Pericles, and Nicias. He styles him also an orator; and Thucydides will give us hereafter a specimen of his manner of haranguing. His name alone indeed hath carried off all the glory of eloquence: but the Demosthenes, who is the subject of this note was an able general, very enterprising, and very brave; always vigilant in the service of his country, though more as a soldier than a statesman; and, provided his country was served, not too anxious about who carried off the honour. In short, he was an open-hearted, disinterested, worthy Athenian.

chinia. Their view in doing it was this;—those, who in general are styled Melians, are divided into three bodies; Paralians, Hierensians, and Trachinians. The last of these the Trachinians, who had been terribly distressed by a war made upon them by the bordering Oetæans, had first of all intended to throw themselves under the Athenian protection; but afterwards, apprehending they might not be hearty in their support, they made application to Lacedæmon by Tisamenus, the delegate appointed by them on this occasion. The Dorians too, from whom the Lacedæmonians are descended, sent their ambassadors also to accompany and join with him in the negotiation, for they likewise were infested by these Oetæans. The Lacedæmonians, after an audience, resolved to send out this colony, as a sure expedient not only to protect the Trachinians and Dorians from insult, but to annoy the Athenians more sensibly in the course of the war, from a city so commodiously seated. For thence they could at any time make an attack upon Eubœa, as the passage was but short; and further, it lay most conveniently upon the road to Thrace. In a word, they were very eager about building this city. In the first place, therefore, they begged the advice of the god at Delphi. His answer being favourable, they sent out a colony composed of their own and the neighbouring people; encouraging further all Grecian adventurers whatever to join in this settlement, except Ionians and Achæans, and some of foreign nations. Three Lacedæmonians are appointed to be the leaders of this colony; Leon, and Alcides, and Damagon. These arriving at the spot, erect upon a new foundation and wall round the city which is now called Heraclea, distant about forty stadia¹ from Thermopylæ, and twenty from the sea. They proceeded next to build the naval docks; and these they began at Thermopylæ close under the straits, since there they were capable of the strongest defence.

The Athenians, when they saw the large resort to this colony, were at first under great apprehensions. They suspected it to be chiefly intended for the annoyance of Eubœa, as the passage from it was short to Censum in Eubœa; though, in the sequel, their apprehensions proved entirely groundless. Not the

least damage accrued to them from this colony; and the reason was this; the Thessalians, who were masters of all the country round about, and upon whose very land it was built, being at least this new settlement might prove too powerful a neighbour at last, gave it all possible annoyance, and harassed the new inhabitants with continual war, till from the large number they were at first they mouldered into nothing. When the Lacedæmonians first declared this colony, the whole world was eager to get a settlement in a city which they thought would want no support. Not but that its sudden decay was owing also in great measure to the Lacedæmonian leaders. From the first moment of their arrival they had spoiled every thing wherein they meddled; they reduced their numbers to a handful of men, because their fears had driven away the rest, as the government was always severe and not always just. The neighbouring people surprising them in such a state, prevailed against them with the utmost ease.

The same summer, and even during this interval of time, the Athenians were employed at Melos, the Athenians of the fleet of this sail who were upon the Peloponnesian coast in the first place, having placed an ambush of Elomenus of Leucadia, intercepted and cut off a part of the garrison. In the next place, with an augmented force they came up to Leucas, being attended now by the whole strength of the Acarnanians except the Oeniadae, by the Locynthians and Cephallenians, and fifteen ships of Corcyreans. The Leucadians, though their territory was laid waste both without and within in the Isthmus, where the city of Leucas and the temple of Apollo are seated, yet durst not venture out against such superior numbers. Upon this, the Acarnanians vehemently pressed it upon Demosthenes the Athenian general to block them up by a wall of circumvallation, imagining they might easily reduce them and rid themselves of a city which had long been their eternal foe. But Demosthenes chose rather to hearken at this time to the suggestions of the Messenians; “how glad it would be, as he was now at the head of so large a force, to invade the Ætolians, who were such plagues to Naupactus; and if their reduction could be completed, the rest of that continent might easily be brought into the Athenian subjection. For, though the Ætolians were a great and warlike people,

¹ About four miles.

yet as they dwelled in open villages remote from one another, as light armour only was in use amongst them, they presumed he might easily complete their reduction, before any succour could reach them." They advised him further, "to begin with the Apodoti, to take the Ophionians next, then to proceed to the Eurytians (which is the most numerous people of Ætolia, reported also to speak in a most barbarous dialect, and to feed upon raw flesh); that, if these could be surprised, the rest of Ætolia would submit of course." He, therefore, willing to oblige the Massenians, and incited above all by the thought, that without exposing the Athenian forces, after he had done with the Ætolians, he might march with the allied strength of the continent, and penetrate by land as far as Boeotia, through the Locrians of Ozoli, to Cytinium in Doris, keeping Parnassus on his right till he got down amongst the Phocians, who, he reckoned, from their constant friendship with the Athenians, would readily join him, or however might easily be compelled to do it; and then, that Boeotia borders next on the Phocians:—Demosthenes, I say, weighing from Leucas with his whole force, to the great regret of the Acarnanians, coasted along to Solium. He there communicated his plan to the Acarnanians, in which they refused to join, because he had refused the blockade of Leucas. Demosthenes, with his other force, the Cephallenians, and Messenians, and Zacynthians, and three hundred soldiers draughted from on board the Athenian ships (the fifteen Corcyrean were already departed), set about this expedition against the Ætolians. He began it from Oeneon in Locris: for the Locrians, called Ozolæ, were allies, and had notice to meet the Athenians with all their force in the midland parts. These, being not only borderers, but using also the same kind of arms with the Ætolians, were judged most proper to accompany the expedition, as they knew so well their method of battle, and their country. Having reposed his army one night within the verge of the temple of the Nemean Jove (in which the inhabitants have a tradition that Hesiod¹ the poet expired,

in pursuance of an oracle which had fixed Nemea for the place of his death), he marched again at break of day, and entered Ætolia. On the first day he taketh Potidania, on the second Crocylum, and on the third Tichium. There he halted, and sent away the booty to Eupoium, of Locris. It was now his resolution, after he had subdued the rest, to march last of all against the Ophionians, if they did not voluntarily submit beforehand, in his retreat back to Naupactus.

This preparation against them did by no means escape the Ætolians. The scheme was no sooner formed than they had gained intelligence of it; and by the time the army was within their borders, they were all drawn together in a numerous body for their mutual defence; nay, even the most distant Ophionians, who are seated upon the Meliac bay, the Bomiensians and Calliensians, were already come up.

The Messenians continued to amuse Demosthenes with the same suggestions as at first: they still insisted, that the conquest of the Ætolians would be an easy performance, and advised him to advance immediately against their villages, nor give them time to gather together in a body to oppose him, but to attack every place he came to, and take it. This advice being quite to his own taste, and relying upon his own good for-

the story." I do not, he replied. "It is then well worth your hearing. A certain Milesian, it seems in whose company Hesiod was hospitably lodged and entertained in Locris, had secretly debauched the daughter of their host. When the affair came to light, it was suspected that Hesiod had all along been privy to the intrigue, and concealed such base behaviour; and, though he was entirely innocent, he fell a victim to hasty resentment and foul calumination. The brothers of the damsel laid wait for, and slew him at the Nemean temple in Locris, and with him his servant, whose name was Troilus. Their bodies being thrown into the sea, that of Troilus, indeed, floating up into the river Daphnus, was stopped at a rock quite surrounded with water, a small distance from the sea. But the moment Hesiod's body was thrown into the sea, a shoal of dolphins caught it and carried it to Rhium and Molyerum. The Locrians that very day were assembled at Rhium for a solemn festival and sacrifice, which they still continue to celebrate at the same place. The dead body was no sooner beheld in its approach, than full of wonder, as was likely, they hurried down to the beach, and, knowing it to be the body of Hesiod, and very fresh, they postponed every other care to the discovery of this murder, from their high regard for Hesiod. This was soon done; the assassins were found out, whom they threw headlong into the sea and demolished their houses. But Hesiod was buried by them in the temple of the Nemean Jove."

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¹ The story of Hesiod's death is related by Plutarch in *The Banquet of the seven wise men*. Solon interposing here said, "Such things, Diocles, must be referred immediately to the gods, they are above human condition. But the case of Hesiod is within the lot of humanity, and concerns us all. But perhaps you know

tune, which hitherto had never been checked, without waiting for the Locrians who were very much wanted, and were to have joined him (for he stood most in need of light-armed darters), he advanced to Ægittium, and assaulting, takes it by storm. The inhabitants made their escape, and posted themselves upon the hills which overlook the town. It was situated amongst lofty eminences, and distant from the sea about eighty stadia.¹

But now the Ætoliars, who were come up for the preservation of Ægittium, running down in separate bodies from different eminences, made an attack upon the Athenians and allies, and poured in their javelins amongst them: and whenever the Athenian army approached to charge, they plied before them; when they again fell back, these again returned to the charge. This kind of engagement continued for a long time, a series of alternate pursuits and retreats, in both which the Athenians suffered most. So long however as their archers had darts, and opportunity to use them, they lost no ground; for the light-armed Ætoliars fell back to avoid the darts. But when the chief of the archers dropped, his party was soon dispersed, and the whole army began to incline. Their strength was quite exhausted by so many repeated charges; and now, the Ætoliars pressing hard upon them, and pouring in whole showers of missive weapons, they turned about and fled. Now tumbling into caverns from whence they could not recover themselves, or bewildered in places of which they had no knowledge, they were miserably destroyed. For Cromon the Messenian, who laid out all the routes, had been killed in the battle. The Ætoliars pursued with their darts, and being not only swift of foot, but also lightly armed, easily overtook many of them in their flight, and did great execution. A large party, who had lost their way, threw themselves into a wood which was quite impassable. The Ætoliars set the wood on fire, in the flames of which they were all consumed. Every affecting species of flight and destruction was now the fate of the Athenian army. Those who had the good fortune to escape, effected it by reaching the sea and Oeneon of Locris, from whence they first began the expedition.

The number of the allies who thus perished,

¹ About eight miles.

was large; that of heavy armed Athenians about a hundred and twenty; so considerable was the loss, and all of them in the very flower of their youth. In the whole course of this war, the state of Athens never lost at any one time so many of her most gallant citizens as now. Procles also, the other commander in this expedition, perished.

They afterwards fetched off their dead by a truce obtained from the Ætoliars. This being done, they retired to Naupactus, and then shipped themselves for Athens. Demosthenes however was left behind at Naupactus, and the parts adjacent. After such a miscarriage he durst not presume to face the people of Athens.

About the same time, the Athenians on the Sicilian station, having sailed towards Locri, landed upon that coast. They destroyed a party of Locrians who endeavoured to make head against them; and then take Peripolus, a town situated on the river Halex.

The same summer the Ætoliars, who had some time before despatched an embassy to Corinth and Lacedæmon, composed of Telesphus the Ophionian, Boriades the Eurythian, and Tisander the Apodotian, prevail there in their suit for a diversion against Naupactus, because the Athenians had invaded their territories. It was about autumn when the Lacedæmonians marched away three thousand heavy-armed of their allies; of which number five hundred belonged to Heraclea, the city lately founded in Trachinia. Eurylochus, a Spartan was appointed to command in the expedition, and was accompanied by two other Spartans, Macarius and Menedæus. The army being drawn into a body at Delphi, Eurylochus despatched a herald to the Ozolian Locri; his route to Naupactus lay through their territory. He was also desirous to detach them from the Athenian alliance. The Amphiasensians were the readiest of all the Locri to give their concurrence, as standing in perpetual awe of the hatred bore them by the Phocians. These therefore were the first who sent in hostages, and who persuaded others to follow their example, from a dread of this army which was now approaching. Accordingly, the Myonians, their own borderers, were the first who complied; for their part of Locris is most difficult of access. These were followed by the Ippensians, and Messapians, and Tritænsians, and Chalcians, Tolophonians, Hessians, and

Oeanthians; and all these gave a personal attendance in the expedition. The Olpeans indeed sent in their hostages, but would not attend. The Hysians refused their hostages till one of their villages called Polis was seized.

When all things were ready, and the hostages placed securely at Cytinium of Doris, Eurylochus with his army taking the route of Locris, advanced against Naupactus. He seized upon Oeneon and Eupolium as he marched, for refusing to concur. When they had entered the territory of Naupactus, and were joined by the Ætolian aid, they wasted the country to the very suburb, of which also, because unfortified, they took possession. Turning thence to Molycrium, a Corinthian colony, but now subject to the Athenians, they reduce it.

But Demosthenes the Athenian (for he had continued at Naupactus ever since the Ætolian miscarriage) having received intelligence of this army, and dreading the loss of this place, had addressed himself to the Acarnanians, and with some difficulty, owing to his departure from Leucas, persuades them to send a succour to Naupactus. Accordingly, they put a thousand of their heavy-armed under his orders, whom he threw into the town by sea, which effectually preserved it. For the danger before was manifest, as the wall was very large in compass, and the number of defendants inconsiderable.

When Eurylochus and his council had discovered that such a succour had been received into the town, and that its reduction was now impracticable, they marched away their forces, not towards Peloponnesus, but to that Ætolia which is now called Calydon, to Pleuron, to the neighbouring towns, and to Proschion of Ætolia. The Ambraciots had now been with and prevailed upon them, to join in some attempts upon Argos in Amphilochia; upon the rest of that province, and Acarnania; assuring them, that could these be reduced, the whole continent there would instantly go over to the Lacedæmonian league. Eurylochus having assured them of his concurrence, and given the Ætolians their dismissal, halted thereabouts with his army, till the Ambraciots had entered upon the expedition against Argos, and it was time for him to join them. And here the summer ended.

The Athenians in Sicily, the beginning of the winter, putting themselves at the head of their Grecian allies, and as many of their

Sicilian as, unable to support the Syracusan yoke, had revolted from Syracuse to join them, began fresh operations of war in concert, and assaulted Nessa a town of Sicily, the citadel of which was in the hands of the Syracusans. But the attempt was unsuccessful, and they again determined to draw off. During the retreat, the Syracusans sallying forth, fell upon those allies of the Athenians who marched in the rear, and with such force, that they put a part of the army to flight, and slew a considerable number,

After this, Laches and the Athenians, having made some attempts, and landed on the coast of Locris near the mouth of the river Caicinus, were engaged by a party of Locrians consisting of about three hundred, under Proxenus the son of Capaton. These the Athenians defeated, and having stripped them of their arms, went off the coast.

The same winter also the Athenians purified Delos, in obedience to an oracle. Pisistratus the tyrant had purified it formerly, not indeed the whole, but so much of the island as lies within the prospect of the temple. The purification now was universal, and performed in the following manner:

They broke up all the sepulchres of the dead without exception, and prohibited for the future any death or birth in the island, both which were to be confined to Rhenæa. For Rhenæa lies at so small a distance from Delos, that Polycrates the tyrant of Samos, who was formerly of great power by sea, amongst other isles he reduced to his dominions, took Rhenæa also, which he consecrated to Delian Apollo, and fastened it to Delos by a chain. And after this purification, the Athenians made the first institution of the Delian games to be solemnized every fifth returning year. Not but that in the earlier times there was used to be a great conflux of Ionians and neighbouring islanders to Delos. They resorted to the solemn festivals there with their wives and children, in the same manner as the Ionians do now to Ephesus. Games of bodily exercise and of music were actually celebrated, and cities exhibited their respective choruses. For this we have the testimony of Homer in the following verses of his hymn to Apollo:

To thee, O Phœbus, most the Delian isle
Gives cordial joy, excites the pleasing smile;
When gay Ionians flock around thy fane;
Men, women, children, a resplendent train,

Whose flowing garments sweep the sacred pile,
Whose grateful concourse gladdens all the isle,
Where champions fight, where dancers beat the
ground,
Where cheerful music echoes all around,
Thy feast to honour, and thy praise to sound.

That there was also a musical game to which artists resorted to make trials of their skill, he fully sheweth in other verses to be found in the same hymn: for, having sung the Delian chorus of females, he closeth their praise with these lines, in which further he hath made mention of himself:

Hail! great Apollo, radiant god of day:
Hail! Cynthia, goddess of the lunar sway:
Henceforth on me propitious smile! and you,
Ye blooming beauties of the isle, adieu!
When future guests shall reach your happy shore,
And refuged here from toils lament no more:
When social chat the mind unbending cheers,
And this demand shall greet your friendly ears—
"Who was the Bard, e'er landed on your coast,
Who sung the sweetest, and who pleased you most?"
With voice united, all ye blooming fair,
Join in your answer, and for me declare;
Say—"The blind bard the sweetest notes may boast,
He lives at Chios, and he pleased us most."

Such an evidence hath Homer left us, that in early times there was a great concourse and festival at Delos. But afterwards the people of the islands and the Athenians sent in their parties for the chorus with victims. But the usual games, and the most of the solemn rites, had been disused, through some sinister events, till the Athenians now made a fresh institution of this solemnity, with the addition of a chariot-race, which had not formerly been a part of it.

The same winter, the Ambraciots, in pursuance of their engagements with Eurylochus, who waited their motions, march away with three thousand heavy-armed against the Amphilocheian Argos. Accordingly, breaking into Argia, they seize Olpæ, a strong place, situated on an eminence on the sea-side. This place had been formerly fortified by the Acarnanians, who used it for the public tribunal of justice. It is distant from the city of Argos, which is also a maritime town, about twenty-five stadia.¹ The Acarnanians were now in motion, some running to the defence of Argos, others to encamp at the important post of Crenæ in Amphilochia, to observe the motions of the Peloponnesians commanded by Eurylochus, that they might not perfect their junction with the

Ambraciots, without some molestation on this route. They also send to Demosthenes, the Athenian general in the Ætolian expedition, to come and put himself at their head; and the Athenian squadron of twenty sail, which was then upon the coast of Peloponnesus, under the command of Aristotle, son of Timocrates, and Hierophon son of Antimnestus.

The Ambraciots at Olpæ sent also a messenger to their own city, ordering them, to a messenger to come out into the field. They were still lest Eurylochus might not be able to pass the Acarnanians, and so they should be compelled either to fight alone; or, should they attempt a retreat, to find it full of danger.

But the Peloponnesians commanded by Eurylochus had no sooner heard that the Ambraciots were at Olpæ, than dislodging from Proschium they marched with all expedition for their support. After passing the Achelous, they took the route of, Acarnania, desolate at present, as the inhabitants were fled to the defence of Argos, having on their right the city and garrison of the Stratians, and the rest of Acarnania on their left. When they had passed through the territory of the Stratians, they crossed Phytia, and again through the territory of Medeon, and then marched into Limnæa. They now entered the kingdom of the Agræans, which had deserted the Acarnanian to favour the Peloponnesian invasion. Securing then the mountain Thyamus, a very uncultivated spot, they crossed it, and descended thence by night into Argia. They afterwards passed undiscovered betwixt the city of the Argians, and the post of the Acarnanians at Crenæ, and so perfected their junction with the Ambraciots at Olpæ. After the junction, their numbers being large, they took possession next morn, at break of day, of the post called Metropolis, and there fix encampment.

Not long after this the Athenian squadron of twenty sail comes into the bay of Ambracia to succour the Argians. Demosthenes is arrived, with two hundred heavy-armed Macedonians, and sixty Athenian archers. The station of the fleet was fixed under the shadow of Olpæ. But the Acarnanians, and a few of the Amphilocheians, who had already gathered into a body at Argos, (for the majority of them was obstructed by the Ambraciots) got every thing in readiness to engage the enemy. They elect Demosthenes to be the com-

¹ About two miles and a half.

mander of the whole associated force, with the assistance of their own generals. He caused them to advance near Olpæ, and there encamped them. A great hollow lay between the armies. For five days they remained in a state of inaction, but on the sixth both sides drew up in order of battle. The Peloponnesians were more numerous, and their line of course was further extended. Demosthenes therefore, that he might not be inclosed, placeth an ambuscade of the heavy and light-armed, to the number in all of about four hundred, in a hollow way overgrown with shrubs and bushes, with orders that in the heat of the charge they should rise up and attack the over-extended line of the enemy in their rear. When all things were ready on both sides, they came to blows. Demosthenes led the right wing, composed of the Messenians, and his few Athenians. The other consisted of the Acarnanians, drawn up in the order they happened to fall into as they came up, and the Amphilocheian darters who were at hand. But the Peloponnesians and Ambraciots were drawn up promiscuously, except the Mantineans. The Mantineans stood embodied rather to the left, but not in the extremity: for Eurylochus, with a select party, was posted there over-against the Messenians and Demosthenes.

No sooner was the battle joined, and the Peloponnesians on that wing were moving forward their superior numbers to surround the right of their adversaries, than the Acarnanians, starting up from their ambuscade, falling upon them in the rear, assault and put them to flight. They gave way before the very first shock, and struck such a consternation into the bulk of the army, that they also began to run: for they no sooner saw the party with Eurylochus, and which was the flower of their strength, entirely broken, than they felt a panic for themselves. And the Messenians, who fought at the same post with Demosthenes, behaved so very well that they finished the rout. The Ambraciots in the meantime, and those in the right, had got the better of their opponents, and were pursuing them towards Argos; for beyond a doubt they are the most warlike people of any in those parts. But when they were returned from the pursuit, they perceived the bulk of their army was defeated; and the rest of the Acarnanians beginning to charge them, with much difficulty they threw themselves into

Olpæ. The number of the slain was great, as they had made their attacks without any order, and with the utmost confusion; we must except the Mantineans, who kept most firmly together, and retreated in the best order of the whole enemy. The battle was ended only with the night.

The next morning, as Eurylochus was killed and Macarius also, the command devolved upon Menedæus. The defeat was irrecoverably great, and he was highly perplexed—whether he should abide a siege, in which he must not only be shut up by land, but by the Athenian ships be blocked up also by sea,—or whether he should endeavour to secure his retreat. At length he treats with Demosthenes and the Acarnanians for a suspension of arms both for his own departure and the fetching of the dead. The dead they at once delivered, and set up a trophy themselves, and took up their own dead to the number of about three hundred. But a truce for their departure was not openly granted to them all. Demosthenes, in concert with the Acarnanian generals, agreed to a secret article with the Mantineans, and Menedæus and the other Peloponnesian officers, and as many others as were of any consideration—that “they should depart immediately.” His policy was, to have the Ambraciots and the promiscuous body of mercenaries left quite destitute, wishing above all things for such a pretext to calumniate the Lacedæmonians and Peloponnesians amongst the Grecians of those parts, “as men who wilfully abandon their friends, from a mere selfish treacherous regard to their own safety.” Having leave therefore to fetch off their dead, they interred them all as well as their hurry would admit. And those in the secret, were busy in concerting the means of their departure.

But now intelligence is brought to Demosthenes and the Acarnanians, that the Ambraciots of the city, with their whole collected force, had, in pursuance of the former summons, begun their march for Olpæ, through Amphilochei, designing to join their countrymen at Olpæ, and quite ignorant of the late defeat. Upon this, he immediately detacheth a part of his army, to beset all the passes, and to seize all the advantageous posts upon their route, and got ready at the same time to march against them with the remainder of his force.

In the meantime, the Mantineans and those

comprehended in the secret articles, got out of the town upon the pretext of gathering herbs and fuel, went gradually off in small parties, gathering what they pretended to come out for as they passed along. But when they had thus straggled to a considerable distance from Olpæ, they moved away in a more nimble pace. The Ambraciots and others, who in great numbers came out in their company, when they perceived them thus stealing off, felt an inclination to follow, and so taking to their heels, ran speedily after them. The Acarnanians imagined at first, that they were all equally endeavouring to escape without permission, and therefore set out in pursuit of the Peloponnesians. Their officers endeavoured to stop them, crying out, that "leave was given for their escape."—Upon which a soldier, concluding their officers had been guilty of treachery, darted his javelin amongst them. But afterwards they connived at the escape of the Mantineans and the Peloponnesians, but made slaughter of the Ambraciots. Great indeed was the tumult, and the perplexity also to distinguish which was an Ambraciote, and which was a Peloponnesian; and amidst the confusion about two hundred were slain. The rest made their escape into the bordering kingdom of Agræis, where Salythius king of the Agræans, who was their friend, took them under his protection.

The Ambraciots of the city were now advanced as far as Idomene. There are two lofty eminences which are called by this name. The higher of the two, by favour of the dark, the detachment sent before by Demosthenes from the camp had seized, without being discovered, and had posted themselves upon it. The Ambraciots had possessed themselves already of the lower, and halted there for the night. Demosthenes after his evening repast, and the remainder of the army, about shut of evening, began to march. He himself took half of them to attack the enemy in front, whilst the other was fetching a compass round the mountains of Amphilochia.

The next morning was no sooner in its dawn, than he comes upon the Ambraciots yet in their beds, still ignorant of all that had passed, and rather supposing these new-comers to be their friends. For Demosthenes had politically placed the Messenians in the van, and ordered them to discourse as they moved along in the Doric dialect, thus to prevent any alarm from

their advanced guards, who further, so long as the dark continued, could not possibly distinguish their faces. By this means, he no sooner assaulted the camp than the rout began. Numbers of them were slain upon the spot. The mainder fled a main towards the mountains. But the passes were all beset; and more than half the Amphilochians, who were well acquainted with their own country, were pursuing in the light enemies who were encumbered with the heavy armour. Quite ignorant of the country, nor knowing whither they were flying, they rushed headlong into hollow ways, into all the ambuscades laid ready by the enemy, to their own destruction. Yet as no possible means of escape was unattempted, some of them turned towards the sea, which was not greatly distant. And when they beheld the Athenian ships moving along the shore, in so fatal concurrence for their ruin, they plunged into the water, and swam up to them, choosing rather in the present consternation, to be destroyed by the Athenians on board of those ships, than by the Barbarians and their most inveterate foes, the Amphilochians. Through a series of misfortunes, but few out of the numerous body of Ambraciots were so happy to escape to their own home. The Acarnanians having stripped the dead, and erected the trophies, marched back to Argos.

On the following day they were addressed by a herald, sent from those Ambraciots who had escaped from Olpæ, and were now in the Agræis. His commission was to obtain the bodies of the dead who had been killed at the first engagement, as they were attempting without permission to escape along with the Mantineans and others who were going off by agreement. This herald, casting his eyes upon the arms of the Ambraciots from the ship, was astonished at the number. He knew nothing of that fresh calamity, but concluded they all belonged to the party for whom he was now employed. Somebody asked him the reason of his surprise, and what he judged to be the number of the dead? Now he who asked the question supposed the herald to have been sent by those of Idomene. "Not more than two hundred," says the herald. The demandant then replied, "It should seem otherwise by the arms, for these are the arms of more than a thousand men." The herald rejoined, "They cannot belong to those of our party." The other replied, "They must, if you fought ye-

terday at Idomene." "We fought nowhere yesterday: we suffered the day before in our retreat from Olpe." "But we fought yesterday against those Ambraciots, who were advancing from the city to relieve you." When the herald heard this, and found that the army of relief from the city was thus destroyed, he burst into a groan; and, quite overpowered with the weight of the present calamities, he went off abruptly, and without renewing his demand about the dead.

During the whole course of this war, no other Grecian city suffered so great a loss in so short a time. I have not presumed to mention the number of the slain, because it is said to have been incredibly great, when compared with the size of their city. But I am well convinced that if, in compliance with the advice of the Athenians and Demosthenes, the Acarnanians and Amphilochians would have proceeded to the excision of Ambracia, they might have done it with the bare shout of their voice. But they dreaded its falling into the hands of the Athenians, who might prove worse neighbours to them than the old.

But to return. A third part of the spoils was bestowed upon the Athenians, the rest was divided amongst the confederate cities. Those allotted the Athenians were lost at sea. For the three hundred suits of armour which are reposed in the temples of Athens, were selected for Demosthenes, who now returned thither, and brought them with him. The dread he had been under ever since his misadventure in Ætolia was quite dispelled by the good service he had now performed.

The Athenians, with their squadron of twenty sail, were now returned to Naupactus; and, since the departure of the Athenians and Demosthenes, the Acarnanians and Amphilochians had granted by treaty to those Ambraciots and Peloponnesians, who had refuged with Salynthus and the Agræans, a safe retreat from amongst the Oeniadæ, who had also gone over to Salynthus and the Agræans. And afterwards the Acarnanians and Amphilochians concluded a peace and an alliance for a hundred years with the Ambraciots, upon these conditions:

"That neither the Ambraciots should be obliged to join the Acarnanians in any attempts against the Peloponnesians; nor the Acarnanians to act with the Ambraciots against the Athenians.

"That if either were attacked, the others should march to their defence.

"That the Ambraciots should restore all the places and frontier belonging to the Amphilochians, which were at present in their hands. And,

"That they should in no shape support Anactorium, which was then in hostility with the Acarnanians."

These articles being mutually agreed to, the war came to a conclusion. But after this, the Corinthians sent a party of their own people, consisting of three hundred heavy-armed, commanded by Xenocides the son of Euthycles, for the guard of Ambracia, who arrived, after great difficulties, as they marched all the way over-land. And this is the account of transactions in Ambracia.

The Athenians in Sicily, this same winter, made a descent against Himeræa from their ships, whilst the Sicilians, pouring down from the upper country, were ravaging its frontier. They steered their course also against the isles of Æolus. But when they were returned to their old station at Rhegium, they found there Pythodorus the son of Isolochus, who was commissioned to take upon him the command of the fleet, in the room of Laches. For the confederates of Sicily had sent a deputation to Athens, to solicit a more ample succour of shipping. Because, as in fact the Syracusans were masters of all their lands, and they were also awed at sea by a few Syracusan vessels, they were now intent on gathering together such a naval force as might strike an effectual terror. The Athenians equipped out forty sail as a reinforcement for Sicily. Their motive was, not only to bring the war in those parts to a speedy determination, but also to keep their own mariners in constant practice. Pythodorus, one of the admirals appointed for this service, they sent off immediately with a few ships: Sophocles son of Sostratides, and Eurymedon son of Thucles, were soon to follow with the main body of the fleet. But Pythodorus, who had now took the command from Laches, steered, about the close of the winter, against that fortress of the Locrians which Laches had taken before. But, being defeated at his landing by the Locrians, he returned again to his station.

About the spring of the year, a torrent of fire overflowed from mount Ætna, in the same manner as formerly, which destroyed part of

the lands of the Cataneans, who are situated at the foot of that mountain, which is the largest in all Sicily. It is said that fifty years intervened between this flow and the last which preceded; and that in the whole the fire hath thus issued thrice since Sicily was inhabited by the Greeks. Such were the occurrences of this winter, at the end of which the sixth year also of this war, the history of which Thucydides hath compiled, expired.

PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

BOOK IV.

YEAR VII. The Athenians seize and fortify Pylus in Laconia. The Lacedæmonians make slight of it at first, yet afterwards exert their utmost efforts to dislodge them, though in vain. Their body thrown into Sphacteria is intercepted, and blocked up by the Athenian fleet. A suspension of arms and a truce ensue, but soon broke. Proceedings in Sicily: a naval engagement in the strait of Messene. At Athens, Cleon is drawn in by his own bravado to undertake the reduction of Sphacteria. He repairs thither, and completes the work beyond all expectation. The Lacedæmonians, terribly distressed, send many proposals for a peace, but none are accepted. The Athenians invade the Corinthians: battle of Soligia. Tragical period of the sedition at Corcyra. Death of Artaxerxes Longimanus.—VIII. Expedition against Cythera. Continuation of affairs in Sicily. The surprise of Megara unsuccessfully attempted. A project formed for a total revolution in Bœotia. Brasidas beginneth his march for Thrace, and by his noble behaviour carries all before him. The battle of Delium. Successful progress of Brasidas in Thrace.—IX. Truce for a year. The affairs of Thrace continued.

YEAR VII.¹

THE ensuing summer, when the corn was beginning to ear, ten sail of Syracusan, joined by an equal number of Locrean vessels, at the invitation of the inhabitants, stood away for Messene in Sicily, and took possession of the place. And thus Messene revolted from the Athenians. But this event was chiefly owing to the practices of the Syracusans, who, foreseeing that this town might open the way for the reduction of Sicily, were greatly afraid lest the Athenians should get established there, and, with augmented forces, pour out from thence upon them. The Locrians assisted out of enmity to the Rhegians, whom they were desirous to have it in their power to attack both by land and sea. At the same time also, these Locrians broke in upon the territory of the Rhegians with their entire force, to deter them from any attempt to save Messene, and to gratify also those fugitives from Rhegium, who acted now in combination with them. For Rhegium had for a long time been embroiled in sedition, and so was unable to take the field against these invaders, who for the same reason were more eager to distress

them. When the ravage was completed, the Locrians marched their land-forces back, but their ships were stationed on the guard of Messene. They also were very busy in the equipment of an additional number, which were to repair to that station, and be ready to move from thence to any future operations of war.

About the same season of the spring, before the corn was fully grown, the Peloponnesians and allies made their inroad into Attica. Agis, the son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, commanded. They fixed their camp, and ravaged the country.

The Athenians now sent out to sea the forty ships already prepared for the Sicilian voyage, under the command of Eurymedon and Sophocles, who staid behind to bring up this reinforcement, since Pythodorus, the third in the commission, was already in his post at Sicily. They had orders also in the course of the voyage to touch at Corcyra, and provide effectually for the preservation of those in the city, who were sadly infested by the outlaws posted on the mountain. Sixty sail of the Peloponnesians were now upon that coast, to act in support of those on the mountain, who, as the city was sorely oppressed with famine, presumed they should with ease carry all be-

¹ Before Christ 425.

fore them. Demosthenes, further, who had been in no public employ since his return from Acarnania, procured leave to go on board this fleet, with authority to employ it on the coast of Peloponnesus, if he judged it for the service.

When they were got to the height of Laconia, intelligence is brought them, that "the Peloponnesian fleet is now in Corcyra." Eurymedon and Sophocles were for making the best of their way thither. But it was the advice of Demosthenes to go first to Pylus, and after they had secured that place, to proceed in their voyage. This was positively refused; but it so happened, that a storm arose which drove the whole fleet to Pylus. Demosthenes insisted that they should immediately fortify the place, since this was the motive of his attendance in the fleet. He showed them, that "there was at hand plenty of timber and stone for the work; that, besides the strength of its natural situation, the place itself was barren, as was also the greatest part of the adjacent country." For Pylus lies at the distance of about four hundred stadia¹ from Sparta, in the district which was formerly called Messenia; but the name given it by the Lacedæmonians is Coryphasium. The others replied: "there are many barren capes in the Peloponnesus, which those may secure who have a mind to plunge the commonwealth into needless expenses." This place, however, seemed to him to be better marked out for this purpose than any other, as being possessed of a harbour; and as the Messenians, who formerly bore some relation to it, and still used the same dialect with the Lacedæmonians, might from hence give them great annoyance, and at the same time effectually keep possession of it. But when neither the commanders nor soldiers, nor the inferior officers,² to whom he afterwards communicated his project, would be brought to a compliance, he quietly let it drop till the mere love of employment, during the idleness of their suspended voyage, sedi-

tiously inclined the private soldiers to compass it with a wall. They took the work in hand, and plied it briskly. Tools they had none for hewing and fitting the stones; but picked out and carried such as they judged most proper for the work, and laid them one upon another as compactly as they could. The mud that was any where requisite, for want of vessels they carried on their shoulders, bending inwards as much as possible, that it might have room to stick on, and holding it up with both hands clasped fast behind that it might not slide down. They spared no pains to prevent the Lacedæmonians, and to put the place in proper posture of defence, before they could come to their disturbance. For the larger part of it was so well fortified by nature, that it stood in no need of the defence of art.

The news of this arrived at Sparta during the celebration of some public festival. They set light by it; assured, that so soon as it appeared in sight, the enemy would easily abandon it, or the place be recovered by easy effort. And they were something dilatory, because their army was yet in Attica.

The Athenians, having completed the works on the side towards the land, and the other necessary spots, in the space of a few days, leave Demosthenes with five ships to guard it, and with the larger number resume their voyage for Corcyra and Sicily.

But the Peloponnesians in Attica were not so soon advertised of this seizure of Pylus, than they marched back with all expedition. The Lacedæmonians, and Agis their king, regarded this affair of Pylus as their own domestic concern. And besides, as they had made the inroad early in the year, and when the corn was yet green, many of them laboured under a scarcity of provisions. The weather also, which proved tempestuous beyond what was usual in that season, had very much incommoded the army. In this manner, many accidents concurred to accelerate their return, and to render this the shortest of all their invasions. For the whole of their stay in Attica was but fifteen days.

About the same time Simonides, an Athenian commander, having gathered together a small party of Athenians from the neighbouring garrisons, and a body of the circumjacent dependents, took possession of Eion in Thracia, a colony of the Medæans. It had declared against the Athenians, but was now put into

¹ About forty English miles.

² The word in the original is Taxiarchs. They seem to be nearly the same with captains of a company, in the modern style, as their command was over about one hundred men. Taxiarchs were also officers of a higher class, in number ten, every Athenian tribe appointing one, whose business it was to marshall the armies, to order the marches and encampments, to take care of provisions, and to punish military offences. But the former seem to be the officers to whom Demosthenes applied himself in the present instance.

their hands by treachery. Yet, the Chalcideans and the Bottians coming immediately to its relief, he was beat out of it again, and lost a great number of his men.

After the retreat of the Peloponnesians out of Attica, the Spartans,¹ in conjunction with those of their allies, marched without loss of time to the recovery of Pylus. The rest of the Lacedæmonians were longer in their approach, as but just returned from another expedition. Yet a summons had been sent all round Peloponnesus, to march directly for Pylus. Their fleet of sixty sail was also remanded from Coreyra, which, being transported by land over the isthmus of Leucas, arrive before Pylus, undescried by the Athenians who lay at Zacynthus. And by this time the land army had also approached.

Demosthenes, before the coming up of the Peloponnesian fleet, had timely despatched two vessels to Eurymedon, and the Athenians on board that fleet now lying at Zacynthus, pressing them to return, as the place was in danger of being lost; which vessels made the best of their way, in pursuance of the earnest commands of Demosthenes. But the Lacedæmonians were now preparing to attack the fortress both by land and sea, presuming it would easily be destroyed, as the work had been raised with so much precipitation and was defended by so small a number of hands. But, as they also expected the return of the Athenian ships from Zacynthus, they designed, in case they took not the place before, to bar up the mouths of the harbour, so as to render the entrance impracticable to the Athenians. For an isle which is called Sphacteria, lying before and at a small distance, locks it up and rendereth the mouths of the harbour narrow; that near the fortress of the Athenians and Pylus, a passage for two ships only abreast; and that between the other points of land, for eight or nine. The whole of it, as desert, was overgrown with wood and quite untrod, and the compass of it at most is about fifteen stadia.² They were therefore intent on shutting up these entrances with ships moored close together, and their heads towards the sea. And to prevent the molestation apprehended, should the enemy take

possession of this island, they threw into it a body of their heavy-armed, and posted another body on the opposite shore;—for by these dispositions the Athenians would be incommoded from the island, and excluded from landing on the main land; and as, on the opposite coast of Pylus without the harbour, there is no road where ships can lie, they would be deprived of a station from whence to succour the besieged: and thus, without the hazard of a naval engagement, it was probable they should get possession of the place, as the quantity of provisions in it could be but small, since the seizure had been executed with slender preparation. Acting upon these motives, they threw the body of heavy-armed into the island, who were draughted by lot out of all the bands. These for a time were successively relieved by others. But the last body, who guarded that post, and were forced to continue in it, consisted of about four hundred and twenty, exclusive of the Helots who attended them, and these were commanded by Epitadas, the son of Molobrus.

Demosthenes, perceiving by these dispositions that the Lacedæmonians would attack him by land and sea, provided for his own defence. The triremes yet remaining with him he drew ashore, and ranged them by way of palisade before the fortress. The mariners he armed with bucklers, sorry ones indeed, as most of them were only twigs of osier plaited. Better arms were not to be procured in so desert a place. And even these they had taken out of a cruiser of thirty oars and a light packet belonging to Messenians, who happened accidentally to put in. The Messenians on board were about forty heavy armed, whom he ranged amongst his own body. The greater part therefore of the unarmed, as well as some who had armour, he placed on the strongest parts of the fortress towards the continent, with orders to beat off the land army whenever they approached. And having selected from his whole number sixty heavy armed and a few archers, he marched out of the fortress to that part of the beach where he supposed the enemy would endeavour to land. The shore indeed was rough and rocky, and bordered on the main sea; yet, as the wall was weakest in this quarter, he judged it would soonest tempt and animate an assault. For never imagining they should be out-numbered in shipping, they had left the wall on this side but weak; and should the enemy now force a landing, the place would undoubtedly be lost.

¹ The reader will be pleased to take notice, that the word Spartans is here emphatical. It means those of the first class, the noblest persons in the community, as is plain from the sequel.

² One mile and a half.

Sensible of this, and determined if possible to prevent their landing, Demosthenes posted himself with his chosen band on the very edge of the water, and endeavoured to animate them by the following harangue :

"My fellow soldiers, here posted with me in this dangerous situation, I conjure you, in so urgent an extremity, to throw away all superfluous wisdom. Let not a soul amongst you compute the perils which now environ us, but regardless of the issue and inspirited by hope let him charge the foe, and be confident of success. A situation desperate like this alloweth no room for calm consideration, but demands the most precipitate venture. Superior advantages however are along with us ;—of this I am convinced, provided we only stand firm together, and scorning to be terrified at the number of our foes, do not wilfully betray those advantages which are now in our favour. The shore is most difficult of access :—this in my judgment makes abundantly for us ;—this will support us, if we keep our ground. But if we give way, difficult as it is now, their landing will be easy—when there are none to obstruct it. Nay, what is worse, we shall make the enemy more furious, when, if we may afterwards press hard upon him, it is no longer in his power to re-embark with ease. For so long as they continue on board they may most easily be encountered ; whilst they are busy in landing, they cannot so far overmatch us, as that we ought to shrink before their numbers. Large though they be, the spot of action will be small for want of ground to draw up in order. What though their force be superior for the land ? that advantage will be lost in their present service, when they must act from their vessels and on the water, where many lucky contingencies are requisite. And thus I am satisfied, that with these disadvantages they are but merely a balance for our smallness of number.

"As for you, O Athenians, who are now present, and who, by the long experience of frequent descents, are perfectly convinced that men, who stand firm and scorn to give way before the dash of the surge or the menacing approach of a vessel, can never be beat off—from you I insist, that, firmly embodied together and charging the enemy on the very margin of the water, you preserve all us who are here, and preserve this fortress."

In this manner Demosthenes having encour-

aged his men, the Athenians became more animated than ever ; and, marching forward to the very margin of the sea, posted themselves there in order of battle. The Lacedæmonians were also in motion ; their land force was marching to assault the fortress, and their fleet was approaching the shore. It consisted of forty-three vessels, and a Spartan, Themelidas the son of Cratesicles, was on board as admiral. He steered directly for the spot on which Demosthenes expected his coming. In this manner were the Athenians assembled on both sides, by land and sea.

The ships of the enemy came on in small divisions, because there was not room for larger. They slackened by intervals, and endeavoured by turns to force their landing. They were brave to a man, and mutually animated one another to beat off the Athenians and seize the fortress.

But Brasidas signalized himself above them all. He commanded a trireme ; and observing that the other commanders and pilots, though they knew they could run aground, yet kept aloof because the shore was craggy, and shrank from every hazard of staving their vessels, he shouted aloud, "that it was shameful for the saving of timber to suffer enemies to mine the fortifications within their territory." He encouraged them on the contrary "to force their landing, though they dashed their vessels to pieces ;" begging the confederates "in this juncture not to refuse bestowing their ships on the Lacedæmonians in lieu of the great services they had done them, but to run them ashore and landing at all adventures to seize the enemy and the fortress." In this manner he exhorted others, and having compelled his own pilot to run the vessel ashore, he was at the top of the stairs, and endeavouring to get down, was beat back by the Athenians. After many wounds received, he fainted with the loss of blood ; and falling upon the gunnel, his shield tumbled over into the water. It was brought ashore and taken up by the Athenians, who afterwards made it a part of the trophy, which they erected for this attack.

The others indeed with equal spirit endeavoured, but yet could not possibly land, as the ground was difficult of access, and the Athenians stood firm, and no where at all gave way. Such now was the strange reverse of fortune, that the Athenians upon land, upon Lacedæmonian land, beat off the Lacedæmonians who

fighting from the water; and the Lacedæmonians from ships were endeavouring a descent upon their own now hostile territory next the Athenians. For at this period of

it was the general opinion, that those landmen and excelled most in land engagements, but that these were seamen and the best figure at sea.

his attack was continued the whole day part of the next before it was given

On the third day, they detached some ships to Asine to fetch timber for engines, obliging by them to accomplish the taking of wall adjacent to the harbour, which, though of greater height, yet might easier be approached by sea.

during this pause, forty sail of Athenians came up from Zacynthus. This fleet had been enlarged by the accession of some guard-ships from off the station of Naupactus, and the sail of Chians. These no sooner discovered the main land about Pylus and the island Sphacteria to be full of armed soldiers, the harbour also to be occupied by the ships of the enemy, which lay quiet in their posts, than, perplexed how to act, they sailed back for the intent to the isle of Prote not far distant and there spent the night.

The day following, being formed into the ranks of battle, they showed themselves again ready for engagement, should the enemy venture to stand out against them into the sea; and if not, were determined to force their way into the harbour. The enemy

kept in the same quiet posture, nor set out executing their former design of barring the entrances. They continued in their usual position along the shore, when they had manœuvred their vessels, and got every thing ready to oppose the assailants should they break into the harbour, where there was no danger of being straitened for room. The Athenians, discovering their intent, broke into the harbour both entrances. Falling there upon the great number of vessels now advanced into the water to obstruct the passage, they put them to flight; and following the chase, which could be but short, they shattered several, and five, one of which had her whole crew on board. They proceeded to attack the rest, which had fled again towards the shore. Some moreover, which had just been manned, were disabled before they could launch into deep. Others, deserted by the mariners

who had fled along the shore, they fastened to their own, and towed away empty. The Lacedæmonians seeing these things, and prodigiously alarmed at the sad event, lest now the communication should be cut off with the body in the island, rushed down with all their force to prevent it. Armed as they were they plunged into the water, and catching hold of the vessels in tow pulled them back towards the shore. It was now the apprehension of every soul amongst them, that the business flagged wherever he himself was not present. Great was the tumult in this contest for the ships, inverting the general custom of both contending parties. For the Lacedæmonians, inflamed and terrified, fought a sea-fight (if it may be so expressed) from the shore: the Athenians, already victorious, and eager to give their good fortune its utmost completion, fought a land-battle from on board. The struggle on both sides was long and laborious, and blood was abundantly shed before the dispute could be ended. But at length the Lacedæmonians recovered all their empty vessels, excepting such as had been taken on the first onset. Each party being retired to their respective posts, the Athenians erected a trophy, and delivered up the dead, and were masters of all the wreck and shatters of the action. Then, without loss of time, they ranged their vessels in circuit quite round the island, and kept a strict watch, as having intercepted the body of men which was posted there. But the Peloponnesians on the main-land, with the accession of their auxiliaries who had now joined them, remained upon the opposite shore near Pylus.

When the news of this action at Pylus was brought to Sparta, it was resolved, as the great calamity was so urgent, that the magistrates in person should repair to the camp, and consult upon the very spot what resource they had left. And when their own eyes had showed them the impossibility of relieving their men, and they were loath to leave them in the wretched extremity either of perishing by famine, or, overpowered by superior numbers, of being shamefully made prisoners, it was concluded "to send to the Athenian commanders to ask a suspension of arms at Pylus, whilst they despatched an embassy to Athens to procure an accommodation, and to obtain leave as soon as possible to fetch off their Spartans." These commanders accepting the proposal, the suspension was agreed upon on the following conditions:

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"That the Lacedæmonians should immediately deliver up the ships in which they had fought; and all the ships of war in general, which they had any where in Laconia, they should bring to Pylus, and deliver up to the Athenians. That they should refrain from making any attempt whatever upon the fortress, either by sea or land.

"That the Athenians should permit the Lacedæmonians on the main-land to carry over a stated quantity of provisions to those in the island, two Attic chœnixes¹ of meal, with two cotyls of wine, and a piece of flesh, for every Spartan, and a moiety of each for every servant. These provisions to be carried thither under the inspection of the Athenians: and no vessels whatever to cross over without permission.

"That the Athenians, notwithstanding, be at liberty to continue their guard round the island, but not to land upon it: and should refrain from giving any annoyance to the army of the Peloponnesians, either by sea or land.

"That if either party should violate these conditions, either in the whole or any part whatever, the truce to be immediately void; otherwise, to continue in force till the return of the Lacedæmonian embassy from Athens.

"That the Athenians should convey that embassy thither and back again in a trireme.

"That upon their return the truce should be ended, when the Athenians should restore the ships now delivered to them, in the same number and condition as they were in before."

On these conditions a suspension of arms took place, in pursuance of which the ships were delivered up to the number of sixty, and the ambassadors despatched away, who arriving at Athens, addressed themselves as followeth:—

"Hither, O Athenians, we are sent on the part of the Lacedæmonians, to negotiate with you in behalf of their citizens in the island, and to propose an expedient which will tend very much to your advantage, and will at the same time preserve as much as possible our own honour in the great calamity with which we are at present beset. It is not our purpose to run out into a long unaccustomed flow of words. We shall adhere to the rule of our country, to

spare many words where few may suffice; and then only to enlarge, when the important occasion requireth an exact detail for the more judicious regulation of necessary acts. Resolving therefore our discourse with an attention devoid of enmity. Be informed as men of understanding ought: and conclude that you are only to be put in mind of that judicious method of procedure, of which yourselves are such competent judges.

"You have now an opportunity at hand to improve a present success to your own interest and credit, to secure the possession of what you have hitherto acquired, and to add to it with the accession of honour and glory. You are only to avoid that insolence of mind so frequent to men who have been, till the present, strangers to success. Such men are ever to presume too much on larger acquisitions, though merely because their present prospect was beyond their expectation: whilst they, who have experienced the frequent vicissitudes of fortune, have gained a more judicious temper, and presume the least upon continuance of success. And there is the highest reason to conclude, that experience hath improved the commonwealth of Athens: and us Lacedæmonians in this piece of wisdom, much more than any other people.

"But be assured of it now, when you behold the calamities with which we are at present environed; we, who are invested with the highest honours and dignity of Greece, at this moment addressing ourselves to you, begging such favours as we formerly thought we were more peculiarly lodged in our own dispensation. Not that we are thus reduced through failure of our strength, or that our former strength too haughtily exerted, is merely through the weight of such unforeseen disasters as continually happen, and which the whole of mankind alike are ever subject to. And from hence it is right that you should learn, amidst the present strength of your state, and its late acquisitions, that fortune may always declare upon your side. Wise indeed are they, who in their estimates of success make judicious allowances for chance. Such are best able to bear the alternative of a calamity with prudence and temper. Such will form their judgments of war, not at an infallible means of accomplishing what scheme they please to undertake, but at deriving its effects from the guidance of fortune.

¹ More than two pints of meal, and one pint of wine, English measure.

Such are the persons who are most of all exempted from fatal miscarriages; because they are not puffed up by presuming too far on present prosperity, and would gladly acquiesce in the peaceable enjoyment of what they now possess.

"It concerns your honour, Athenians, to deal in this manner with us, lest, in case you now reject our proposals, when you yourselves in future times miscarry (many such events must happen), your present good fortune may then be perversely ascribed to chance, even though you are now able to deliver down to posterity the fame of your power and moderation beyond a possibility of blemish. The Lacedæmonians invite you to agreement, and a conclusion of the war. They offer you peace and alliance, nay friendship in its whole extent, and the exchange of good offices mutually revived; demanding nothing in return but their citizens out of the island. To this step they have condescended rather than be exposed to the dangers incidental on either side, should they either seize some favourable opportunity to force their escape by arms, or holding out to the last against your blockade, be reduced with all the aggravations of defeat. Great enmities, in our opinion, may the soonest be brought to a firm determination—not when either party having exerted all their strength, and gained the far greater superiority in war, disdains the fair accommodation, and relieth on that forced acquiescence which necessitated oaths impose; but rather, when, though victory be within their reach, they recollect humanity, and having succeeded by valour quite beyond their expectations, determine the contest with temper and moderation. Then the foe, who hath not felt the extremity of force, is henceforth disarmed by the strength of gratitude, and is more securely bound by the affections of his own mind to abide for the future by all his compacts. Such ready deference mankind are more apt to show towards those who have been with a remarkable superiority their enemies, than to such as they have opposed in more equal competition. It is natural when men take the method of voluntary submission, for the pleasing contest of generosity to be kindled between them; but to hazard the last extremities and even grow desperate against that haughtiness which will not relent.

"Now, if ever, is the crisis come to effect such a pleasing reconciliation between us both,

before the intervention of some incurable event to ulcerate our passions, which may lay us under the sad necessity of maintaining an eternal enmity both public and private in regard to you, and you lose the benefit of those advantageous offers we now lay within your option.

Whilst the event is yet undetermined, whilst the acquisition of glory and of our friendship is within your reach, whilst yet we only feel the weight of a supportable calamity, and are clear from foul disgrace, let us now be mutually reconciled; let us give the preference to peace over war, and effectuate a cessation of miseries to the other Grecians. The honour of such an event will by them be more abundantly ascribed to you. At present they are engaged in a perplexing warfare, unable yet to pronounce its authors. But in case a reconciliation now take place, a point for the most part within your decision, they will gratefully acknowledge you for generous benefactors.

"If then you thus determine, you gain an opportunity to render the Lacedæmonians your firm and lasting friends, since now they request your friendship, and choose to be obliged rather than compelled. Reflect within yourselves how many benefits must in all probability result from such a lucky coincidence. For you cannot but know, that when we and you shall act with unanimity, the rest of Greece, conscious of inferiority, will pay us the utmost honour and regard."

The Lacedæmonians talked in this strain upon the presumption, that the Athenians had formerly been desirous of peace, and had been obstructed merely through their opposition; but now, thus freely tendered, they would accept it with joy, and give up the men. The Athenians, on the contrary, reckoning the Spartans in the island already in their power, imagined that a peace would be at any time in their own option, and were now very eager to improve their present success. But such a measure was insisted upon most of all by Cleon the son of Cnæmetus, the greatest demagogue at this time, and most in credit with the people. It was he who persuaded them to return the following answer.

"That, previous to all accommodation, the Spartans shut up in the island must deliver up their arms and their persons, and be brought prisoners to Athens. When this was done, and the Lacedæmonians had surrendered Nisæa and Pegæ, and Trozæne and Chalcis, (of which

places they had not possessed themselves by arms, but in pursuance of a former treaty, when distress exacted compliance from the Athenians, and they had been obliged upon any terms to purchase peace,) then they might fetch away their countrymen, and conclude a peace for whatever term both parties should agree."

To this answer the Lacedæmonians made no direct reply,¹ they only requested that a committee might be appointed, with whom, after the arguments on each side should be freely offered and discussed, they might agree upon some expedient to mutual satisfaction. Cleon upon this broke out into loud invectives against them, affirming, "he knew beforehand that they intended nothing just or fair; but now their view was manifest to all, as they had absolutely refused to have any transactions with the body of the people, and had thus expressed a desire to negotiate with a small committee: if their views were fair and upright, he called upon them to explain themselves, in the presence of all." But the Lacedæmonians, perceiving that nothing they could urge would have any influence on the people, and in case, to ward off the distress they feared, they should make too large proposals, these offered and unaccepted, would expose them to the censure of their confederates; and that further, the Athenians would not comply with their demand on any reasonable terms; they broke off all further conference, and quitted Athens. The very moment they return to Pylus, the truce was at an end. The Lacedæmonians re-demanded their ships, according to the article for that purpose agreed on. But the Athenians objecting some infractions to them, such as an incursion towards the fortress, expressly prohibited by the articles, and some other matters of little consequence, absolutely refused a restitution. They justified the refusal upon this express stipulation between them, that "if the conditions were in any degree violated, the truce should immediately be void." The Lacedæmonians protested against these proceedings, and charging the detention of their ships with the highest injus-

tice, broke off all further debate and prepared for war.

Pylus was now the scene in which both these warring parties exerted their utmost efforts. The Athenians sailed the whole day round the island with two ships in an opposite course; in the night, their whole fleet was stationed round it upon guard, except on that side towards the main sea when the weather was tempestuous. And to strengthen their guard they had now received a reinforcement of twenty sail from Athens, so that the number of their shipping amounted in the whole to seventy. The Peloponnesians maintained their post on the continent, and made frequent assaults upon the fort: intent all along to seize the first favourable opportunity, and to accomplish the preservation of their countrymen.

In Sicily, this while, the Syracusans and confederates, augmenting the number of their guard-ships on the station of Messene with another squadron they had since equipped, from Messene renewed the war. The Locrians spared no pains to spur them on from the great aversion they bore to the Rhegians. They had now broke into the territories of the latter with their whole force. They had even a mind to hazard a naval engagement against them, as they saw the number of Athenian ships at hand to be very inconsiderable, and had received intelligence that the larger numbers designed for this service were stopped for the present to block up the isle of Sphacteria. For should they once get the better at sea, they hoped, as they then might attack Rhegium both by sea and land, to find it an easy conquest, and so the posture of their own affairs would be considerably strengthened. For as Rhegium, which is a promontory of Italy, lies at a very small distance from Messene in Sicily, they could thus prevent the approach of the Athenians, and be entirely masters of the strait. This strait is that part of the sea which runs between Rhegium and Messene, and over which lies the shortest cut from Sicily to the continent. This the place which was formerly called Charybdis, and through which Ulysses is said to have sailed. As the current here sets in strongly from two great seas, the Tyrrhene and Sicilian, and runs with great rapidity, it is not at all strange that it should have been esteemed a dangerous passage.

Yet in the very middle of this strait the Syracusans and confederates, with a number of

¹ Diodorus Siculus, l. 12. says further, That the Lacedæmonian ambassadors offered to set at liberty an equal number of Athenians, who were now their prisoners. And, when this offer was rejected, the ambassadors replied freely, "It was plain they set a higher value on Spartans than on their own citizens, since they judged an equal number of the latter not to be an equivalent."

ships little more than thirty, were forced to engage in the evening of the day, the dispute beginning about a vessel that was passing through. They stood away to oppose sixteen sail of Athenians and eight of Rhegians. They were worsted by the Athenians; but each side separated in hurry and confusion, just as they could, to their several stations at Messene and Rhegium. They lost one ship in this action, which was stopped by the sudden approach of night.

But after this the Locrians evacuated the territory of Rhegium, and the whole collected fleet of the Syracusans and confederates, took a new station at Peloris of Messene, and their whole land-force attended. The Athenians and Rhegians sailing up to their station, and finding none at present on board the ships, rushed in amongst them. Yet they lost one of their own vessels by the force of a grappling-iron fastened upon it, the crew of which was saved by swimming. Immediately after this the Syracusans got on board, and being towed along the shore towards Messene, the Athenians came up again to attack them; but, the enemy running off into the deep and giving the first charge, they lose another of their ships. Though continuing to be towed along the shore, and to charge in this manner, yet the Syracusans, without suffering any loss, got safe into the harbour of Messene. And now the Athenians, having received intelligence that Camarina was betrayed to the Syracusans by Archias and his accomplices, stood away for that place.

In the meanwhile the Messenians, with their whole force by land, and accompanied by their ships, marched away against Chalcidic Naxos, which bordered upon their own territory. The first day they force the Naxians to shelter themselves behind their walls, and then they plundered the country. The day following, sailing up the river Acesine, they plundered along the shore, and with their land-force made an assault upon the city. The Siculi, who live upon the mountains, were now pouring down in numbers to repel the Messenians. This the Naxians perceiving, became more outrageous, and animating one another with the thought that the Leontines and their other Greek allies were now marching to their relief, they suddenly sally out of the city and fall upon the Messenians, whom they put to flight, and slaughtered more than a thousand of them;

the remainder with difficulty, escaping to their own homes: for the barbarians attacked them upon their road, and made great havoc of them. The ships upon the station of Messene broke up soon after, withdrawing respectively to their own harbours.

Immediately the Leontines and allies, in concert with the Athenians, appeared before Messene, as now reduced to a very low ebb. They assaulted it on all sides; the Athenians making their attempt from their ships on the side of the harbour, whilst the land-forces did the same on the body of the place. But the Messenians, and a party of Locrians commanded by Demoteles, who after their late blow had been left there for the security of the place, made a sudden sally from the city, and falling unexpectedly on the army of the Leontines, put the greater part to flight, and did great execution upon them. This was no sooner perceived by the Athenians, than they threw themselves ashore to succour their confederates, and falling in with the Messenians, who had lost the order of their battle, drove them again behind their walls. This done, having erected a trophy, they put over to Rhegium. And after this, the Grecians of Sicily continued a land war against one another, in which the Athenians had no participation.

At Pylus, the Athenians still kept the Lacedæmonians blocked up in the island, and the army of the Peloponnesians remained in their old post upon the continent, in a state of inactivity. Their constant guard subjected the Athenians to excessive hardships, since provisions and fresh water were equally scarce. There was but one single fountain for their use, which lay within the fortress of Pylus, and yielded but a slender quantity of water. The majority of them were forced to dig into the gravel upon the beach of the sea, and take up with such water as could thus be got. They were further very much straitened in their station for want of room. They had not road enough for their ships to ride in with tolerable convenience, so that alternately one division lay ashore to take their necessary repasts, whilst the other launched more to sea. But what discouraged them most was the length of the blockade, so contrary to what they had expected. They had imagined a few days' siege would have worn out a body of men shut up in a barren island, and having only salt water for their drink. But this had been redressed by the Lacedæ-

monians, who had by a public edict encouraged all who were willing to carry over into the island meal, and wine, and cheese, and any other eatable which might enable them to hold out, assigning a large pecuniary reward for any successful attempt of this nature, and promising freedom to every Helot who carried them provisions. This was performed through a series of dangers by several; but the Helots were most active of all, who putting off from Peloponnesus (wherever they chanced to be) landed by favour of the dark on the side of the island which lies upon the main-sea. Their chief precaution was to run over in a hard gale of wind. For whenever the wind blew from the sea, they were in less danger of being discovered by the guard of triremes, which then could not safely lie quite round the island. In executing this service, they put every thing to hazard. As a prior valuation had been given in, they run their vessels on shore at all adventures; and the heavy-armed soldiers were ready to receive them at every place most convenient for landing. Those, however, who ventured out when the weather was calm, were certainly intercepted. Such, further, as were expert at diving, swam over through the harbour, dragging after them by a string bottles filled with poppies mixed up with honey and the powder of linseed. These for a time escaped discovery, but were afterwards closely watched. No artifice was left unpractised on either side; some being ever intent to carry provisions over, and other to intercept them.

At Athens, in the meantime, the people, being informed of the hardships to which their own forces are reduced, and that those in the island receive supplies of provisions, were perplexed how to act. They were full of apprehensions lest the winter should put a stop to their siege, being conscious of the impossibility of procuring them subsistence from any part of Peloponnesus; and more so, as the soil about them was barren, and that even in summer they were not able to furnish them with necessary supplies; that further, as no harbours were in the parts adjacent, there would be no commodious road for their shipping; so that, in case they relaxed their guard, the besieged would go securely away; or otherwise, they might get off, by the favour of stormy weather, in those vessels which brought over provisions. But they were most of all alarmed at the conduct of the Lacedæmonians, who because they

had now a safe resource in prospect, had discontinued all manner of negotiation. In a word they highly repented the refusal of their former offers.

Cleon, conscious to himself that the blame of baffling that accommodation would be thrown upon him, taxed them who brought the last advices as broachers of falsehoods. But those who had been sent to make the report, demanded, "since they could not be credited, that a deputation might be sent to know its truth." For which office Cleon himself was nominated by the Athenians, in conjunction with Theogenes.

But now he plainly saw that he must either be necessitated to make the same report as those had done whom he had charged with falsehood; or, should he report differently, must soon be convicted of a lie. He perceived also, that the inclinations of the people were mostly bent on an ample reinforcement; upon which he ventured to give them this further advice—That "sending a deputation on such an errand was quite superfluous, since opportunities might be lost by so dilatory a measure: if they were really convinced of the truth of the report, they should at once put to sea against their enemies." He then proceeded to a malicious glance against Nicias son of Niceratus, who at that time presided over the military affairs. He hated him, and sneered him thus—That "if their generals were really men, it would be an easy matter to sail thither with an additional strength, and make a seizure of those in the island; for his own part, was he in command, he would do it in a trice." The Athenians began immediately to clamour and rail at Cleon, for not instantly setting about that enterprise himself, which to him appeared so easy. This Nicias laying hold of, chagrined at the same time by the sneer upon himself, called upon him aloud—"To take what force he pleased, and to perform the service in his stead." Cleon, imagining this to be a mere verbal offer, declared himself ready. But when he found that Nicias was earnest in the point of resignation, he drew back, alleging, that "it could not be, since not he but Nicias was general." He trembled now, since he never suspected that the other would venture to give up his office to him. Nicias however called a second upon him, and formally surrendered his office to him, so far as related to Pylus, desiring the Athenians to be

his witnesses. The people now, for such is the temper of the multitude, the more pains Cleon took to decline the voyage, and disentangle himself from his own bravados, called out so much the more vehemently upon Nicias to give up the command, and roared aloud at the other to go on board. Unable now to extricate himself, he intimates his acceptance of the employ, and standing forth, averred, that "he was not under the least dread of the Lacedæmonians; would not be accompanied by so much as one Athenian, but would take only what Lemnians and Imbrians were at hand, and those targeteers who were come to their aid from Ænus, and the four hundred archers from other places. With these, he said, added to the military force already at Pylus, he would either in the space of twenty days bring off all the Lacedæmonians alive, or put them all to death upon the spot."

This big way of talking raised a laugh among the people; all men of sense however were not a little delighted. They concluded, they should compass by it one of these two desirable ends; either to rid themselves effectually of Cleon, which they chiefly expected; or, should they be disappointed of this, to get those Lacedæmonians into their power.¹

¹ The honour of Athens was very deeply concerned in the point, which had been the subject of this day's debate in the assembly of the people, and yet it hath turned out a mere comic scene. The dignity of the republic had never been well supported on these occasions, since the death of Pericles. Cleon had introduced all kinds of drollery and scurrility into the debates; and it was now become quite the same thing to the people, whether they laughed with or laughed at him. He hath now rallied Nicias, though none but a person of so diffident and fearful a temper as Nicias could so have been rallied, out of an honourable command; and then is laughed himself into it, and though an arrant poltroon is metamorphosed into a general of the first class, and soon after swells into a very hero. However, the Athenian good sense, whatever turn Thucydides gives it, can hardly be justified on this occasion, in thrusting so important a commission upon Cleon purely for a joke. Plutarch says, they always bore his impertinent and mad way of talking, because it was humorous and diverting. Once, when the assembly had been met some time, and the people had sat long expecting his coming, at length he made his appearance with a garland on his head, and begged the favour of them to adjourn till the morrow, "For, at present, said he, I am not at leisure, since I have sacrificed to-day, and must entertain my friends." A loud laugh ensued at his impudence, and then they rose and adjourned. This affair of Pylus, was, however, far from a jocular point; and the Athenians might have paid very dear for their mirth, had not Cleon been wise enough to associate Demosthenes with him in the command.

Having thus transacted the requisite points in the public assembly, where the Athenians had awarded the expedition to him by a formal decree, and Demosthenes, at Cleon's own request, was joined in the commission of commanders at Pylus, he hastened to his post with the utmost speed. His reason for associating Demosthenes in the command, was owing to some notice received that he was bent on landing upon the island; as the soldiers, terribly incommoded by the straitness of their stations, and resembling besieged more than besiegers, were eager for this bold adventure. Demosthenes was animated more to the attempt because the island had lately been set on fire. Before this accident, as it had been quite covered over with wood, and was pathless, because ever uninhabited, he durst not think of such a step, and judged all these circumstances, to be for the enemy's advantage. For, though a more numerous army should have landed against them, they were enabled terribly to annoy them from posts undescried. What errors might be committed, or how large their strength, might be more easily concealed on that side by the covert of the woods; whereas all the errors of his own army would lie clear and open to observation, when the enemy might suddenly attack, and in what quarter they pleased, since battle must be entirely in their own option. On the other side, should he force them to a close engagement on rough and woody ground, the smaller number by being skilled in the passes, he imagined, must prove too hard for a superior number without such experience; that by this means his own force, merely on account of its numbers, might be imperceptibly destroyed, as it could not be discerned which part of it was hardest pressed, and stood most in need of support.

These inward suggestions were more prevalent in the mind of Demosthenes from the remembrance of his Ætolian defeat, which was partly owing to the woods amongst which he engaged. But as the narrowness of their station had necessitated his soldiers to land sometimes upon the skirts of the island, and under the cover of an advanced guard, to dress their repast, a soldier, though entirely without design, set the wood on fire, which spread but slowly, till a brisk gale happening to arise, the greatest part of it was unexpectedly destroyed by the flames. Demosthenes, having gained by this means a clearer view of the Lacedæmo-

nians, found them more numerous than from the quantity of victuals sent in by stipulation, he was used to compute them. He then judged it highly to concern the Athenians to exert their utmost efforts: and, as the island was now become more opportune for a descent, he got every thing in readiness for its execution, having sent for a supply of men from the adjacent confederates, and busied himself about all the dispositions needful for success. He had further received an express from Cleon notifying his approach, who now, at the head of the supply he himself had demanded, arriveth at Pylus. No sooner were they joined, than they despatched a herald to the camp on the continent, demanding, "Whether they were willing to order their people in the island to surrender their arms and persons, without risking extremities, on condition to be kept under an easy confinement till the whole dispute could be properly accommodated?"—This being positively refused, they remained quiet one day longer; but on the succeeding day, having embarked their whole strength of heavy-armed on board a few vessels, they put out by night, and a little before the ensuing dawn, landed on each side of the island, both from the main sea and the harbour, amounting in the whole to eight hundred men in heavy armour. They advanced with their utmost speed towards the first guard on the island. This was done in pursuance of a previous disposition: for this first guard consisted of about thirty heavy-armed: the main body under Epitadas was posted about the centre, where the ground was most level and watery: and another party guarded the extremity of the island facing Pylus, which, towards the sea, was a rocky cliff, and by land, altogether impregnable. On the top, further, of this cliff was seated a fort, built some ages before of stones picked carefully for the purpose. This they judged might be serviceable to them, should they be forced to shelter themselves from superior violence. In this manner was the enemy posted.

The Athenians immediately, in their first career, put the whole advanced guard to the sword, having-surprised them yet in their huts, and but seeking to lay hold of their arms. Their landing was yet undiscovered, since the enemy judged their vessels to be only the usual guard which was every night in motion.

No sooner also was the dawn completely

broke, than the remainder of the Athenian force was landed from a number of vessels, somewhat more than seventy. All the mariners came ashore, in their respective distinctions of arms, excepting the rowers of the lowest bench.¹ They were eight hundred archers, and a body no less numerous of targeteers. The Messenian auxiliaries attended, and all in general who had been employed at Pylus, except such as were necessarily detained for the guard of the fortress.

According to disposition formed by Demosthenes, they advanced in separate bodies, consisting of near two hundred, more or less, and took possession of all the eminences. The design was, thus to reduce the enemy to a plunge of distress by surrounding them on all sides, and puzzling them in their choice which party first to make head against, that at the sight of numbers on all sides they might be quite confounded; and, should they then attack the body in their front, they might be harassed by those in their rear; or should they wheel towards those on either flank, they might be exposed to the bodies both in front and rear. Which way soever the enemy might turn, they were sure to have behind them the light-armed and less martial of their opponents, infesting them with their bows, and darts, and stones. These would do execution from a distance: an enemy could not possibly engage with them; since even flying they would prevail, and when the enemy retreated would return briskly to their work. With so much address had Demosthenes previously planned the order of landing, and in close adherence to it brought them now to action.

The body commanded by Epitadas, and which was the bulk of the whole force in the island, when they saw their advanced guard entirely cut off, and the enemy advancing to attack

¹ It is in the original, excepting the Thalamil. The rowers on the different benches were distinguished by a peculiar name. Those of the uppermost were called Tharnitæ; those of the middle, Zeugitæ; and those of the lowest, Thalamil. The labour of the Thalamil was the least, though most constant, because of their nearness to the water, and the shortness of their oars. Much more strength and skill were required on the upper benches, and most of all on the uppermost, who for that reason had better pay. Those on the lowest bench seem to have been mere drudges at the oar, and qualified for nothing better; the others were more complete seamen, and ready on all occasions for the duty both of rowing and fighting.

them next, drew up in order and marched towards the heavy-armed of the Athenians, designing to engage them. For the latter were so placed as to oppose them in front; the light-armed were posted on either of their flanks, and in the rear. But against these heavy-armed they could not possibly come to action, nor gain an opportunity to exert their own distinguishing skill. For the light-armed pouring in their darts on either of their flanks, compelled them to halt; and their opposites would not move forward to meet them, but stood quiet in their posts. Such indeed of the light-armed, as adventured in any quarter to run up near their ranks, were instantly put to flight; however, they soon faced about and continued their annoyance. They were not encumbered with any weight of armour; their agility easily conveyed them beyond the reach of danger, as the ground was rough, and ever left desert had never been levelled by culture. In such spots the Lacedæmonians, under the load of their arms, could not possibly pursue. In this kind of skirmish, therefore, they were for a small space of time engaged.

When the Lacedæmonians had no longer sufficient agility to check the attacks of these skirmishing parties, the light-armed soon took notice that they slackened in their endeavours to beat them off. It was then, that their own appearance, many times more large than that of their foes, and the very sight of themselves began to animate them with excess of courage. Experience had now lessened that terror in which they had been used to regard this foe. They now had met with no rough reception from them, which fell out quite contrary to what they firmly expected at their first landing, when their spirits had sunk very low at the thought, that it was against Lacedæmonians. Contempt ensued; and embodying, with a loud shout they rushed upon them; pouring in stones and arrows and darts, whatever came first to hand. At such a shout, accompanied with so impetuous a charge, astonishment seized their foes, quite unpractised in such a form of engagement; at the same time the ashes of the wood, which had been burnt, were mounting largely into the air. So that now each lost sight of what was close before him, under the showers of darts and stones thrown by such numbers, and whirling along in a cloud of dust.

Amidst so many difficulties the Lacedæmo-

nians now were sorely distressed. The safeguards on their heads and breasts were no longer proof against the arrows, and their javelins were broke to pieces when poised for throwing. They were quite at a loss for some means of defence; they were debarred the prospect of what was passing just before them; and the shouts of the enemy were so loud that they could no longer hear any orders. Dangers thus surrounding them on all sides, they quite despaired of the possibility of such resistance as might earn their safety. At last, a great part of that body being wounded, because obliged to adhere firmly to the spot on which they stood, embodying close, they retreated towards the fort on the skirt of the island, which lay at no great distance, and to their guard which was posted there. But when once they began to move off, the light-armed, growing more resolute and shouting louder than ever, pressed hard upon their retreat; and whatever Lacedæmonian fell within their reach, in the whole course of the retreat, was instantly slaughtered. The bulk of them with difficulty recovered the fort, and in concert with the guard posted there drew up in order to defend it, in whatever quarter it might possibly be assaulted. The Athenians, speedily coming up, were hindered by the natural site of the place from forming a circle and besetting it on all sides. Advancing therefore directly forwards, they endeavoured to beat the defendants off. Thus, for a long time, for the greatest part of the day, both sides persisted in the contest, under the painful pressures of battle and thirst and a burning sun. No efforts were spared by the assailants to drive them from the eminence; nor by the defendants to maintain their post. But here the Lacedæmonians defended themselves with more ease than in the preceding engagement, because now they could not be encompassed on their flanks.

When the dispute could not thus be brought to a decision, the commander of the Messenians, addressing himself to Cleon and Demosthenes, assured them, "they took a deal of pains to no manner of purpose; but would they be persuaded to put under his guidance a party of the archers and light-armed, to get a round about way on the enemies' rear by a tract which he himself could find, he was confident he could force an entrance." Having received the party he demanded, marching off from a spot undescried by the Lacedæmonians, in order to con-

ceal the motion, and continuing to mount higher and higher along the ridge of rock that lay upon the verge of the island, in the quarter where the Lacedæmonians, depending upon its natural strength, had placed no guard, with great difficulty and fatigue he got behind them undiscovered. Now showing himself on a sudden upon the summit and in their rear, he astonished the enemy with this unexpected appearance; and his friends, who now beheld what they so earnestly looked for, he very much emboldened. The Lacedæmonians were now exposed to the missive weapons on both sides; and (if a point of less consequence may be compared to one of greater) were in a state parallel to that of their countrymen at Thermopylæ.¹ For those being hemmed in by the Persians in a narrow pass, were utterly destroyed: these now, in like manner beset on both sides, were no longer able to contend. Being but a handful of men opposed to superior numbers, and much weakened in their bodies for want of food, they quitted their post. And thus the Athenians became masters of all the approaches.

But Cleon and Demosthenes, assuredly convinced that should the foe give way too fast, it would only conduce to their expeditious slaughter under the fury of the victorious troops, began to stop their fury, and to draw off their men. They were desirous to carry them alive to Athens, in case they would so far hearken to the voice of a herald as to throw down their arms dejected as they must be in spirit and overpowered with the instant danger. It was accordingly proclaimed, that "such as were willing should deliver up their arms and their persons to the Athenians, to be disposed of at discretion."

When this was heard, the greater number threw down their bucklers and waved their hands, in token of accepting the proposal. A suspension of arms immediately took place, and a conference was held between Cleon and Demosthenes on one side, and Styphon the son

of Pharax on the other. Of those who had preceded in the command, Epitadas, who was the first, had been slain, and Hippagretes, who was his successor, lying as dead among the slain, though he had yet life in him, Styphon was now the third appointed to take the command upon him, according to the provision made by their law, in case their generals drop. Styphon intimated his desire of leave to send over to the Lacedæmonians on the continent for advice. This the Athenians refused, but however called over some heralds to him from the continent. Messages passed backwards and forwards twice or thrice; but the last who crossed over to them from the Lacedæmonians on the continent brought this determination,—“The Lacedæmonians permit you to take care of your own concerns, provided you submit to nothing base.” In consequence of this, after a short consultation with one another apart, they delivered up their arms and their persons. The remainder of the day and the succeeding night the Athenians confined them under a strong guard. But the day following, having erected a trophy upon the island, they got themselves in readiness to sail away, and distributed the prisoners to the custody of the captains of the triremes. The Lacedæmonians, having obtained permission by a herald, fetched off their dead.

The number of those who were slain, and those who were taken alive, stood thus: they who had thrown themselves into the island amounted in the whole to four hundred and twenty heavy-armed. Of these three hundred wanting eight were carried off alive, the rest had been destroyed. Among the prisoners were about one hundred and twenty Spartans. The number of Athenians slain was inconsiderable: for it was not a standing fight. The whole space that these men were besieged in the island, from the engagement at sea, till the battle in the island, was seventy-two days. Twenty of these during the absence of the ambassadors to negotiate an accommodation, they were supplied with food: the remainder of the time, they were fed by such as got over by stealth. Nay, meal and other eatables were found in the island, even when all was over. Their commander Epitadas had made a more sparing distribution than his stores required.

Now the Athenians and Peloponnesians respectively drew off their forces from Pylos to return home: and the promise of

¹ The famous three hundred Spartans with king Leonidas at their head, who stopped the vast army of Xerxes at the pass of Thermopylæ, and at length perished all to a man. They were all afterwards entombed on the spot where they fell with this short epitaph:—

Tell, traveller, at Sparta what you saw,
That here we lie obedient to her law.

The same spirit and resolution was at this time generally expected from the Spartans, now encompassed round about by their enemies, in the Isle of Sphacteria.

Cleon, mad as it had been, was fully executed. For within the twenty days, he brought them prisoners to Athens, and made his words good.¹

The expectation of Greece was more disappointed by this event, than by any other occurrence whatever in the series of the war. It was generally presumed that neither famine nor any extremity could have reduced these Lacedæmonians to deliver up their arms, but that, sword in hand and fighting to the last gasp, they would have bravely perished. They could not afterwards believe that those who surrendered were like to those who were slain. Some time after, a soldier in one of the confederate bands of the Athenians, demanding with a sneer of one of them who were taken prisoners in the island, "if the slain were not of true gallantry and courage?" the other replied, that "a spindle (by which he meant an arrow) would be valuable indeed, if it knew how to distinguish the brave;" intimating by this answer, that the slain were such as stones and darts despatched in the medley of battle.

When the prisoners were brought to Athens, it was the public resolution there "to keep them in bonds, till some definitive treaty could be agreed on. And if, previously to this, the Peloponnesians should repeat their inroad into the Attic territory, they should all undergo a public execution." They established also a garrison for Pylus. And the Messenians of Naupactus sending thither the most proper of their own people, as into their own native country (for Pylus is a part of the ancient Messenia,) infested Laconia with depredations and did them vast damage, the more because they spoke the same dialect.²

As for the Lacedæmonians, who never knew before what it was to be thus plundered, war

in such a shape being new to them, and their Helots deserting continually to the foe; apprehensive farther, lest such unusual proceedings within their own district might draw worse consequences after them—they had a painful sense of their present situation. This compelled them to send their embassies to Athens, desirous however at the same time to conceal what they really thought of their own state, and spare no artifice for the recovery of Pylus and their people. But the Athenians grew more unreasonable in their demands, and after many journeys to and fro, sent them finally away with an absolute denial. Such was the course of proceedings in relation to Pylus.

The same summer, and immediately on the close of the former event, the Athenians set out to invade Corinth with a fleet of eighty ships which carried two thousand heavy-armed of their own people, and, with some horse- transports, on board of which were two hundred horsemen. They were also attended by some of their confederates, by the Milesians, and Andrians, and Carysthians. Nicias the son of Niceratus with two colleagues commanded this armament. At the early dawn of morning they came to anchor between Ceresus and Reitus, on the shore of that place which the Solygian hill overhangs, of which formerly the Dorians possessing themselves made war upon the Corinthians then in Corinth who were of Æolian descent. Upon that eminence there is now a village called Solygia. From the shore where the armament came now to anchor, this village was distant about twelve,³ the city of Corinth sixty,⁴ and the isthmus twenty stadia.⁵

The Corinthians, who had already been advised from Argos of the approach of the Athenian armament, had long since by way of prevention drawn their whole force together at the isthmus, excepting what was in employ without the isthmus, and the five hundred absent in the guard of Ambracia and Leucadia. With all the rest of their people able to bear arms they were posted on the isthmus, to watch the approach of the Athenians. But when the Athenian fleet had passed by undiscovered by favour of the night, and signals notified their approach elsewhere, leaving half their force at Cenchrea to obstruct any at-

¹ It should be added here, that he also robbed for the present a very able and gallant officer of the praise he merited on this occasion. The whole affair of Pylus was planned, carried into execution, and brought to a successful and glorious issue, by the conduct and bravery of Demosthenes. Aristophanes (in the Knights) hath made a low comic character of the latter, and introduced him venting sad complaints against Cleon for pilfering the honour from him. "This Paphlagonian (says he) hath snatched from every one of us whatever nice thing we had got to suit the palate of our Lord and master (the people). 'Tis but the other day, I myself had cooked up a noble party of Lacedæmonians at Pylus, when this vilest of scoundrels came running thither, pilfered it away from me, and hath served it up to table as if it was of his own dressing."

² The Doric.

³ Near one mile and a quarter.

⁴ Six miles.

⁵ Two miles.

tempt of the Athenians upon Crommyon, they marched with all speed against the enemy. Battus, one of their commanders, (for there were two such in the field) at the head of a separate body marched up to the open village of Solygia, in order to defend it, whilst Lycophron with the remainder advanced to the charge. The Corinthians fell first upon the right wing of the Athenians, who were but just landed before Chersonesus, and then proceeded to engage the whole of that army. The action was warm, and fought hand to hand. The right wing, consisting of the Athenians, and also the Carysthians, who were drawn up in the rear, gave the Corinthians a warm reception, and with much difficulty repulsed them. Retreating therefore upwards to a wall built of stone, for the ground was a continued ascent, and being there above the enemy, they annoyed them with stones; and having sung their psæon, rushed down upon them again. The Athenians having stood the shock, they engaged the second time hand to hand. But a band of Corinthians being come up to the support of their own left wing, occasioned the rout of the right wing of the Athenians, and pursued them to the sea-side. But the Athenians and Carysthians now turned again, and beat them off from the ships.

In other parts of the action the dispute was resolute on both sides, especially where the right wing of the Corinthians, with Lycophron at its head, was engaging the left wing of the Athenians. They were apprehensive the enemy would endeavour to force their way to the village of Solygia. For a considerable space the battle was obstinate, neither side giving way; but at length, through the advantage on the Athenian side of being assisted by a party of horse, whereas their opposites had none, the Corinthians were broke and driven up the ascent, were grounding their arms, they came down no more to the charge, but remained in a quiet posture. In this rout of the right wing, numbers of the Corinthians perished, and Lycophron their general. But the rest of the body had the good fortune to make a safe retreat, and so to secure themselves upon the eminence, as they could not be briskly pursued, and were not compelled to move off with precipitation. When the Athenians perceived that the enemy would no more return to the charge, they rifled the bodies of the foes whom they had slain, and carried off their own

dead, and then without loss of time erected their trophy.

That division of the Corinthians, which had been posted at Cenchrea to prevent any attempt upon Crommyon, had the view of the battle intercepted from them by the mountain Oneius. But when they saw the cloud of dust, and thence knew what was doing, they marched full speed towards the spot. The aged inhabitants also, when they are informed of the battle, rushed out of Corinth to succour their own people. The Athenians perceiving the approach of such numerous bodies, and judging them to be succours sent up by the neighbouring Peloponnesians, threw themselves immediately on board their ships, with what spoil they had taken, and the bodies of their own dead excepting two, which not finding in this hurry they left behind. They were no sooner re-embarked than they crossed over to the adjacent islands, from whence they despatched a herald to demand leave, which was granted, to fetch off the dead bodies they had left behind.¹

The number of Corinthians slain in the battle was two hundred and twelve; that of Athenians somewhat less than fifty.

The Athenians, leaving the islands, appeared the same day before Crommyon, situated in its territory, and distant from the city of Corinth one hundred and twenty stadia.² They landed and ravaged the country, and that night reposed themselves there. The day following they sailed along the coast, first to Epidaurus; and, after a kind of descent there, arrived at

¹ This incident is related by Plutarch, in the life of Nicias, as a proof of the great piety and humanity of Nicias. His asking leave to fetch off these two bodies was, according to that writer, an actual renunciation of the victory; since it was against all rules, for persons who had condescended to such a submission, to erect a trophy. But, without disparaging the good qualities of Nicias, or his obedience to the institutions of his country in regard to the dead, which were ever most sacredly observed, it may be questioned, whether he renounced the victory on this occasion. Thucydides says, the trophy was already erected, which ascertained, without doubt, the honour of the victory, and nothing is said of its demolition by the Corinthians, when they received this request of truce from Nicias. His re-embarking in a hurry seems a distinct affair. It had no connection with the late battle, which had been clearly and fairly won; but was owing to a fresh army coming into the field on the side of the enemy. This stopped him indeed from gaining any fresh honour, but surely did not deprive him of what he was already possessed of.

² About 12 English miles.

Methone, which lies between Epidaurus and Trœzen. Possessing themselves there of the isthmus of Chersonesus on which Methone is situated, they run up a wall across it, and fixed a garrison of continuance in that post, which for the future extended their depredations over all the districts of Trœzen, Halias, and Epidaurus. But the fleet, when once this post was sufficiently secured, sailed away for Athens.

During the space of time which coincided with these transactions, Eurymedon and Sophocles, who with the ships of the Athenians had quitted Pylus to proceed in the voyage to Sicily, arrived at Corcyra. They joined the Corcyreans of the city, marching out against those who were posted on the mount of Istone, that party who repassing soon after the sedition were at this time masters of the country, and committed sad ravage. Accordingly they assaulted that post, and carried it by storm. The defendants, who had fled away in a body towards another eminence, were soon forced to capitulate, "giving up their auxiliaries, and then giving up their own arms, to be proceeded with afterwards at the pleasure of the people of Athens." The commanders removed them all for safe custody into the isle of Ptychia, till they could conveniently be conveyed to Athens, with this proviso, that "if any one person should be caught in any attempt to get off, the whole number should forfeit the benefit of the capitulation."

But the leaders of the populace at Corcyra, apprehending that the Athenians, should they be sent to Athens, might possibly save their lives, contrive the following machination.—They tamper successfully with some of those who were confined in the isle, by the means of some trusty agents whom they sent privately amongst them, and instructed that "with great professions of regard for them, they should insinuate no other resource was left for them but to make their escape with all possible expedition, and that themselves would undertake to provide them with a bark, for it was the certain resolution of the Athenian commanders to give them up to the fury of the Corcyrean populace."—When they had given ear to these suggestions, and were on board the bark thus treacherously provided for them, and so were apprehended in the very act of departure, the articles of capitulation came at once to an end, and they were all given up to the Corcyreans.

Not that the Athenian commanders did not highly contribute to the success of this treachery; since, in order to make it go down more easily, and to lessen the fears of the agents in the plot, they had publicly declared that "the conveyance of those persons to Athens by any other hands would highly chagrin them, because, then, whilst they were attending their duty in Sicily, others would run away with all the honour." The Corcyreans had them no sooner in their power, than they shut them up in a spacious edifice. Hence afterwards they brought them out by twenties, and having formed two lines of soldiers, in all military habiliments, facing one another, they compelled them to walk between the lines, chained one to another, and receiving blows and wounds as they passed along from those who formed the lines, and struck at pleasure so soon as they perceived the objects of their hatred. They were followed by others who carried scourges, and lashed those forwards who moved not readily along. Threescore persons had been brought forth and destroyed in this manner, before those who remained in the edifice became sensible of their fate. For they had hitherto imagined, that those who fetched them out did it merely to shift their confinement. But when they learned the truth from some person or other whom they could not disbelieve, they called out aloud on the Athenians, and implored as a favour to be put to death by them. To stir from the place of their confinement they now absolutely refused, and averred, that to the utmost of their power they would hinder every body from coming in to them. But the Corcyreans had not the least inclination to force an entrance by the doors. They mounted up on the top of the edifice, and tearing off the roof, flung the tiles and shot arrows down upon them. The others protected themselves to the best of their power; and many of them were employed in making away with themselves by cramming the arrows shot from above down their own throats. Others tearing away the cordage from the beds which happened to be within, or twisting such ropes as they could find from shreds of their own garments, so strangled themselves to death. No method was omitted during the greatest part of the night (for night dropped down upon this scene of horror) till, either despatched by their own contrivance, or shot to death by those above, their destruction

was completely finished. So soon as it was day, the Corcyreans having thrown their bodies on heaps into carriages, removed them out of the city. But their wives, so many as had been taken prisoners in company with their husbands, they adjudged to slavery for life.

In this manner the Corcyreans from the mountains were destroyed by the people. And a sedition so extensive was brought to this tragical period, so far at least as relates to the present war. For nothing of the same nature broke out afterwards so remarkable as to need a particular relation.

The Athenians departed from Corcyra, made the best of their way for Sicily, whither they were bound at first setting out, and prosecuted the war there in concert with their allies.

In the close of this summer, the Athenians on the station of Naupactus, marching in junction with the Acarnanians, possessed themselves of Anactorium, a city of the Corinthians, situated on the mouth of the gulf of Ambracia. It was put into their hands by treachery. In consequence of this, the Corinthian inhabitants were ejected, and the place re-peopled by new inhabitants invited thither from all parts of Acarnania. And the summer ended.

The ensuing winter, Aristides, the son of Archippus, one of those who commanded the squadrons which the Athenians had put out to raise contributions among their dependents, apprehended Artaphernes, a noble Persian, at Eion on the river Strymon. He was going to Lacedæmon on a commission from the king. Being conveyed to Athens, the Athenians had his letters, which were wrote in Assyrian, translated and read in public. Their contents were large, but the principal was this passage addressed to the Lacedæmonians, that "he was not yet properly informed what it was they requested of him. For though he had been attended by frequent embassies, yet they did not all agree in their demands. If therefore they were desirous to make an explicit declaration, they should send some of their body to him in company with this Persian." But the Athenians afterwards send Artaphernes back to Ephesus in a trireme, and with an embassy of their own, who meeting at that place with the news that Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes, was lately dead, (for about this

time that monarch died,) the ambassadors returned back to Athens.

The same winter also, the Chians demolished their new fortifications. The Athenians had expressly ordered it, suspecting that they were intent on some innovating schemes. It availed nothing, that they had lately given the Athenians all possible securities, and the strongest assurances that they would in no shape attempt or think of innovations. And thus the winter ended; and with it the seventh year of this war, of which Thucydides has compiled the history, was brought to a conclusion.

YEAR VIII.¹

Early in the following summer, at the time of the new moon, the sun was partially eclipsed; and in the beginning of the same month, the shock of an earthquake was felt.

The fugitives from Mitylene and Lesbos, general, who, to a great number, had sheltered themselves on the continent, assembled in a body, and having hired some additional mercenaries in Peloponnesus, and drawn them off safely from thence, surprise Rhægium; but in consideration of two thousand Phœciæ staters² paid immediately down, they restored it again undamaged. This being done, they marched next against Antandrus, and got possession of it by the treachery of a party within the city, who betrayed it to them. It was farther, their intention to set at liberty the cities styled the Actean, which had formerly been possessed by the Mityleneans, but were now in the hands of the Athenians. But their principal view was the possession of Antandrus, which once effectually secured (for it lay convenient for the building of ships as it had plenty of timber, and mount Pelion stood just above it,) they would then be amply furnished with all the expedients of war, might act offensively from thence, might terribly annoy Lesbos which lies near it, and reduce the Æolian fortresses along the coast. This was the plan which now they were intent to put in execution.

The same summer the Athenians, with a fleet of sixty ships, and taking with them two thousand heavy-armed, a few horsemen, the Milesians, and others of their confederates

¹ Before Christ 424. ² Above 1800*l.* sterling.

made an expedition against Cythera. The command was lodged with Nicias son of Niceratus, Nicostratus son of Diotrophes, and Autocles son of Tolmæus. Cythera is an island: it lies upon the coast of Laconia over-against Malea. The inhabitants are Lacedæmonians, resorting thither from the neighbouring coast. A magistrate was sent over yearly from Sparta by the style of judge of Cythera; the garrison of heavy-armed established there was regularly relieved; and no care omitted in the good government and management of the place. It was the port which their trading ships first entered, in their return from Egypt and Libya. It was the chief security of Laconia against those piratical parties which might infest it from the sea, from whence alone they are capable of doing them any mischief; for by its situation it hath entirely the command of the seas of Sicily and Crete. The Athenian armament therefore arriving here, with a detachment of ten ships and two thousand heavy-armed, surprise a maritime town which is called Scandea. With the rest of their force they made a descent on that part of the island which is opposite to Malea, and advanced towards the city of Cythera, situated also on the sea, and they found immediately that all the inhabitants were drawn out into the field in readiness to receive them. An engagement ensued, wherein the Cythereans maintained their ground for a small space of time, but then turning about, fled again into their citadel. They soon afterwards capitulated with Nicias and his colleagues, submitting to the Athenians at discretion, barring only the penalty of death. Some of the Cythereans had beforehand obtained a conference with Nicias. This rendered the capitulation more easy and expeditious, and not only the present, but all future points were by this means speedily and satisfactorily adjusted. For the Athenians insisted that they should evacuate Cythera, because they were Lacedæmonians, and because the island lay so conveniently on the Laconic coast. The accommodation being once perfected, the Athenians, having secured Scandea, the fortress situated upon the harbour, and fixed a garrison in Cythera, stood away for Asine and Helas, and most of the adjacent places on the coast. There they made descents, and reposing themselves in the nights at the most convenient of

those places, they spent about seven days in ravaging the country.

The Lacedæmonians, though they saw the Athenians had possessed themselves of Cythera, and expected further that they would proceed to make more such descents upon their territories, yet nowhere drew together in a body to repulse them. They only stationed their parties of guard in such posts as were of greatest importance. In other respects they exerted their utmost vigilance, being under apprehensions that the very form of their government was in danger of subversion. Their loss in Sphacteria was unexpected and great indeed. Pylus was now in the hands of the enemy, as was also Cythera. War was bursting in upon them on all sides with irresistible impetuosity. This compelled them, contrary to their usual maxims, to form a body of four hundred horse and archers. If they were ever dejected by the prevalence of fear, at this juncture they were more feelingly so, when they saw the necessity of entering the lists, contrary to all that practice of war to which they had been inured, in a naval contest, and in this against the Athenians, whose passion it was to compute as so much loss, whatever they left unattempted. Their general misfortune besides, which so suddenly and so fast had poured in upon them, had thrown them into the utmost consternation. They excessively dreaded the weight of such another calamity, as they had been sensible of in the blow at Sphacteria. Intimidated thus, they durst no longer think of fighting; nay, whatever measures they concerted, they at once desponded of success, as their minds, accustomed until of late to an uninterrupted career of good fortune, were now foreboding nothing but disappointment. Thus, for the most part whilst the Athenians were extending their devastations all along their coasts, they remained inactive. Each party on guard, though the enemy made a descent in the face of their post, knowing themselves inferior in number, and sadly dispirited, made no offer to check them. One party indeed which was posted near Cortyta and Aphrodisia, perceiving the light-armed of the enemy to be straggling, ran speedily to charge them; but when the heavy-armed advanced to their support, they retreated with so much precipitation, that some (though few) of them were killed and their arms rifled. The

Athenians, after erecting a trophy, re-embarked and repassed to Cythera.

From hence they sailed again along the coast of the Limerian Epidaurus; and, after ravaging part of that district, they arrived at Thyrea, which, though it lies in the district called Cynuria, is the frontier town which parts Argia and Laconia. This place belonged to the Lacedæmonians, who had assigned it for the residence of the exiled Æginetæ, in requital of the services they had done them at the time of the earthquake and the insurrection of the Helots, and further because, though subject to the Athenians they had ever firmly abode in the Lacedæmonian interest. The Æginetæ, thus again invaded by the Athenians, abandoned the fortification upon the sea-side which they were busy in throwing up, and retreated into the city, which was the place of their residence, seated higher up, at the distance of about ten stadia¹ from the shore. A party of Lacedæmonians had been posted there, to assist those who were employed in the new fortification; and yet, though earnestly pressed by the Æginetæ, they refused to accompany them within their walls, being averse to run the risk of a new blockade. They chose rather to retreat towards the eminences, as they judged themselves disabled by the inferiority of their number from facing the enemy, and remained there in a state of inaction.

By this time the Athenians, having completed their landing advanced with their whole force, take Thyrea by storm. They set the city in flames, and destroyed whatever was within it. Such of the Æginetæ as survived the instant carnage, they carried prisoners to Athens; and with them Tantalus son of Patrocles, who commanded there as general for the Lacedæmonians. He had been wounded and so taken prisoner. They also carried thither some few persons whom they had taken in Cythera, such as for its security it was expedient to remove. These the Athenians, after a consultation, decreed "to be disposed of in the islands, but the rest of the Cythereans still to occupy their own land, subjected to the yearly tribute of four talents;² but the Æginetæ, as many as had been taken prisoners, to be all instantly put to death," (to gratify that eternal rancour they bore them,) "and Tantalus to be

kept in prison along with his countrymen taken in Sphacteria."

The same summer a suspension of arms was agreed on in Sicily; first, between the Camarineans and Geloans: and then, the other Sicilians, holding a general congress at Gela, whither the ambassadors from the several states resorted, entered into conferences about the terms of a general reconciliation. Many different expedients were proposed on all sides, and many disputes arose, each insisting on a reparation suitable to their own private sense of grievance. But Hermocrates³ the son of Hermon a Syracusan, who laboured most of any at a firm reunion, delivered his sentiments thus:

"I am here the representative, ye men of Sicily, of one and not the meanest of the Sicilian states nor yet the most exhausted by war; and what I am going to propose is calculated for, and will, I am convinced, most effectually secure the welfare of our common country. And what need is there now to run over in minute detail the calamities inseparable from war, in the hearing of men who have experienced them all? None ever plunge headlong into these, through an utter ignorance of them; nor, when the views are fixed on gratifying ambition, are men used to be deterred by fear. The acquisitions proposed in the latter case, are generally imagined to overbalance dangers: and the former choose rather to submit to hazards, than suffer diminution of their present enjoyments. Yet where the parties actuated by these different views, embroil themselves at a juncture when it is impossible to succeed, exhortations to a mutual agreement are then most highly expedient.

"To be influenced by such exhortations, must at present be highly for the advantage of us all. For it was the strong desire of fixing

³ This great and accomplished Syracusan seems to be ushered into this history with peculiar dignity, as the very mouth of Sicily, exhorting them all to concord and unanimity, and teaching them the method of securing the welfare and glory of their common country, upon the noblest. This is noted merely to draw upon him the attention of the reader. He will act afterwards in the most illustrious scenes, and show himself on all occasions a man of true honour and probity, a firm and disinterested patriot, an excellent statesman, and a most able commander. The Athenians never had a more determined or a more generous enemy. But that will not hinder our historian from representing him in all his merit.

¹ About a mile.

² Seven hundred and seventy-five pounds sterling.

our own separate views on a firm establishment, which at first embroiled us in this war, and which at present raiseth such mutual altercations even during our endeavours to effect an accommodation : and, in fine, unless matters can be so equally adjusted as to satisfy all parties, we shall again have recourse to arms. But then, we ought to recollect, that not merely for securing our separate interests, if we would act like men of sense, is this present congress opened ; but, to concert the best measures within our reach to preserve (if possible) our country from falling, and, as I judge, in great danger of falling, a sacrifice to Athenian ambition. It is to convince you how necessary a reunion is, not so much from what I can urge, as from the light these very Athenians themselves hold out before you. Possessed of a power far superior to any other Grecians, here they lie amongst us with a few ships, to note down our indiscretions ; and, under the plausible pretext of alliance, though with malice lurking in their hearts, they are studying to improve them in a specious manner to their own advantage. For should war be again our option ; and in it, should the assistance of men be accepted, who though uninvited would be glad to invade us ; whilst we are harassing and exhausting one another, and cutting open for these Athenians a road to our subjection, it is much to be apprehended that, when once they behold our strength at the lowest ebb, they will pay us a visit with more formidable armaments, and exert their utmost endeavours to complete our destruction.

“ It becomes each party amongst us, provided we know what is really our interest, to form alliances and to launch in hazardous attempts, rather to acquire what belongs to others than to prejudice what themselves at present possess ; and to rest assured that sedition must ruin our several states, nay, Sicily itself, of which we, the joint possessors, are ready, are all of us ready, to be supplanted by hostile treachery, whilst mutually embroiled in our domestic quarrels. It is high time we were convinced of this, that every individual might be reconciled with his neighbour, and community with community, and all in general combine together to preserve the whole of Sicily ; that our ears be deaf to the mischievous suggestions, that those amongst us of Doric descent are enemies to every thing that is Attic, whilst those of Chalcidic, because of that Ionian affinity, are sure of their protec-

tion. The Athenians invade us not from private enmity, because we are peopled here from these divided races, but to gratify their lust after those blessings in which Sicily abounds, and which at present we jointly possess. Nay, this they have already clearly declared, by their ready compliance with the invitation of those of the Chalcidic race. For though they have never claimed assistance from hence by virtue of their natural attachments here, yet they have shown a greater readiness in support of those than any compact between them required. Yet, though the Athenians be in this manner rapacious, in this manner politic, by me at least they ought to be forgiven ; since I blame not men who are greedy of empire, but such as are too eager to bend their necks to their yoke : because it is the constant never-failing turn of the human temper, to controul who will submit, but to make head against more powerful encroachments. As for us, who know these things, and yet will not timely provide against them, though each in this assembly be separately convinced, that it demands our greatest attention to unite in dissipating a storm which threatens us all, we err strangely in our conduct ; especially, when its diversion might be so readily effected, would we only bring our private quarrels to an amicable determination : for it is not from quarters of their own, that the Athenians rush thus to annoy us, but from ground which belongs to those who invited them. Thus, of course, without any intervening trouble, one war will not be terminated by another, but dissension will at once subside in peace. And these new-comers, who under specious colours are here for our ruin, must return again with a disappointment, which they may as speciously palliate. So desirable a benefit will at once infallibly accrue, from proper determinations in regard to the Athenians.

“ That peace is the greatest of human blessings, is a truth which all the world alloweth ; — What hindereth us then, why we should not firmly establish it with one another ? or do you rather imagine, that if the condition of one man be happy and that of another be wretched, tranquillity will not contribute sooner than warfare to amend the state of the latter, and to preserve the state of the former from a sad reverse ? or that peace is not better calculated to preserve unimpaired the honours and splen-

dours of the happy, and all other blessings, which, should we descend to a minute detail, might largely be recounted, or might be set in the strongest light by opposing to them the calamities which ensue from war? Fix your minds therefore on these considerations, that you may not overlook my admonitions, but in compliance with them look out respectively in time for expedients of prevention.

"In case it be presumed, that success must result from power, without taking into debate the justice or violence of the cause, let me detect the dangerous fallacy of such a sanguine hope, which must be blasted in the end. Many are they, it is well known, who would have gratified their revenge on violent oppressors, and many who have exerted their utmost force for their own aggrandizement; yet the first, so far from accomplishing their revenge, have met destruction in its pursuit; and it had been the fate of the latter, instead of enlarging, to suffer the loss of what they already possessed. For revenge is not certain, because justly sought after to retaliate violence; nor is power assured of its end, because invigorated with sanguine expectation. Events are for the most part determined by the fallible unsteady balance of futurity; which, though deceivable as deceit can be, yet holds out before us the most instructive hints. For thus armed equally beforehand with needful apprehension, we embark into mutual contest with wise premeditation. Now therefore, checked by the gloomy dread of the yet invisible event, and awed on all sides by the terrors which the presence of these Athenians spread amongst us; deterred further by those hopes already blasted, which assured us alternately of success against one another, had not they interfered to obstruct and control us; let us send far away from Sicily these enemies that are hovering about us; let us enter into firm and lasting union with one another; at least, let us conclude a truce for so long a time as can possibly be agreed, and defer our own private disputes to a remote decision. In a word, let us acknowledge, that, if my advice takes place, we shall continue free in our respective communities, where, masters of ourselves and accountable to none beside, we shall be enabled to recompense both our friends and our foes according to their deserts. But, in case it be obstinately rejected, and the mischievous insinuations of others prevail, why then adieu henceforth to

the just vindication of our own wrongs; or, if we are violently bent upon effecting it, we must strike up a friendship with unrelenting foes, and must range ourselves in opposition there, where nature hath most closely attached us.

"For my own part, who now, as I observed at setting out, represent the greatest of the Sicilian states, and in this character am more accustomed to attack another than to defend myself, I here, in her name, conjure you to make use of conviction, and unite together in a speedy accommodation, nor so eagerly to thirst after the damage of our foes as to plunge ourselves into irreparable mischiefs. I am not conscious to myself of that foolish haughtiness of heart, which expects to be absolute in its own private will; or that fortune, whose master I am not, should attend my orders; but I am ready to give way to good sense and reason. And I require you all respectively thus to give way to one another, and not to wait till you are compelled to do so by your enemies. It can argue no baseness for kinsmen to give way to kinsmen, a Dorian to a Dorian, or a Chaldean to others of his own race. Nay, what is most comprehensive, we are all neighbours, all joint inhabitants of the same land, a land washed round by the sea, and all styled by the same common name of Sicilians. Wars indeed in the course of time I foresee we shall wage upon one another, and future conferences will again be held, and mutual friendship shall thus revive. But when foreigners invade us, let us be wise enough to unite our strength, and drive them from our shores: for to be weakened in any of our members, must endanger the destruction of the whole; and to such confederates and such mediators we will never for the future have recourse."

"If to such conduct we adhere, we shall immediately procure a double blessing for Sicily. We shall deliver her from the Athenians, and a domestic war. For the future we shall retain the free possession of her in our own hands, and more easily disconcert any projects that hereafter may be formed against her."

The Sicilians acknowledge the weight of these arguments thus urged by Hermocrates, and all the several parties joined in one common resolution "to put an end to the war, each retaining what they were at present possessed of; but that Morgantina should

be restored to the Camarineans, upon the payment of a certain sum of money to the *Syracusans*." Such also as were confederated with the Athenians, addressing themselves to the Athenian commanders, notified their own readiness to acquiesce in these terms, and their resolution to be comprehended in the same peace. These approving the measure, the last hand was put to the accommodation.

The Athenian fleet, which had no longer any business there, sailed away from Sicily. But the people at Athens manifested their displeasure against the commanders at their return home, by passing a sentence of banishment against Pythodorus and Sophocles, and subjecting Eurymedon, who was the third, to a pecuniary mulct; as if, when able to have perfected the reduction of Sicily, they had been bribed to desist. They had enjoyed so long a career of good fortune, that they imagined nothing could disconcert their schemes; that enterprises of the greatest as well as of small importance, no matter whether adequately or insufficiently supported, must be ended to their wish. This was owing to the unexpected good luck with which most of their projects had of late succeeded, and now invigorated all their expectations.

The same summer, the Megareans of the city of Megara, pressed hard by the Athenians, who constantly twice a year made an inroad into their territory with their whole united force; harassed at the same time by their own outlaws, who having been ejected by the popular party in the train of a sedition had settled at Pegæ, and from thence were continually plundering them, began to have some conference about the expediency of recalling their outlaws, that the city might not doubly be exposed to ruin. The friends of these exiles, perceiving such a design to be in agitation, insisted more openly than ever that the affair should be regularly considered. The leaders of the people being convinced that their own and the strength of the people united in their present low condition could not possibly overrule it, were so far influenced by their fears as to make a secret offer to the Athenian generals, Hippocrates the son of Ariphron and Demosthenes the son of Alcisthenes, "to put the city into their hands;" concluding, they should be less endangered by such a step than by the restoration of the exiles whom they themselves had ejected. It was agreed, that in the first place the

Athenians should take possession of the long walls (these were eight stadia¹ in length, reaching down from the city to Nisæa their port) to prevent any succour which might be sent from Nisæa by the Peloponnesians, since there alone they kept their garrison for the security of Megara. After this, they promised their endeavours to put them in possession of the upper city. And this they would be able to effect more easily, when the former point was once secured.

The Athenians therefore, when all was fixed and determined on both sides, crossed over by night to Minoa the island of the Megareans with six hundred heavy-armed, commanded by Hippocrates, and sat themselves down in a hollow whence the bricks for the walls had been taken, and which lay near enough for their purpose: whilst another body, under Demosthenes the other commander, consisting of light-armed Plateans, and the Athenian patrols, concealed themselves near the temple of Mars, which lies still nearer. Not a soul within the city knew any thing of these motions, excepting those whose vigilance it concerned this night to observe them. When the morning was ready to break, the plotters of Megara proceeded thus:

Through a series of time they had established a custom to have the gates of the long walls opened to them in the night, by carrying out a wherry upon a carriage, which they persuaded the officers posted there, they conveyed nightly down the ditch into the sea, and so went upon a cruise. And before it was light, bringing it back again to the walls upon the carriage, they conveyed it through the gates, that it might escape the notice of the Athenian watch on Minoa, who by this means might be eluded, as they never would descry any boat in the harbour. The carriage was now at the gates, which were opened as usual for the reception of the wherry. This the Athenians observing (for this was the signal agreed on) came running from their place of ambush to take possession of the gates before they could be shut again. The very moment the carriage was between, and obstructed the closing them together, both they and the Megarean coadjutors put the watch which was posted at the gates to the sword. The Plateans, and patrolling parties under Demosthenes, rushed in first to that spot where the trophy

¹ About three quarters of a mile.

now stands, and having thus gained an entrance (for the Peloponnesians who were nearest had taken the alarm), the Plateans made good their ground against those who attacked them, and secured the gates till the heavy-armed Athenians, who were coming up with all speed, had entered. Each of these Athenians afterwards, so fast as he got in, advanced along the wall. The Peloponnesian guards, though few in number, made head against them for a time; some of them soon dropped, and then the rest ran speedily off. They were dismayed at such an attack from their enemies in the night; and, as the treacherous Megareans fought against them, they concluded that all the Megareans were combined together in betraying them. It happened farther that an Athenian herald had proclaimed of his own accord that "such Megareans as were willing to side with the Athenians should throw down their arms." When the Peloponnesians heard this, they at once quitted their posts; and, seriously believing that all the Megareans had combined to betray them, fled again into Nisæa.

At the time of morning's dawn, the long walls being thus surprised, and the Megareans within the city thrown into a tumult, the agents for the Athenians, in concert with all their accomplices in the plot, insisted on the necessity to throw open the city gates, and march out to battle; since it had been agreed between them, that so soon as ever the gates were thus opened, the Athenians should rush in. There was a method to be observed on their side, in order to be distinguished; this was, to besmear themselves with ointment, that they might receive no harm. Their security would have been greater, had they opened the gates at once; for now four thousand heavy-armed Athenians and six hundred horsemen, who had marched in the night from Eleusis, according to a prior disposition, were at hand. But whilst the accomplices, properly besmeared, stood ready at the gates, one of their own party, who was privy to the whole plot, discovereth it to the other Megareans. These drawing up together, came forwards in a body, and denied "the expediency of marching out, (since formerly, when stronger than now, they durst not hazard such a step,) or running such a manifest risk of losing the city; and, should any one affirm the contrary, the point should be instantly determined by blows." They gave not the least hint as if they had discovered the

design, but strenuously insisted that their own measure was most advisable, and stood firm together for the security of the gates. Thus it was no longer possible for the conspirators to put their plot in execution.

The Athenian commanders, being sensible that the project had been somehow crossed, and that they were not able themselves to take the city by storm, immediately run up a wall to invest Nisæa; concluding, that could they carry it before any succours came up, it would be impossible for Megara to hold out much longer. Iron and workmen, and all proper materials, were quickly supplied them from Athens. They begun at the wall which they had lately surprised, they ran it along for some time parallel with Megara, and then down to the sea on both sides of Nisæa. The work, both of ditch and wall, was divided amongst the army. They made use of the stones and bricks of the suburbs, and having felled some trees and wood, they strengthened what was weak with an additional palisade. The houses of the suburbs, being topped with battlements, served the use of turrets. This whole day they plied hard at the work; and about the evening of the succeeding day it was only not completed. The garrison within Nisæa was in great consternation. They laboured already under a scarcity of provisions, which they had been used to fetch daily from the upper city. Thus concluding that the Peloponnesians could not succour them with sufficient expedition, and imagining the Megareans were combined against them, they capitulated with the Athenians on the following terms:

"To be dismissed every man at a certain ransom, after delivering up their arms.

"But as for the Lacedæmonians, their commander, and every other person in that number, these to be disposed of by the Athenians at discretion."

These terms being agreed to, they evacuated Nisæa. And the Athenians, having thus cut off their long walls from the city of the Megareans, and possessed themselves of Nisæa, were preparing to accomplish what was yet to be done.

But Brasidas son of Tellis, the Lacedæmonian, happened at this time to be about Sicyon and Corinth, levying forces to march for Thrace. He was no sooner informed of the surprisal of the walls, than he trembled for the Peloponnesians in Nisæa, and lest Megara should be

taken. He summons the Bœotians to attend him expeditiously with their forces at Tripodiscus (the place so named is a village of the Megaris under the mountain Geranea), whither he was marching himself with two thousand seven hundred heavy-armed Corinthians, four hundred Phliasians, six hundred Sicyonians, and what levies he had already made upon his own account. He imagined he might come up before Nisæa could be taken. But hearing the contrary (for he came up in the night to Tripodiscus), with a picked body of three hundred men, before the news of his march could be spread, he approached to the city of Megara, undescried by the Athenians, who were posted near the sea. He intended to declare that he was ready to attempt, and in fact would have been glad to have effected, the recovery of Nisæa. But it was principally his view to get admission into Megara, and provide for its security. He demanded admission, assuring them he had great hope of recovering Nisæa. But the factious in Megara, perplexed at this step of Brasidas—on one side, lest he meant to reinstate the exiles by ejecting them; the other, lest the people with such an apprehension might at once fall upon them, and their city thus plunged into a tumult of arms might be lost, if the Athenians, who lay ready in ambush, should seize it; refused him admittance, and both factions thought proper, without any stir, to await the event. For it was severally their full expectation, that a battle must ensue between the Athenians and these new-comers; and then, without plunging themselves into unnecessary hazards, they might join their own favourite party if victorious.

Brasidas, when he could not prevail, withdrew again to the main of his army. By the succeeding dawn the Bœotians joined him, who had resolved to succour Megara, even previous to the summons sent by Brasidas, since they regarded the danger that place was in as their own. They were actually advanced with their whole force as far as Platæa; and, the messenger having met with them here, they became much more eager than before. They sent forwards a detachment of two and twenty hundred heavy-armed, and six hundred horsemen, but dismissed the multitude to their own homes. When the whole force was thus united, consisting of at least six thousand heavy-armed, and the heavy-armed Athenians stood drawn up in order near Nisæa and the

sea-shore, whilst their light-armed were straggling about the plain, the Bœotian cavalry made an unexpected sally against those stragglers, and chased them to the shore: for hitherto no aid whatever had taken the field in behalf of the Megareans. The Athenian cavalry clapped spurs to repel the Bœotian, and a battle ensued. The horse were a long time thus engaged, and both sides claimed a victory. For the general of the Bœotian cavalry, and a small number of his party, the Athenians drove before them to Nisæa, where they put them to the sword and rifled them. They remained masters of the dead bodies, gave them up afterwards by a truce, and erected a trophy: but neither side so keeping their ground as to render the action decisive, they retreated as it were by consent; the Bœotians to their main army, and the Athenians to Nisæa.

Brasidas, after this, advanced nearer to the sea and to the city of Megara with his army. Having occupied there some advantageous ground, they drew up in order and stood still, imagining the Athenians would attack them; and assured, that the Megareans were intently observing for whom the victory might declare. In both these respects, they judged their present posture the most judicious; because it was not their own business to attack, or voluntarily to run into conflict and danger; and thus, having manifestly exhibited their alacrity to act defensively, a victory might justly be ascribed to them without the expense of a battle. In regard further to the Megareans, the consequence could not but be fortunate: for, in case the latter had never beheld them thus prompt in their succour, they would have stopped all farther risk, and so undoubtedly they should have lost the city, as men completely vanquished; but now, should the Athenians decline an engagement, the points for which they themselves came thither must be secured without a blow; which proved to be the result. For the Megarians, when the Athenians came out and drew up in order close to the long walls, and then, as the enemy did not advance to attack them, stood quiet in their ranks; their commanders also judging the hazard by no means equal, and themselves, who had so far been successful, not at all concerned to begin an engagement against superior numbers, in which, should they prevail, they could only take Megara, but, should they miscarry, must lose the flower of their domestic strength; especi-

cially as their opponents would act in probability with more daring resolution, since as the large strength they had now in the field consisted only of quotas from several constituents, they hazarded but little; thus facing one another for a considerable space, and neither side presuming to make an attack, till each at length wheeled off, the Athenians first towards Nisæa, and the Peloponnesians again to their former post:—then, I say, the Megareans in the interest of the exiles, regarding Brasidas as victor, and animated by the refusal of attack on the Athenian side, open the gates of Megara to Brasidas himself, and the several commanders from the auxiliary states; and, having given them admission, proceed with them to consultation, whilst the partizans of the Athenian interest were in the utmost consternation.

Soon afterwards, the confederates being dismissed to their respective cities, Brasidas also himself returned to Corinth, to continue his preparations for that Thracian expedition, in which before this avocation he had been intently employed.

The Athenians also being now marched homewards, the Megareans in the city, who had acted most zealously in favour of the Athenians, finding all their practices detected, stole off as fast as possible. The others, after concerting the proper steps with the friends of the exiles, fetch them home from Pegæ, having first administered to them the most solemn oaths “to think no more on former injuries, and to promote the true welfare of the city to the utmost of their power.”

But these, when re-invested with authority, and taking a review of the troops of the city, having previously disposed some bands of soldiers in a proper manner, picked out about a hundred persons of their enemies, and who they thought had busied themselves most in favour of the Athenians. And having compelled the people to pass a public vote upon them, they were condemned to die and suffered an instant execution. They farther new-modelled the government of Megara into almost an oligarchy. And this change, though introduced by an inconsiderable body of men; nay, what is more, in the train of sedition; yet continued for a long space of time in full force at Megara.

The same summer, the Mityleneans being intent on executing their design of fortifying Antandrus, Demodocus and Aristides, who commanded the Athenian squadron for levy-

ing contributions, and were now at Helespont, (for Lamachus the third in the commission had been detached with ten ships towards Pontus,) when informed of what was thus in agitation, became apprehensive that Antandrus might prove of as bad consequence to them as Anæa in Samos had already done: wherein the Samian exiles having fortified themselves, were not only serviceable to the Peloponnesians at sea, by furnishing them with pilots; but farther, were continually alarming the Samians at home, and sheltering their deserters. From these apprehensions they assembled a force from among their dependents, sailed thither, and having defeated in battle those who came out of Antandrus to oppose them, gain once more possession of that town. And no long time after, Lamachus, who had been detached to Pontus, having anchored in the river Calix in the district of Heraclea, lost all his ships. A heavy rain had fallen in the upper country, and the land-flood rushing suddenly down, bore them all away before it. He himself and the men under his command were forced to march over land through Bithynia (possessed by those Thracians who are seated on the other side of the strait in Asia) to Chalcedon, a colony of Megareans in the mouth of the Euxine sea.

This summer also Demosthenes, immediately after he had quitted the Megaris, with the command of forty sail of Athenians, arrives at Naupactus. For with him, and with Hippocrates, some persons of the Bœotian cities in those parts had been concerting schemes how to change the government of those cities, and introduce a democracy on the Athenian model. The first author of this scheme was Ptæodorus, an exile from Thebes, and matters were now ready for execution.

Some of them had undertaken to betray Siphæ: Siphæ is a maritime town in the district of Thespiæ, upon the gulf of Crissa. Others of Orchomenus engaged for Cheronea, a town tributary to that Orchomenus which was formerly called the Minyæian but now the Bœotian. Some Orchomenian exiles were the chief undertakers of this point, and were hiring soldiers for the purpose from Peloponnesus. Cheronea is situated on the edge of Bœotia towards Phanotis of Phocis, and is in part inhabited by Phocians. The share assigned to the Athenians was the surprisal of Delium, a temple of Apollo in Tanagra, looking towards Eubœa. These things farther were to be

achieved on a day prefixed, that the Bœotians might be disabled from rushing to the rescue of Delium with all their force, by the necessity of staying at home to defend their respective habitations. Should the attempt succeed, and Delium once be fortified, they easily presumed that, though the change of the Bœotian governments might not suddenly be effected, yet, when those towns were in their hands, when their devastations were extended all over the country, and places of safe retreat lay near at hand for their parties, things could not long remain in their former posture; but in process of time, when the Athenians appeared in support of the revolt, and the Bœotians could not unite in a body to oppose them, the designed revolution must necessarily take place. This was the nature of the scheme at present in agitation.

Hippocrates, having the whole force of Athens under his command, was ready at the proper time to march into Bœotia. But he had despatched Demosthenes beforehand to Naupactus with forty ships, that, after he had collected a sufficient force in those parts from the Acarnanians and their other confederates, he should appear with his fleet before Siphæ, which was then to be betrayed to him. A day also was fixed upon between them, in which both of them were at once to execute the parts assigned them.

Demosthenes, being arrived at Naupactus, found the Oeniadæ already compelled by the united Acarnanians into an association with the confederates of Athens. He marched away, therefore, at the head of the whole confederacy in those parts, and invaded first Salynthus and the Agræans; and having carried some other points, got all in readiness to show himself before Siphæ at the time appointed.

About the same time this summer, Brasidas, at the head of seventeen hundred heavy-armed, began his march towards Thrace. When he was come up to Heraclea in Thachis, he despatched a messenger beforehand to his correspondents in Pharsalus, to beg a safe-conduct for himself and his army. And as soon as he was met at Melitia of Achæa, by Panærus, and Dorus, and Hippolochidas, and Torylaus, and Strophacus, who had been formerly the public host of the Chalcidians, he continued his march forwards. Others also of the Thessalians assisted in conducting him, and from Larissa Niconidas the friend of Perdiccas.

The passage through Thessaly without proper guides is always difficult, and must be more so to an armed body. Besides, to attempt such a thing through a neighbouring dominion without permission first obtained, hath ever been regarded by all the Grecians with a jealous eye, and the bulk of the Thessalians had been ever well-affected to the Athenians. Nor could Brasidas have possibly effected it, had not the Thessalian been rather despotic than free governments. For upon his route he was stopped at the river Enipeus, by some of contrary sentiments to the rest of their countrymen, who ordered him to proceed at his peril, and taxed him with injustice in having come so far without the general permission. His conductors told them in return, that "without such permission he should not proceed; but, as he had come amongst them on a sudden, they thought themselves obliged in friendship to conduct him." Brasidas also gave them strong assurances, that "he was come thither for the service of Thessaly and of them; that his arms were not intended against them, but against the common enemy, the Athenians; that he never suspected any enmity between Thessalians and Lacedæmonians, why they might not tread upon one another's ground; that even now, should they withhold their consent, he was neither willing nor indeed able to proceed; but," he conjured them, "however, to give him no molestation." Having heard these declarations, they acquiesced and withdrew. Brasidas now, by the advice of his conductors, advanced with the utmost speed without ever halting, in order to anticipate fresh and more potent obstruction. Nay, the very same day that he left Melitia, he advanced as far as to Pharsalus, and encamped upon the banks of the Apidanus. From thence he proceeded to Phacium, and from thence into Peræbia. Being so far advanced, his Thessalian guides received their dismissal; and the Peræbians, who are tributaries to the Thessalians, escorted him to Dium in the kingdom of Perdiccas: it is a fortress of Macedonia situated under mount Olympus on the Thessalian side. In this manner Brasidas, advancing so expeditiously as to prevent all obstruction, completed his passage through Thessaly, and arrived in the dominions of Perdiccas and the region of Chalcis. For those in Thrace who revolted from the Athenians, had joined with Perdiccas in procuring this auxiliary force out of Peloponnesus, be-

cause the great success of the Athenians had struck a terror amongst them. The Chalcideans were persuaded, that they should be first attacked by the Athenians: and in truth their neighbour-states, who yet persevered in their obedience, were secretly instigating them to it. Perdiccas, indeed, had not yet declared himself their enemy; but he dreaded the vengeance of the Athenians for former grudges; and now he had a scheme at heart for the subjection of Arribæus king of the Lyncestians.

Other points concurred to facilitate the procurement of such a succour from Peloponnesus, such as the misfortunes by which the Lacedæmonians at present were afflicted. For, the Athenians pressing hard on Peloponnesus, and not least of all on Laconia, they hoped in case they could equally annoy them in this quarter, by thus marching an army against their dependants, to effect a diversion. And they were more encouraged by the offers of maintenance for their troops, and solicitations to support revolts. They were at the same time glad of a pretext to rid themselves of their Helots, lest, in the present state of affairs, now that Pylus was in hostile hands, they might be tempted to rebel. This farther gave rise to the following event:—Dreading the youth and number of these slaves (for many precautions have ever been put in practice by Lacedæmonians to curb and awe their Helots,) they made public proclamation, that “so many of them as could claim the merit of having done signal service to the Lacedæmonians in the present war should enter their claims, and be rewarded with freedom.” The view in this was, to sound them, imagining that such who had the greatness of spirit to claim their freedom in requital of their merit, must be also the ripest for rebellion. About two thousand claimants were adjudged worthy, and accordingly were led about in solemn procession to the temple, crowned with garlands, as men honoured with their freedom. But, in no long time after, they made away with them all: nor hath the world been able to discover, in what manner they were thus to a man destroyed.

Now also with alacrity they sent away seven hundred of their heavy-armed under the orders of Brasidas. The rest of his body were mercenaries, whom he had hired in Peloponnesus. And it was in compliance with his own particular desire, that Brasidas was employed in this service by the Lacedæmonians.

The Chalcideans, however, were highly satisfied with a person who had ever passed in Sparta for one of the most active and accomplished citizens; and who, in his foreign employments, had performed very signal services for his country. From his first appearance amongst them, his justice and moderation so instantly recommended him to the adjacent cities, that some voluntarily submitted, and others were by intrigue put into his possession. By him the Lacedæmonians were actually empowered, if the accommodation they wished for took place, which it afterwards did, to make exchange and restitution of towns, and so relieve Peloponnesus from the hardships of war,

Nay more, even in succeeding time, upon the breaking out of the Sicilian war, the virtue and prudence of Brasidas exerted at this juncture, which some attested by their own experience, others upon sound and unsuspected report, imprinted a zeal on the confederates of Athens to go over to the Lacedæmonians. For, having been the first sent out to a foreign trust, and approved in all respects as a worthy man, he left behind him a strong presumption, that the rest of his countrymen were like himself.¹

So soon therefore as it was known at Athens, that he was arrived to take upon him the conduct of affairs in Thrace, the Athenians declare Perdiccas their enemy, ascribing this expedition to his cabals, and by strengthening their garrisons kept a strict watch over all their dependents in that quarter.

But Perdiccas with his own forces, and accompanied by the body under Brasidas, marcheth against a neighbouring potentate, Arribæus son of Bromerus, king of the Macedonian Lyncestians: enmity was subsisting between them, and the conquest of him was the point in view. When he was advanced with his army, and in conjunction with Brasidas, to the entrance of Lynceus, Brasidas communicated his intention to hold a parley with Arribæus, before he proceeded to act offensively against him; and if possible, to bring him over to the Lacedæmonian alliance; for Arribæus had already notified by a herald, that he was willing to refer the points in dispute to the arbitration of Brasidas. The Chalcidean ambassadors also, who followed

¹ When Brasidas was beginning his march for Thrace, he wrote this letter to the ephori at Sparta:—“I will execute your orders in this war, or die.” *Plutarch's Laconic Apophthegms.*

the camp, were continually suggesting to him, that "he ought not to plunge himself rashly into difficulties for the sake of Perdiccas," designing to reserve him more entirely for their own service. And besides this, the ministers of Perdiccas had declared it at Lacedæmon to be their master's intention, to bring over all the neighbouring states into this alliance: so that it was entirely with public views, that Brasidas insisted upon treating with Arribæus. But Perdiccas urged in opposition, that "he had not brought Brasidas to be the judge of his controversies, but to execute his vengeance on the enemies he should point out to him; that it would be unjust in Brasidas to treat with Arribæus, when he supported half the expense of his troops." Yet, in spite of such remonstrances, and in open defiance of him, Brasidas parleyed. And being satisfied with the offers of Arribæus, he drew off his troops, without so much as entering his dominions. But henceforth Perdiccas, looking upon this step as an injury to himself, reduced his contribution of support from a moiety to a third.

Brasidas however the same summer, without loss of time, continued the operations of war; and, a little before the vintage, being attended by the Chalcideans, marched towards Acanthus, a colony of the Andrians. The inhabitants of this place were embroiled in a sedition about his reception; a party, who co-operated with the Chalcideans, were for it; but the people opposed. Yet, fearing the loss of their fruit, which was not quite got in, the people were at last prevailed upon by Brasidas, to grant entrance to himself without any attendants, and after giving him audience to resolve for themselves. Brasidas is admitted; and standing forth in the presence of the people, for though a Lacedæmonian he was an able speaker, he harangued them thus:

"My commission from the Lacedæmonians and the march of their troops hither under my command verify, O ye Acanthians, the declaration made by us, when first we began this war against the Athenians, that we were going to fight for the liberties of Greece. But if our appearance here hath been too long deferred, it should be ascribed to the unexpected turns of war nearer home, whereas we hoped to demolish the Athenians speedily without endangering you, we ought to be exempted from any censure here. For now, you behold us oppor-

tunely at hand, and intent in conjunction with you to pull these tyrants down.

"I am surprised indeed that your gates should be barred against me, or that my presence should any way chagrin you. For we Lacedæmonians, imagining we were going to confederates, whose wishes were fastened upon us before their eyes could behold us, and from whom we might depend upon the most cordial reception; we, I say, have pierced forwards through a series of dangers, marching many days together through hostile territories, and surmounting every obstacle by a zeal for your service. If therefore your affections are alienated from us, or if you act in opposition to your own, and to the liberty of the rest of Greece, your conduct must terribly distress us. And that, not only because you yourselves reject us, but may by such a step deter all others, to whom I shall afterwards apply, from co-operating with me. Such obstacles you will raise before me, if you, to whom first I have addressed myself, you who are masters of a city of great importance, and are in esteem for your good sense and discretion, should refuse to receive me. I shall be utterly unable to put a plausible colour upon such a refusal, and shall be exposed to reproach, as if I meant injustice under the cloak of liberty, or came hither too weak and impotent to make head against the Athenian strength, should it be exerted against me.

"And yet with that force, of which at this very moment I am honoured with the command I marched myself to the succour of Nisæa, and openly defied a superior number of Athenians who declined the encounter. It is not therefore probable, that they can send hither a force to our annoyance equal to that armament they employed at Nisæa: nor am I sent hither to execute the schemes of oppression, but to further the deliverance of Greece. I have the security of most solemn oaths, sworn by the magistrates of Lacedæmon, that whatever people I bring over to their alliance shall remain in free possession of their own liberties and laws. And farther, we are forbid the use of violence and fraud as the means of rendering you dependent on us; but, on the contrary, are to act in support of you who are oppressed with Athenian bondage. Upon reasons so valid do I insist upon it, that I am no longer suspected by you, having given you the strong-

est assurances, that I am no impotent avenger, and that you may boldly abet my cause.

"If there be any person in this assembly, who hesitates upon the apprehension that I may betray the city into the hands of a private cabal, let him bid adieu to his fears, and distinguish himself in open confidence. I came not hither to be the tool of faction; I am convinced that liberty can never be re-established by me, if, disregarding ancient constitutions, I enslave the multitude to the few, or the few to the crowd. Such things would be more grievous than the yoke of foreign dominion. And should we Lacedæmonians proceed in this manner, our labours could never merit a return of gratitude, but instead of honour and glory, foul reproach would be our portion. The crimes on which we have grounded this war against the Athenians, would then appear to be our own, and more odious in us for having made parade of disinterested virtue, than in a state which never pretended to it. For it is more base in men of honour to enlarge their power by specious fraud than by open force. The latter, upon the right of that superior strength with which fortune hath invested it, seizeth at once upon its prey; the other can only compass it by the treachery of wicked cunning.

"It is thus that in all concerns of more than ordinary importance, we are accustomed to exert the utmost circumspection. And besides the solemn oaths in your favour; you can receive no greater security of our honest intention than the congruity of our actions with our words, from whence the strongest conviction must result, that with what I have suggested you are obliged in interest to comply. But if all my promises are unavailing, and you declare such compliance impossible; if, professing yourselves our sincere well-wishers you beg that a denial may not expose you to our resentments; if you allege that the dangers through which your liberty must be sought, overbalance the prize; that in justice it ought only to be proposed to such as are able to embrace the offer, but that no one ought to be compelled against his own inclinations;—I shall beseech the tutelary gods and heroes of this island to bear me witness, that whereas I come to serve you, and cannot persuade, I must now, by ravaging your country, endeavour to compel you. And, in acting thus, I shall not be conscious to myself of injustice, but shall justify

the step on two most cogent motives:—for the sake of the Lacedæmonians; lest whilst they have only your affections, and not your actual concurrence, they may be prejudiced through the sums of money you pay to the Athenians;—for the sake of all the Grecians; that they may not be obstructed by you in their deliverance from bondage. This is the end we propose, and this will justify our proceedings. For without the purpose of a public good, we Lacedæmonians ought not to set people at liberty against their wills. We are not greedy of empire, but we are eager to pull down the tyranny of others. And how could we answer it to the body of Greece, if, when we have undertaken to give liberty to them all, we indolently suffer our endeavours to be traversed by you?

"Deliberate seriously on these important points, and animate yourselves with the glorious ambition of being the first who enter the lists for the liberties of Greece, of gaining an eternal renown, of securing the uninterrupted possession of your private properties, and investing the state of which you are members with the most honourable¹ of all titles."

Here Brasidas concluded. And the Acæthians, who had already heard this affair largely discussed on both sides, and secretly declared their votes—the majority, because the arguments of Brasidas were prevailing, and because they dreaded the loss of their fruit, resolved to revolt from the Athenians. Then they required of Brasidas himself to swear the oath of their security, which the Lacedæmonian magistrates had at his departure enjoined him to take, that "whatever people was brought over into their alliance by him should remain in possession of their own liberties and laws," and this done, they receive his army. Not long after, Stagyrus also, another colony of the Andrians, revolted. And thus ended the transactions of this summer.

Very early in the succeeding winter, when the strong places of Bœotia were to have been betrayed to Hippocrates and Demosthenes the Athenian commanders, preparatory to which Demosthenes was to show himself with his fleet before Siphæ, and the other to march to Delium, there happened a mistake about the days prefixed for execution. Demosthenes indeed, who steered towards Siphæ, and had on

¹ Free.

and the Acarnanians, and many of the conspirators of that quarter, is totally disappointed. The whole scheme had been betrayed by Demachus the Phocian of Phanotis, who gave information of it to the Lacedæmonians, and they to the Bœotians. All Bœotians now took up arms to prevent consequences (for Socrates was not yet in their country to dissuade them on that side), Siphæ and Chæronæa are secured in time. And so soon as the conspirators perceived that things went wrong, they gave up all farther thoughts of exciting commotions in the cities.

Socrates having summoned into the field the whole force of Athens, as well citizens as foreigners, not excepting even foreigners who were sent at that time to be there, arrived late before Delium, not before the Bœotians were returned home again from Siphæ. He encamped his forces, and set about fortifying Delium, the temple of Apollo, in the following manner.—Round about the temple and precincts they sunk a ditch: of the earth taken up they formed a rampart instead of a

They drove into the ground on each side a row of stakes, and then threw on the vines cut from within the precincts of the temple. They did the same by the stones and the sides of the adjacent buildings which had been demolished, and omitted no expedient to give heat and substance to the work. They added wooden turrets upon such spots as seemed most to require it. No part of the old wall of the temple was now standing: the wall, which stood the longest, had lately fallen down. They began the work the third day after their marching out from Athens. That day they plied it, and the following, and continued it on the fifth till the time of repast. Then, the work being for the most part completed, they drew off their army to the distance about ten stadia¹ from Delium, in order to return home. Their light-armed indeed, for the most part, marched off directly, but the heavy-armed, halting there, sat down upon their arms. Socrates staid behind for the time necessary to post the proper guards, and to put the finishing hand to those parts of the fortification which were not yet perfectly completed. But during all this space, the Bœotians, had been employed in drawing their forces together to Delium. When the quotas from the several

cities were come up, and they perceived the Athenians were filing off towards Athens, the other rulers of Bœotia (for they were eleven in all) declared their resolution not to engage, since the enemy is no longer on Bœotian ground: for the Athenians, when they grounded their arms, were within the borders of Oropia. But Pagondas the son of Æoladas, one of the Bœotian rulers in the right of Thebes, and at this time in the supreme command, in concert with Arianthidas the son of Lysimachidas, declared for fighting. He judged it expedient to hazard an engagement; and addressing himself to every battalion apart, lest calling them together might occasion them to abandon their arms, he prevailed upon the Bœotians to march up to the Athenians, and to offer battle. His exhortation to each was worded thus:

“It ought never, ye men of Bœotia, to have entered into the hearts of any of your rulers, that it is improper for us to attack the Athenians, because we find them not upon our own soil. For they, out of a neighbouring country, have rushed into Bœotia, and have fortified a post in it; from whence they intend to ravage and annoy us. And our enemies in short they are, in whatever place we find them, from what place soever they march to execute hostilities against us. Now therefore let him who hath judged this step we are taking hazardous and insecure, acknowledge and forego his error. Cautious and dilatory measures are not to be adhered to by men who are invaded, and whose all is at stake: they are expedient only for those whose properties are secure, and who bent on rapine exert their malice in the invasion of others. But it is eternally the duty of you Bœotians to combat such foreigners as presume to invade you, either upon your own or your neighbour's ground, no matter which. And this above all must be done against Athenians, not only because they are Athenians, but because they are the nearest borderers upon us. For it is a maxim allowed, that no state can possibly preserve itself free, unless it be a match for its neighbouring powers.

“Let me add farther, that when men are bent on enslaving not neighbours only, but even such people as are more remote, how can it be judged improper to encounter such, so long as we can find ground whereon to stand? Call to mind for your present information the

¹ About an English mile.

Eubœans situated in yon island opposite to us; call to mind the present disposition of the bulk of Greece in regard to these Athenians. Why should we forget, that neighbouring states so often battle one another about settling their various boundaries; whereas, should we be vanquished, our whole country will be turned merely into one heap of limitation, and that never again by us to be disputed? for when once they have entered upon it, they will remain the masters of it all, beyond control. So much more have we to fear from these neighbours of ours, than any other people.

"Those again, who in all the daring insolence of superior strength are wont to invade their neighbours, as these Athenians now do us, march with extraordinary degrees of confidence against such as are inactive, and defend themselves only on their own soil. His schemes are more painfully completed, when men sally boldly beyond their borders to meet the invader, and, if opportunity serveth, attack him first. Of this truth our own experience will amply convince us. For ever since the defeat we gave these very men at Coronea, when taking the advantage of our seditions they had possessed themselves of our lands, we have kept Bœotia quiet from every alarm till the present. This we ought now to remember, that the seniors among us may proceed as they then begun; that the juniors, the sons of those sires who then displayed such uncommon bravery, may exert themselves to preserve unblemished their hereditary virtues. We ought all to be confident, that the god will fight on our side, whose temple they pollute by raising ramparts, and dwelling within its verge. And, as the victims we have offered are fair and auspicious, we ought at once to advance to the charge of these our foes, and make them know, that their lust and rapine they only then can gratify when they invade such cowards as abandon their own defence: but from men who were born to vindicate their own country for ever by the dint of arms, and never unjustly to enslave another—that from such men they shall not get away without that struggle which honour enjoins."

In this manner Pagondas exhorted the Bœotians, and persuaded them to march against the Athenians. He put them instantly in motion, and led them towards the enemy; for it was now late in the day. When he had approached the spot on which they were posted,

he halted in a place from whence, as an eminence lay between, they could have no view of one another. There he drew up his men, and made all ready for the attack.

When the news was brought to Hippocrates, who was yet at Delium, that "the enemy is advancing to the charge," he sendeth orders to the main body to form into the order of battle. And not long after, he himself came up, leaving left about three hundred horse at Delium, to guard that place in case an attempt should be made upon it, or seizing a favourable opportunity to fall upon the rear of the Bœotians during the engagement. Not but that the Bœotians had posted a party of their own to watch their motions, and find them employment. When therefore the whole disposition was perfected, they showed themselves on the top of the eminence, and there grounded their arms, remaining still in the same order in which they designed to attack; being in the whole about seven thousand heavy-armed, more than ten thousand light-armed, a thousand horse, and five hundred targeteers. The right wing was composed of Thebans and those who ranked with them; the centre of the Haliartians, and Coroneans, and Copiensians, and others that live about the lake (Copœis); and the left of Thespiensians, Tanagreans, and Orchomenians. In the wings were posted the cavalry and light-armed. The Thebans were drawn up in files of twenty five; the others variously, as circumstances required. And such was the order and disposition of the Bœotians.

On the Athenian side, the heavy-armed, being in number equal to their enemies, were drawn up in one entire body of eight in depth. Their cavalry was posted on either wing. But light-armed soldiers, armed as was fitting, the Athenians had none at this juncture, neither in the field nor in the city. The number which had taken the field at first to attack this expedition exceeded many times over the number of the enemy; but then most of them had no arms at all, since the summons had been extended to all who resided in Athens, both citizens and foreigners. The crowd of these, so soon as ever the route was pointed homewards, were, excepting a few, gone speedily off. But, when they were drawn up in the order of battle, and were every moment expecting the charge, Hippocrates the general showing himself in the front of

the Athenians, animated them with the following harangue :

"The admonition, Athenians, I intend to give you will be very concise, but such a one is sufficient to the brave; I pretend not to encourage Athenians, but merely to remind them of their duty. Let the thought be a stranger to every heart amongst you, that we are going to plunge into needless hazards in the territory of a foe. Be it the territory of a foe, yet in it you must fight for the security of your own. And, if we conquer now, the Peloponnesians will never again presume, without the aid of the Bœotian horse, to repeat their inroads into Attica. By one battle therefore you acquire this, and secure your own land from future annoyance. Charge therefore your enemies, as you ought, with a spirit worthy of the state of Athens—that state which every soul amongst you boasts to be the first of Greece—and worthy of your great forefathers who formerly at Oenophyta, under the conduct of Myronides, defeated these people in the field, and possessed for a time all Bœotia as their prize."

Hippocrates had not gone along half the line encouraging them in this manner, when he was compelled to desist and leave the greater part of his army unaddressed. For the Bœotians, to whom Pagondas also had given but a short exhortation, and had this moment finished the plan of attack, were coming down from the eminence. The Athenians advanced to meet them, and both sides came running to the charge. The skirts of both armies could not come to an engagement, as some rivulets that lay between stopped them equally on both sides. The rest closed firm in a stubborn fight, and with mutual thrusts of their shields. The left wing of the Bœotians, even to the centre, was routed by the Athenians, who pressed upon those who composed it, but especially on the Thespiensians. For, the others who were drawn up with them giving way before the shock, the Thespiensians were enclosed in a small compass of ground, where such of them as were slaughtered defended themselves bravely till they were quite hewed down. Some also of the Athenians, disordered in thus encompassing them about, knew not how to distinguish, and slew one another. In this quarter therefore the Bœotians were routed, and fled towards those parts where the battle was yet alive. Their right wing, in

which the Thebans were posted, had the better of the Athenians. They had forced them at first to give ground a little, and pressed upon them to pursue their advantage. It happened that Pagondas had detached two troops of horse (which motion was not perceived) to fetch a compass round the eminence and support the left wing which was routed. These suddenly appearing in sight, the victorious wing of Athenians, imagining a fresh army was coming up to the charge, was struck into consternation. And now being distressed on both sides by this last turn, and by the Thebans who pursued their advantage close and put them into a total disorder, the whole Athenian army was routed and fled. Some ran towards Delium and the sea, others to Oropus, and others towards mount Parnes; all to whatever place they hoped was safe. But the Bœotians, especially their horse, and the Locrians who had come up to the field of battle just as the rout began, pursued them with great execution. But the night putting an end to the chase, the bulk of the flying army preserved themselves more easily.

The day following, such of them as had reached Delium and Oropus, leaving behind a garrison in Delium, which still remained in their possession, transported themselves by sea to Athens. The Bœotians also, having erected a trophy, carried off their own dead, rifled those of the enemy, and having posted a guard upon the field of battle, retired to Tanagra, and called a consultation about the method of assaulting Delium.

A herald, farther, despatched by the Athenians about their dead, meets upon his way a herald of the Bœotians, who turned him back by assuring him that his errand would be fruitless till he himself should be again returned. The latter, being come to the Athenians, declared to them in the name of the Bœotians :

"That by their late proceedings they had enormously violated the laws of the Grecians, amongst whom it was an established rule, that amidst their mutual invasions religious places should be ever spared, whereas the Athenians had not only fortified, but had made Delium a place of habitation, and whatever profanations mankind can be guilty of, had been there by them committed: that the water, which it would even be impious for the Bœotians themselves to touch unless by way of ablution, before they sacrificed, had been profanely

drawn by them for common use; that, for these reasons the Bœotians, in the cause of the god and in their own, invoking the associated Dæmons and Apollo, gave them this early notice to evacuate the sacred place, and clear it of all incumbrances."

This message being thus delivered by the herald, the Athenians returned this answer to the Bœotians by a herald of their own:

"That they were hitherto guilty of nothing illegal in regard to the holy place, nor would willingly be so for the future. They had no such intention when they first entered into it, and their view was merely to give an ejection from thence to persons who had basely injured them. It was a law among the Grecians for those who were masters of any district, whether great or small, to be also proprietors of its temples, which are to be honoured by them with the usual forms, and with what additional ones they may be able to appoint. Even the Bœotians, as well as many other people, who this moment were possessed of lands from which they had ejected the old proprietors, made a seizure first of those temples which had belonged to others, and continued in the free possession of them. For their own parts, could they conquer more of their territory, they should manfully retain it; and as to the spot they now occupied, their position there was voluntary, and as it was their own they would not quit it. It was necessity alone made them use the water, which ought not to be ascribed to any insolent or profane motive, but to the preceding invasions their enemies had made, self-preservation against which laid them under a present necessity of acting as they did. It might with reason be hoped, that every proceeding to which war and violence indispensably obliged, would obtain forgiveness from the god: for the altars are a refuge to involuntary offences, and transgression is imputed only to those who are bad without compulsion, and not to such as urgent necessities may render daring. The guilt of impiety belonged more notoriously to such as insisted on the barter of temples for the bodies of the dead, than to those who are content to lose their just demands rather than submit to so base an exchange." They farther enjoined him in their name to declare, that "they would not evacuate Bœotia, since the ground which they occupied in it belonged to no Bœotians, but was now their own property, acquired by

dint of arms. All they required, was a truce for fetching off their dead, according to the solemn institutions of their common country."

The Bœotians replied thus: "If they are now in Bœotia, let them quit the ground which belongeth to us, and carry off what they demand. But if they are upon ground of their own, they themselves know best what they have to do." They judged indeed that Oropia, on which it happened that the bodies of the dead were lying, as the battle had been fought upon the lines of partition, belonged to the Athenian jurisdiction, and yet that it was impossible for them to be carried off by force; and truce farther they would grant none, where the point related to Athenian ground; that it was therefore the most proper reply—"they should quit their territory, and so obtain their demands." The herald of the Athenians having heard this, departed without effect.

Immediately after, the Bœotians having sent for darters and slingers from the Melian bay, and being reinforced by two thousand heavy-armed Corinthians, and the Peloponnesian garrison which had evacuated Nisæa, and a party of Megareans, all which had joined them since the battle, marched against Delium, and assaulted the fortification. They tried many methods, and took it at last by the help of a machine of a very peculiar structure.—Having split asunder a large sail-yard, they hollowed it throughout, and fixed it together again in a very exact manner, so as to resemble a pipe. At its extremity they fastened a caldron by help of chains, into which a snout of iron was bent downwards from the yard. The inside, farther, of this wooden machine was lined almost throughout with iron. They brought it from a distance to the fortification on carriages, and applied it where the work consisted chiefly of vines and timber. And when near enough, they put a large bellows to that extremity of the yard which was next themselves, and began to blow. But the blast, issuing along the bore into the caldron, which was filled with glowing coals and sulphur and pitch, kindled up a prodigious flame. This set fire to the work, and burnt, with so much fury, that not a soul durst any longer stay upon it, but to a man they abandoned it and fled away amain: and in this manner was the fortress carried. Of the garrison, some were put to the sword, but two hundred were made

oners. The bulk of the remainder, throw-
themselves on board their vessels, escaped
safety to Athens.

It was the seventeenth day after the battle
of Delium was taken. And not long after,
a herald despatched by the Athenians came
to the Boeotians, but quite ignorant of this event, to sue
for the dead, which were now delivered by the
Athenians, who no longer laid any stress upon
his former reply.

At the battle there perished of the Boeotians
a little under five hundred; of the Athe-
nians, few less than a thousand, and Hippo-
crates the general; but of light armed and bag-
men a considerable number indeed.¹

Somewhat later in time than this battle,
Cleisthenes, who, on his appearance before
the Athenians, had been disappointed in his hope of
being king, it betrayed to him, having the land-force
on board his fleet, consisting of four hun-
dred heavy armed Acarnanians, and Agræans,
and Athenians, made a descent on Sicyonia.
Before all his vessels could land their men,
the Sicyonians had marched down to make
war against them. They defeated those that
were landed, and chased them again on board.
Some they killed, and some they took alive;
after erecting their trophy, they delivered
the dead by truce.

During the former transactions at Delium,
Cleisthenes also king of the Odrysians was killed

The Athenians received in truth a terrible blow on
this occasion. The Boeotians, a people heavy and stupid
in proverb, continued ever after the terror of the
Athenians, the politest and most enlightened people
of the earth. Nay, that gross and stupid people had,
that day, well nigh completed the destruction of all
that was pre-eminently wise and good at this time upon
the earth, and done an irreparable mischief to sound reason
and sense for ever after. When the two troops of
Athenians, after fetching a compass round the hill, had com-
pleted the rout of the Athenians, who were now flying
with the utmost speed, the divine Socrates was
almost alone, facing the enemy, and fighting and
killing like a lion overpowered. Alcibiades, who
was in the cavalry, was making off on horseback;
seeing Socrates in such imminent danger, he rode
back to him, covered his retreat, and brought him off.
He thus repaid him the great obligation he had
formerly received from him at Potidæa. Strabo relates
(Geog. I. 9.) that Xenophon also the same day
saved his life to Socrates. Having fallen from his horse,
being trampled among the crowd, Socrates took
hold of his shoulders, and carried him to a place of
safety. Upon the whole, brutal strength and mere
valour were never so near getting a total conquest
of all the light and understanding which human
nature hath to boast of, that did not come directly down
from heaven.

in an expedition he had formed against the
Triballians, who encountered and vanquished
him. And Seuthes the son of Sparodocus,
his nephew by the brother, succeeded him in
the kingdom of the Odrysians and the rest of
Thrace over which he had reigned.

The same winter, Brasidas, in conjunction
with the allies of Thrace, marched against
Amphipolis, an Athenian colony, upon the
river Strymon.

The spot of ground on which this city now
standeth, Aristagoras the Milesian formerly,
when he fled from king Darius, had endeavoured
to plant, but was beat off by the Edonians.
Two and thirty years after, the Athenians
made the same attempt, having sent thither a
colony consisting of ten thousand of their own
people and such others as voluntarily came in,
all of whom were destroyed by the Thracians
at Drabescus. But after an interval of twenty-
nine years, the Athenians came hither again
with a fresh colony led by Agnon the son of
Nicias, who having drove away the Edonians,
built this city upon the spot of ground which
had formerly been called the Nine Roads. They
rushed to the seizure from Eion, a maritime
emporium situated at the river's mouth, and
belonging to them. Eion is distant twenty
stadia² from the spot where the city now
standeth, and which by Agnon was named
Amphipolis, because it is almost surrounded
by the Strymon which floweth along it on both
sides. Running therefore a wall from the
river to the river, he planted his colony on a
spot conspicuous both to the land and to the sea.

Against this place, Brasidas decamped from
Arne of Chalcidica, advanced with his army.
About sunset he arrived at Aulon and Bro-
miscus, where the lake Bolbe issueth into the
sea. From hence, after taking the evening re-
past, he continued his march by night. It
was winter, and a snow was falling. This
favoured and encouraged his enterprise, as he
intended to surprise the people of Amphipolis,
except such as were privy to his design. For
there resided in the place a body of Argyl-
lians, who are an Andrian colony, and others
who acted in combination with him, some of
them at the instigation of Perdiccas, and others
at that of the Chalcideans: but in a more par-
ticular manner the Argylilians, who had a place
of residence very near it, who farther had ever

² About two English miles,

been suspected by the Athenians. And were really intent on the ruin of the place when now a fair opportunity was within their reach, and Brasidas at hand (who long before had been tampering with these inhabitants of foreign mixture) in order to have the city betrayed to him. The Argyllians at this juncture received him into their own city, and revolting from the Athenians led his army forwards that very night to the bridge laid over the Strymon. The city is seated at some distance from this pass; and it was not then defended by a fort as it is now, but was only the station of a small party of guards. Brasidas therefore easily forced the guard, being favoured in some degree by treachery, not a little also by the season and his own unexpected approach. He then passed the bridge, and was immediately master of all the effects of those Amphipolitans who reside in all the tract without the walls. This passage was so sudden, that those within the city had no notice of it; and as to those without, many of them being seized, and others flying for preservation within the wall, the Amphipolitans were thrown into vast confusion, increased by their mutual suspicions of one another. And it is said, that if Brasidas, instead of permitting his troops to disperse for plunder, had advanced directly against the city, it must unavoidably have fallen into his hands. But he, on the contrary, having ordered them to halt, employed himself in the ravage of what lay without; and, finding nothing effectuated in his favour by accomplices within, he for the present desisted. But those his accomplices were overpowered in number by the opposite party, who prevented their opening the gates immediately to Brasidas; and, acting in concert with Eucles their commandant, who resided there by the orders of the Athenians to guard the place, they despatch a messenger to the other commander in Thrace, Thucydides the son of Olorus, who compiled this history, and was then in Thasus, (Thasus is an island, a colony of the Parians, and distant about half a day's sail from Amphipolis,) pressing him to come instantly to their relief.

Thucydides no sooner received this notice, than with the utmost expedition he put to sea, with seven ships that happened to be at hand. He designed nothing so much as to prevent if possible the loss of Amphipolis; or, if that was impracticable, to throw himself into Eion, and secure it in time.

Brasidas, in the meanwhile, fearing at the approach of this succour from Thasus, informed besides that Thucydides drew an ample revenue from the working of his gold-mines in this quarter of Thrace, and was on this account of great credit amongst the principal persons of this part of the continent, tried all possible expedients to get possession of the city before his arrival, lest his appearance amongst them might animate the Amphipolitans with the hope of succour by sea and from Thrace, which the credit of Thucydides might easily obtain for their effectual preservation, and in pursuance of this they might refuse to capitulate. He sent them therefore very moderate terms, ordering his herald to proclaim that "the Amphipolitans and Athenians within the city should, if they desired it, be continued in the free possession of their property, and of all their rights and liberties whatever: but those who refused to stay, should have the space of five days allowed them to quit the town and remove their effects."

This proposal was no sooner heard, than the inclinations of the many took a new turn. The Athenian interest had but a few supporters in the city: the bulk of the inhabitants were a mixture of foreign nations. There were also within many persons, relations of those who had been made prisoners without. And thus, in their present consternation, the proposal was generally received as mild and gentle. The Athenians for their part, who thought themselves more exposed to danger than the rest, and had besides no hope of speedy relief, were delighted with the offer of quitting the place. So also were all the rest, that they were not to lose their rights and liberties as citizens, and should thus escape the danger they had dreaded, even beyond their hopes. Upon this, the agents of Brasidas expatiated only on the mildness and generosity of the terms he had offered, because now they perceived that the multitude had altered their sentiments, and would no longer hearken to the Athenian commandant. In short, an accommodation was perfected, and they opened the gates to Brasidas, upon the conditions he had proposed by his herald. And in this manner did the inhabitants deliver up Amphipolis.

But in the evening of the same day, Thucydides and the squadron came over to Eion. Brasidas was already in possession of Amphipolis, and designed that very night to

ion also. And unless this squadron had been in thus critically to its defence, at break of day it had been lost.

Thucydides instantly took care to put Eion in a posture of defence, in case Brasidas should attack it; and to provide farther for its future security, when he had opened a refuge there for such as were willing to remove thither from Amphipolis, according to the articles of the late surrender.

But Brasidas on a sudden fell down the river with a large number of boats towards Eion, designing if possible to seize the point of land that juts out from the walls, which would have given him the command of the river's mouth. He endeavoured at the same time also to assault it by land, but was repulsed in both attempts. And now he effectually employed his art in resettling and securing Amphipolis.

Myrcinus also, a city of Edonia, revolted to him upon the death of Pittacus king of the Ionians, who was killed by the sons of Hæcæus and his own wife Braures. Gapselus on after did the same, and Oesyme: they were colonies of the Thracians. These events were owing to the practices of Perdiccas, who came thither in person immediately after the surrender of Amphipolis.

The loss of that city cast the Athenians into great consternation, and with reason, because it was a place of great importance to them, from thence they had materials for building ships, and a pecuniary revenue; and farther, because, after a safe-conduct through the country, the route was now open to the Lacedæmonians as far as the Strymon, to annoy their dependents. Yet, had they not possessed themselves of the bridge, the large lake formed above the river, and the check given by the garrisons stationed at Eion, would have hindered the Lacedæmonians from penetrating thither. But all obstacles appeared to the Athenians now quite easy to be surmounted; and their apprehensions that their dependents would revolt, alarmed them much. For Brasidas in the rest of his conduct gave constant proofs of an excellent temper; and the declaration was ever in his mouth, that "he had been sent thither to restore the liberty of Greece."

Accordingly the cities which were subject to the Athenians had no sooner heard of the surrender of Amphipolis, together with the brave exploits and the mild engaging deportment of Brasidas, than they conceived the most ardent

inclination to shake off the yoke. They secretly despatched their agents to him, earnestly desiring a visit from him, with respective assurances from each, that they would be the first to revolt. They judged, there was no longer room to apprehend any bad consequences from such a step; falsely estimating the Athenian power to be much less considerable than it afterwards appeared. But this their judgment was founded more upon uncertain presumption than deliberate prudence. It is the turn of mankind, when their passions are warm, to give themselves up to blind and sanguine hope, and to throw aside with despotic scorn whatever seemeth to be counter to their wishes. It was but lately that the Athenians had been vanquished by the Bœotians; and Brasidas had been making such recitals as might persuade, though in fact they were conclusive, that at Nisæa with his single force he offered battle to the Athenians and they declined it. This made them confident, and they became perfectly convinced, that there was no longer a strength sufficient to chastise them. But what had the greatest influence on their thoughts, and disposed them entirely to run all hazards, was the immediate pleasure they promised themselves in a change, and that now they were going for the first time to experience the sweets of Lacedæmonian friendship.

These inclinations were perceived by the Athenians, who sent garrisons into each of these cities in order to curb them, with as much expedition as the shortness of time and the wintry season would permit.

Brasidas also had sent to Lacedæmon, soliciting a speedy reinforcement, and was busy himself in providing materials to build triremes in the Strymon. But the Lacedæmonians neglected to supply him, partly through the envy which the leading men at Sparta had conceived against him, and partly because their attention was principally confined to the recovery of their people made prisoners in Sphacteria, and to bringing the war to a conclusion.

The same winter the Megareans having recovered their long walls, which were in the possession of the Athenians, leveled them with the ground.

Brasidas thus master of Amphipolis gathered together the allies, and leadeth them into the district called Acte. It is the tract which stretcheth out into the sea from the canal which was dug by Xerxes, and Athos the

highest mount in Acte is its utmost verge upon the Ægean sea. The cities in it are, Sane, a colony of Andrians, seated close to the canal and on that part which faceth the sea towards Eubœa; Thyssus farther, and Cleone, and Acrothous, and Olophyxus, and Dium, which are promiscuously inhabited by various sets of Barbarians, who speak both languages. There is also a small number of Chalcideans amongst them, but the bulk are Pelasgians (the issue of those Tyrrhenes who formerly inhabited Lemnos and Athens), and Bisaltians, and Crestonians, and Edonians: they reside in small fortresses. Most of them went over to Brasidas; but Sane and Dium stood out. He therefore made his army halt on their lands, and laid them waste. Yet as this had no effect, he marched from thence to Torone of Chalcidica, then possessed by the Athenians. He hastened thither at the invitation of a small party, who were ready to betray the city to him. Being arrived whilst yet it was dark, he sat down about break of day with his army near the temple of Dioscuri, which lieth not at most above three stadia from the city.¹ The bulk of the Toroneans and the Athenian garrison were ignorant of his approach: but the accomplices, who knew he would be punctual, sent some of their body unperceived to observe his approach. When these were thus certainly assured he was at hand, they conducted back with them to their friends seven men armed only with daggers. Twenty had at first been selected for this service, but only seven of them now had the courage to proceed: Lysistratus the Olynthian was the person who commanded. They got in by the wall towards the sea without causing an alarm, and ascending from thence slaughtered the guard in the citadel, which is seated upon the most eminent spot, the whole city being built on the declivity of a hill, and burst open the postern towards Canastrœum. Brasidas, having since advanced a little with the rest of his force halted again. But he ordereth a hundred targeteers to go before, that, when the gates should be opened, and the signal given which was before agreed on, they might break in first. These after an interval of time wondered at the delay, and by gradually advancing were got close to the city. Such of the Toroneans within as acted in concert with those who had entered, when once

the postern was burst, and the gates leading to the forum were thrown open after bursting the bar, in the first place conducting some of them about, led them in at the postern, that they might strike a sudden panic on the ignorant inhabitants when attacked in rear and in front and on all sides. This done, they lifted up the appointed signal of fire, and gave instant admittance to the rest of the targeteers through the gates which led to the forum.

Brasidas, when once he saw the signal, roused up his army and led them running towards the place, shouting all at once aloud, and thus striking the greatest consternation into the inhabitants. Some immediately rushed in at the gates; others mounted over the square wooden machines, which, as the wall had lately fallen down and was now rebuilding, lay close to it for the raising of stones. Brasidas, with the bulk of his force betook himself immediately to the upper parts of the city; intending to seize the eminence, and possess himself effectually of the place. The rest dispersed themselves equally through every quarter.

Amidst this surprisal, the majority of the Toroneans, quite ignorant of the plot, were in vast confusion. But the agents in it and their party quickly ranged with the Athenians. The Athenians, (for of them there were about fifty heavy-armed asleep in the forum,) when they found what was done, some few excepted who were slain instantly on the spot, fled away for preservation; and some by land, others in the guard ships stationed there, got safe into Lecythus, a fort of their own. They kept this in their own hands, as it was the extremity of the city towards the sea stretched along on a narrow isthmus. Hither also those of the Toroneans who persevered in their fidelity, fled to them for refuge.

It being now broad day, and the city fully secured, Brasidas caused proclamation to be made to those Toroneans who had fled for refuge to the Athenians, that "such as were willing might return to their old habitations, and should enjoy their rights without any molestation." But to the Athenians a herald was sent expressly, commanding them to evacuate Lecythus which rightly belonged to the Chalcideans, and a truce should be granted them to remove themselves and their baggage." An evacuation they absolutely refused, but requested one day's truce to fetch off their dead: he solemnly accorded two. De-

¹ Above a quarter of a mile.

ing this space he was very busy in strengthening the houses adjacent to Lecythus, and the Athenians did the same within.

He also convened the Toroneans to a general assembly, and harangued them very nearly in the same manner as he had done at Acanthus,—“that it was unjust to look upon those who had been his coadjutors in the surprisal of the city, as men worse than their neighbours, or as traitors; they had no enslaving views, nor were biassed to such conduct by pecuniary persuasions; the welfare and liberty of the city had been their only object. Neither should they who had no share in the event, be more abridged than those who had. He was not come thither to destroy the city, or so much as one private inhabitant of it. For this very reason he had caused the proclamation to be made to those who had sheltered themselves amongst the Athenians, because such an attachment had not in the least impaired them in his esteem, since it was entirely owing to their ignorance that they had thus undervalued the Lacedæmonians, whose actions, as they were always more just, would for the future entitle them much more to their benevolence; their terror hitherto had been merely the result of inexperience.” He then exhorted them in general “to take care for the future to be steady and firm allies, since, should they henceforth offend, they would be made answerable for the guilt. They were not chargeable for the past, as they had rather been sufferers themselves from superior force; the preceding opposition therefore deserved forgiveness.”

Having spoken thus, and revived their spirits, when the truce was expired he made assaults upon Lecythus. The Athenians defended themselves from a paltry rampart and the battlements of the houses. One whole day they effectually repulsed them. But on the following, when a machine was to be planted against them by the enemy, from whence they intended to throw fire upon their wooden fences, and the army was now approaching to the spot which seemed convenient for lodging their machine, and whence it might be played off with effect; they raised for prevention a wooden turret, the base of which was an edifice that lay ready at hand, and carried up many buckets and tubs of water and heavy stones; and upon it also many defendants were mounted. But the edifice, too heavily laden, on a sudden was crushed by the

weight. The crash with which it fell was great: and those of the Athenians who stood near and saw it, were rather concerned than terrified. But those at a distance, and especially such as were most remote, imagining the place was already taken in that quarter, fled mainly to the sea and to their vessels.

When Brasidas perceived they were quitting the battlements and had himself beheld the accident, he led his army to the assault, and immediately carried the fortress. Such as were found within it were instantly destroyed. And the Athenians in boats and ships, after having thus abandoned it to the enemy, crossed over to the Pallene.

But Brasidas, (for in Lecythus there is a temple of Minerva; and before he proceeded to the assault he had publicly proclaimed, that a reward of thirty minæ¹ of silver should be given the man who first mounted the rampart,) concluding now that it was taken less by human than some other means, reposed the thirty minæ in the temple, as an offering to the goddess. And having demolished Lecythus and cleared all away, he consecrated the whole spot as sacred to her. During the remainder of the winter, he provided for the security of the places already in his possession, and was planning future conquests. And with the end of this winter the eighth year of the war expired.

YEAR IX.²

Very early in the spring of the ensuing summer, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians made a truce to continue for a year. The motives on the Athenian side were these—that “Brasidas might no longer seduce any of their towns to revolt, before they were enabled by this interval of leisure to act against him; and besides, that if they reaped any advantage from this truce, they might proceed to a farther accommodation.” On the Lacedæmonian side it was imagined that “the Athenians were under such terrors, as in fact they were, and, after a remission of calamities and misfortunes, would more eagerly come into some expedients for a future reconciliation; of course, would deliver up to them their citizens, and come into a truce for a larger term.” The recovery of these Spartans was a point on which they laid

¹ 96l. 15s. sterling.

² Before Christ 433.

a greater stress than ever, even during the career of success which attended Brasidas. They foresaw, that in case he extended his conquests, and even brought them to a balance with their foes, of those they must for ever be deprived, and the conflict then proceeding upon equal advantages, the dangers also would be equal, and the victory still in suspense.

Upon these motives, both parties and their allies agreed to a truce of the following tenor:

"As to the temple and oracle of the Pythian Apollo, it seemeth good unto us, that access be granted to all who desire it, without fraud and without fear, according to the laws of our country. The same is approved of by the Lacedæmonians and their allies now present; and they promise to send heralds on purpose, and to spare no pains to procure the consent of the Bœotians and Phocians.

"As to the treasure belonging to the god, care shall be taken by us to find out those who have presumed to embezzle it; and this fairly and honestly, according to the laws of our country, both by you, and by us, and by all others who are willing; all proceeding respectively according to the laws of their several constitutions.

"It hath farther seemed good to the Lacedæmonians and their other allies, if the Athenians agree to the truce, that both parties shall keep within their own bounds, and hold what we are at present respectively possessed of; that is to say, the former to keep in Coryphasium,¹ within the mountains of Boupphas and Tomeus; the latter in Cythera; without enlarging the communication for the procuring of alliance, neither on our side against you, nor on your side against us. That those in Nisæa and Minoa pass not beyond the road that leads from the gates of Megara, adjacent to the temple of Nisus, towards the temple of Neptune, and from the temple of Neptune carrieth directly to the bridge laid across to Minoa. That neither the Megareans nor their allies pass beyond the same road, nor into the island which the Athenians have taken; both keeping within their bounds, and upon no occasion whatever to have any intercourse with one another; the Megareans still to retain what they possess in Trœzen, and whatever they hold by compact with the Athenians; to

have farther the free use of the sea upon their own coasts, and those of their alliance.

"That the Lacedæmonians and allies shall not navigate the sea in a long ship,² but in any other vessel rowed with oars, and of no longer burden than five hundred talents.³

"That by virtue of this truce, safe-conduct be granted both of passage and re-passage, either by land or sea, either to Peloponnesians or to Athens, to all heralds and ambassadors, and their whole retinue how numerous soever, commissioned to negotiate the determination of the war, or to get controverted points adjudged.

"That so long as this truce be in force no deserters be entertained, neither by you, nor by us, whether they be freemen or slaves.

"You shall do justice in our causes, and we shall do the same for you, according to the laws of our respective constitutions, to the end that all controversies may be judicially settled without a war.

"These articles have the approbation of the Lacedæmonians and their allies. But, if anything more honourable or more just occur to you, you are to repair to Lacedæmon, and propose it there. For whatever points you demonstrate to be just, will in no degree ever be rejected, neither by the Lacedæmonians nor by their allies: provided the persons charged with these new commissions be sent with full powers to put to them the finishing hand, in the same manner as you require the same conditions from us.

"This truce shall be in force for a year."

Ratified by the people.

The Acamantine tribe presided. Phanippus was the notary public. Niciades was in the chair. Laches pronounced—"Be it for the welfare and prosperity of the Athenians, that a suspension of arms is granted upon the terms offered by the Lacedæmonians and allies."

Agreed in the public assembly of the people.

"That this suspension shall continue for a year.

"That it shall take place this very day, the fourteenth day of the month Elaphebolion.

"That during this interval, ambassadors and heralds shall pass between them, to adjust the terms upon which the war should be definitively concluded.

¹ In which stood the fort of Pylus.

² A ship of war.

³ Five and twenty tons.

That the generals of the state and the
lents in course shall first at Athens con-
an assembly of the people, to adjust the
upon which their embassy should be em-
to put an end to the war. And
that the ambassadors, who were now pre-
n the assembly, shall give a solemn rati-
on that they will punctually abide by this
for a year."

e Lacedæmonians and their allies agreed
se articles, and pledged their oath for the
vation of them to the Athenians and their
at Lacedæmon, on the twelfth day of the
a Gerastius.

e persons who settled the articles and
ed at the sacrifice were,
r the Lacedæmonians—Taurus the son of
imidas, Athenæus the son of Pericidas,
charidas the son of Eryxidaïdas. For
orinthians—Æneas the son of Ocytus,
amidas the son of Aristonymus. For
iconians—Damotimus the son of Nau-
s, Onasimus the son of Megacles. For
legareans—Nicasus the son of Cecalus,
crates the son of Amphidorus. For the
urians—Amphias the son of Eupæidas.
he Athenians—Nicostratus the son of
sphas, Nicias the son of Niceratus, Au-
the son of Tolmæus, generals of the

this manner was a suspension of arms
aded, during which they continued with-
aterruption to hold conferences with one
er, about settling the terms of a firm and
g peace.

ring the interval these matters were thus
tation, Scione a city in the Pellene re-
l from the Athenians to Brasidas. The
eans indeed in the Pellene give out that
re of Peloponnesus; that their ancestors
settled in these other seats were driven
originally by a storm, which in their re-
hom Troy dispersed the Achæans. When
ad notified their revolt to him, Brasidas
l over to Scione by night. A party of
ends sailed before him in a trireme, and
lowed at some distance in a fly-boat, to
d that, if he should fall in with any vessel
than this boat, the trireme might make
against her; but if another trireme of
strength should come up to them, he
d she would neglect his smaller boat, and
l attack the ship, which would give him
o complete his passage in security.

When he was safe landed, and had convened
an assembly of the Scioneans, he harangued
them as he had done before at Acanthus and
Torone. But he added farther, that "they
were a people most deserving of applause,
since, though the communication with the
Pellene, as being an isthmus, was cut off by
the Athenians who were masters of Potidæa,
and they were by this means become islanders
to all intents and purposes, yet they had, with-
out prior solicitation, advanced boldly towards
liberty, nor could bear to lie in cowardly in-
activity till necessity forced them to such
measures as tended to their manifest welfare.
This was ample proof that they were ready to
undergo any other the greatest perils, to obtain
the wished for settlement of their state. He
therefore regarded them, as in truth the most
gallant friends of the Lacedæmonians, and
would in all respects do proper honour to their
worth."

The Scionians were elevated by these hand-
some commendations. All of them became
full of spirits, not even those excepted to whom
the prior steps had been by no means agree-
able. They cheerfully determined to sustain
all future war, and in every shape gave Bra-
sidas honourable entertainment. By public
vote they placed upon his head a golden crown
as the deliverer of Greece, whilst every single
Scionean was busy in adorning him with rib-
bons, and caressing him like a victor in the
solemn games. His stay at present was short;
he only placed a small party in the town to
secure it, and then re-passed to Torone. But
soon after, he transported thither the greater
part of his force, designing with the aid of the
Scioneans to make attempts upon Mende and
Potidæa. He concluded however that the
Athenians would lose no time in throwing a
succour as into an island, and so he endeavoured
to be beforehand with them,

He had already formed an intelligence to
the prejudice of those cities, to get them be-
trayed: and he was now intent on executing
his schemes against them. But during this
pause, Aristonymus, despatched by the Athe-
nians, and Athenæus by the Lacedæmonians, to
circulate the news, arrived in a trireme, and
notify to him the suspension of arms. His for-
ces were then transported back to Torone.

The persons employed communicated the
articles of the truce to Brasidas, and all the
Lacedæmonian confederates in Thrace declared

their acquiescence in what had been done. Aristonymus was well satisfied in other respects, but finding, by computing the days, that the revolt of the Scioneans was too late in point of time, he protested against their being entitled to the benefit of the truce. Brasidas on the other hand urged many arguments to prove it prior in time, and refuseth to restore that city. When therefore Aristonymus had reported this affair at Athens, the Athenians in an instant were ready to take up arms again for the reduction of Scione. But the Lacedæmonians, by an embassy purposely despatched, remonstrated that "they should regard such a proceeding as a breach of the truce," and asserted "their right to the city, as they reposed entire credit on Brasidas; however, they were ready to refer the dispute to a fair arbitration." The others refused to abide by so hazardous a decision, but would recover it as soon as possible by force of arms. They were irritated at the thought, that persons seated as it were upon an island should presume to revolt from them, and have such confidence in the unprofitable land power of the Lacedæmonians. There was farther more truth in the date of the revolt than at present the Athenians could evince: for, in fact, the Scioneans revolted two days too late. But at the instigation of Cleon they immediately passed a decree, that "the Scioneans should be reduced by force, and then put to the sword." And their intention was recalled from all other points, to expedite the needful preparations for the execution of this.

In the meantime, Mende, also a city in the Pellene, and a colony of the Eretrians, revolted from them. Brasidas received them into his protection, thinking himself justified, as they had openly come over to him in the time of truce. Besides, he had himself some reasons to recriminate upon the Athenians, as violaters of the articles. Upon this account the Mendeans were more encouraged to the step, as they saw Brasidas was determined to support them; and were convinced, by the affair of Scione, that he would not abandon them. The design farther had been originally set on foot by the few; who, though they delayed it for a time, were resolved to push it into execution: for they apprehended that a discovery might prove fatal to themselves; and so forced the bulk of the people to act against their inclination. But the Athenians, who had quick intelligence of it, were now exas-

perated much more than before, and redoubled their preparations against both those places.

Brasidas, who soon expected the arrival of their armament, conveyed away the wives and children of the Scioneans and Mendeans to Olynthus of Chalcidica, and had them escorted thither by five hundred heavy-armed Peloponnesians and three hundred Chalcidic light-armed troops: the commander of the whole army was Polydamidas. Those left behind, expecting soon to be visited by the Athenians, united their endeavours to get things in good order for their reception.

In the interval, Brasidas and Perdiccas marched together a second time into Lyncestia against Arribæus. They commanded their separate bodies; one, the forces of the Macedonians subject to himself, and the heavy-armed Grecians who dwelled amongst them; the other, the remainder of his own Peloponnesians reinforced by Chalcideans and Acæthians, and quotas from other cities such they were able to furnish. The number of heavy-armed Grecians computed together amounted to about three thousand: the cavalry that attended, both of Macedonians and Chalcideans, was upon the whole little less than a thousand, and the remaining crowd of barbarians was great.

Breaking thus into the territory of Arribæus and finding the Lyncestians already in the field to oppose them, they also sat down and fought them. The infantry on each side were posted on an eminence, and a plain lay between them. This yielding room for the excursions of the horse, the cavalry of both began a skirmish first. But then Brasidas and Perdiccas, as soon as the Lyncestian heavy-armed were moving first from the eminence to the aid of the cavalry, and were ready to engage, marched also down into the plain to oppose them, where they charged and routed the Lyncestians. A large number of the latter were slain, the rest fled for preservation to the eminences, and there stood quiet.

The victors after this, having erected a trophy, continued for two or three days in the same post, waiting for the Illyrians who were coming up to join Perdiccas for a stipulated price. And then Perdiccas intended to advance against the villages of Arribæus, and sit longer inactive. Mende however was still the most permost in the care of Brasidas:—that place must be lost, should the Athenians arrive.

it in the interval :—the Illyrians besides not yet come up. He relished not the act, and was more inclined to go back. This ordered some disputes between them, in midst of which the news was brought, that Illyrians had deserted Perdiccas, and joined selves with Arribæus. Upon which it soon resolved between them to retire, as was reason to dread the accession of men renowned for military valour. Yet the disament between them prevented their fixing any certain time for filing off. Night came on which the Macedonians and the crowd of barbarians being struck with a sudden panic, numerous armies are apt to be, without any in cause,) and imagining that much larger forces were coming against them than in fact true, and that they were only not near enough to attack them, they instantly took to heels and hurried homewards. Perdiccas at that time knew nothing of the matter, and not being informed of it, was compelled by the flying troops to dislodge in their company, without being able to get a sight of Brasidas. For they were encamped at a distance from each other.

At the dawn of day, Brasidas perceived that the Macedonians had dislodged, and that the Illyrians and Arribæus were approaching to attack him. He therefore drew his forces together, forming a square with his heavy-armed, in the centre of which he disposed all the crowd of light-armed; and in this form he intended to stand. He appointed the youngest men to stand out, in case the enemy anywhere attacked them; and he himself with a picked body of five hundred, determined to bring up the rear, in order to sustain and make good the retreat against the van of the enemy who would press upon their rear. And before the day came near, as well as the hurry would permit, he animated his soldiers thus :

Did I not suspect, ye men of Peloponnesus, that thus abandoned as you are, and ready to be attacked by Barbarians, and those numerous forces you were in some consternation, I should have thought it needless to instruct or to encourage you. But now, against this desertion of our ranks, and this multitude of our enemies, I will endeavour by a short admonition and exhortation to raise within you the full grandeur of your souls. Upon you it is incumbent to stand out with gallantry in every martial scene, and in the account, not merely of acting in the

open field in the presence of so many confederates, but of your own hereditary valour. Your souls ought not to be dismayed at a multitude of foes, since you were not born under governments where the many control the few, but where the few command the many. And the only means, by which you acquired this noble privilege, was victorious perseverance in the fields of battle. Yet of these Barbarians, your fears of whom are the result of your ignorance, you ought to be informed, from what you have learned yourselves in former conflicts against them with the Macedonians, as well as from what I conjecture, and what I depend upon from the accounts of others, that in action they will be by no means terrible. For when a hostile force, though in reality weak, carrieth with it the appearance of strength, a true discovery of its state is no sooner obtained, than it redoubleth the courage of their opponents. But men in whom valour is firmly implanted, none can assault with extraordinary spirit but such as know them not. These enemies of yours are dreadful for a while, merely till brought to trial. Their multitude rendereth them terrible to the sight; the loudness of their shouts is insupportable to the ear. Their weapons, brandished about and clashing in the air, have a frightful and menacing look. But their spirit will not answer their show, when charging against such as will sustain their shock. They are not drawn up with skill, nor will they blush when compelled to quit their ground. To fly from or to fly after an enemy is equally a matter of glory to them: by such things is their valour established and rescued from reproach. For a battle where every combatant is his own commander, leaveth a specious and handsome opportunity to each of providing for his safety. They this moment judge it more safe to intimidate us at a distance than to run to the charge: for otherwise, before this they had attacked us. And you plainly see, that all the terror which now runs before them, will vanish at the onset, as terrible only to sight and hearing. When therefore they advance to the charge, sustain it and repulse them; and when opportunity serveth, fall back into your ranks again with regularity and order. You shall thus the sooner secure your retreat, and be convinced for the time to come, that such rabbles, to men who can stand the first fury of their onset, have only made, at a distance and by their pausing, a vain and menacing

parade of valour ; but such as will give ground and fly before them, they pursue with eagerness ; and are excellently brave when there is no resistance."

After this exhortation, Brasidas caused his army to file leisurely off. The Barbarians perceiving it pressed forwards with great noise and clamour, supposing that he fled, and that they might intercept and cut him off. But when the appointed parties sallied out from all quarters to receive them, and Brasidas himself with his picked body sustained their charge, they repulsed them at their first assault, to the great surprise of the enemy. Afterwards, receiving every repeated attack, they beat them off continually ; and then, during the intervals of pause, retreated in good order ; till at length, the bulk of the Barbarians discontinued their efforts in the plain against the Greeks under Brasidas, and leaving only a part of their body to follow and annoy them in their retreat, the rest wheeled speedily off to pursue the flying Macedonians, and such as they overtook they slaughtered. To the narrow pass farther between two hills, which was the entrance into the territories of Arribæus, they hurried before in order to secure it, knowing it to be the only route by which Brasidas could retreat. He was now drawing near it, and in the most difficult part of the passage they were spreading themselves circularly to encompass him on all sides. But Brasidas perceiving their design, ordered the three hundred that marched with him to advance full speed up that hill which he thought was most practicable, and possess themselves of it, and this with the utmost expedition, each as he was able without regarding form, and endeavour to drive the Barbarians thence, who were already posting themselves upon it, before they were joined by larger numbers and could invest him on all sides. They did so, attacked, and made themselves masters of the hill, which enabled the main body of the Grecians to march up without obstruction. For now the Barbarians were thrown into consternation, when their detachment had in this manner been beat off from the eminence. And here they discontinued the pursuit, imagining the enemy had already passed the frontier, and secured their retreat.

Brasidas, when once he was master of the eminences, marched on without molestation ; and the very same day reached Arnissa, the

first place within the dominions of Perdiccas. His soldiers indeed, who were exasperated against the Macedonians for having thus precipitately abandoned them, whatever yokes of oxen they met with on their route, or whatever baggage lay dropped upon the ground, (as such things it was likely should happen in retreat by night and confused by fear,) they former they unyoked and cut to pieces, and secreted the latter as lawful plunder. But Perdiccas first began to regard Brasidas as his enemy, and ever after forced himself against his inclinations to hate the Peloponnesians, not indeed in his judgment preferring the Athenians, but prevailed upon by the exigencies of his own affairs, he cast about for the means of being again reconciled to the latter, and disentangling himself from the former.

Brasidas, having retreated through Macedonia to Torone, findeth the Athenians there in possession of Mende. Judging it impossible now to pass over into the Pallene and drive out the enemy, he chose to remain there securely to garrison Torone. For, during the time of the expedition into Lynceus, the Athenians had put to sea against Melos and Scione with the armament they had provided, consisting of fifty ships, ten of which were Chian, of a thousand heavy-armed of their own citizens, six hundred archers, a thousand mercenary Thracians, and a body of geteers furnished by their adjacent dependencies. Nicias the son of Niceratus, and Nicostratus the son of Diotrephes had the command of the whole. They weighed from Potidea, landing at the temple of Neptune, marched directly for Mende. The Mendeans, with their own force and three hundred Scioneans who were come to their succour, and the Peloponnesian auxiliaries, in all seven hundred heavy-armed under the command of Polydamas, were encamped without the city upon a strong eminence. Nicias taking with him a hundred and twenty light-armed Methoneans, and picked men of the heavy-armed Athenians, and all the archers, attempted to mount by the path that led up the eminence ; but, being galled by the enemy, was not able to force the ascent. Nicostratus, with all the rest of the force, having fetched a compass about, in order to mount in a remote quarter, where the ascent was impracticable, was quite thrown into disorder : and thus the whole Athenian army narrowly escaped a total defeat. As there

the Mendeans and allies maintained their post the whole day, the Athenians drew off and encamped. And, when night came on, the Mendeans withdrew into the city.

The next day, the Athenians sailing round to the Scione side possessed themselves of the suburbs, and spent the whole day in ravaging the country, as not a soul sallied out to obstruct them: for some bustles now were on foot in the city inclining to a sedition. The three hundred Scioneans departed also in the succeeding night to their own home: and the day following, Nicias advancing with a moiety of the force within their frontier, ravaged the district of the Scioneans; whilst Nicostatus, with the remainder, sat down before the upper gates of Mende, from whence the road leadeth to Potidea. But Polydamidas, as the Mendeans and the auxiliaries had chanced to ground their arms in this quarter within the wall, drew them up in order of battle, and exhorted the Mendeans to sally out. It was replied in a seditious manner by one of the popular faction, that "they would not sally, and would have nothing to do with the war." At such a refusal Polydamidas having laid hands upon the person, a tumult at once ensued, in which the people ran immediately to arms, and, furious with anger, made towards the Peloponnesians, and all those of the opposite faction who sided with them. They fell upon and routed them in an instant, terrified as they were at this sudden assault; and the gates were thrown open at the same time to the Athenians. They supposed this insurrection had been made against them in consequence of some previous combination; and as many as escaped out of the scuffle with life, fled away to the citadel, which was before in their possession.

But the Athenians (for Nicias was now returned before the city) bursting into Mende, for it was not opened by composition, with their whole united force, plundered it as though taken by storm; nay, the generals had some difficulty to restrain their soldiers from putting the inhabitants to the sword. And after this they issued their commands to the Mendeans to continue their government in the usual form, and to proceed judiciously against those of their body whom they esteemed the principal authors of the revolt. Those in the citadel they shut up with a wall extending on both sides to

the sea, and posted a guard to secure the blockade.

When in this manner they had possessed themselves of Mende, they marched against Scione. The inhabitants, with the Peloponnesian aids, coming out to receive them, posted themselves on a strong eminence before the city; which, unless the enemy could take it, would infallibly prevent their walling them about. But the Athenians stormed the post, and after an engagement forcing them to dislodge, they formed their camp, and having erected a trophy, got every thing in readiness for the circumvallation. And no long time after, whilst they were busied in this work, the auxiliaries blocked up in the citadel at Mende, having forced the guard posted near the sea, get away by night; and the major part of them, escaping privily through the Athenian camp before Scione, got safe into that town.

When the circumvallation of Scione was in hand, Perdiccas, having despatched a herald for the purpose to the Athenian generals, strikes up a new treaty with the Athenians. He took this step out of pure enmity to Brasidas, arising from the retreat out of Lynceus; and had begun from that time to act in their favour. For it happened, that at this very juncture of time Ischagoras the Lacedæmonian was bringing up by land a reinforcement to Brasidas. But Perdiccas, as well to oblige Nicias, who, as he had renewed his alliance, commanded him to give some conspicuous proof of his attachment to the Athenians, as to gratify his own resentment in refusing the Peloponnesians a passage through his dominions, had gained the concurrence of his Thessalian friends, since with the chief persons of that country he had ever been closely united by the hospitable ties, and so stopped the reinforcement and their convoy that they durst not attempt to pass through Thessaly. Ischagoras, however, and Aminias and Aristeus, reach Brasidas in person, being commissioned by the Lacedæmonians to inspect the posture of their affairs, and brought with them some young men of Sparta, though contrary to their laws, who were to take upon them the government of the cities which were no longer to be trusted to their former managers. In effect, Clearchus the son of Cleonymus they place as governor in Amphipolis, and Epiteldas the son of Hegesander in Torone.

This same summer, the Thebans demolished the walls of the Thespiensians, alleging as the reason, that they were practising with the Athenians. This demolition had ever been intended, but its execution was now become more easy, as the flower of their youth had perished in the late battle fought against the Athenians.

This summer also, the temple of Juno at Argos was destroyed by fire. Chrysis the priestess had placed a burning torch too near the garlands, and unawares fell fast asleep. The flames broke out and were raging all around before they were perceived. Chrysis indeed instantly, for fear of the Argives, flies away by night to Phlius. They, according to the law enacted for that purpose, appointed another priestess in her room, whose name was Phaeinis. Eight years of this war were elapsed, and it was the middle of the ninth when Chrysis fled.

The circumvallation of Scione also was completed about the close of this summer; and the Athenians, leaving behind a sufficient body to guard it, drew off the rest of their army.

In the ensuing winter, things were quiet between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, because of the suspension of arms. But the Mantineans, and Tegeatæ, and the confederates on both sides, engaged at Laodicea of Orestis: but the victory was doubtful. Each party

routed a wing of their opponents, and both sides erected trophies, and sent the spoils to Delphi. Many however were slain on both sides, and the battle was drawn, the night putting an end to the contest. The Tegeatæ indeed passed the night upon the field, and immediately erected a trophy. But the Mantineans withdrew to Bucolion, and afterwards erected their trophy in opposition.

In the close of this winter, and when the spring was already approaching, Brasidas further made an attempt upon Potidæa. For having approached it in the night, and applied his ladders, so far he proceeded without causing an alarm. For the bell being passed by, during that interval, before he that carried it forward could return, the moment was seized for applying them.¹ However, the alarm was taken before he could possibly scale, upon which he drew off his army without loss of time, not caring to wait for the return of day. And thus ended the winter; and with it the ninth year of this war, of which Thucydides hath completed the history.

¹The officers regularly went their rounds to see that all the sentinels were at their posts. When they approached any of them, a little bell was rung, by which the sentinel was to answer, in proof that he was at his post and awake. The interval between the rounds was so considerable, and the vigilance of the sentinel, as the bell was just gone by, might be so relaxed, that Brasidas hoped he might execute his scheme.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

BOOK V.

YEAR X. The truce endeth. Cleon sent commander into Thrace; his proceedings there. The battle of Amphipolis, in which Brasidas and Cleon are killed. A general peace, styled the Nicias. An alliance, offensive and defensive, between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians.—XI. The peace merely nominal; and Thucydides proceedeth in his history of the Peloponnesian war. The Corinthians practise against the Lacedæmonians, An Argive league. No confidence between the principal states. A train of negotiations. A separate alliance between the Lacedæmonians and Boeotians, contrary to article. Panactum demolished.—XII. The demolition of Panactum and the separate alliance highly resented at Athens. Many are scheming a rupture, but especially Alcibiades. By his means a negotiation is brought on at Athens, and an alliance formed with the Argives. The Lacedæmonians forbidden to assist at the Olympic games.—XIII. War between the Argives and Epidaurians. The Lacedæmonians throw a garrison into Epidaurus; and the Athenians replace the Helots and Messenians in Pylos.—XIV. The Lacedæmonians take the field against the Argives. Two large armies face one another within sight of Argos, yet part without engaging. The Lacedæmonians take the field a second time. The battle of Mantinea. The Argives enter into league with the Lacedæmonians.—XV. Fresh strife at Argos in favour of the Athenians.—XVI. Expedition of the Athenians against the isle of Melos. The conference in form, by way of dialogue. The Athenians become masters of that island.

YEAR X.¹

In the following summer, the truce, made for a year, expired, of course, at the time of the Pythian Games. And, during this relaxation from war, the Athenians caused the Delians to evacuate the isle of Delos; imagining that, upon the taint of some crimes long since committed, they were not sufficiently pure to perform due service to the god, and that this yet was wanting to render that work of purgation complete, in which, as I have already related, they thought themselves justified in demolishing the sepulchres of the dead. The Delians settled again, so fast as they could remove themselves thither, at Ataramytium, bestowed upon them for this purpose by Pharnaces.

Cleon,² having obtained the commission

from the Athenians, went by sea into the Thracian dominions, so soon as the suspension of arms expired, having under his command twelve hundred heavy-armed Athenians, three

das from the head of that accomplished Spartan, even without having Demosthenes for his second. We may guess to what a height of insolence he was now grown, from the Knights of Aristophanes. And, to set it in the most ludicrous view, the poet opens his play with Nicias and Demosthenes, whom he paints in a very injurious manner; and, no doubt, it must have been very grating to them, to see themselves represented in so low buffoonery upon the stage of Athens. "Demosthenes begins with a shower of curses on that execrable Paphlagonian, Cleon; Nicias seconds him; then both of them howl together in a most lamentable duetto. They next lay their heads together about some means of redress. Demosthenes proposeth getting out of their master Cleon's reach. 'Let us go, then,' says Nicias. 'Ay; let us go,' cries Demosthenes. 'Say more,' says Nicias, 'let us go over to the enemy.' 'Ay; over to the enemy,' adds the other. 'But first,' says Nicias, 'let us go and prostrate ourselves before the images of the gods.' 'What images?' says Demosthenes; 'dost thou think then there are any gods?' 'I do.' 'Upon what grounds?' 'Because I am undeservedly the object of their hatred.'—Such are the daring misrepresentations Aristophanes makes of characters that by no means deserve it! Demosthenes afterwards describes the arrogance of Cleon

¹ Before Christ 422.

² Cleon is now grown perfectly convinced that he is a very hero, and hath prevailed upon a majority of the people of Athens to be of the same mind, since, seriously and deliberately, they intrust him with a most important and delicate commission. He now imagines he can carry all before him, and pluck all the laurels of Bras-

hundred horsemen, and larger numbers of their allied forces. His whole armament consisted of thirty sail. Touching first at Scione, yet blocked up, he drew from thence the heavy-armed, stationed there as guards; and, standing away entered the haven of the Colophonians, lying at no great distance from Torone. Being here informed, by the deserters, that Brasidas was not in Torone, nor the inhabitants able to make head against him, he marched his forces by land towards that city, and sent ten of his ships about, to stand into the harbour. His first approach was to the new rampart, which Brasidas had thrown up quite round the city in order to inclose the suburbs within its cincture, and thus by the demolition of the old wall, had rendered it one entire city. When the Athenians came to the assault, Pasitolidas, the Lacedæmonian, who was commandant, and the garrison under his command, exerted themselves in its defence. But, when they could no longer maintain it, and at the same time the ships, sent around on purpose, had entered the harbour, Pasitolidas, fearing lest the ships might take the town now left defenceless, and, when the rampart was carried by the enemy, he himself might be intercepted, abandons it immediately, and retired with all speed into the town: but the Athenians were already disembarked and masters of the place. The land-force also broke in instantly at his heels, by rushing along through the aperture in the old wall; and some, as well Peloponnesians as Toroneans, they slew in the moment of irruption. Some also they took alive, amongst whom was Pasitolidas the commandant. Brasidas was indeed coming up to its relief, but receiving intelligence on his march that it was taken he retired; since he was forty stadia² off, too great a distance to prevent the enemy.

thus: "He hath one foot fixed in Pylus, and the other in the assembly of the people. When he moves, he struts and stretches at such a rate, that his bum is in Thrace, his hands in Ætolia, and his attention amongst the tribes at home."—Nicias then proposeth poisoning themselves by drinking bull's blood, like Themistocles;—"Or rather," says Demosthenes, "a dose of good wine." This is agreed upon, in order to cheer up their spirits, and enable them to confront Cleon, and play off against him, the seller of black-puddings. Nicias accordingly goes and steals the wine.—Yet, in spite of the most outrageous ridicule, and the opposition of all wise and honest men at Athens, we see Cleon now at the head of an army, to stop the rapid conquests of Brasidas.

² About four miles.

But Cleon and the Athenians now erect two trophies; one upon the harbour, the other at the rampart. They farther doomed to slavery, the wives and children of the Toroneans. The male inhabitants, together with the Peloponnesians and every Chalcidean that was found amongst them, amounting in all to seven hundred, they sent away captives to Athens. The Peloponnesians indeed were afterwards released, by virtue of the subsequent treaty; the rest were fetched away by the Olynthians, who made exchanges for them, body for body.

About the same time, the Boeotians, by treachery, got possession of Panactum, a fort upon the frontier, belonging to the Athenians.

As for Cleon, having established a garrison at Torone, he departed thence, and sailed round Athos, as bound for Amphipolia.

But two vessels about this time, bound from Italy and Sicily, sailed out of the harbour of Athens, having on board Phæax, the son of Erasistrotus, with whom two other persons were joined in commission, to execute an embassy there. For the Leontines, after the departure of the Athenians from Sicily, in consequence of the joint accommodation, had encreased many strangers as denizens of their city, and the populace had a plan in agitation for a distribution of the lands. The noble, alarmed at this, and the concurrence of the Syracusans and ejected commons. They were dispersed, and wandered up and down as so many vagabonds; while the noble, striking up an agreement with the Syracusans, abandoned and left in desolation their own city, settling at Syracuse as free denizens of that place. And yet, soon after some of this number, dissatisfied even here, returned to Syracuse again, and seize upon Phocæ, a quarter of the old city of the Leontines, and upon Bricinnis, which is a fortress in the Leontine. Hither the greater part of the commons resorted to them; and adhering firmly together, from these strongholds they ravaged the country by their hostilities. When the Athenians had intelligence of this, they sent out Phæax, to persuade, by all proper means, their old allies in that country, and to gain, if possible, the concurrence of the other Sicilians, to take up arms for the preservation of the people of Leontium, against the encroaching power of the Syracusans. Phæax, upon his arrival, recommendeth the scheme successfully to the Camarineans and Agrigentines. But the negotiations meeting with some obstacles

Gela, he desisted from addressing himself to the rest, since he was assured he could not possibly succeed. Retiring therefore through the district of the Siculi to Catane, and calling on his road at Bricinnia, and having encouraged the malcontents there to persevere, he departed. Not but that, in this Sicilian voyage, both passing and repassing, and also upon the coast of Italy, he had urged to several cities "how expedient for them was the Athenian friendship."

He met also in his course with those Locrians, who were going to another settlement, after expulsion from Messene. They had been driven to this necessity by seditious factions at Messene, one of which had invited them thither since the joint accommodation among the Sicilians; and now they were forced to shift again, though Messene had for a time been entirely in their power. Pheax therefore, meeting with these in their removal, gave them no annoyance; for the Locrians had been at a conference with him, to concert the measures of an agreement with the Athenians. These, however, were the only party of all the confederates, who, when the Sicilians had amicably ended their disputes, refused to treat with the Athenians, who were brought to such submission since merely by a war, in which they were embroiled against the Itonians and Meleans, who bordered upon them, and were colonies of their own. And, some time after this, Pheax truly returned to Athens.

But Cleon, who from Torone was gone about by sea against Amphipolis, marching away from Eion, maketh an assault upon Stagirus, a colony of Andrians, but without success; yet Galepsus, a colony of the Thasians, he taketh by storm. He sent farther ambassadors to Perdiccas, to summon his attendance in the expedition, according to the tenor of the new alliance. He sent others into Thrace to Pollex, king of the Odomantians, that he would hire as large a body of Thracians as could be got, and bring them up under his own orders. And, during this interval, he himself lay quiet at Eion.

But Brasidas, informed of these proceedings, placed himself in an opposite post at Credylium. This place belongeth to the Argilians, and is seated on an eminence on the other side of the river, and at no great distance from Amphipolis. From hence he had a perfect view of all Cleon's motions; so that now it was impos-

ible for the latter to make any approach with his army, from thence to Amphipolis, without being discovered. Brasidas, however, suspected that Cleon would approach, and, from a contempt of his opponents, would certainly advance thither, without waiting for reinforcements.

He had at the same time, provided himself with fifteen hundred mercenary Thracians, and had assembled all the Edonian targeteers and horsemen. Of the Myrcinians and Chalcidians he had a thousand targeteers, besides those in Amphipolis. But his whole force of heavy-armed of all sorts amounted to about two thousand; and he had three hundred Grecian horsemen. With a detachment, consisting of fifteen hundred of these, Brasidas had posted himself at Credylium; the rest were left in Amphipolis, under the orders of Clearidas.

Cleon remained without stirring for the present, but was soon forced to such a step as Brasidas expected. The soldiers were chagrined at their inactivity, and were disparaging his conduct by invidious parallels, "against how much skill and courage, with how much unskillfulness and cowardice he was matched;" and that "with the highest regret they had attended him from Athens on this expedition." Sensible of their discontent, and unwilling to disgust them more by too long a continuance in the same post, he drew them up and led them on. He acted now upon the vain conceit with which his success at Pylus had puffed him up, as a man of great importance. It could not enter his heart, that the enemy would presume to march out against and offer him battle. He gave out that "he was only advancing in order to view the place: he waited indeed the arrival of additional forces, not as if they were needful to his security, should the enemy attack him, but to enable him completely to invest the city, and to take it by storm." Being advanced, he posted his troops upon a strong eminence before Amphipolis, and went in person to view the marshes of the Strymon, and the situation of the city on the side of Thrace, how it really was. He judged he could retreat at pleasure without a battle. Not so much as one person appeared upon the works, or issued out at the gates; for they were all shut fast. He now concluded himself guilty of a mistake in coming so near the place without the machines, "as the town must infallibly have been taken, because abandoned."

Brasidas, however, had no sooner perceived that the Athenians were in motion, than descending from Cerdylum, he marcheth into Amphipolis. He there waved all manner of sally and all show of opposition against the Athenians. He was afraid of trusting too much to his own forces, as he judged them inferior to the enemy, not truly in numbers, for so far they were nearly balanced, but in real worth; for the Athenian force, appointed for this service, was composed of the very flower of Athens, and the choicest troops of the Lemnians and Imbrians. For this reason, he prepared to assail them with art; because in case he gave the enemy a view of his numbers, and of the sorry manner in which they were armed, he judged he should be less likely to gain a victory, than by concealing them till the moment of action, and avoiding that contempt which their real state would have inspired. Picking out, therefore, a party of one hundred and fifty heavy-armed for himself, and appointing Clearidas to command the rest, he designed to fall suddenly upon the Athenians in their retreat; concluding he should never again find them in this forlorn manner, when the reinforcements they expected were come up. Calling, therefore, all his soldiers around him, as he was desirous of animating them, and letting them into his scheme he harangued them thus:

"Ye men of Peloponnesus, let it suffice that I briefly put you in mind that we are natives of that country which hath ever by valour preserved itself free, and that you of the Doric are now going to attack your opponents of the Ionic descent, whom you are inured to defeat. My words are chiefly designed to inform you in what manner I have planned the method of attack, lest hazarding the event with so small a party, and not with our entire force, may seem unequal to the work, and may too much dispirit you. The enemy, I conjecture, from an utter contempt of us, and a strong presumption that we durst not come out into the field against them, have shown themselves before this city; and this very moment, disorderly scattered as they are to view the situation, they heartily despise us. The leader, therefore, who hath the most acuteness in detecting such blunders in a foe, and then seizeth the proper moment to fall upon them, as best enabled by his own strength; not so much in the open and regular manner of a methodical fight, as with a surprise, most advantageous in

the present juncture;—such a leader may, in the most part, be assured of success. Such stealths as these draw after them the highest glory: by these the man who over-reacheth his enemy the most, performeth the most substantial service for his friends. Whilst, therefore, haughtily presuming on their own weakness, they remain thus disordered, and, by what appeareth to me, are bent more on drawing off than remaining here,—during this their intermission of purpose, and before their resolution can be regularly adjusted, I myself, at the head of my chosen party, will be amongst them, if possible, and will rush with vigour into the centre of their army. And then, Clearidas, when once you perceive that I am engaged, and, as in probability it must be, have thrown them into disorder, then, at the head of yours, accompanied by the Amphipolitans and the rest of the confederates, throw open the gates on a sudden for your sally, and advance with your utmost speed to the charge. And thus, it may confidently be hoped, the enemy must be thrown into the utmost consternation; because a second body, thus rushing to the charge, is more terrible to the first than the present which is already engaged. And show yourself now, Clearidas, that gallant man which in honour, as a Spartan, you ought to be.

"You, in general, ye confederates, I exhort to follow with manly resolution, and to remember that good soldiers are bound, in duty, to be full of spirit, to be sensible of shame, and to obey commanders; that, this very day, if you behave with valour, you are henceforth free, and will gain the honourable title of Lacedæmonian allies; otherwise, must continue to be the slaves of the Athenians; where the least that can befall you, if neither sold for slaves nor put to death as rebels, will be a heavier yoke of tyranny than you ever yet have felt, whilst the liberty of the rest of Greece must by you for ever be obstructed. But so tardy behaviour I conjure you to scorn, as you know for what valuable prizes you are to enter the lists. I myself shall convince you, that I am not more ready to put others in mind of their duty, than personally to discharge my own through the whole scene of action."

Brasidas, having ended his harangue, prepared to sally out himself, and placed the main body under the orders of Clearidas, at the gates which are called the Thracian, to be ready to rush out at the appointed time.

To Cleon now,—for Brasidas had been plainly seen coming down from Cerdylum; and, as the prospect of the city lay open to those without, had been seen also when sacrificing before the temple of Minerva, and forming the proper dispositions:—to Cleon, I say, who was now in a remote quarter to view the posts, advice is brought, that “the whole force of the enemy was visibly drawn up within the city, and that, under the gates, many feet of horses and men might be discerned, as ready for a sally.” Upon hearing this, he went to the place, and was convinced by his own sight. He determined, however, not to hazard a battle before his succours were arrived; and though he knew his motions could not be concealed, he went off, and ordered the signal to be given for a retreat; commanding farther that the left wing should file off first, which indeed was the only method of drawing off securely to Eion. But as they seemed to him to be long about it, he wheeled off himself at the head of the right; and thus, exposing his men to the missive weapons of the enemy, was drawing off his army.

At this instant Brasidas, perceiving it was time to attack, since the army of the Athenians was already in motion, says to those about him, and to all that were near,—“These gentlemen wait not for us, that plainly appeareth by the shaking of their spears and heads; for those who make such motions are not used to stay for the enemy’s approach. But let somebody throw me open the appointed gates and let us boldly and with all speed sally out against them.” In effect, Brasidas, issuing at the gates of the entrenchment, and the first of what was then the long wall, advanced with all speed directly along the road, where now standeth the trophy, to be seen by those who pass along by the strongest part of the town, and, falling upon the Athenians, dismayed not only at their own irregular situation, but also terrified at his bold attack in the very centre of their army, he putteth them to the rout. And now Clearidas, sallying out according to order at the Thracian gates, was advancing to second him. The consequence was, that, by such an unexpected and sudden assault on both sides, the Athenians were thrown into the highest confusion. Their left wing, which inclined the most towards Eion, as having filed off first, was instantly broken, and fled. These were no sooner dispersed in flight, than Brasi-

das, advancing to the attack of the right, is wounded:—he dropped;—but the Athenians are not sensible of it. Those who were near him took him up and carried him off. This accident, however, enabled the right wing of the Athenians to maintain their ground the longer; though Cleon, who from the first had never intended to stand an engagement, flies instantly away; and, being intercepted by a Myrcinian targeteer, is slain. But his heavy-armed, embodying together and gaining an eminence, repulsed Clearidas, who twice or thrice attacked them, and maintained their ground till the Myrcinian and Chalcidic cavalry and the targeteers, surrounding and pouring in their darts upon them, compelled them to fly. Thus the whole Athenian army was distressed in a laborious flight: they ran different ways amongst the mountains; numbers had been destroyed in the charge, others by the Chalcidic horse and targeteers; but the remainder escaped in safety to Eion.

Those who took up Brasidas, when he dropped in the action, and bore him off, carried him into the city yet alive. His senses remained till he heard his party were victorious, and soon after that he expired.¹

The rest of the army with Clearidas, being come back from the pursuit, rifled the dead and erected a trophy.

This done, all the confederates assisted under arms at the funeral of Brasidas, whom they interred at the public expense within the city near the place where the forum now standeth. And afterwards the Amphipolitans, having inclosed his monument, performed sacrifice to him as a hero. They also enacted solemn games in his honour and annual sacrifices. Nay, they ascribed their colony to him as founder, after demolishing the edifices of Agnon, and defacing every memorial which might continue the memory of his foundation. They acted thus, partly out of real gratitude to Brasidas, whom they regarded as their deliverer, and partly at

¹ The first embassy which came from the Grecians in Thrace to Sparta, after the death of Brasidas, made a visit to his mother Argileonis. The first question she asked them was, “Did my son die bravely?” And when the ambassadors expatiated largely in his praise, and said, at last, “there was not such another Spartan left alive:”—“You mistake, gentlemen,” said the mother: “my son was a good man; but there are many better men than he in Sparta.” *Plutarch’s Læonic Apophthegms.*

this juncture to show their high respect for the Lacedæmonian alliance, as they stood in great dread of the Athenians. For, considering their hostile embroilments with the Athenians, they thought it neither for their interest nor satisfaction to continue the honours of Agnon.

To the Athenians they also delivered the bodies of their dead. The number of them, on the Athenian side, amounted to six hundred, whereas the enemy lost but seven men. This was owing to the nature of the fight, which had not been carried on in a regular manner, but was rather a slaughter, in consequence of a surprise and sudden consternation. After the reception of their dead, the Athenians sailed away for Athens; but those under the orders of Clearchus applied themselves to re-settle and secure Amphipolis.

About the same time, in the close of this summer, Ramphias, and Autocharidas, and Epicydidas, Lacedæmonians, were conducting up, for the Thracian service, a reinforcement consisting of nine hundred heavy-armed. Being arrived at Heraclea, in Trachis, they regulated there such things as seemed to require an amendment; and, during the season they halted here, the battle of Amphipolis was fought, and the summer ended.

But, early as possible in the succeeding winter, the reinforcement under Ramphias proceeded on their route as far as Pierium of Thessaly. But the Thessalians opposing their farther passage, and Brasidas being now dead, to whom they were conducting this supply, they returned home. They imagined that their aid was no longer wanting, as the Athenians, in consequence of their overthrow, had quitted that country: and themselves had not sufficient ability to carry the plans into execution which Brasidas had been meditating. But the principal motive of their return was their own consciousness, at setting out, that the Lacedæmonians were more inclined to peace.

It so fell out indeed, immediately after the battle of Amphipolis and the return of Ramphias from Thessaly, that neither of the parties meddled any longer with the operations of war, but were more inclined to a peace. The motives on the Athenian side were these:—They had received a terrible blow at Delium, and a second lately at Amphipolis: hence they no longer entertained that assured confidence of their own strength, which had formerly occasioned them to reject all accommodations, as

they imagined, in their then career of success they should soon give law to their enemies. Nor also they were under apprehensions of their dependents, lest buoyed up by the late misfortunes of Athens, they might the sooner be induced to revolt. And they heartily repented now, that they had neglected the fine opportunity, which their success at Pylos gave them, of bringing the dispute to a happy determination.

On the other hand, the Lacedæmonians acted on these motives:—They found themselves strangely mistaken in the events of war. At its commencement, they imagined, that in the space of a few years, they should entirely have demolished the power of the Athenians, by laying their territory waste; but they had suffered a terrible calamity in the affair of Sphacteria, such as never before had been felt by Sparta. Devastations now were extended over all their country, from Pylos and Cythera. Their Helots had also in numbers deserted to the foe; and they lived in constant expectation that those, who yet persevered in their allegiance, gained by the solicitations of those who were fled, might, in the present low ebb of Sparta, attempt to subvert their constitution, as had formerly been the case. It happened farther, that the thirty years' truce with the Argives was on the point of expiring, and the Argives were unwilling to renew it, unless the Cynuria was previously restored. They judged it therefore a plain impossibility to make head, at the same time, against both Argives and Athenians. They had also a suspicion that some cities of Peloponnesus would revolt from them to the Argives, which proved afterwards true.

Both parties, then, being respectively influenced by such considerations, an accommodation was judged to be expedient. The anxiety of the Lacedæmonians about it was not the least, as they were eagerly bent on recovering their prisoners that had been taken at Sphacteria; for they were all citizens of Sparta, of the first rank, and allied to the most honorable families. They had begun to solicit their liberty so soon as ever they were taken; but the Athenians, flushed with conquest, at that time disdained to treat. Yet, after the blow received at Delium, the Lacedæmonians, knowing then they were become more tractable, held of the favourable juncture, and obtained a cessation of arms for a year, in which space

they were, by article, to hold mutual conferences, in order to settle an accommodation for a longer time. And since the Athenians had now again more lately been totally defeated at Amphipolis, and as well Cleon as Brasidas was dead, both of whom had most strenuously opposed an accommodation; the latter, because he was successful and reaped glories in war; the former, because, in a season of tranquillity, his villanies must needs be detected, and his bold calumniations lose all credit; the persons, who at present were chief in the management of either state, were more strongly disposed than ever to adjust disputes. These were, Pleistionax, the son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedæmonians, and Nicias, the son of Niceratus, by far the most successful general of that age. Nicias desired it, as hitherto he had never been defeated, and was bent on securing his own prosperity on a lasting foundation, on obtaining a relaxation of toils for himself, and of their present burdens for his fellow-citizens, and on leaving his name illustrious to posterity, as one who had never involved his country in calamity. These views, he judged, could only be accomplished by vacuity from danger, by exposing himself, as little as possible, to the uncertainties of fortune; and vacuity from danger was compatible solely with peace. Pleistionax had been calumniated by his enemies on the account of his restoration; and they invidiously suggested to his prejudice, upon every loss whatever which the Lacedæmonians sustained, that such was the consequence of transgressing the laws in the repeal of his banishment. For they laid to his charge, that, in concert with his brother Aristocles, he had suborned the priestess of Delphi to give one general answer to all the deputations sent by the Lacedæmonians to consult the oracle, that "they should bring back the seed of the demigod son of Jove from a foreign land into their own country: if not, they should plough with a silver ploughshare;" and thus, at length, so seduced the Lacedæmonians in the favour of an exile, residing at Lyceum, upon account of his precipitate retreat out of Attica, as though purchased by bribes from the enemy, and from a dread of his countrymen dwelling in a house, one-half of which was part of the temple of Jupiter, that, nineteen years after, they conducted him home with the same solemn procession and sacrifices as those, who were the original founders of Lacedæmon, had appointed

for the inauguration of their kings. Repining, therefore, at these calumniations, and judging that, as peace giveth no room for miscarriage, and that, farther, if the Lacedæmonians could recover the prisoners, his enemies would be debarred of a handle for detraction; whereas, whilst the chances of war subsist, the persons at the helm of government must be liable to reproaches for every disaster; he was earnestly desirous to bring about an accommodation.

This winter, therefore, they proceeded to a conference; and, at the approach of spring, great preparations were openly in hand on the Lacedæmonian side, and a scheme for fortifying in Attica was circulated through all the states, in order to render the Athenians more compliant. Many meetings were held, and many demands, with large justifications, were urged on both sides, till, at length, it was agreed, that "a peace should be concluded, each party restoring what they had conquered in the war, but Nisæa to remain in the hands of the Athenians." Platæa was re-demanded by the latter, but the Thebans urged that it had not fallen into their hands by force or by treachery, but they possessed it in pursuance of a free and voluntary surrender. And, upon the same plea, the Athenians kept Nisæa.

Things being so far adjusted, the Lacedæmonians called together their confederates; and all their voices, excepting those of the Bœotians, and Corinthians, and Eleans, and Megareans, who were not at all satisfied with these proceedings, concurring for a peace, they ratify the accommodation, and solemnly pledged the observance of it to the Athenians, who, in exchange, swore the same to the Lacedæmonians, in effect as followeth:—

"The Athenians and Lacedæmonians, and their allies, have made peace on these terms, and every state hath sworn to their observance.

"In regard to the common temples:—Permission is granted, to all who desire it, to sacrifice, to visit, to consult the oracles, to send public deputations, in the prescribed forms of every people, both by land and sea, without any molestation.

"That the sacred soil of the temple of Apollo at Delphi, and Delphi itself, be ruled after its own model, be taxed at its own discretion, and be administered by its own magi-

strates, whose determinations to be final, both in regard to life and property, according to the primitive laws of the place.

"That this peace continue for the space of fifty years, between the Athenians and the confederates of the Athenians, on the one side, and the Lacedæmonians and the confederates of the Lacedæmonians, on the other, without fraud and without molestation, both at land and sea.

"Be it farther unlawful for either party to take up arms to the detriment of the other,—neither the Lacedæmonians and their allies against the Athenians and their allies,—nor the Athenians and their allies against the Lacedæmonians and their allies, without any fraud or evasion whatsoever. And, if any difference intervene between the contracting parties, let it be adjusted according to equity, and upon oath, in such manner as they shall agree.

"Agreed, farther, that the Lacedæmonians and allies deliver up Amphipolis to the Athenians.

"That, whatever cities the Lacedæmonians deliver up to the Athenians, leave be given to the inhabitants to remove at their own discretion, with all their effects.

"That the cities, which pay the assessments rated by Aristides, enjoy all their rights and privileges whatever.

"And, be it unlawful for the Athenians and their allies to take up arms to the annoyance of those cities which pay that assessment, from the time that this treaty be in force. Those cities are, Argilus, Stagirus, Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, Spartolus; these cities to observe a strict neutrality, forming no engagements with either Lacedæmonians or Athenians.—Provided, that, if the Athenians can by fair means prevail upon these cities, it be lawful for the Athenians to admit them confederates at their own free choice.

"That the Mecerbeans, and Saneans, and Singeans, shall inhabit their own cities in the same manner as the Olynthians and Acanthians.

"Agreed, farther, that the Lacedæmonians and allies restore Panactum to the Athenians.

"That the Athenians restore to the Lacedæmonians Coryphasium,¹ and Cythera, and

Methone, and Pteleum, and Atalanta, and all the Lacedæmonians, now prisoners of the state at Athens, or public prisoners, in any quarter soever within the dominions of Athens; and to give leave of departure to all the Peloponnesians blocked up in Scione, and to all the confederates of the Peloponnesians whatever in Scione, and to all persons whatever whom Brasidas placed there.—This article also to extend to any confederates of the Lacedæmonians, now public prisoners in Athens, or public prisoners in any other quarter of the Athenian dominions.

"That, in return, the Lacedæmonians and allies release all the prisoners, both Athenians and confederates, which are now in their hands.

"That, in regard to the Scioneans, Trezeneans, and Sermilyans, and any other city belonging, of right, to the Athenians, the Athenians to proceed with the cities specified, and all the others, at their own discretion.

"That the Athenians shall swear observance to the Lacedæmonians and their allies separately, according to their cities. Let both sides swear, in the most solemn manner, according to the forms of each separate oath, and the oath to be conceived in these words:—"I abide by my compacts and the present articles, honestly, and without equivocation.—Be an oath taken, to the Athenians, by the Lacedæmonians and allies, to the same import.

"Be this oath renewed annually by the contracting parties.

"Be pillars erected at Olympias, at Pythia, at the Isthmus, and at Athens in the citadel, and at Lacedæmon in the Amycleum, with this treaty inscribed upon them.

"If any point be in any manner or degree for the present, through forgetfulness on either side, omitted; or, if any thing, upon a future consultation holden, be judged more proper, the Lacedæmonians and Athenians are empowered, with all due regard to their oaths, to make additions and alterations, at their joint discretions.

"Pleistolas, presiding in the college of ephori, putteth this treaty in force at Sparta, on the twenty-seventh day of the month Artemisius: at Athens, Alcæus, the archon, on the twenty-fifth day of the month Elaphebolion.

"Those who took the oath and sacrificed were,

¹ This includes the fort of Pylus, seated on the cape of Coryphasium.

"On the Lacedæmonian side,—Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daithus, Ischagoras, Philochardas, Zeuxidas, Anthippus, Telles, Alciniadas, Empedias, Menas, Lamphilus.

"On the Athenian,—Lampo, Isthmionicus, Nicias, Laches, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Agnon, Myrtilus, Thrasyclus, Theagenes, Aristocretes, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leo, Lamachus, Demosthenes."

This treaty was perfected upon the close of the winter, in the first commencement of the spring, immediately after the Bacchanalian festivals at Athens. Ten complete years, and some few days over, were elapsed, since the first irruption into Attica, and an open commencement of the war. And let him that would be assured of the truth, compute only by the seasons of the year, and not by those who, in the contending states, were either archons, or, by the offices they bore, had events distinguished by an enumeration of their names. For it cannot be exactly known in what determinate part, whether, in the beginning or middle, or any other portion, of a magistracy, any important event occurred. But, if the computation proceed by summers and winters, which method I have observed, such an inquirer will find, that these two halves being equivalent to a whole year, ten complete summers, and the same number of winters, elapsed in the course of this first part of the war.

The Lacedæmonians, for to them it fell by lot to make the first restitutions, released immediately what prisoners they had in their hands; and, having despatched Ischagoras, and Menas, and Philocharidas, in the quality of their ambassadors to the cities of Thrace, ordered Clearchidas to deliver up Amphipolis to the Athenians, and all the confederates there to submit to the terms of the treaty, according to the stipulation given for them. But this they positively refused, as they judged the treaty prejudicial. Clearchidas also, to ingratiate himself with the Chalcideans, would not deliver up Amphipolis, alleging, that, without their concurrence, he could not possibly do it. He himself returned in person soon after with the ambassadors, in order to make his defence at Lacedæmon, should Ischagoras accuse him there of disobeying orders. His view was, farther, to try if the accommodation could by any means be evaded. But, when he found it

fast confirmed, he posted back with all speed to his government, having express orders from the Lacedæmonians to deliver up Amphipolis; or, if that was beyond his power, to cause all the Peloponnesians within that garrison instantly to evacuate the place.

The confederates happened, at this juncture, to be at Lacedæmon, where such of them, as had hitherto refused to accept the treaty, were ordered by the Lacedæmonians to accede to it. But this they positively refused, alleging the same reason as before; and plainly affirming, that "they would not come in, till better terms than the present were obtained for them." Their remonstrance had no effect upon the Lacedæmonians, who sent them away without redress, and struck up forthwith an alliance, offensive and defensive, with the Athenians. They had reason to conclude that "the Argives would come to no agreement with them," since they had lately declared a negative to their ambassadors, Ampelidas and Lichas; "and yet these Argives," they judged, "could be no dreadful foe without the Athenians; and that the rest of Peloponnesus would not now presume to interfere, who, without this method of prevention, would certainly have gone over to the Athenians." An Athenian embassy, therefore, being at this crisis resident amongst them, a conference was holden, and the terms completely adjusted. The ratification was made by solemn oath, and the articles of this alliance, offensive and defensive, were these:

"The Lacedæmonians enter into this alliance for the term of fifty years.—Provided that

"If any enemy enter the territories of the Lacedæmonians, and commit any manner of hostilities to their prejudice, the Athenians march forthwith to their succour, with all the possible means of redress, and with their whole united force.

"And, in case such invaders shall have withdrawn themselves, that the state under which they acted be declared an enemy both to the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians, both which are to join in acting offensively against that state, nor to lay down their arms without the mutual consent of both the contracting states.

"These terms to be observed with honour, with alacrity, and without any fraud whatever.

"Provided, farther, that, if any enemy enter the territories of the Athenians, and commit hostilities to the prejudice of the Athenians,

the Lacedæmonians march forthwith to their succour, with all the possible means of redress, and with their whole united force.

"And, in case such invaders shall have withdrawn themselves, that the state under which they acted be declared an enemy both to Lacedæmonians and Athenians, both which are to join in acting offensively against that state, nor to lay down their arms without the mutual consent of both the contracting states.

"These terms also to be observed with honour, with alacrity, and without any fraud whatever.

"Provided, farther,—That, if there happens any insurrection among the Helots, the Athenians march to the succour of the Lacedæmonians with their whole strength, to the full extent of their power.

"The same persons, on both sides, shall swear to the observance of these articles, who swore to the former.

"The oaths to be annually renewed; for which purpose, the Lacedæmonians shall give their attendance at Athens, at the Bacchanalian festival; and the Athenians theirs at Lacedæmon, at the Hyacinthian.

"Both parties to erect their pillar; one at Lacedæmon, near Apollo's, in the Amycleum; the other at Athens, near Minerva's, in the citadel.

"And, in case the Lacedæmonians and Athenians think proper to make any additions or alterations in the terms of this alliance, the same lawfully to be done by both, at their joint discretion.

"The oath of observance was sworn,

"On the Lacedæmonian side, by 'Pleistanax, 'Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daithus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Anthippus, Alcinda, Telles, Empedias, Menas, Laphilus.

"On the Athenian side, by Lampo, Isthmionicus, Laches, Nicias, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Agnon, Myrtilus, Thrasyacles; Theagenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leo, Lamachus, Demosthenes."

This alliance was concluded in a very little time after the treaty of peace; and the Athenians now released to the Lacedæmonians their Spartans, who were made prisoners at Sphacteria. The summer also of the eleventh year

was now begun; and so far the transacted these first ten years of this war, closely carried on, have been regularly-compiled.

YEAR XI.²

After the treaty of peace and the alliance, offensive and defensive, between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians; both which were concluded after the ten years' war, at the time when Pleistolas presided in the college of Ephori at Sparta, and Alcæus was Archon at Athens; the peace became in force amongst the acceding parties. But the Corinthians and some of the Peloponnesian states were endeavouring the overthrow of all these proceedings: and immediately there arose another great combustion, amongst the confederates against Lacedæmon. More than this, as time advanced, the Lacedæmonians became suspected by the Athenians, as they showed no great punctuality in executing the conditions of the peace. For the space of six years and ten months, they refrained indeed from entering one another's territory in a hostile manner; but, during such a correspondence which abounded in suspicions, they were, in all other respects, active in a reciprocal annoyance. And at length, necessitated to dissolve the treaty concluded at the ten years' period, they engaged afresh in open war.

The same Thucydides, an Athenian, has also compiled an account of these latter transactions in a regular series, according to the summers and winters, down to that period of time when the Lacedæmonians and their allies put an end to the empire of Athens, and became masters of the long walls and the Piræus. The whole continuance of the war to this period was twenty-seven years. And, if any man be inclined to think that this intervening accommodation should not be reckoned as war, he will find no arguments to support his opinion: for, let him only survey the transactions as they are distinctly related, and he will find it an absurdity to pronounce that an interval of peace, in which neither all the restitutions were made, nor the benefits obtained, which the mutual stipulations required. And, setting these considerations aside, in the Mantinea and Epidauric and other wars, transgressions were committed on both sides. The confeder-

¹ The kings sign this alliance, but did not sign the former treaty.

² Before Christ 421.

rates also of Thrace continued still to be as great enemies as ever. And the Bœotians never agreed to more than a bare cessation of arms, renewable every tenth day.

Including, therefore, the first war which lasted ten years, and that suspicious interval which ensued, and ended at last in a second open rupture, the whole continuance, if computed by summers and winters, will turn out, upon inquiry, to have been so many years, and some few additional days. And such as laid stress upon the predictions of oracles can assent only to this computation as genuine. For my own part, I perfectly well remember that, not only at the commencement, but even during the whole course of the war, many such predictions were given out, that "it must needs continue three times nine years." I also lived through its whole extent, in the very flower of my understanding and strength, and with a close application of my thoughts, to gain an exact insight into all its occurrences. It was farther my lot to suffer a twenty years' exile from my country after my employment in the business of Amphipolis, and to be present at the transactions of both parties, and not the least of those of the Peloponnesians, in consequence of my banishment; by which means I had leisure to gather more ample informations about them. I shall relate therefore the quarrel and breach of the treaty, subsequent to the first ten years, and the incidents of the war which afterwards ensued.

Upon the conclusion of the treaty of peace for fifty years and the subsequent alliance, the embassies from the different states of Peloponnesus, who had been summoned thither to give their concurrence, withdrew from Lacedæmon. The rest of them indeed went directly home; but the Corinthians, stopping in their return at Argos, began first, at a conference with some of the magistracy there, to insinuate "that since the Lacedæmonians, not in order to serve but to enslave Peloponnesus, had entered into a treaty and an alliance, offensive and defensive, with their once most inveterate foes, the Athenians, it highly behoved the Argives now to watch over the preservation of Peloponnesus, and to form a public resolution,—That any Grecian state, which is free and uncontrolled, which enjoyeth and supporteth an equal share of rights and privileges, might enter into an alliance, offensive and defensive, with the Argives, for the guard of their mu-

tual properties against their common foes:—This to be communicated only to the few who were absolute masters of the decisions of each state, and every where to shun all conference with the bulk of the people, lest the scheme might be detected, in case the multitude should refuse their concurrence." They assured them, that the majority of the states were so exasperated against the Lacedæmonians, that they would infallibly come in. And, after suggesting such a course, the Corinthians also returned home.

The persons at Argos who had listened to these insinuations, reported the scheme, in the next place, to the whole magistracy and people of Argos. The Argives resolved accordingly, and elected a committee of twelve, with whom such Grecians as desired it might agree upon an alliance, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians excepted. Neither of these states were permitted to treat with the Argives, without the public consent of the whole people.

The Argives were the more readily persuaded to such a measure as they plainly saw a war was unavoidable between themselves and the Lacedæmonians; for the truce between them was on the point of expiring. They were also animated by the hope of gaining into their hands the sovereignty of Peloponnesus. For at this juncture of time, Lacedæmon lay under the greatest discredit, and was fallen into utter contempt upon account of their late disasters; whereas the Argives were in the high vigour of their strength in all respects, as they had never interfered in the Attic war; and, having observed an exact neutrality with both, had been thriving in peace and plenty. The Argives, therefore, in this manner invited those Grecians who were willing to enter into their alliance.

The Mantineans and allies were the first who, out of a dread of the Lacedæmonians, accepted the proposal. For these Mantineans, in the heat of the war against the Athenians, had seized and appropriated to themselves a certain district of Arcadia subject to Lacedæmon, and now concluded that the Lacedæmonians would never leave them in the quiet possession of it, when they were at liberty to act for its recovery. This readily induced them to have recourse to the league of Argos, regarded by them as a powerful state, which had ever been at variance with Lacedæmon, and, like their own, was democratical.

No sooner had the Mantineans revolted, than the rest of Peloponnesus began to mutter that "they ought also to take the same step," imagining that revolt to have been founded upon some stronger reasons than yet appeared; exasperated also against the Lacedæmonians for sundry reasons, and, above all, for this article in the peace with Athens,—that, "in case the two states of Lacedæmon and Athens think proper to make any additions or alterations, the same to be lawful." For this was the clause which gave the greatest alarm to Peloponnesus, and inspired a jealousy that the Lacedæmonians might strike up a bargain with the Athenians to enslave the other states: since, in justice, no alteration ought to be made without the concurrence of the whole confederacy. Alarmed, therefore, at these proceedings, many of them made instant application to the Argives, exerting their several endeavours to obtain their alliance.

But the Lacedæmonians, perceiving what a combustion was arisen in Peloponnesus, principally owing to the insinuations of the Corinthians, who were also going to enter into this league with Argos, they despatch ambassadors to Corinth from a desire to prevent what might ensue. Here they represented to them,—“how criminal their conduct had been, in having thus originally fomented the present tumult; and that, in case they abandoned the Lacedæmonians and went over to the Argive league,” they assured them, that, “by such a step, they must break the most sacred oaths; injustice they had already committed in refusing to accede to the Athenian peace, since, pursuant to old stipulations between them, whatever a majority of the confederates resolved was to be binding on all, unless some god or hero enjoined a dissent.” But the Corinthians, in the presence of all those of the confederacy who had not accepted the peace, and whose attendance they had previously invited, replied to the Lacedæmonians without entering into a particular detail of the injuries they had done them, in not covenanting with the Athenians for the restitution of Solium, or Anactorium, or any other point in which they thought themselves aggrieved; but speciously pretending, that “they could never abandon their allies in Thrace, whom by solemn oaths they were bound to support; oaths which they had severally sworn when they first revolted in concert with the Potidæans, and had on other occasions

since renewed:” arguing from hence “they could not have violated the common oath of the confederates in refusing the cession to the Athenian peace, since, as they had sworn upon the faith of the gods to do so, formerly, they could not betray them and out the guilt of perjury. The stipulation, therefore, ran thus: unless some god or hero joined a dissent:—their present dissent, therefore, appeared to them to be a divine intimation.” So far they argued from their oaths; and, in regard to the alliance offensive and defensive with Argos,—“They would consult with their friends, and take steps as were expedient and just.” An answer the Lacedæmonian ambassador parted home. An Argive embassy had also at the same time to be at Corinth, pressed the Corinthians to enter into the league without any farther hesitation. They desired them to attend, at the next meeting they held, for a final answer.

There arrived soon after an embassy from the Eleans, who made, in the first place, an alliance offensive and defensive with the Corinthians; and then from Corinth repaired to Argos, became allies of the Argives, according to the scheme pre-established for this purpose, for a misunderstanding had arisen between the Corinthians and the Lacedæmonians about Lepreum. In the former war of the Lepreates against a part of Arcadia, the Eleans had been prevailed upon to join the Lepreates for a moiety of that that should be conquered; and, at the conclusion of the war, the Eleans left all the management of the Lepreates, subject to the annual tribute of a talent¹ to Olympeus, son of Jove. This was regularly paid till the Peloponnesian war; but, that war being then on its pretence of its discontinuance, the Eleans would have exacted it by force. The Lacedæmonians had recourse to the Lacedæmonians. The dispute was referred to the Lacedæmonian arbitration; but the Eleans, taking up the pretence that they should not have justice, not abide the reference, but began to ravage the territory of the Lepreates. The Lacedæmonians, notwithstanding this, proceeded to arbitration:—that “the Lepreates were masters of their own conduct, and that the Eleans were guilty of injustice:” and, as the latter would not abide by their arbitration, they then

¹ £193 15s. sterling.

garrison of heavy-armed into Lepreum; but the Eleans, regarding this step as the reception of a city by the Lacedæmonians which had revolted from them, and alleging the treaty in which it was stipulated,—that, “of whatever places the parties were possessed upon the commencement of the Attic war, the same they should continue to hold at its expiration,” as if they had met with injustice, they revolt to the Argives; and the Eleans entered into that league offensive and defensive, as hath been already related.

The Corinthians soon followed their example, and with the Chalcideans also of Thrace, became the allies of Argos. But the Bœotians and Megareans, though they had threatened the same thing, thought proper to drop it. They had been ill used by the Lacedæmonians, but judged however that the democracy of the Argives would be less compatible with their interests, whose form of government was oligarchical, than the polity of the Lacedæmonians.

About the same time of this summer, the Athenians, becoming masters of the Scioneans after a long blockade, put all who were able to bear arms to the sword, and made their wives and children slaves, and gave the land to be cultured by the Platæans.

They also again brought back the Delians to Delos; induced to it by the many defeats they had suffered in battle, and the express oracle of the god at Delphi.

The Phocians also and Locrians began about this time to make war upon one another.

And now the Corinthians and Argives, united in league, go together to Tegea, to persuade its revolt from the Lacedæmonians. They saw it was a large district; and, in case they compassed its accession, they imagined the whole of Peloponnesus would be at their beck. But, when the Tegeatæ declared, that “they would in no shape oppose the Lacedæmonians,” the Corinthians, who till now had acted with great alacrity, slackened in their zeal for contention, and began to fear that no more of the states would come in. They proceeded, however, to the Bœoteans, and solicited them “to accede to the league between themselves and Argives, and to co-operate with them for the common welfare.”—And, as there were truces for ten days between the Athenians and Bœotians, which were agreed upon soon after the peace for fifty years was made, the Corin-

thians now pressed the Bœotians “to accompany them to Athens, and solicit for truces of the same nature for them; but, in case the Athenians refused to grant them, to renounce the suspension of arms, and for the future never to treat without their concurrence.” The Bœotians, thus solicited by the Corinthians, desired a longer time to consider about their accession to the Argive league. To Athens, indeed, they bore them company, but could not obtain the ten days’ truces: for the Athenians answered,—“The Corinthians have a peace already, if they are confederates of the Lacedæmonians.” And, upon the whole, the Bœotians absolutely refused to renounce their own truces, though the Corinthians insisted upon it, and urged, with some warm expostulations, that it had been so covenanted between them. So there was only a mere cessation of arms between the Corinthians and Athenians, without any solemn ratification.

This same summer, the Lacedæmonians took the field with their whole united force, under the command of Pleistionax, the son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedæmonians, and marched to the Parrhasians of Arcadia. These were subject to the Mantineans, and, in consequence of a sedition, had invited this expedition. But it was also designed, if possible, to demolish the fortress of Cypsela, which the Mantineans had erected, and, as it was situated in Parrhasia, towards the skirts of Laconia, had placed a garrison in it. The Lacedæmonians, therefore, ravaged the territory of the Parrhasians. But the Mantineans, leaving their own city to the guard of the Argives, marched themselves to the support of their dependents. But, finding it impossible to preserve the fortress of Cypsela and the cities of the Parrhasians, they retired. The Lacedæmonians also, when they had set the Parrhasians at liberty, and demolished the fortress, withdrew their forces.

The same summer also, upon the return from Thrace of those soldiers who had served under Brasidas, and who came home after the peace under the conduct of Clearidas, the Lacedæmonians decreed “those Helots, who had served under Brasidas, to be free, and to have permission to reside wherever they pleased.” And, no long time after, they placed them together with such persons as were newly enfranchised, at Lepreum: it is situated between Laconia and Elea; and they were now at variance with the Eleans. As for

those Spartans who had been made prisoners in Sphacteria, and had delivered up their arms, conceiving some fears about them, lest, should they lay their late disgrace too much to heart, as they were persons of the greatest rank, they might introduce some innovations in the state, they declared them infamous, even though some of the number were, at this time, possessed of posts in the government. But this infamy extended no farther than to disqualify them from offices, and from buying and selling. Yet, in a short time afterwards, they were again restored to their full privileges.

The same summer also the Dictideans took Thyssus, a town seated upon the Athos, and confederate with the Athenians.

Through the whole course of the summer, the communication was open between the Peloponnesians and Athenians. Not but that the Athenians and Lacedæmonians began to be jealous of one another immediately after the peace, as the reciprocal restitution of places was not punctually performed. For, though it had fallen to the Lacedæmonians' lot to begin these restitutions, yet they had not restored Amphipolis and other cities. They had compelled neither their confederates in Thrace, nor the Bœotians, nor the Corinthians, to accept the peace, always pretending, that, "should they refuse it, they were ready to join with the Athenians in their compulsion;" nay, they limited to them a time, though not by a regular written notice, "within which, such as did not accede were declared enemies to both." The Athenians, therefore, seeing none of these points were put in actual execution, became jealous of the Lacedæmonians, as men who acted insincerely in every step; insomuch, that, when Pylus was re-demanded, they refused its restitution, and heartily repented that they had released the prisoners taken at Sphacteria. They also kept possession of other places, and intended to do so, till the other side had performed their engagements. But the Lacedæmonians alleged "they had done every thing in their power; that, for instance, they had released such Athenians as were prisoners amongst them, had recalled their soldiers from Thrace, and, wherever they were masters of the execution, had performed it. As to Amphipolis," they said, "they were not so far masters of it as to make an actual surrender. They had omitted no endeavours to bring the Bœotians and Corinthians to a compliance, to

recover the disposal of Panactum, and the dismissal of those Athenians who were prisoners of war in Bœotia. Pylus, however, they insisted, "should immediately be restored to them; at least that the Messenian Helots should be withdrawn, as they had been from Thrace; and then the Athenians, if they pleased, might continue in possession of that fortress themselves." Many were held, and much argumentation between them this summer; and, at last, prevailed upon the Athenians to withdraw Pylus the Messenians and others, as well as all deserters whatever, out of the hands of These they transplanted to Crania in Ionia. This summer, therefore, was a summer of inaction, and the intercourse was very scanty between them.

In the ensuing winter,—for others were in office, as the authority of those whom the peace was made was now diminished, and some who were averse to the peace succeeded—embassies attending from the Athenians, the Bœotians, and Corinthians also being present, and a reciprocal alteration, coming to an agreement, the rest of them separated to their own homes without effect. But Cleon and Xenares, those two of the ephors most inclined to dissolve the peace, the Bœotians and Corinthians for a conference. In this they exhorted the Athenians to act unanimously in promotion of their views, in pursuance of which the Bœotians first make themselves a party in the league, and then employ their good offices to form an alliance between the Athenians and the Lacedæmonians: for, by these means the Bœotians could least of all be necessary to take part in the Attic peace; as the Lacedæmonians would prefer the renewal of their alliance with the Argives to the peace with the Athenians and the dissolution of the league; since, to their certain knowledge, the Lacedæmonians had ever been desirous of the friendship of Argos, consistently to their honour; knowing it would facilitate the termination of their war without Peloponnesus also requested the Bœotians "to demand Panactum of the Lacedæmonians, and to change it if possible for Pylus, thus to get clear of the main obstacle to a peace with the Athenians."

The Bœotians and Corinthians, in

by Xenares and Cleobulus and the party in their interest at Lacedæmon, departed, both, to report this scheme to their principals. But two persons, in the greatest authority in the state of Argos, were attending upon the road for their return. They met, and conferred with them "about the means of gaining the concurrence of the Bœotians in this league, upon the same footing with the Corinthians, and Eleans, and Mantineans: for they were confident, were this point once completed, they might easily become the arbiters of war or peace, either in relation to the Lacedæmonians, (if they so determined, and would act together with firm unanimity,) or to any other state whatever."

The Bœotian ambassadors were highly delighted with this discourse. The solicitations of these Argives happened to coincide with the instructions recommended to them by their friends at Lacedæmon. And the Argives, finding them satisfied with their motion, assured them they would send ambassadors to the Bœotians, and so they parted.

But the Bœotians, at their return, reported to the rulers of Bœotia the proposals from Lacedæmon, and those from the Argives upon the road. The Bœotian rulers were delighted, and grew now more zealous than ever; because, on both sides, from their Lacedæmonian friends, and also from the Argives, the solicitations were concurrent. And, very soon after, the Argive ambassadors arrived to forward the despatch of the treaty. The Bœotian rulers, however, at present, gave only a verbal approbation of the scheme, and then dismissed them, promising to send an embassy of their own to Argos, to perfect the alliance.

But, in the meantime, it was judged to be previously expedient, that the Bœotian rulers, and the Corinthians, and the Megareans, and the ambassadors from the allies of Thrace, should mutually interchange their oaths, "to act in support of one another, if upon any occasion such support might be requisite, and to enter neither into war nor peace without joint consent;" and then the Bœotians and Megareans (for these acted in union) to form a league with the Argives, but before such exchange of oaths, the Bœotian rulers communicated the whole of the plan to the four Bœotian councils, in whom the sovereignty is lodged; recommending it, as worthy their confirmation, that "whatever cities were willing might mutually

interchange such oaths for their reciprocal advantage." Yet the Bœotians who composed the councils refused a confirmation; apprehensive it might tend to embroil them with the Lacedæmonians, should they pledge such an oath to the Corinthians, who were now abandoning the Lacedæmonian interest: for the rulers had not made them privy to the scheme from Lacedæmon, how, "Xenares and Cleobulus, of the college of Ephori, and their friends, advise them, to enter first into league with the Argives and Corinthians, and then to extend it to the Lacedæmonians." They had presumed that the supreme council, though they secreted these lights, would not resolve against a plan which themselves had pre-digested and recommended to them. But now, as this affair took so wrong a turn, the Corinthians and ambassadors from Thrace went home without effect; and the Bœotian rulers, who had all along intended, in case their scheme had passed to perfect an alliance with the Argives, made no farther report to the councils in relation to the Argives, sent no embassy to Argos in consequence of their promise, but suffered the whole plan to sink away in careless and dilatory unconcern.

In this same winter the Olynthians, after a sudden assault, took Mecyberne, which was garrisoned by Athenians.

After the former proceedings,—for conferences were still continued between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians about those places they held from one another,—the Lacedæmonians, conceiving some hope that, if the Athenians could recover Panactum from the Bœotians, they also might regain Pylus, addressed themselves in solemn embassy to the Bœotians, and importuned them to deliver up Panactum and the Athenian prisoners, that they in return might get Pylus from them. But the Bœotians persisted in a refusal, unless they would make a separate alliance with them, as they had done with the Athenians. Upon this the Lacedæmonians, though convinced that such a step would be injustice to the Athenians,—since it had been stipulated that, "without joint consent, they should neither make peace nor war,"—yet, bent on the recovery of Panactum, that they might exchange it for Pylus, the party at the same time amongst them, who were meditating a fresh rupture, inclining to the Bœotian interest, made the requisite alliance in the very close of this winter on the approach of spring. The consequence was, that Panactum was im-

mediately levelled with the ground; and the eleventh year of the war was brought to a conclusion.

YEAR XII.¹

Early in the spring of that summer which was now approaching, the Argives,—when the expected embassy from Bœotia was not arrived in pursuance of promise, when they found that Panactum was demolished, and a separate alliance struck up between the Bœotians and Lacedæmonians,—began to fear they should be totally abandoned, and that their whole confederacy would go over to the Lacedæmonians. They concluded that, through the prevalence of the Lacedæmonian arguments, the Bœotians had been persuaded to level Panactum and accede to the treaty made with Athens, and that the Athenians were privy to all these steps; and so, of consequence, they themselves were now utterly excluded from an alliance with the Athenians, and their former hopes entirely blasted, that, in case disputes should arise, and their treaty with the Lacedæmonians not be renewed, they might, at worst, depend on gaining the Athenian alliance. The Argives, therefore, amidst these perplexities, and the dread of being attacked at once by the Lacedæmonians and Tegeatæ, by the Bœotians and Athenians, as they had formerly refused an accommodation with the Lacedæmonians, and had grasped in thought at the sovereignty of Peloponnesus;—the Argives, I say, had no longer one moment to lose, but despatched instantly Eustrophus and Æson, whom they judged to be persons most agreeable there, in embassy to Lacedæmon. They now judged it their interest to procure the best peace which the present posture of affairs would allow from the Lacedæmonians, and then quietly to attend the event of things. In this view, the ambassadors on their arrival had a conference with the Lacedæmonians about the terms of a peace; and at first the Argives insisted, that “to some state or private person should be referred, for equitable arbitration, the controversy between them about the district of Cynuria;” concerning which, as it is frontier to both, they are eternally at variance; in this district stands the cities of Thyrea and Anthena, and the possession of it is in the hands of the Lacedæ-

monians. But, at length, when the Lacedæmonians would not suffer any mention to be made of this, declaring only, that, “were they willing to renew the former truce, they should find them complying,” the Argive ambassadors, however, prevailed upon the Lacedæmonians to agree to these proposals: that, “for the present, a peace should be concluded for the term of fifty years; provided, notwithstanding, that liberty remain to either party to send a challenge, when neither was embarrassed by plague or war, and the right of this district be then decided by arms between Lacedæmon and Argos, as had formerly been done² when the victory was equally claimed on both sides; and that, in this case, it be not lawful to carry the pursuit beyond the boundaries of either Argos or Lacedæmon.” These proposals, it is true, appeared at first to the Lacedæmonians to be foolish: but, at length, as their necessary interest made them vastly desirous of the Argive friendship, they complied with the demand, and the terms agreed on were digested into writing. But the Lacedæmonians, before they put the last hand to the treaty, insisted on their previous return to Argos, and reporting it to the people; and, in case the ratification was given to repair again to Lacedæmon, at the Hyacinthian festival, and swear observance. And upon this they returned to Argos.

¹ Herodotus relates this remarkable piece of history in Clio. “They had a conference,” says he, “and came to an agreement, that three hundred men on each side should decide the point by combat, and the land contested should remain the property of the victors; and both armies in the meantime should retire within their respective dominions, nor be present at the combat, but by being spectators of it, either of them, seeing their countrymen defeated, might run to their assistance. When articles were settled, both armies drew off; and selected on each side for the combat staid behind engaged. They fought it out with equal resolution and fortune: of six hundred men only three were left alive, two of them Argives, Alcino and Chromis; and one Lacedæmonian, Othryades; these were all the survivors when night came on. The Argives, as victors, ran in haste to Argos; but Othryades, for the Lacedæmonians, having stripped the dead bodies of the Argives, and carried off their arms to the place where his own army had encamped, continued upon the field of battle. The morning both parties came to learn the event; and then, truly, each party also claimed the victory: the one averring, that a majority survived on their side; the other maintaining, that even those had fled, whilst their own combatant had kept his ground and spoiled the dead. In short, from wrangling they came again to blows and a general engagement; in which, after great slaughter on both sides, the Lacedæmonians obtained the victory.”

Whilst the Argives were employed in this negotiation, the Lacedæmonian ambassadors, Andromenes, and Phædimus, and Antimenidas, who were commissioned to receive Panactum and the prisoners of war from the Bœotians, and deliver them over into the hands of the Athenians, found, upon their arrival, that Panactum was already demolished by the Bœotians, upon pretext that, "in former times, upon occasion of some dispute about it, an oath had been taken by the Athenians and Bœotians, that neither should inhabit that place, excluding the other, but should jointly possess it;" but what Athenian prisoners of war were in the hands of the Bœotians were delivered up to Andromenes and his colleagues, who carried and released them to the Athenians. They also reported the demolition of Panactum, declaring this to be equivalent to a restitution, as no enemy to Athens could occupy that post for the future.

These words were no sooner heard than the Athenians conceived the deepest resentments. They thought themselves injured by the Lacedæmonians, not only in the demolition of Panactum, which ought to have been restored standing, but also in the separate alliance made lately with the Bœotians, of which they now had notice, in open contradiction to their own declaration, "of joining them to compel by force such as would not accede to the treaty." They reflected also upon other points in which the engagements of the treaty had been in no wise fulfilled, and concluded themselves overreached. For these reasons they gave a rough answer to the ambassadors, and an instant dismissal.

Upon so much umbrage, taken by the Athenians against the Lacedæmonians, such persons at Athens, as were willing to dissolve the peace, set themselves instantly at work to accomplish their views. Others were labouring the same point, but none more than Alcibiades, the son of Clinias;¹ a person, in respect of age, even

¹ Alcibiades is here beginning his political intrigues, to open the field for his own soaring and enterprising genius to dilate itself more at large. Pericles was his near relation and guardian; Socrates was his friend and guide so long as virtue was his care. Warmer passions soon gained the ascendant over him; and he plunged into all the busy scenes of life, with that intense application and flexible address to all persons and all occasions, which surprised the world; "more changeable than aameleon, as Plutarch expresseth it, since that creature cannot put on a fair or white appearance." His character is thus drawn in miniature by the neat and

then but a youth; at least he would have passed for such in the other states, though, for the dignity of his birth, he was much honoured and caressed. It seemed to him the most expedient step to form a good understanding with the Argives. Not but that his opposition to other measures was the result of his ambition and a study of contention, because the Lacedæmonians had employed their interest in Nicias and Laches to perfect the treaty, slighting his assistance upon account of his youth, nor paying him the deference he expected from the ancient hospitality between that state and the family from which he was descended. This, indeed, his grandfather had renounced; but he himself, in the view of renewing it, had shown extraordinary civilities to the Spartans who were made prisoners at Sphacteria. Thinking himself, therefore, in all respects slighted, at this crisis he began openly to oppose them: he affirmed, that "the Lacedæmonians were a people who could not be trusted; that they had treacherously entered into the peace in order to divert the Argives from their alliance, that again they might attack the Athenians when left alone." Nay, farther; upon the first dissatisfaction between them, he secretly despatcheth his emissaries to Argos, exhorting them "at his invitation, to come to Athens, in company with the Mantineans, and Eleans, and solicit an alliance, since opportunity favoured, and his whole interest should be exerted in their support."

The Argives, having heard these suggestions, and being now convinced that the Bœotian separate alliance had been made without the privity of the Athenians, who, on the contrary, were highly discontented at the Lacedæ-

monian masterly pen of Cornelius Nepos: "Nature, says he, seems to have exerted her utmost power in Alcibiades. It is agreed, by all writers who have made him the subject of their pens, that a more extraordinary man never lived, either for virtues or vices. Born in a most noble republic, of a most honourable family, by far the handsomest person of his age, fit for every thing, and full of address; he was a commander that made the greatest figure both by land and sea; an orator whom none could surpass; nay, his manner and matter, when he spoke, were quite irresistible. Exactly as occasions required, he was laborious, persevering, indefatigable, generous; splendid in all his outward appearance, and at his table; full of affability, profuse of civility, and of the utmost dexterity in adapting himself to the exigencies of time; and yet, in the seasons of relaxation, and when business no longer required him to keep his faculties on the stretch, he was luxurious, dissolute, lewd, and intemperate. The whole world was astonished that so vast an unlikeness, and so different a nature, should be united in the same person."

monian proceedings, took no farther notice of their embassy at Lacedæmon, though sent expressly there to negotiate an accommodation, but recalled all their attention from thence to the Athenians. They reflected, that Athens, a state which from long antiquity had been their friend, which was governed by a democracy in the same manner as their own, and which was possessed of a great power at sea, could most effectually support them in case a war should break out against them. In short, they lost no time in despatching their ambassadors to the Athenians to propose an alliance, who were accompanied by embassies from the Eleans and Mantineans.

A Lacedæmonian embassy also arrived in great haste, composed of Philocharidas, and Leon, and Endius, persons who were judged most acceptable at Athens. They were afraid lest the Athenians, in the heat of their resentments, should clap up an alliance with the Argives. They sent also by them a demand of the restitution of Pylus, in lieu of Panactum, and excuses for the separate alliance they had made with the Bœotians, "which had been concluded without any design of prejudicing the Athenians." Upon these points they spoke before the senate,¹ notifying at the same time

that "they were come with full power to put an end to all disputes;" by which they gave some alarm to Alcibiades, lest, should they make the same declaration before the assembly of the people, it might have an influence upon the multitude, and an alliance with the Argives might prove abortive.

But Alcibiades now contriveth to baffle them by art. He prevaileth upon the Lacedæmonians, by solemnly pledging his faith to them, that "in case they would disown, before the people, the full powers with which they were invested, he would engage for the restitution of Pylus; for he himself would then persuade the Athenians to it, with as much zeal as he now dissuaded, and would get all other points adjusted to their satisfaction." His view in acting thus was to detach them from Nicias, and to gain an opportunity of inveighing against them, in the assembly of the people, as men who had nothing sincere in their intentions, and whose professions were dissonant with themselves; and so to perfect an alliance with the Argives, and Eleans, and Mantineans. And this artifice in the sequel took effect: for, when they were admitted to an audience before the people, and replied to the demand, when put, contrary to what they had said in the senate, that "they had no such powers," the Athenians in an instant lost all patience. And

¹ The Lacedæmonian embassy have, on this occasion, their first audience before the senate. The business of this history hath been hitherto transacted in the assembly of the people: for, as the generals of the state were the chief ministers in time of war, and had a power of convening the people at their own discretion, all points that required a speedy determination were brought before the people in the first instance; and the influence of the senate, which operated in ordinary occasions, was checked and suspended in time of war, which starts many extraordinary occasions, or left it in the will of the generals of the state to call and treat as extraordinary whatever they pleased. By these means the people had engrossed the power, the balance which Solon designed always to preserve was in a great measure lost, and the aristocratical influence was quite suspended.

As, therefore, the popular assembly had its note at first setting out, the form and constitution of the senate now require an explanation.—At this time it consisted of five hundred persons, and for that reason is often styled the council of five hundred, and sometimes by Thucydides, the council of the bean, from the manner of their election. Every year, on an appointed day, each tribe returned the names of their members who were qualified and stood candidates for this honour. The names were engraved on pieces of brass, and cast into a vessel; the same number of beans were cast into another vessel, fifty of which were white and the rest black. They then proceeded to draw out a name and a bean, and the persons to whom the white beans were drawn became the senators of the year. Each senator

had a drachma, that is, sevenpence three farthings, a day for his salary.

In the next place, the names of the tribes were thrown into a vessel, and into another nine black beans and one white one; the tribe, to whose name the white bean was drawn, took the first course of presidency for a tenth part of the year, and the order of the succeeding course was determined in the same manner by the bean. How the fifty in course were again subdivided into tens, and from these tens a chairman chosen for a day, hath been already explained, in the note on the popular assembly, Book I.

The senate sat every day in the prytæneum, or state house, where the presidents had also their diet. They were the grand council of state, took into consideration all the affairs of the commonwealth, debated, and voted by beans; and whatever determinations were thus made in the senate were afterwards carried down to the assembly of the people, to be ratified and passed into laws. By Solon's original constitution, nothing was to be proposed to the people before it had been canvassed and approved in the senate: but this seems to have been abolished by the generals of the state, who had all the military business in their department, and a power to convene the people at their pleasure, and lay matters before them in the first instance. To restore the aristocratical power, and reduce that of the people, occasioned a usurpation and sad confusion in Athens, as will be seen in the eighth book of this history.

now, Alcibiades roaring out aloud against the Lacedæmonians with much more vehemence than he had ever done before, they listened greedily to all he said, and were ready instantly to call in the Argives and their companions, and to make them confederates. But the shock of an earthquake being felt before any thing could be formally concluded, the assembly was adjourned.

At the next day's assembly, Nicias,—though the Lacedæmonians had been thus over-reached, and he himself ensnared by their public acknowledgment that they had no full powers,—spoke, however, on the Lacedæmonian side, insisting “on the necessity of maintaining a good correspondence with them, and deferring all agreement with the Argives, till they could send to the Lacedæmonians, and be distinctly informed of their final resolutions.”—“It maketh,” said he, “for your credit, but for their disgrace, that a war should be averted: for, as your affairs are in a happy posture, it is above all things eligible for you to preserve your prosperity unimpaired, but they in their present low situation, should put all to hazard in the hopes of redress.” He carried it, in short, that ambassadors should be despatched, he himself to be one in the commission, “earnestly to require of the Lacedæmonians, that, if their intentions were honest, they should surrender Panactum standing, and Amphipolis; and should, farther, renounce the alliance with the Boeotians, in case they still refused to accede to the peace;—this in pursuance of the article, that ‘neither should make peace without joint consent.’” They ordered it to be added farther, that “they themselves, could they have deigned to act unjustly, had concluded before this an alliance with the Argives, as they were already attending and soliciting such a measure.” And, having subjoined their instructions in relation to all other points in which they thought themselves aggrieved, they sent away the ambassadors in commission along with Nicias. These being arrived, and having reported their instructions, added, in conclusion, that, “unless they would renounce their alliance with the Boeotians, if still refusing their accession to the peace, they would admit the Argives and their associates into league.” The Lacedæmonians replied, “they would never renounce their alliance with the Boeotians:” for the party of Xenares the Ephorus, and all those who acted in the same combina-

tion, had still the majority: however, at the request of Nicias, they renewed the oaths. Nicias was afraid of being forced to depart without settling any one point of his commission, and of falling under public censure, (which really came to pass,) as undoubted author of the peace with the Lacedæmonians. And when, upon his return, the Athenians had heard that no one point was adjusted at Lacedæmon, they immediately conceived the warmest indignation; and, looking upon themselves as highly abused, Alcibiades introducing the Argives and their associates, who were still at Athens, they entered into treaty and an alliance offensive and defensive with them, as followeth:

“The Athenians, and Argives, and Eleans, and Mantineans, for themselves and their respective dependents on all sides, have made a peace, to continue for the term of a hundred years, without fraud and without violence, both at land and at sea.

“Be it unlawful to take up offensive arms, either by the Argives, and Eleans, and Mantineans, or their dependents, against the Athenians and dependents of the Athenians, or by the Athenians and their dependents, against the Argives, and Eleans, and Mantineans, and their dependents, without any artifice or evasion whatsoever. On these conditions the Athenians, and Argives, and Eleans, and Mantineans, to be confederates for one hundred years.

“Provided, that, in case an enemy invade the territory of the Athenians, the Argives, and Eleans, and Mantineans march to the succour of the Athenians, in strict conformity to a summons received from Athens, in the most vigorous manner they may be able, to the fulness of their abilities.

“But if the enemy, after ravaging, be again withdrawn, the state under which they acted to be declared an enemy to the Argives, and Mantineans, and Eleans, and Athenians; and to be pursued with the offensive arms of all those confederate states.

“And, farther, that it be not lawful for any of the contracting states to lay down their arms against that state which hath so offended, without the consent of all the rest.

“The Athenians also to march to the succour of Argos, and Mantinea, and Elis, in case an enemy invade the territory of the Eleans, or that of the Mantineans, or that of the Ar-

gives, in a strict conformity to a summons received from any of those states, in the most vigorous manner they may be able, to the fullness of their abilities.

"But if the enemy, after ravaging, be again withdrawn, the state under which they acted to be declared an enemy to the Athenians, and Argives, and Mantineans, and Eleans, and to be pursued with the offensive arms of all these confederate states.

"And, farther, that it be not lawful to lay down their arms against the state which hath so offended, without the joint consent of all these contracting states.

"That no armed force be admitted to pass in order for war through any of their respective dominions, or those of their respective dependents, nor along their sea, unless such a passage be granted unanimously by all the contracting parties, by the Athenians, and Argives, and Mantineans, and Eleans.

"Agreed, farther, that, when the auxiliaries attend, the state which summoned them supply them with thirty days' provision so soon as they shall have entered the territory of the state which summoned their attendance, and the same at their departure.

"And, if there be occasion for the attendance of such an auxiliary force for a larger space, that the state which sent for it maintain that force, by paying to every soldier, heavy-armed, and light-armed, and every archer, three oboli of Ægina¹ a-day, and a drachma of Ægina to every horseman.

"But the state which sent for auxiliaries to have the supreme command, so long as the war continueth within its district.

"If, farther, it be agreed by the contracting states to act offensively with their united forces, the command then to be equally divided among all the states.

"That the Athenians swear to observe these articles in their own names and those of their dependents; but the Argives, and Mantineans, and Eleans, and the dependents of these, are to swear separately, each state for itself.

"Each party to take the oath in the most solemn fashion of their own country, in the

most sacred manner, with the choicest victims. The terms of the oaths to be thus conceived:—I will stand by the alliance, according to covenant, justly, honestly, and sincerely; and I will not transgress its obligation by any fraud or evasion whatsoever.'

"To be sworn—

"At Athens, by the senate and the other magistrates: the presidents in course to administer the oath.

"At Argos, by the senate, and the eight and the artynæ: the eighty to administer the oath.

"At Mantinea, by the demiurgi, and the senate, and the other magistrates: the three and the polemarchs to administer the oath.

"At Elis, by the demiurgi, and the officers of state, and the six hundred: the demiurgi and the keepers of the sacred records to administer the oath.

"These oaths to be renewed. For what purpose, the Athenians to repair to Elis, and to Mantinea, and to Argos, thirty days before the Olympic Games. But the Argives, and Eleans, and Mantineans, are to repair to Athens, ten days before the great Panathenæa.

"The articles relating to this peace, and these oaths, and this alliance, to be inscribed on a column of stone,

"By the Athenians, in the citadel:

"By the Argives, in the forum, in the temple of Apollo.

"By the Mantineans, in the temple of Jupiter, in the forum: and

"All jointly to erect by way of memorial, a brazen pillar at Olympia, at the Olympics now approaching.

"If it be judged expedient, by any of the contracting states, to make any additions to these articles already agreed, whatever, in pursuance of this, be deemed proper, by the joint determination of all parties, the same to be valid."

A peace and alliance, offensive and defensive, was in this manner concluded: and thus subsisting between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians were not, upon this account, denounced by either side.

The Corinthians, however, who were confederates of the Argives, refused to accede; but, what is more, they had never sworn to the alliance, made previous to this, between the Eleans, and Argives, and Mantineans—

¹ The value of three oboli of Ægina is about six pence, and the drachma of Ægina nearly one shilling English; for, according to Dr Arbuthnot, the talent of Ægina consisted of a hundred Attic minæ, and therefore was larger than the Attic talent in the proportion of one hundred to sixty.

"to have the same foes and the same friends." They pretended that the defensive league already made was quite sufficient,—“to succour one another, but not to concur in an offensive war.” In this manner the Corinthians were drawing off from the league, and again warped in their inclinations towards the Lacedæmonians.

The Olympics were solemnized this summer, in which Androstenes, the Arcadian, was for the first time victor in the Pancrace, and the Lacedæmonians were excluded the temple by the Eleans, so that they could neither sacrifice nor enter the lists. They had not discharged the fine set upon them by the Eleans, by virtue of the Olympic laws, who had charged them with a conveyance of arms into the fort of Phyrcon, and with throwing some of their heavy-armed into Lepreum, during the Olympic cessation. The fine imposed was two thousand minæ,¹ at the rate of two minæ for every heavy-armed soldier, agreeably to the letter of the law.

The Lacedæmonians, upon this, despatched an embassy, to remonstrate against the injustice of the sentence; that “the cessation had not been notified at Lacedæmon when they threw in their heavy-armed.”

The Eleans replied, that “the cessation was already in force: for they proclaim it first amongst themselves; and so, whilst they were quiet, and expected no such usage, they had been wronged by a surprise.”

The Lacedæmonians retorted, that, “if so, it was needless for them to proceed to a publication of it in Lacedæmon, if the Eleans had already judged themselves wronged. But the fact was far different in the light they saw it, and trespass had not been committed in any shape whatever.

But the Eleans adhered to their first charge, that “they could not be persuaded the Lacedæmonians had not wronged them; yet, in case they were willing to surrender Lepreum to them, they are ready to remit their share of the fine, and to pay for them that part of it which was due to the god.”

But, when this would not content, it was urged again by the Eleans, that, “if they were unwilling to part with it, they should by no means surrender Lepreum; but then, as they were desirous to have the use of the temple,

they must go up to the altar of Olympian Jupiter, and swear, in the presence of the Grecians, that they would hereafter pay the fine.”—But, as they also refused to comply with this, the Lacedæmonians were excluded the temple, the sacrifice, and the games, and performed their own sacrifices at home. Yet the rest of the Grecians, except the Lepreatæ, were admitted to assist at the solemnity.

The Eleans however, apprehensive they would sacrifice by force, set a guard of their armed youths around the temple. These were reinforced by the Argives and Mantineans, a thousand of each, and a party of Athenian horse who were at Argos, in readiness to attend the festival. But a great consternation had seized the whole assembly of united Greece, lest the Lacedæmonians should return with an armed force; more especially, when Lichas, the son of Archasilas, a Lacedæmonian, was scourged in the course by the under-officers, because, when his chariot had gained the prize, and the chariot of the Bœotian state was proclaimed victor, pursuant to the exclusion of the Lacedæmonians from the race, he stepped into the midst of the assembly and crowned the charioteer, desirous to make it known that the chariot belonged to him. Upon this, the whole assembly was more than ever alarmed, and it was fully expected that some strange event would follow: the Lacedæmonians, however, made no bustle; and the festival passed regularly through its train.

After the Olympics, the Argives and their confederates repaired to Corinth, in order to solicit the concurrence of that state. A Lacedæmonian embassy happened also to be there. Many conferences were held, and nothing finally determined: but, upon feeling the shock of an earthquake, they parted each to their respective cities. And here the summer ended.

In the ensuing winter, a battle was fought by the Heracleots of Trachis, against the Ænians, and Dolopians, and Meliensians, and some of the Thessalians. For the bordering nations were enemies to the city of Heraclea, as this latter place had been fortified for their more especial annoyance. From its foundation they had ever opposed it, preventing its growth to the utmost of their power; and at this time they defeated the Heracleots in a battle, in which Xenares, the son of Cnidias, the Lacedæmonian commandant, was slain; a

¹ 2000 minæ—6,458l. 6s. 8d. sterling.

number also of the Heracleots perished. And thus the winter ended: and the twelfth year of the war came also to an end.

YEAR XIII.¹

The succeeding summer was no sooner begun, than the Bœotians, viewing the low estate to which it had been reduced by the late battle, took into their own hands the city of Heraclea, and discharged Hegesippidas, the Lacedæmonian commandant, as guilty of mal-administration. They took this city into their own hands, from the apprehension that, during the embroilments of the Lacedæmonians in Peloponnesus, the Athenians might seize it. The Lacedæmonians, however, were chagrined at this step of the Bœotians.

This same summer also, Alcibiades, the son of Clinias, being general of the Athenians, with the concurrence of the Argives and their allies, entered Peloponnesus with a small party of heavy-armed Athenians and archers, and enlarged his forces upon his route by the aids of the confederates in those quarters; where, he not only made such a disposition of affairs as might best answer the views of the alliance, but also, traversing Peloponnesus with his force, he both persuaded the Patreans to continue their works quite down to the sea, and intended also to execute a plan of his own for erecting a fort upon the Rhium of Achaia.² But the Corinthians, and Sicyonians, and all such as were alarmed at the annoyance this fort might give them, rushed out to prevent him, and obliged him to desist.

The same summer a war broke out between the Epidaurians and the Argives. The pretext was grounded on a victim due from the Epidaurians to the Pythian Apollo, as an acknowledgment for their pastures; for the Argives were now the chief managers of the temple. But, this pretended grievance set apart, it had been judged expedient, by Alcibiades and the Argives, to get possession, if possible, of Epidaurus, in order to prevent molestation on the side of Corinth, and to ren-

der the passage of Athenian succours more expeditious from Ægina than by fetching a compass about Scyllæum. The Argives, therefore, were intent on their preparations, as resolved to take the field and act against Epidaurus, in order to exact the victim by force of arms.

But, about the same time, the Lacedæmonians also marched out, with their whole force, as far as to Leuctra, upon their own frontier, towards Lyceum, under the command of Agis, the son of Archidamus, their king. Not a man was privy to the design of their thus taking the field, not even the states from which the quotas were furnished out. But, when the victims they sacrificed for a successful campaign proved inauspicious, they again marched home, and circulated fresh orders to their confederates to be ready to take the field again after the next month, which was the month Carneius,³ the grand festival of the Dorians. But, when they were thus withdrawn, the Argives, taking the field on the twenty-seventh day of the month preceding Carneius, and though celebrating their own festival that very day, continued all this intermediate time to make incursions and ravages upon Epidauria. The Epidaurians sent about to solicit the succours of their allies; some of whom excused themselves as bound to observe the approaching festivals, though others advanced as far as the frontiers of Epidauria, and then refused to act. And during the space of time that the Argives were in Epidauria, embassies from the several states held a congress at Mantinea, at the request of the Athenians; and, proceeding to a conference, Ephamidas, the Corinthian, remonstrated, that "their words were by no means consistent with their actions; for whilst they were here sitting together upon the terms of peace, the Epidaurians and allies, and the Argives, were opposing one another in arms: that, consequently, the first thing to be done was to send deputations on both sides to dis-

¹ Before Christ 419.

² This was a grand project indeed! It aimed at no less than the total ruin of Corinth, and putting an end to all the navigation of that trading and opulent city through the bay of Crissa. The Athenians were already entire masters of the sea on the other side of the Isthmus.

³ This festival was observed by most cities in Greece; but with the greatest pomp and solemnity at Sparta, where it began the thirteenth of the month Carneius, according to the Lacedæmonian style, and lasted nine days. A camp was formed for its celebration, in which they continued during the whole solemnity, and observed strict military discipline. By these means, as we find a little lower, the Argives, in this instance no slaves to superstition, attended to the festival and warfare at the same time, and annoyed the Epidaurians, whilst religious awe restrained the friends of the latter from acting in their defence. See *Potter's Archaeologia*, vol. i. p. 468.

band those armies, and then orderly to proceed to treat of peace." Yielding, therefore, to the justice of such a remonstrance, they fetched the Argives out of Epidauria; and, returning to the congress, they were not able even then to agree together: upon which the Argives once more entered Epidauria, and resumed the ravage,

The Lacedæmonians now had taken the field, and were advanced to Carys; but, as now again the victims sacrificed portended no success to a campaign, they once more withdrew.

The Argives also, after ruining about a third of the territory of Epidauria, were returned home. In this incursion they were assisted by one thousand heavy-armed Athenians, with Alcibiades at their head; who, having heard that the Lacedæmonians had now left the field, as their service was now no longer needful, marched away. And in this manner the summer passed.

In the beginning of the next winter, the Lacedæmonians, unknown to the Athenians, threw a body of men, to the number of three hundred, with Agesippidas as commandant, into Epidaurus by sea. Upon this, the Argives repaired instantly to Athens, with remonstrances, that, "though it was explicitly mentioned in the treaty that no enemy should be suffered to pass through their respective dominions, yet they had permitted the Lacedæmonians to make this passage by sea without molestation.¹ Unless, therefore, they would replace the Messenians and Helots in Pylus, to annoy the Lacedæmonians, they should deem themselves aggrieved." Upon this, the Athenians, at the instigation of Alcibiades, underwrote this charge upon the Laconic column, that "the Lacedæmonians were guilty of perjury;" and removed the Helots from Crania into Pylus, to resume their depredations, but refrained from any other act of hostility.

In the course of this winter, though the Argives and Epidaurians were at war, yet no regular battle was fought between them. The hostilities consisted of ambuscades and skirmishes, in which, according to the chance of action, some persons perished on both sides.

But in the close of winter, when the spring

was now approaching, the Argives, provided with ladders for scale, came under Epidaurus, hoping to take it by surprise, as insufficiently manned by reason of the war; but, failing of success, they soon withdrew. And then the winter ended, and with it ended also the thirteenth year of the war.

YEAR XIV.

ABOUT the middle of the ensuing summer, when their confederates the Epidaurians, were sadly distressed, when some of the Peloponnesians had already revolted, and others showed plainly a spirit of discontent, the Lacedæmonians were clearly convinced that, unless expeditiously prevented, the mischief would spread abroad. Upon this they took the field against Argos with their whole force, both themselves and their Helots; and Agis, the son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, commanded in chief. They were attended in the field by the Tegeatæ, and all the other Arcadians whatever confederated with the Lacedæmonians. But the allies of the other parts of Peloponnesus, and those without the isthmus, were assembled at Phlius:—the Bœotians, consisting of five thousand heavy-armed, and the same number of light-armed; five hundred horsemen, each attended by a soldier on foot:—the Corinthians, of two thousand heavy-armed;—the other confederates with their several quotas;—but the Phliasians with the whole of their force, because the army was assembled in their district.

The Argives, who had some time before intelligence of the Lacedæmonian preparations, and that since they were filing towards Phlius in order to join the forces assembled there, now took the field themselves. They were joined by a succour of the Mantineans, strengthened by the addition of their dependents, and three thousand heavy-armed Eleans. Upon their march, they fell in with the Lacedæmonians at Methydrium of Arcadia. Each party posts itself upon a rising ground. The Argives got every thing in readiness to attack the Lacedæmonians whilst yet they were alone; but Agis, dislodged by night and stealing a march, completed his junction with the body of confederates at Phlius. When this was perceived by the Argives, they drew off early the next dawn, first of all to Argos, and then to

¹ The Argives, in this remonstrance, acknowledge the dominion of the sea, even on the coast of Peloponnesus, to belong to Athens.

the pass on the route of Nemea, by which they expected the Lacedæmonians, with their confederates, would fall into their country. Yet Agis took not that route which they expected; but, having communicated his design to the Lacedæmonians, and Arcadians, and Epidaurians, he took a different route, though much less practicable, and descended into the plains of Argos. The Corinthians, and Pellenians, and Phliasians, followed by another more direct route; and orders had been given to the Bœotians, and Megareans, and Sicyonians, to take the route which leadeth to Nemea, on which the Argives were posted, that, in case the Argives should march into the plain to make head against the Lacedæmonians, the last with their cavalry might press upon their rear.

After these dispositions, and such a descent into the plain, Agis ravaged Saminthus and other places; upon intelligence of which, the Argives, so soon as it was day, dislodged from Nemea, to stop the depredations, and on their march met with the body of Phliasians and Corinthians; and, encountering, slew some few of the Phliasians, whilst not a much greater number of their own men were destroyed by the Corinthians. The Bœotians also, and Megareans, and Sicyonians, took the route of Nemea conformably to orders, and found the Argives already dislodged; but the latter, upon entering the plain, and in view of the ravage made upon their lands, drew up in order of battle. The Lacedæmonians stood regularly drawn up on the other side. And now the Argives were shut up in the middle of their enemies: for, on the side of the plain, the Lacedæmonians, and those in their body, intercepted their return to the city; on the high ground above them were the Corinthians, and Phliasians, and Pellenians; on the other part, towards Memea, were the Bœotians, and Sicyonians, and Megareans. Calvary they had none: for the Athenians were the only part of their confederacy who were not yet come up.

The bulk, indeed, of the Argives and confederates apprehended not the danger, which at present environed them, to be so great; but rather concluded they might engage with advantage, and that they had caught the Lacedæmonians fast within their territory, and near to Argos itself. Two Argives, however,—Thrasylus, one of the five in command, and Alci-

phron, the public host of the Lacedæmonians,—the very instant the armies were moving to the charge, had addressed themselves to Agis and proposed expedients to prevent a battle giving their word, that “the Argives were ready to do and to submit to justice, upon a fair and equitable arbitration, in case the Lacedæmonians had any charge against them; and for the future would live at peace, if a present accommodation could be effected.”

In this manner these Argives presumed to talk, merely of themselves, and without the public authority. Agis also, by his own private determination, accepted the proposals; and, without reporting them to the council of war, without canvassing things maturely himself, or at least communicating only with one person of the number which had authority in the army, grants them a four months’ truce, “in which space they were to make good what engagements they had now made;” and then instantly drew off the army, without imparting the reasons of his conduct to the other confederates. The Lacedæmonians, indeed, and confederates, followed when he led them off, because their laws enacted such obedience; yet, amongst themselves, were lavish of their censure against Agis, that, when so fine an opportunity of engaging was in their power, when their enemies were hemmed in on all sides, both by their horse and their foot, they were drawn off, without performing any thing worthy of such mighty preparations; for, to this very day, a finer army of Grecians had never appeared in the field. A most gallant figure, in truth, it made, whilst they were all together at Nemea. The Lacedæmonians were there to be seen with the whole collected force of their state, accompanied by the Arcadians, and Bœotians, and Corinthians, and Sicyonians, and Pellenians, and Phliasians, and Megareans. The troops which composed their several quotas were all picked men, and were judged a match in the field of battle, not only for the whole Argive alliance, but the addition of double strength. This great army, however, laying all the time most heavy imputations on the conduct of Agis, drew off, and were disbanded to their several habitations.

On the other part also, the Argives were still much more exasperated against those who had made this suspension without public authority. They imagined the Lacedæmonians had escaped them when they had the finest

opportunity of striking a blow, inasmuch as the contest must have been decided under the very walls of Argos, and in company with a numerous and gallant alliance. And hence, upon their return, at the Charadrum, the place where the crimes committed in an expedition are adjudged, before they enter the city, they were beginning to stone Thrasyllus, who, flying to an altar, escapeth with life: his effects, however, they confiscated to public use.

But, after this, came up the Athenian succour, consisting of a thousand heavy-armed and three hundred horsemen, commanded by Laches and Nicostratus. The Argives, who, after all, were afraid to break the agreement with the Lacedæmonians, ordered them "to be gone forthwith;" and, though they requested a conference, refused to introduce them into the assembly of the people, till the Mantineans and Eleans, who were not yet departed, by great importunity obtained a compliance. Here the Athenians,¹ in the presence of Alcibiades their ambassador, assembled with the Argives and their allies, averred, that "the suspension was not valid, since agreed to without the consent of the body of the confederates; now, therefore, as themselves were come up opportunely to their assistance, they were obliged in honour to prosecute the war." The confederates allowed the force of this argument: and the whole alliance, except the Argives, marched instantly away against Orchomenus, of Arcadia. But even the Argives, though they staid behind at first, were persuaded by such reasoning, and soon after went also to take part in the expedition. Thus, united, they sat down before and besieged Orchomenus. They made several assaults upon it, desirous for other reasons to get it into their hands, but more particularly because the hostages from Arcadia were lodged in that city by the Lacedæmonians.

The Orchomenians, terrified at the weakness of their walls and the multitude of their besiegers, and lest, as no relief appeared, they should soon be exhausted, thought proper to capitulate on these conditions;—"to be received into the confederacy,—to give hostages of their own body,—and to deliver up to the Mantineans those whom the Lacedæmonians had lodged with them."

Having thus got possession of Orchomenus,

the confederates, in the next place, held a consultation, "against what other city, in their plan of conquest, they should next proceed." The Eleans exhorted them to march against Lepreum, but the Mantineans against Tegea; and the Argives and Athenians adhered to the Mantineans. The Eleans, upon this, were offended that they had not voted for the siege of Lepreum, and separated to their own home. But the rest of the confederates set about preparations at Mantinea, as fully bent on the siege of Tegea; and even some of the citizens of Tegea were exerting their efforts within that city to betray it to them.

But the Lacedæmonians, after they were withdrawn from Argos, in pursuance of the suspension of arms for four months, laid heavy charges upon Agis, for not conquering Argos at so fair an opportunity, fairer than ever they had reason to expect,—“since so numerous and so gallant a body of confederates could never again, without greater difficulty, be assembled together.” And when afterwards the news arrived that Orchomenus was taken, their indignation became more violent than ever. In such a ferment, they instantly resolved, though not consistently with the calm Lacedæmonian temper, that "his house must needs be demolished, and a fine of one hundred thousand drachmas² be imposed upon Agis." He earnestly pleaded against the execution of the sentence, that, "in another expedition, he would purge the charge by some notable service to the state; if not, they might then proceed to punish him at pleasure." Upon this, they suspended the fine and demolition, but passed a law upon the present occasion, such as never before had been made amongst them; for they elected a committee of ten Spartans to attend him as a council, without whose concurrence he was not permitted to lead out their army into the field.

In the meantime a message is brought them from their friends at Tegea, that "unless they come thither with the utmost expedition, Tegea will revolt from them to the Argives and their confederates, and is only not revolted already."

To prevent this, the whole Lacedæmonian strength, both of citizens and Helots, is levied with more sharpness than had ever been known before; and, taking the field, they marched to Orestæum, of Menalia. An order was sent

¹ Laches and Nicostratus.

² £3220 3s. 4d. sterling.

beforehand to their Arcadian allies, to assemble and follow them directly towards Tegea.

But when the whole Lacedæmonian strength was thus marched to Orestæum, the sixth part of the number, consisting of the more aged and younger classes, was from thence again dismissed to Sparta, to take upon them the guard of that place, whilst the rest of their military force marcheth to Tegea; and, not long after, their Arcadian confederates join them.

They sent also to Corinth, to the Bœotians, Phocians, and Locrians, a summons of speedy aid into the Mantineans. But, for some of these, the summons was too short; and, for the rest, it was by no means an easy task to take the field in separate bodies, and, waiting for their mutual junction, to force their passage through an enemy's country; for such lay between to obstruct their advance; however, they were earnestly bent to attempt it. The Lacedæmonians, in the meantime, enlarged with such Arcadian parties as were already come up, marched on and broke into the Mantinean; and, having formed their camp near the temple of Hercules, they ravaged the country.

The Argives and their allies, when their enemy was thus in sight, having posted themselves on a spot of ground by nature strong and difficult of approach, drew up in order, as ready to engage. The Lacedæmonians also immediately advanced towards them, and even approached so near as within the cast of a stone or a dart. But one of the old experienced Spartans, perceiving that they were to attack so difficult a post, roared out aloud to Agis,¹ that "he was going to repair one evil by another," as if, by his present ill-judged eagerness, he was bent on making reparation for his censured retreat from Argos. Upon this, either struck with such an exclamation, or whether upon a sudden his own thoughts suggested to him a different conduct, he drew off his army again, with all possible expedition, before the battle could be joined. And, wheeling from thence into the Tegeatis, he turned a stream of water into the Mantinean, about which, as apt to do great damage to the lands

on which side soever it flowed, the Mantineans and Tegeatæ are eternally at blows. It was his scheme to draw down the Argives and their allies from their strong post, on the eminence, in order to prevent the turning of this stream, so soon as they knew it was in agitation, and thus to gain an opportunity of fighting in the plain. In pursuance of this, he halted the whole day upon the stream, and accomplished its diversion. But the Argives and their allies, surprised at this sudden and precipitate retreat, had been, at first, unable to conjecture what it meant. At length, when the enemy was totally withdrawn, and quite out of their view, after lying inactively in their posts, and no orders received for a pursuit, they began a second time to lay heavy imputations on their own commanders;—that, "on the former occasion, the Lacedæmonians, when fairly caught near Argos, had been suffered to escape; that now again, though they were openly flying, not a soul must pursue them, but, through shameful indolence, their enemies are preserved, and themselves are treacherously betrayed." The commanders, upon the first noise of these clamours, were highly chagrined, but afterwards they marched them down from the eminence, and, advancing into the plain, encamped them there, as determined to fight the enemy. The day following, the Argives and allies were drawn up to be in readiness for action, should the enemy appear. And the Lacedæmonians, marching away from the stream to re-occupy their former camp near the temple of Hercules, on a sudden perceived that the whole body of their foes were ready drawn up in order of battle, and had quitted their strong post on the eminence.

At this crisis, the Lacedæmonians were struck with a greater astonishment than the memory of man could parallel. For now, in an interval of time exceeding short, they were bound to get every thing in readiness for fight: yet, such was their diligence, that in an instant they were formed into a beautiful array, Agis, their king, issuing all the necessary orders, according to law; for, when a king leadeth their armies, all orders are given by him: he himself declareth what he willeth to be done to the general officers;² they carry his orders to the colonels;³ these to the captains;⁴ who afterwards forward them to the subalterns;⁵

¹ Plutarch says it was an apophthegm of this Agis, that Lacedæmonians never ask concerning their enemies. "How many are they?" but "Where are they?" And that, when he was hindered from fighting at Mantinea, he said, "They, who would rule over many, must fight against many:" and, being asked what was the number of the Lacedæmonians, he replied "Enow to beat cowards."

² Polemarchæ.

³ Pentecontarchæ.

⁴ Lochagæ.

⁵ Enomotarchæ.

by whom they were communicated to all the private men under their respective commands. The orders, when any such are requisite, are in this method dispersed and circulated with the greatest expedition: for, in the Lacedæmonian armies, almost the whole soldiery, few only excepted, have a command assigned in regular subordination; and the care of executing orders is incumbent upon numbers.

In their present array, the left wing consisted of the Skiritæ, who, of all the Lacedæmonians, ever claim this post as their peculiar right; next them were posted the Brasidean soldiers who had served in Thrace, accompanied by those who had lately been honoured with the freedom of Sparta; then, along the line, were regularly posted all the troops which were composed of pure Lacedæmonians; next to them stood the Hereans of Arcadia, and beyond them the Mænalians. In the right wing were the Tegeatæ, but in the utmost extent of it some few Lacedæmonians. Their cavalry was equally posted on both the wings: and in this form was the Lacedæmonian disposition made.

On the side of the enemy, the Mantineans had the right wing, because the business fell upon their ground; next to them were the allies from Arcadia; then a picked body of Argives, to the number of a thousand, who long had been exercised in the study of arms at the public school at Argos; and next to them stood the rest of the Argive forces: these were followed by their own confederates, the Cleoneans and Orneatæ. The Athenians were ranged in the outermost body, and composed the left wing, supported by their own cavalry. Such was the order and disposition on both sides.

The army of the Lacedæmonians had the appearance of superior numbers: but exactly to write the number, either of the several bodies on each side, or of their whole force, I own myself unable. The amount of the Lacedæmonians was not known, because of the profound secrecy observed in their polity; and the amount of their enemies, because of the ostentation ordinary to mankind in magnifying their own strength, hath been still disbelieved. However, from the following computation, an inquirer may discover the number of the Lacedæmonians, who on this occasion were drawn up in the field.

Besides the Skiritæ, who were in number six hundred, seven battalions were in this en-

gagement. Now in every battalion there were four companies; and, in every company, four platoons; in the first rank of every platoon were four fighting soldiers. In regard to depth they were not equally formed, as every colonel determined the depth at his own private discretion; but generally they were drawn up eight deep. The front line of their whole force, excepting the Skiritæ, consisted of four hundred and forty-eight men.¹

When both sides were ready, the small respite before the engagement was employed by the several commanders in animating the soldiers under their respective orders.

To the Mantineans it was urged,—that “the points, for which they were going to fight, were their country and their future fate, either rule or slavery; that, of rule, whose sweets they had known, they might not be divested, and that they might never feel again what slavery is.”

To the Argives,—it was “for their ancient sovereignty, and the equal share of dignity they had once enjoyed in Peloponnesus, now timely to prevent an eternal submission to such losses, and earn revenge for the many injuries a neighbouring state, unrelenting in its enmity, had done them.”

But to the Athenians,—that, “in honour, they were obliged to signalize their valour in a conspicuous manner, in the company of numerous and gallant allies: that should they gain a victory over the Lacedæmonians on Peloponnesian ground, their own empire would be established and enlarged, and no enemy would ever again presume to invade their territories.”

And in this manner were the Argives and their confederates animated to the fight.

¹ The Lacedæmonian *mora*, or brigade, consisted of four *lochi*, or battalions, equal to 2048 men: for a *lochos*, or battalion, consisted of four *pentecosties*, or companies, equal to 512 men; a *pentecosty*, or company, of four *enomatia*, or platoons, equal to 128 men; and each *enomatia* or platoon, consisted of 32. This is the account of Thucydides, who computes the platoon by 4 in front and 8 in depth. The platoon consisted therefore of 32; which, multiplied by 4, is equal to 128, the number of a company; which also multiplied by 4, is equal to 512, the number of a battalion. The number of battalions was seven, which shows the number of Lacedæmonians to have been 3584; and then with the addition of 600 *Skiritæ*, who were posted on the left, to have amounted, in the whole, to 4184 men. Or again, the whole front line, is equal to 448, multiplied by 8, the number in depth, is equal to 3584, added to 600 *Skiritæ*, is equal to 4184.

But the Lacedæmonians were encouraging one another, and, during martial strains enjoined by their discipline, like men of bravery as they were, each animated his neighbour with the recital of the gallant acts they had performed together. They were persons, who knew that a long experience in the toils of war conduceth more to preservation, than a short verbal harangue, how finely soever delivered.

And now the armies were mutually approaching: the Argives and their allies advanced in a brisk and angry manner; but the Lacedæmonians moved slowly forwards to the sound of many flutes, the music which their laws ordained; not from any religious motive, but for advancing with equal steps, keeping time with the notes, to prevent all disorders in the ranks; accidents very frequent in large armies whilst drawing to an encounter.¹

But, during the approach, Agis the king bethought himself of making a new disposition.—It is the constant case with all armies, that, upon the right, their wings, whilst they approach one another, extend themselves too far, so that constantly, on both sides, the left wing is overreached and flanked by the enemy's right. This proceedeth from the dread every soldier lieth under of being exposed on his unarmed side, which maketh him eager to get it covered by the shield of the next person on his right, and positive that a firm closing together in this manner, will render them impenetrable to the shock of the enemy. This turn of the body is first begun by the right-

hand man of the whole front, and is the result of his constant care to shift his defenceless side from the aim of the foe; and the dread of being in the same manner exposed obligeth all the rest to follow his motion. And thus, in the present approach, the Mantineans in their wing had far overreached the Skiritæ; but the Lacedæmonians and Tegeatæ had done so, more in regard to the Athenians, in proportion as they exceeded them in numbers. Agis, therefore, fearing lest the left wing of the Lacedæmonians might be quite surrounded, and judging that the Mantineans quite too far overreached them, sent orders to the Skiritæ and Brasideans to wheel away from the spot where they were first posted, and fill up the extremity of the line, so as to render it equal to the Mantineans; and, to supply the void thus made, he ordered from the right wing, two battalions, commanded by general officers, Hipponoidas and Aristocles, to repair thither, and falling in, to close up the ranks; judging that their own right would still be more than sufficient to execute their parts, and the wing opposed to the Mantineans might, by this disposition, be properly strengthened. But, as he issued these orders in the very onset and close of battle, it happened that Aristocles and Hipponoidas absolutely refused to change their post, (though for such disobedience, as apparently the result of cowardice, they were afterwards banished from Sparta); and before the new disposition could be completed, the enemy had begun to charge. Upon the refusal of these two battalions to change their post, Agis countermanded those marching to strengthen the Skiritæ to their former places, who now were unable to fall into the ranks, or close together with those whom they had quitted: but on this occasion, more remarkable than ever, the Lacedæmonians, though in all respects outdone in the military art, gave signal proofs of their superiority in true manly valour.

For, to come to particulars, when once they were at blows with the enemy, the right wing of the Mantineans routs the Skiritæ and Brasideans. Then the same Mantineans, supported by their confederates and the thousand picked Argives, falling in at the void in the Lacedæmonian line, which was not yet filled up, did great execution upon them; for, taking them in flank, they entirely broke them, drove them for shelter among their carriages, and

¹ Milton hath made use of this Lacedæmonian march to adorn and raise his own noble poetry. It was full and strong in his imagination, when he wrote the following lines. *Paradise Lost*, book I.

“Anon they move

In perfect phalanx, to the Dorian mood
Of flutes and soft recorders; such as raised
To height of noblest temper heroes old,
Arming to battle; and, instead of rage,
Deliberate valour breathed, firm, and unmoved
With dread of death to flight or foul retreat:
Nor wanting power to mitigate and stave,
With solemn touches, troubled thoughts, and chase
Anguish, and doubt, and fear, and sorrow, and pain,
From mortal or immortal minds. Thus they,
Breathing united force, with fixed thought,
Moved on in silence to soft pipes, that charm'd
Their painful steps o'er the burn'd soil: And now,
Advanced in view, they stood, a horrid front
Of dreadful length and dazzling arms, in guise
Of warriors old with order'd spear and shield,
Awaiting what command their mighty chief
Had to impose. He through the armed files
Darts his experienced eye; and soon, traverse
The whole battalion, views their order due.”

made a slaughter of the old men who were appointed for their guard. And in this quarter, the Lacedæmonians were clearly vanquished.

But in the other quarters, and especially in the centre, where Agis the king was posted, and round him the horse-guards, styled the three hundred, falling upon those troops which were composed of the elder Argives, and them which are called the pentelochi, and upon the Cleoneans, and Orneatæ, and those Athenians who ranked along with them, they broke them in an instant, so that many of them durst not stand to exchange a blow, but, so soon as they felt the Lacedæmonian shock, turned about at once, and others were trampled under foot in the great hurry they were in to secure their escape.

But when the main body of the Argives and their allies was in this quarter routed, their foot, on both the flanks, were instantly discomfited. Now, also, the right of the Lacedæmonians and Tegeatæ, by the advantage of superior numbers, had overreached and encompassed the Athenians. These now, on all hands, were beset with danger; in this quarter they were surrounded by their enemies, in another they were already vanquished; and they must have suffered the most of any part of the army, had it not been for the excellent support their own cavalry gave them. It happened also that Agis, when he perceived that the Mantineans and the thousand Argives had got the better on the left, commanded the whole army to wheel off to the support of the vanquished. And whilst this was executing, the Athenians laid hold of the interval, which this motion of the enemy, and their drawing off from around them occasioned, to secure their own escape without any opposition, accompanied by the Argives, who were also vanquished with them.

But the Mantineans, and those who fought in company with them, and the picked band of Argives, were now no longer intent on pressing upon their adversaries; but, perceiving their own side to be completely vanquished, and the Lacedæmonians approaching to their attack, they turned about and fled. Yet numbers of them perished, and those chiefly Mantineans; for the greatest part of the picked band of Argives completed their escape.

The flight however was not precipitate, nor the distance to a place of safety great. For

the Lacedæmonians, till the enemy fled, maintain their combats with long and steady toil; but, after a route, pursue them neither long nor far.

And thus, or very nearly thus, was the procedure of the whole battle, the greatest that for many ages had been fought amongst Grecians, and where the competition lay between most renowned and flourishing states. The Lacedæmonians, amassing together the arms of their enemies who had been slain, immediately erected a trophy, and rifled the bodies of the dead. They also took up their own dead, and carried them to Tegea, where they received the rites of sepulture; and also delivered, upon truce, the slain of their enemy. There fell of the Argives, and Orneatæ, and Cleoneans, seven hundred; and two hundred of the Mantineans; two hundred also of the Athenians, including the Æginetæ, and their several commanders. On the Lacedæmonian side,—as the confederates were never hard pressed, what loss they suffered is scarcely deserving of notice; and the exact number of their own dead it is difficult to discover, but it was reported to have been about three hundred.

When a battle was certainly to be fought, Pleistionax, the other king, marched out to their support, with the whole body of citizens, both old men and youths. But when he was advanced as far as Tegea, he received the news of a victory, and returned to Sparta. The Lacedæmonians also sent messengers to countermand their allies from Corinth, and from without the isthmus. And, being themselves returned to Sparta, after giving dismission to their allies, as the Carneian solemnities were at hand, they celebrate the festival. The imputation also of cowardice, at that time laid to their charge by the rest of Greece, because of their misfortune at Sphacteria, and some other instances of impolitic and dilatory conduct, by this one action, they completely purged away. Now it was determined that their depression had been merely the result of fortune, but that in inward bravery they were still themselves.

The day before this battle was fought, it happened that the Epidaurians, with the whole of their strength, had made an incursion into Argia, as left defenceless, and had done great execution on the guards, left behind at the general march of the Argives.

Three thousand heavy-armed Eleans, as auxiliaries to the Mantineans, came up after the

battle; as did also a thousand Athenians to join the former body, upon which the whole alliance marched immediately against Epidaurus, whilst the Lacedæmonians were solemnizing the Carneian festival. After an equal distribution of the work, they began to raise a circumvallation around that city. The rest, indeed, soon desisted; but the Athenians, conformably to their orders, completed theirs round the eminence on which stood the temple of Juno. To guard this work, the whole alliance left behind a sufficient number draughted from their several bodies, and then departed to their respective homes. And the summer was now at an end.

In the first commencement of the succeeding winter, and after the celebration of the Carneian festival, the Lacedæmonians immediately took the field; and, advancing as far as Tegea, sent from thence to Argos proposals for an accommodation. There was already in that city a party in their intelligence, who were also bent in overturning the popular government at Argos; and, since the event of the late fatal battle, they were enabled to use more cogent arguments to persuade the many into the accommodation. Their scheme was, first to enter into truce with the Lacedæmonians, as preparatory to an alliance offensive and defensive, which was next in agitation; and, this point carried, then immediately to execute their plot against the people.

Lichas, son of Arcesilaus, the public host of the Argives, accordingly arriveth at Argos, charged to make two demands in the name of the Lacedæmonians; the one, "whether war be still their option?" the other, "how if their choice be peace?" Upon this a strong debate arose, for Alcibiades was present. But the party who acted in the Lacedæmonian interest, prevailed with the Argives to accept their proposals of an accommodation; which were as followeth:

"Thus resolved, by the Lacedæmonian council, to compound with the Argives.—

"These to restore their children to the Orchomenians, and their men to the Mænalians; to restore also the Lacedæmonians their citizens now detained at Mantinea; to evacuate Epidaurus and demolish their works.

"And the Athenians, if they will not quit Epidaurus, to be declared enemies to the Argives and to the Lacedæmonians, and to the confe-

derates of the Lacedæmonians and to the confederates of the Argives.

"And, if the Lacedæmonians have in the power any young men, to release them to the states.

"In relation to the god,¹ we consent that an oath be administered to the Epidaurians, and we grant the form to be prescribed by the Argives.

"The states of Peloponnesus, both small and great to be, none excepted, free, according to their own primitive constitutions.

"And, if any state without Peloponnesus shall enter offensively into the lands of Peloponnesus, succours to be united, in pursuance of a general consult of Peloponnesians, and the determinate and most expedient method.

"All confederates of the Lacedæmonians, whatever, without Peloponnesus, shall enjoy the same privileges as those of the Lacedæmonians and those of the Argives enjoy, each remaining in free possession of their territories.

"These articles to be communicated to the confederates, and ratification to be made, if they approve. If different methods seem advisable to the confederates, all parties to desist and return directly home."

These proposals, by way of preliminary, the Argives accepted; and the army of the Lacedæmonians was drawn off from Tegea to their own home. And afterwards, in the course of mutual negotiation, the same party at Argos prevailed upon their countrymen to renew their alliance with the Mantineans and Eleians, and even with the Athenians, and to strike a peace, and an alliance offensive and defensive, with the Lacedæmonians. The tenor of it was this:

"Resolved thus, by the Lacedæmonians and the Argives, on a peace and an alliance offensive and defensive, for the term of fifty years,

"They shall do justice to each other reciprocally, with impartiality and equity, according to their several forms of law.

"The other states in Peloponnesus, comprehended in this peace and alliance, shall continue in the enjoyment of their own laws, their own independence, holding the same territories, doing justice with impartiality and with equity, according to their several forms of law.

¹ The Pythian Apollo. This article seems designed to adjust the quarrel about the victim, related in the transactions of the last year.

"All confederates of the Lacedæmonians whatever, without Peloponnesus, shall enjoy the same privileges with the Lacedæmonians themselves; and the Argive confederates shall enjoy the same with the Argives themselves; each holding their respective territories.

"If a joint expedition be at any time requisite, a consultation to be held, by the Lacedæmonians and the Argives, about the determinate and most expedient methods of issuing orders to the rest of the alliance.

"But, if any controversy arise between the states, either those within or those without Peloponnesus, either concerning their boundaries or any other point, it shall be determined by judges.

"And, if any confederate state have a dispute with another state, they shall go with a reference, to that state which to the contending states shall be thought most impartial. Private persons, however, to be judged by the laws of that state to which they are subject."

This peace, and such an alliance, was now perfected; and the reciprocal damages of war and all other offences were now buried in oblivion. And, having already settled all points to general satisfaction, they concurred in a suffrage, "to receive no herald nor embassy from the Athenians, till they were withdrawn out of Peloponnesus, and had given up their fortifications at Epidaurus;" and farther, "for the future to make neither peace nor war but with joint concurrence." Their attention was also extended to objects more remote; and in conjunction they despatched ambassadors to the cities in Thrace and to Perdiccas, and seduced Perdiccas to swear adherence to their league: not that he instantly declared his revolt from the Athenians, but he was bent on accomplishing it ever since he saw the Argives had done it; for he was originally descended from Argos. They renewed also their ancient oaths to the Chalcideans, and strengthened them by the addition of new.

The Argives also despatched an embassy to the Athenians, requiring them to quit the works they had raised at Epidaurus. The latter, sensible that their soldiers were but a handful of men when compared with those who were associated with them in that service, sent Demosthenes to draw them off. He, upon his arrival, pretending to solemnize some martial game without the fortress, when the rest of the garrison was gone out to the spec-

tacle, barred fast the gates. And afterwards, the Athenians, having renewed the peace with them, surrendered the fortifications they had raised, into the hands of the Epidaurians.

When the Argives had in this manner gone off from the alliance, the Mantineans also, who at first stood out, finding at length that without the Argives they could do nothing of themselves, thought proper to accommodate their disputes with the Lacedæmonians, and resigned their command over the cities of Arcadia. The Lacedæmonians also and Argives, to the number of a thousand each, marched in company to Sicyon; where, principally by the presence of the Lacedæmonians, the government was shifted into the hands of a smaller number. And after transacting such points in concert, they soon procured the demolition of the popular government at Argos; and an oligarchy, suited to the Lacedæmonian model, was erected in its stead.

As the winter was now in its close, these transactions ran out nearly into the spring; and the fourteenth year of the war expired.

YEAR XV.¹

In the following summer, the Dictideans of Athos revolted from the Athenians to the Chalcideans; and the Lacedæmonians resettled the state of Achaia, which for a time had been under a management not agreeable to them.

The people of Argos also, combining gradually together and resuming their spirits, made an assault upon the few. They waited for a favourable opportunity, till the festival of the naked games was celebrating at Lacedæmon. A battle was fought within the precincts of Argos, in which the people was the victor; some of their opponents they slew, and others they doomed to perpetual exile. The Lacedæmonians, when their adherents implored their succour, were too dilatory in moving; but at last they adjourned the games, and marched away to their support; and hearing, when they were come to Tegea, that "the few were vanquished," they determined to proceed no farther, maugre all the entreaties of the new exiles; but, retreating forthwith to Sparta, they resumed the celebration of the games. Yet, being afterwards attended by deputations from those in Argos, as well as by such as had

¹ Before Christ 420.

been lately banished, in the presence of the whole confederacy, after many arguments had been urged on both sides, they came to a resolution, that "the Argives in the city were guilty of injustice;" and a decree was passed, that "they should march against Argos." But, after all, their proceedings are dilatory and remiss.

In the meantime, the people of Argos, dreading the Lacedæmonian strength, and re-addressing themselves again to Athens for a renewal of alliance, and proceeding to execute a plan which they thought the strongest expedient of preservation, built long walls quite down to the sea, that, in case they should be blocked up by land, all proper supplies might be thrown into the city by sea, through the good offices of the Athenians. To this scheme of new fortifications some cities also of Peloponnesus were privy underhand. The whole body of the Argives without distinction, the citizens, their wives, and their servants forwarded the work; and from Athens they were supplied with carpenters and masons. And here the summer ended.

Winter now succeeding, the Lacedæmonians, when advertised of these new fortifications, march their forces against Argos, their own, and all those of the allies, excepting the Corinthian. Some new projects in their favour were now also in agitation within Argos itself. The whole army was commanded by Agis, the son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians. The new turns they expected for their service took not effect within the city; but they made themselves masters of the new-erected walls, and levelled them with the ground. They also took Hysie, a town in Argia; and having put all the freemen found within that place to the sword, they drew off, and dispersed to their several cities.

After this, the Argives marched their force into Phliasia; and, after ravaging that district, because the exiles from Argos had met with a reception there, they again retired: for many of those exiles had taken up their residence at Phlius.

In the same winter, the Athenians, exasperated against Perdiccas, prevented all manner of importations into Macedonia. They charged him "with taking part in the late treaty, confirmed by the sanction of oaths, between the Argives and Lacedæmonians; that, farther, when they had made great pre-

parations against the Chalcidians of Thrace and Amphipolis, and Nicias, the son of Niceratus, was appointed to command in that service, he had violated his obligations to act in concert, and that expedition came to nothing purely through his secession: he was therefore an enemy to Athens."

The winter expired in this manner; and with it the fifteenth year of the war came also to an end.

YEAR XVI.¹

When summer came on, Alcibiades, with twenty sail, arrived at Argos, where he seized three hundred of the citizens, whose fidelity to the Athenians, and adherence to the Lacedæmonian interest, was still suspected; and these the Athenians secured in the neighbouring island, which were subject to their dominion.

The Athenians also undertook the reduction of Melos with a naval force, consisting of thirty sail of Athenians, six of Chians, and two of Lesbians; on board of which were transported twelve hundred heavy-armed Athenians, three hundred archers, and twenty who drew the bow on horseback. The number also of their dependents, from the continent and islands, which attended, was about fifteen hundred heavy-armed. The Melians are a colony of the Lacedæmonians,² and had there-

¹ Before Christ 416.

² The original of this colony is curious, according to the account given of it by Plutarch.—"When the Tyrhenes were masters of Lemnos and Imbros, and made a practice of ravishing the wives of the Athenians, at Brauron, a mixed breed was the consequence; whom, as half-barbarians, the Athenians drove out of the isles. Thus exiled, they repaired to Tænarus, and were useful to the Spartans in their war against the Helots. They were afterwards rewarded for their good services with the freedom of Sparta and liberty of intermarriage. Yet, not being allowed the honour of serving the offices of the state, or a seat in the council, they became afterwards suspected, as caballing together for bad designs, and projecting to overthrow the constitution: the Lacedæmonians therefore apprehended them all; and, throwing them into prison, kept them confined under a strong guard, till they could find out clear and incontestable evidence against them. The wives of the prisoners came in a body to the prison, and, after much prayer and entreaty, were at length admitted by the guard to the sight and discourse of their husbands. When once they had gained access, they ordered them immediately to strip, and change clothes with them: to leave them their own, and, dressed in those of their wives, to make their escape directly in that disguise. It was done; the women staid behind, determined to endure whatever might be

fore refused to receive law from the Athenians in the same manner as the inhabitants of the other islands received it. At first, however, they observed a strict neutrality; but, in process of time, when the Athenians, by ravaging their country, would have obliged them to act offensively, they openly took part in the war against them.

With a force so strong as hath been described, Cleomedes, the son of Lycomedes, and Tisias, the son of Tisimachus, landed and encamped upon the island. Yet, before they proceeded to hostilities, they sent a deputation from the army to demand a conference; whom the Melians refused to introduce into the assembly of the people, but, in the presence only of the magistrates and the few, commanded them to deliver their instructions. Upon this the Athenian deputation expressed themselves as followeth:

"Since to the people in full assembly we are precluded from speaking, lest the many,—hearing their true interest declared at once by us in a continued discourse, and proved by arguments fitted to persuade and too strong to be refuted,—might be wrought into our views, for such, we are sensible, is the plain construction of this our guarded audience by the few; to you also, who now sit here, we recommend a method of making that point yet more secure,—that, to the reasons we offer, you reserve not your objections for one formal deliberate reply, but, in case we offer any seeming incongruity, you immediately interrupt us, and discuss the point. And tell us, first, whether or not this proposal be agreeable."

The Melians, who composed the synod, answered thus:

"The candour of such leisurely debate, for mutual information, is not to be disapproved; and yet there seemeth to be great inconsistency between such candour and those warlike pre-

parations, with which you no longer intend hereafter, but in present act have already beset us. For we perceive, that hither you are come to be authoritative judges of your own plea, and that the decision must needs prove fatal to us: since if, superior in debate, we for that reason refuse submission, our portion must be war; and, if we allow your plea, from that moment we become your slaves."

ATHENIANS.—"To what purpose this? If here you are met together to retail your suspicions of future events, or to talk of any thing but the proper means of extricating and preserving your state from the present and manifest dangers which environ it, we had better be silent: but, if the latter be your purpose, let us come to the point."

MELIANS.—"There is reason for it, and there ought to be forgiveness, when men, so situated as we are, are liable to much distraction both in speech and thought. The point for which we are assembled is, it is true, no less than our future preservation: if, therefore, it must be so, let the conference proceed in the method you require."

ATHEN.—"As, therefore, it is not our purpose to amuse you with pompous details,—how, after completely vanquishing the Mede, we had a right to assume the sovereignty, or how, provoked by the wrongs received from you, we come hither to earn redress,—we shall wave all parade of words that have no tendency towards conviction: and, in return, insist from you, that you reject all hopes of persuading us by frivolous remonstrances,—that, as a colony of the Lacedæmonians, you were incapacitated from accompanying our arms, or that wrongs in any shape you have never done us.—But, these things apart, let us lay all stress on such points as may really, on both sides, be judged persuasive: since of this you are as strongly convinced as we ourselves are sensible of it,—that, in all human competitions, equal wants alone produce equitable determination; and, in what terms soever the powerful enjoin obedience, to those the weak are obliged to submit."

MEL.—"If this be so, we boldly aver,—for, as you have discarded justice from the question, and substituted interest in its place, we must follow the precedent,—that you also it concerneth, we should not be deprived of the common privilege of men; but that to human creatures, ever liable to so dangerous a loss, the

the consequence; and the guards, deceived by appearances, let out the husbands instead of the wives. They marched off and seized Taygeta; then seduced the Helots to revolt, and promised to support them; which struck a great terror amongst the Spartans. They sent to treat with them, and made up the matter on these conditions: 'that they should have their wives restored safe to them; should be furnished with money and vessels for removal; and, when settled in another country, should be reckoned a colony and kinsmen of the Lacedæmonians.'—A body of them settled some time after in the isle of Melos." *Of the Virtues of Women.*

pleas of reason and equity, even though urged beyond their exact limitations, should be indulged and allowed their weight. And more to you than to others is this proper to be suggested, lest, after satiating revenge in all its fury, should you ever be overthrown, you may teach your enemies how you ought to be treated."

ATHEN.—"That affecteth us not: for, though to our share an overthrow of empire fall, the event would render us neither abject nor desponding; because men, inured to enlarged command, as the Lacedæmonians for instance, are never terrible to the vanquished. But our contest, at present, is not against the Lacedæmonians. That revenge alone is terrible, when subjects tumultuously rebel, and gain the ascendant over such as were once their masters; and truly, to avert such dangerous extremities, be the care intrusted to us. But, on the present occasion, that we are here for the enlargement of our own power, and that what we have to urge concerneth the preservation of the state of Melos—these are the points we are to establish. We are desirous to have our power extended over you without obstruction; and your preservation to be amply secured for the common benefit of us both."

MEL.—"And how can it turn out as beneficial for us to become your slaves as it will for you to be our masters?"

ATHEN.—"Plainly thus:—because, instead of suffering the extremities of conquest, you may merely become our subjects; and we, by exempting you from a total destruction, shall gain your service."

MEL.—"But will not these terms content you:—that we be permitted to persevere in quiet: to be friends to you, instead of enemies; but, in regard to war, to be strictly neutral?"

ATHEN.—"No: for all your enmity cannot hurt us so much as the acceptance of such friendship from you. The latter, to those over whom we rule, would suggest intimations of our weakness: your enmity is a proof of our power."

MEL.—"Are your subjects then such sorry judges of equity and right, as to place upon the same level those who are under no manner of tie, and who were never indebted for their settlement to you, and those who, revolting from you, have been again reduced?"

ATHEN.—"Why should they not? They

know such a sense of things may be well grounded in regard to both; inasmuch as those who are exempted from our yoke, owe such exemption to their own superior strength, and if we attack them not, it is the pure result of fear. And hence, the reduction of you, besides enlarging our empire, will invest it with more ample security; especially when, seated on an island, you are bound to submit to the masters of the sea, and to remain henceforth too weak for resistance, unless your are victorious at the present crisis."

MEL.—"Do you then conclude that what we have proposed is incompatible with your own security?—For since, excluding us from the plea of justice, you endeavour merely to persuade us into subserviency to your interest, we also are again necessitated to insist more on the profitable to ourselves, and, by showing that with our welfare your own also coincideth, endeavour to prevail.—What think you of all those states which now stand neutral in your disputes? How will you avoid their implacable hatred when, terrified at such your usage of us, they must live in constant expectation of your hostilities? And whither can our conduct tend, but to enlarge the number of your declared enemies, and to constrain others, who never designed to be your foes, to take up arms against you, though to their own regret?"

ATHEN.—"That never can be: since free states seated on the continent we have nothing to apprehend; they are under no immediate necessity of guarding their liberty against attacks from us. Those alone we dread who are seated in islands; and who, like you, refuse our government; or who, having felt the pains of subjection, are irritated against us. Such are most likely to have recourse to violent measures, and to plunge themselves and us into imminent dangers."

MEL.—"If this be so;—and if you, ye Athenians, can readily embark into so many perils to prevent the dissolution of your own empire; if states, by you enslaved, can do so much to throw off your yoke;—must it not be wretchedly base and cowardly in us, who yet are free, to leave any method, even to the last extremity, untried, of averting slavery?"

ATHEN.—"If you judge of things as wise men ought, we answer—Not. For the point in which your are at present concerned, is not a trial of valour upon equal terms, in order to escape the reproach of cowardice; but your

deliberations proceed at present about the means of self-preservation, that you may not be obliged to encounter those who must by far overpower you."

MEL.—"But we, on the contrary, know, that the enterprises of war have sometimes very different events to those which superiority of numbers gave reason to expect; and, in regard to ourselves, that, if we yield at once, eternal despair must be our fate; but, by acting resolutely in our own defence, we may yet entertain a hope of success."

ATHEN.—"Hope in this manner is ever applied to be the solace of danger. And truly, in situations which can afford to be disappointed, though ever prejudicial, it is not always fatal. But such as idly lavish their last resources, their very all, upon hope, (for it is prodigal by nature,) are only by their own ruin convinced of its delusion; nay, when its delusion is thus by sad experience discovered, and men should guard themselves against it, it will not yet let go its hold in the human heart. Choose not, therefore, so fatal a resource for yourselves in your present destitute situation, hanging as you are on the very brink of ruin. Let not your conduct resemble the foolish behaviour of the mob of mankind; who, though by human means their safety might be earned, yet, when calamity hath chased away all visible hopes of redress, betake themselves to others of a darker cast, to divinations and to oracles, and all such vain expedients as hope suggesteth to draw them to their destruction."

MEL.—"Difficult indeed, as we apprehend, and you well know, the contest must prove to us against your strength and fortune, matched as we are so unequally together. Yet the confidence still supporteth us, that in fortune, since of divine disposal, we shall not be inferior, as with innocence on our side we stand against injustice; that, farther, our deficiencies in strength will be amplified by the addition of Lacedæmonian aid; since it is incumbent upon them to support us, if from no other motive, yet from the ties of blood and a sense of honour. And thus it is not entirely without good grounds that we can form the resolution to withstand your efforts."

ATHEN.—"Nor have we any reason to apprehend, on our own account, that the divine benevolence will not equally exert itself for us; because neither our opinions nor our acts are worse than those of the rest of mankind, either

in regard to the worship of the gods or an acknowledgment of their providence. For of the divine nature we think like the rest of the world; and of men, that beyond a scruple they are impelled, by the necessary bent of their nature, to seize dominion wherever they have power. As for ourselves, we were not the authors of this constitution, nor were we the first who digested it into practice. We found it already in force; we have accordingly applied it, and shall leave it behind us for the practice of every future age; conscious that you yourselves, and every other state, invested with equal power, would make the same exertion of it. And truly, so far as relateth to the gods, we have no more reason to distrust their protection than our neighbours. But your sentiments of the Lacedæmonians are such, that you are confident of support from them because it will be base in them to refuse it. Here we bless your simplicity, but envy not your folly. The Lacedæmonians, we allow, amongst one another, and in paying all due regard to the laws of their country, give ample proofs of honour and virtue: but their behaviour towards the rest of mankind, though it would open a large field of censure were it to be minutely examined, yet at present shall be shown by one concise declaration,—that according to the best lights we have been able to collect, they repute as honourable the things which please them, and as just the things which promote their interest. Such maxims are not in the least conducive to your preservation: it is all chimera."

MEL.—"No. We ground our hopes of relief from them upon their own clear conviction of what their interest enjoineth them. This never can suffer them to entertain a thought of abandoning the Melians, who are a colony of their own; of being faithless to the states of Greece, who wish them well; or of promoting the schemes of the common foe."

ATHEN.—"Of consequence you imagine,—that their interest is connected with your security; that the duties of justice should in honour be observed, though attended with dangers. But these are maxims which the Lacedæmonians, least of all men, have resolution enough to observe in fact."

MEL.—"We have the strongest grounds to imagine, that in our defence they will hazard any dangers, from a sense that their own preservation dependeth more on us than any other people, as we are finely situated for doing them

service in Peloponnesus, and in affection are more faithfully attached to them through the bands of consanguinity."

ATHENS.—"But the certainty of obtaining succour in the intervals of need seemeth not to depend so much on the merit of those who implore it, as on the consciousness of superior strength in those who are implored to give it: a maxim this, to which no state adheres so strictly as the Lacedæmonian. Hence, ever through a diffidence of their own domestic force, they never dare even to invade their neighbours without the concurrence of numerous allies. There cannot, therefore, be the least room to expect, that they will transport an aid into an island whilst we are masters of the sea."

MEL.—"Not perhaps of their own forces; but they have confederates enough to employ in this service. The sea of Crete is wide and spacious; a passage through it, even the lords of the sea will find it more difficult to obstruct, than those who are intent on stealing it, to effect with safety. Or, grant they miscarry in the attempt, at worst they can make a diversion upon your territory, or against the remainder of your dependents who escaped the efforts of Brasidas. And then your attention and your arms must be drawn from a quarter where you have no right to fix them, for the necessary defence of your own home and your own appendage."

ATHENS.—"Though such turns may intervene, your own experience should teach you to distrust them: for you are not, cannot be ignorant, that the Athenians never yet would condescend to raise a siege through hostile dread. But we cannot avoid observing, that, in the whole course of this debate, though declared by you to be held as the means of your preservation, you have not so much as started one single point upon which wise men can presume to fasten the least confidence of redress. Your firmest security is placed in the faint hope of some distant contingencies; but your present strength is merely trifling against the extensive scope of your antagonists. Nay, victim you must fall to your own absurd presumptions, unless, when we are once withdrawn to give you time to consult, you determine to try some other expedient. You will then no longer be controlled by that sense of shame, which, when dishonour glareth before and dan-

ger presseth on, precipitateth men into ruin. For though they see, with their eyes quite open, into what an abyss they are going to plunge, yet to avoid the imputation of what the world styleth dishonour,—so prevalent is the force of one bewitching sound!—though vanquished by it, they scorn to yield to reason, wilfully embarrassing themselves with incurable calamities, and contracting a more shameful weight of dishonour, through their own mad obstinacy, than fortune could award them. Such consequences, you are now concerned by mature deliberations to avoid. You are next to reflect, that no shame can attend your plying under the force of a most formidable state; a state which designeth to make the moderate demands alone,—that you would accept her alliance, and securely enjoy your territory upon the condition only to pay her tribute; and, when war or safety are left to your own option, that you would not peevishly prefer the worse. For those are the men to maintain themselves in credit and prosperity, who never suffer their equals to insult them, who pay proper regard to their superiors, and towards their inferiors behave with moderation. Reflect on these points whilst we withdraw; and remember, again and again, that your country now calleth for all your prudence, since, by the single deliberation of this single day, as either it taketh a prosperous or sinister turn, her fate will be determined."

Here the Athenians withdrew from the conference; and the Melians, after being some time alone, and resolving finally to reject what they had already refused, gave in their answer thus:

"We continue, Athenians, in the very same sentiments we have already declared. We shall not in an instant of time abandon that liberty which, in the free possession of our own state, we have enjoyed for the space of seven hundred years; which still we shall spare no endeavours to preserve, intrusting it to that fortune which, by divine permission, hath hitherto preserved it, and to that redress we expect from human aid and the Lacedæmonians. But thus much again we offer:—to be friends to you, enemies to neither, on condition you quit our lands, after an accommodation ratified between us to our reciprocal satisfaction."

The Melians in this manner delivered their

answer. But the Athenians, the very
 ant they quitted the place of conference,
 d themselves thus:

"ou, Melians, alone of all mankind, are
 rsons, so far as we can judge, who re-
 future contingencies as an over-balance
 stant dangers, and, through mad presump-
 value things yet invisible as really actual.
 the greater your dependence, the more
 your confidence upon Lacedæmonians,
 fortune, and upon hope, the more abun-
 7 fatal your delusions will prove."

d, this said, the Athenian deputation re-
 d to their camp.

t the Athenian commanders, upon this
 l of submission from the Melians, applied
 selves instantly to the acts of war; and,
 ng the work in shares to the several
 s in their army, completely shut up the
 ns in a line of circumvallation. And,

this was perfected, and a sufficient num-
 oth of the Athenians and their depen-
 , were appointed to stay behind and con-
 the blockade both by land and sea, they
 ted with the bulk of their forces. Those,
 r, who were left for this service, staid
 d and continued the blockade.

out the same time, the Argives, making
 ruption into Phliasia, and caught in an
 scade laid for them by the Phliasiens, and
 own exiles, were slaughtered to the num-
 f eighty.

ie Athenians, by their excursions from
 s, committed many depredations on the
 dæmonians. But these had not influence
 gh upon the Lacedæmonians to cause a
 iciation of the peace, or a renewal of the

They only proclaimed, that, "their peo-
 ad free leave to make reprisals on the
 nians."

ie Corinthians also had a war with the

Athenians, on account of some private differ-
 ences between them; but the rest of Pelopon-
 nesus interfered not in the quarrel.

The Melians, farther, assailing it by night,
 carried that part of the Athenian circumvalla-
 tion which lay close to their market. They
 slew the guards who were posted there; and,
 having gained a conveyance into the town for
 provisions, and all necessary stores they could
 procure by money, they afterwards withdrew,
 and discontinued all efforts of resistance: but
 the Athenians took care for the future to
 place a stronger guard upon their works. And
 here the summer ended.

In the winter which followed, the Lacedæ-
 monians drew out their forces in order to begin
 an expedition into Argia; but, when the vic-
 tims offered on the frontiers boded no success
 to the expedition, they again withdrew. Yet
 the Argives, as such an invasion had been in-
 tended against them, suspected it was owing
 to the intrigues of a faction within their city;
 some of whom they immediately secured, but
 the rest escaped by flight.

About the same time also, the Melians
 carried another part of the Athenian circum-
 vallation, as the party by which it was guarded
 was not numerous. But, upon such distur-
 bances, a strong reinforcement was sent from
 Athens, under the command of Philocrates,
 the son of Demeas. The Melians were now
 closely invested on all sides; and, some schemes
 to betray the town being in agitation amongst
 them, they thought proper to make a volun-
 tary surrender. This they did "at the dis-
 cretion of the Athenians;" who put to death
 all they found within the place able to bear
 arms, and made the women and children slaves.
 The town they afterwards re-peopled by send-
 ing thither a colony of five hundred.

THE
PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

BOOK VI.

THE Athenians resolve on the expedition to Sicily. Description of that island.—YEAR XVII. The debate in the assembly of the people at Athens about the expedition. The generals nominated with full powers. The affair of the Mercuries. Departure of the grand fleet for Sicily. Proceedings at Syracuse. The Athenian fleet arrives on the coast of Italy. Alcibiades recalled, to take his trial about the Mercuries and profanation of the Mysteries. A digression,—containing the true account of a former revolution at Athens, begun by Harmodius and Aristogiton. Alcibiades flies, and is proclaimed a traitor. The Athenians land at Syracuse. A battle ensues, in which the Athenians are victorious; but, soon after, they return to Catana. The negotiations at Camarina. Alcibiades at Sparta.—XVIII. The Athenians land again at Syracuse, take Epipolæ by surprise, and begin to invest Syracuse in form. Battles; The Athenians carry on their works; counterwork of the Syracusans. Aid sent to Syracuse from Peloponnesus, under the command of Gylippus; he arrives at Tarentum. The Athenians, by openly joining the Argives against the Lacedæmonians, violate the treaty of peace in Greece.

IN the same winter the Athenians came to a resolution, to make a second expedition against Sicily, with a larger force than had been sent thither heretofore, under Laches and Eurymedon, and to attempt its total reduction. The bulk of the people was, in truth, ignorant of the largeness of the island, and of the multitude of the Grecians and Barbarians by whom it was inhabited; ignorant, farther, that they were going to embark in a war, not much less considerable than the Peloponnesian.

The compass of Sicily is little under eight day's sail for a trading vessel; and, though it be so large, it is severed from the main land, so as not to be part of the continent, by a gut, in breadth about twenty stadia.¹ The manner in which it was inhabited in the earliest ages was this; and the several nations which possessed it these.

The Cyclops and Læstrigons are said to be the most ancient inhabitants of some part of this country; but, from what stock they were derived, or from whence they came hither, or what is become of them since, I have nothing

to relate. Poetical amusements must here suffice, or such information as every man picks up for his own use.

The Sicanians appear to be the first people who, next those, inhabited this country; though, according to their own accounts, they are prior; because they claim to themselves the original tenure: but, according to the truest discoveries, they are found to have been Iberians, who were compelled to remove from the banks of the Sicanus, in Iberia, by the Libyans. And from them, at that time, this island received the name of Sicania, having before been called Trinacria. They continue, to this day, to inhabit the western parts of Sicily.

After the taking of Troy, some of the Trojans, who had escaped the Achæans, arrive in their vessels upon the Sicilian shore, and, forming a settlement adjacent to the Sicanians, they all took jointly the name of Elymi; and their cities were Eryx and Egesta. They were also increased by the accession of some Phocians from Troy, who, having first been driven to Libya by a storm, passed over afterwards from thence into Sicily.

The Siculi passed over first into Sicily from

¹ About two miles.

Italy, for there they originally dwelled. They fled before the Opici; and as the story is told, not without probability, having observed how the current set within the strait, and seized a favourable gale they crossed over upon rafts, and perhaps by some other methods. There are, even to this very day, a people in Italy called Siculi; and that region, in a similar manner, obtained its name of Italy from a certain Arcadian king, who bore the name of Italus. These, crossing into Sicily with formidable numbers, and vanquishing the Sicanians in battle, drove them into the southern and western parts, caused the name of the island to be changed from Sicania to Sicily, settled themselves in, and kept possession of, the richest tracts in the country, since their passage hither was near three hundred years earlier than the landing of any Grecians in Sicily. Nay, they continue, to this very day, in possession of the midland and northerly parts of the island.

The Phœnicians also had settlements quite round the coast of Sicily. They secured the capes on the sea and the small circumjacent isles, for the sake of trafficking with the Sicilians. But when the Grecians, in considerable numbers, began to cross over and fix their residence here, the Phœnicians abandoned their other settlements, and, uniting together, seated themselves at Motya, and Soloeis, and Panormus, near to the Elymi; secure of their own continuance in these quarters from their friendship with the Elymi, and because, from this part of Sicily, the passage to Carthage is exceeding short.—So many were the barbarians seated in Sicily; and such the order of their settlements.

The first Grecians who came hither were the Chalcideans of Eubœa. Thucles led the colony which settled at Naxus, and erected the altar of Apollo the Guide, which is still to be seen without the city; and on which the deputations, sent from hence to the oracles, offer sacrifice before they begin their voyage.

In the year following, Archias, a Corinthian, of the race of Hercules, founded Syracuse, having previously expelled the Sicilians out of that island on which the inner city is seated, though now no longer washed round about by the sea. And, in process of time, the upper city also, being taken in by a wall, became exceeding populous.

In the fifth year after the foundation of

Syracuse, Thucles and his Chalcideans sailed forth out of Naxus; and having, by force of arms, drove away the Sicilians, they built Leontium, and afterwards Catana. But the Cataneans themselves declared Evarchus their founder.

About the same point of time, Lamis also, leading a colony from Megara, arrived in Sicily, and planted them on a spot called Troilus, upon the river Pantacias. But, removing afterwards from thence to Reontium, he associated himself a short time with the Cataneans for the protection of his party; yet, being ejected by them, and then having founded Thapsus, he dies. His followers, upon this, removed from Thapsus; and Hyblon, a Sicilian king, betraying another place into their hands, and becoming himself their conductor, they settled those Megareans who are called Hyblæan; and, after a continued possession of two hundred and forty-five years, they were expelled out of their city and territory by Gelon, tyrant of the Syracusans. Yet, before this ejection, about a hundred years after their settlement there, they had sent out Pammilus, and built the city of Selinus. Pammilus had come thither more lately from Megara, their mother city, and assisted them in making this new settlement at Selinus.

Antiphemus from Rhodes, and Enimius from Crete, each leading a separate colony, founded Gela in conjunction, in the forty-fifth year after the foundation of Syracuse. The name of this new city was taken from the river Gela: yet the spot where the city now stands, and which was first walled round, is called Lindii. But their polity was framed upon the Doric model.

In the hundred and eighth year, as near as possible, after this last settlement, the Gelæans built Acragas, giving the city its name from the river Acragas. They declared Aristonous and Pystilus to be its founders, and gave it the civil institutions of Gela.

Zancle was originally founded by a band of pirates, who arrived there from Cyme, a Chalcidic city in Opicia; though afterwards a numerous reinforcement from Chalcis and the rest of Eubœa joined them, and possessed that district in community. The founders were Perieres and Cratæmenes; one of them from Cyme, the other from Chalcis. But the name of Zancle was first of all given it by the Sicilians, because in shape it bears a resemblance

to a scythe, and the Sicilians call a scythe *zancum*. But, in process of time, these people were driven from thence by the Samians and other Ionians, who flying from the Medes, had landed in Sicily. And, after a short interval, Anaxilas, tyrant of the Rhegians, ejected the Samians, repopled the city with a number of mixed inhabitants, and changed its name to Messene, in honour of the country from whence he was originally descended. Himera also was founded from Zancle by Euclides, and Simus, and Saeon. Into this colony came also a very numerous body of Chalcideans. Some exiles farther from Syracuse, who had been worsted in a sedition, and were distinguished by the title of Miletids, took up their residence amongst them. Hence their dialect became a mixture of the Chalcidic and the Doric; but the Chalcidic model obtained in their civil institutions.

Acrae and Casmenae were founded by the Syracusans; Acrae seventy years after Syracuse, and Casmenae near twenty after Acrae. Camarina also was first founded by the Syracusans, very nearly one hundred and thirty-five years after the building of Syracuse; its founders were Dascon and Menecolus. But the Camarineans being afterwards driven out by the arms of the Syracusans, because of a revolt, in process of time Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, received the lands of the Camarineans as a ransom for some Syracusan prisoners of war, and taking upon himself to be their founder, replanted Camarina. Yet once more, again it was demolished by Gelon; and replanted a third time by the same Gelon. So many nations of Greeks and Barbarians inhabited Sicily.

An island so large and so populous the Athenians were passionately bent on invading. Their truest and final view was, to compass its total reduction; but the pretext, alleged for a colour, was their readiness to succour such as by blood were related, or by prior alliances had been attached, to them. An Egestean embassy, now residing at Athens, laboured the point with all possible industry, and with extraordinary earnestness pressed them to engage in it. For the Egesteans, who bordered upon the Selinuntians, had been embroiled in a war with the latter, about some connubial points, and a certain tract of land to which both laid claim. The Selinuntians, farther, assisted by their Syracusan allies, pressed hard upon them

both by land and sea. And hence, the Egesteans were now suggesting at Athens, that "they ought not to forget their alliance with the Leontines, made by Laches in the former war;" requesting farther, that a naval force might be sent thither for their succour. To this purpose many other arguments were alleged by them, but the principal was this: "If the Syracusans, who have overthrown the Leontines, be left in the unmolested enjoyment of their conquest, and proceed still farther to destroy the remaining parties of that alliance, they will get into their hands the whole power of Sicily. Such an event would be attended with the utmost danger; lest in consequence of it, as they were Doric by descent, they might think themselves bound by the ties of blood to assist with a powerful armament their kindred Dorians, and, in quality of colonies, might succour those Peloponnesians by whom they were originally planted, and thus form a combination to demolish the Athenian empire. In policy, therefore, the Athenians were obliged to support the allies who yet remained, in order to make head against the Syracusans; and this the more readily, as they themselves would undertake to furnish them with sums of money equal to the exigencies of the war." With such discourse the Athenians were frequently entertained in their popular assemblies, as the Egestean ambassadors, still urging their point, had gained many advocates to second their arguments. And at length it was decreed, that "ambassadors should be previously despatched to Egesta to inspect the state of their wealth, whether they had such sums as they talked of in the public treasury and the temples; and also to draw up a report of the present posture of their war against the Selinuntians. And, in pursuance of this, the ambassadors from the Athenians were sent to Sicily.

The Lacedæmonians, in the same winter, joined by their allies, those of Corinth excepted, and marching into Argia, ravaged a small part of that territory, and carried off the corn, having brought carriages for that purpose. They also removed the Argive exiles to Ornea, and left them a small detachment from their main army for the security of their persons. A temporary truce being also made, during which the Orneats and Argives were to abstain from all hostilities against one another, they drew off the army to their respective homes.

However not long after this, the Athenians

arrived with thirty sail of ships and six hundred heavy-armed. The Argives in conjunction with the Athenians, took the field with all their strength, and besieged those in Ornea for the space of a day. But, as at night the besiegers removed to a distance in order for repose, those of Ornea made their escape. On the day following, the Argives, when sensible of their escape, levelled Ornea with the ground, and then withdrew. And afterwards the Athenians re-embarked for Athens.

The Athenians also threw in by sea a party of horsemen into Methone, a frontier town of Macedonia. With these, consisting of their own citizens and such Macedonians as had refused among them, they harassed the country belonging to Perdiccas. But the Lacedæmonians sent a summons of aid for Perdiccas to the Chalcideans of Thrace, who kept terms with the Athenians by truces renewed every tenth day: these however refused to march. Thus ended the winter, and with it the sixteenth year of the war, of which Thucydides hath compiled the history.

YEAR XVII.¹

In the succeeding summer, very early in the spring, the Athenian ambassadors returned from Sicily, accompanied by the Egæstians. They brought sixty talents of uncoined silver, being a month's pay for sixty sail of ships, the equipment of which for succour they were instructed to solicit from the Athenians. Upon this, an assembly of the people was called, and the reports of the Egæstian and their own ambassadors were received, consisting of many points, specious indeed, but false in fact; and, so far as related to their treasure, that "sums ample enough are already reposit in their temples and their public treasury." In consequence of this, a decree was made that "a fleet of sixty ships should sail for Sicily; the commanders, Alcibiades, the son of Clinias, Nicias, the son of Niceratus, and Lamachus,² the son of

Xenophanes, to be invested with full power to act at their own discretion. The whole armament to act as an aid to the Egæstians against the Selinuntians; to replace also the Leontines in their former habitations, if the state of the war gave them leisure to exert that service; and to manage all other points in Sicily as they should judge most beneficial to the Athenian interest."

But the fifth day after this, another assembly of the people was held upon the ways and means to expedite the equipment of the fleet, and by proper decrees to supply the commanders with what might be requisite to accelerate their departure. Nicias, who against his will had been named for a commander, was persuaded that the public determinations were rash and premature, since, on short examination, and motives merely specious, they were bent on the total reduction of Sicily,—an arduous undertaking! now therefore he stood up; and, having a mind to stop proceedings, he advised the Athenians as follows:

"I am aware that the present assembly is held to concert the means of expediting our preparations, and to get all in readiness for the expedition to Sicily. But, in my sentiments, we ought once more to resume the consideration of the previous point, 'Whether upon the whole it be advisable to equip out such a fleet; and not, by rash and premature resolves on points of such vast importance, through too easy compliance with foreign solicitations, to embroil ourselves in an unnecessary war. For my own part, truly, I am invested with honour by the present measures, and no man upon earth is so little anxious about his own person

then gallantly to carry the point into execution. But then, he wanted the means of properly supporting the authority and dignity of his post. He was now ranked with two of the most wealthy and noble Athenians; whereas his own condition was low; nay, he was (according to Plutarch) so exceedingly poor, that before he went to any foreign command, he was used to petition the state for a little money to furnish him out, and even to buy him some shoes. Mr Warr, in his notes on Thucydides, refers us for his character to a comedy of Aristophanes, (The Acharnians;) that is, to imagine after the character of a plain blunt officer from a professed droll, or to seek truth from him who ridiculed all mankind. Aristophanes hath represented Lamachus as a vain-glorious roaring bully, a mere thing of straw, a creature of verbal pomp and parade; contrary to all the truth of history. Writers who live by turning great and good men into ridicule, should never be reckoned good evidence as to the truth and reality of characters, when history dissents.

¹ Before Christ 415.

² Lamachus, the third in this commission, seems to have been picked out for the command for the peculiar constitution of his own character, which was a proper mean between the cautious and phlegmatic disposition of Nicias and the fiery impetuous ardour of Alcibiades. He was now (according to Plutarch) a brave old experienced officer. In his youth he had been remarkable for heat and fire; a length of service and years mellowed him into the right temper, to deliberate beforehand, and

al safety. But at the same time I pronounce that person to be a valuable member of the public, who makes use of all his prudence to preserve his own life and property : for such a one purely for his own private benefit, must be desirous that the public welfare flourish and abound. But, however, neither in the preceding assemblies could the pre-eminence of honour awarded to me bias me to speak in contradiction to my judgment : nor shall it bias me at present ; but what I think tends most to the public good, that only shall I utter.

" I am also sensible, that what I can urge may have but little influence on Athenians' tempers, when I attempt persuading you to secure what you already possess, and to hazard the present for things invisible and future : but that your eagerness is quite unseasonable ; and that the ends which you too sanguinely propose are not easy to be accomplished ;—these things I shall clearly demonstrate.

" To this purpose I aver, that, if the intended expedition proceeds, you are going to leave many enemies behind you here, and to take the most certain method of fetching hither more numerous opponents. You imagine, perhaps, that the late peace will be firmly and constantly observed ; though it is merely a nominal peace, and that only so long as you remain inactive. Nay, such it hath been made by the conduct of some even of our own community. And, should any considerable force of ours have the unhappiness to sink under hostile efforts, our old enemies will be suddenly upon us ; since merely by calamities they were reduced to an accommodation, and, in a manner more disgraceful to themselves than to us, were necessitated to treat. In the next place, we have found, that in the treaty itself many articles are still controverted. There are, farther, divers states, and those by no means the weakest, who have not accepted the accommodation ; but, on the contrary, are still in arms against us ; whilst others are inhibited merely by ten-day truces, and that only because the Lacedæmonian measures are hitherto pacific. But suddenly, perhaps, when once they find our strength divided, the very measure into which we are now precipitating ourselves, they may fall upon us in a general combination augmented by the strength of Sicily, whose accession to their former confederacy they would have been glad to purchase at any price. On these possibilities we are bound sedately to

reflect, that we may not plunge a state, so highly exalted, into superfluous dangers, nor fondly covet to wrest their empire from the hands of others before we have adequately ensured our own, since the Chalcideans of Thrace, though so many years are now elapsed since they first revolted, are not yet reduced ; and some other states on the continent render us only a precarious obedience.

" Yet—to the Egesteans, our old allies, who are injuriously oppressed, we are bound in honour to send a most speedy succour.—And, in the meantime, we continue to defer avenging ourselves upon those whose revolt from us is of long standing now, and whose injustice we are still obliged to suffer. Though the latter, could we once bring them back to their duty, we might easily control for the future : but the former, should we ever become their masters, remote and numerous as they are, we should not without difficulty be able to awe. It must be madness, therefore, to invade that people, whom, though conquered, you can never retain in their obedience ; and who, in case the attempt against them miscarry, will for the future be much more disaffected towards you than they were before that attempt was made.

" But it is farther my real opinion, that the Sicilians, as their affairs are now circumstantiated, would become less formidable to us, if once reduced to the Syracusan yoke ;—and yet on this remote contingency the Egesteans have chiefly insisted, in order to alarm us. Perhaps now it may come to pass, that its single states may combine against us to gratify the Lacedæmonians ; but, in the other case, it is quite improbable that a united empire would hazard its own welfare to demolish another. For if, acting from a political precaution, they may side with the Peloponnesians to overturn our empire, those very Peloponnesians may probably, from the same principle, concur with us to demolish the Sicilian. As for us, the Grecians there may have reason to dread us most if we go not at all amongst them ; and, what is next to that, if we only give them a sight of our power for a short time, and then withdraw. But if, acting offensively, we incur miscarriage, they will instantly despise us, and join our neighbouring foes to annoy us here. For things that are placed most remotely from us, as likewise those which yield no opportunity of adjusting our opinion of them by experience, such, it is universally known, are most apt to

excite admiration. Reflect, ye citizens of Athens, that your present elevation of spirits is owing to your success against the Lacedæmonians and allies. You crouched for fear under their first attacks; till, having gained the superiority over them, to their utter disappointment, you instantly despised them. And now, nothing less than Sicily can content you. We by no means ought to be too much buoyed up by the disasters of our foes, but only to be so far confident as we are able to awe their intriguing tempers. We ought to ascribe no other view to the Lacedæmonians, than a vigilant care to seize the first opportunity of wiping off their disgrace by giving us a blow, and thus recovering their former reputation; and that they are most earnest on accomplishing this, since, from time immemorial, the glory of military valour hath been their warmest, most prevailing passion. Our welfare therefore, if we knew in what our welfare consists, by no means summons us to enter the lists in behalf of the Egesteans of Sicily, who to us are mere barbarians; but to exert our utmost vigilance to guard our own constitution from oligarchical encroachments.

"My duty obligeth me also to remind you, that we have had but a short respite to breathe from the havoc made amongst us by pestilence and war, and to repair the prodigious waste of our fortunes and our lives. These, according to all the rules of equity, should be reserved for our own domestic exigencies, and not to be lavished away on a set of fugitives, who implore our protection, and are bound in interest to tell specious falsehoods; though, whilst plunging their neighbours into hazards, they have nothing but words to contribute; and, should we redress them, know not how to be grateful; but, in case we miscarry in the attempt, must involve their friends in their own destruction.

"If there be, farther, a person, who, elevated with his own designation to the command, incites you earnestly to sail; heedful of nothing but his own private views, nor qualified by his years for so important a trust; if his passion be merely to excite admiration for his fine breed of horses, or, by the gains of his commission, to repair the havoc of his fortune caused by prodigality; I conjure you to afford no such person an opportunity to make a splendid figure at the expense of your country: but rest convinced, that men of such a turn will be corrupt in public office, as they are bad econo-

mists in private life; that the enterprise in hand is a very arduous trust, far beyond such measures or such exploits as a stripling can devise or execute.

"I own myself intimidated by that crowd of youths who sit by this person and abet his schemes. I am hence obliged to implore the men of years and experience, who happen to sit near them, by no means to dread the appearance of pusillanimity, which, in case the decree of war be revoked, might be objected to them; by no means to indulge the same passions by which boys are actuated, so as to doat upon remote contingencies. You, gentlemen, by experience are convinced, that success exceedingly seldom results from hot and unguine presumption, but most frequently from calm and prudent deliberation. In behalf of your country, which is now at the brink of more critical dangers than ever was known before, hold up your hands in opposition, and support what I am going to move, namely,—That 'the Sicilians, confining themselves within their present limits, which we do not pretend to abridge, with free navigation along the coast of the Ionian gulf, and transacting their own affairs at large through the whole extent of the Sicilian seas, be at liberty to take care of their own concerns without molestation:'—and, in particular, to return to the Egesteans the following answer:—Since, without the privacy of the Athenians, they have already involved themselves in a war against the Selinuntians, let them also, without the concurrence of the Athenians, bring it to a conclusion: that, moreover, we shall form no alliance for the future, as hath formerly been the case, with men whose indirect behaviour we must be forced to abet, though, when we stand in need of reciprocal assistance from them, we shall get none at all.'

"And you, sir, who at present preside in this assembly, if you are conscious that it is your duty to superintend the public welfare, if you are desirous to behave like a worthy patriot, put the question, and call upon the Athenians once more to give their votes. And, in case you are afraid to act contrary to order, in proposing what is counter to a former decree; reflect that, when so great a crowd of witnesses are at hand to justify the step, you only act the part of a physician to your country, which hath swallowed down pernicious counsels; and that the best discharge the duty of first

gistrate, who will render to his country all service he is able; at least, with his eyes on, will never suffer it to be hurt."

In this manner Nicias delivered his sentiments. But the far greater part of the Athenians who were present declared for the expedition, and against the repeal of what had already decreed. Some however there were, who made a fruitless opposition.

The person who showed most ardour, and sed them most earnestly to proceed, was Alcibiades, the son of Clinias; partly from a notion to oppose Nicias, with whom, in political points, he generally clashed, and as he had calumniously glanced at him in speech; but, principally, because he was ambitious of being at the head of this expedition. He presumed, that not Sicily only, Carthage also, might be reduced by him-

and, when he should be the author of so great a success, that he must needs abound in wealth and glory. His credit was great, at least, amongst the citizens; but the warmth of his passion threw him into larger expenses than his fortune could support, being sumptuous in every article of life, and especially in his dress.

And it was chiefly by him that the overthrow of Athens was at length occasioned. For the bulk of the city, alarmed at the great irregularity of his private life, the excessive luxury of his dress and diet, as also at the greatness of spirit which he showed in the single branch of his conduct, turned out to him as a man who affected the people. And though, when in public councils, he conducted the war with the utmost bravery, yet, at home, each single citizen was disgusted at his manners, and displaced him to make room for others, which soon drew after it the subversion of the state. Upon this occasion, therefore, Alcibiades stood up, and addressed the Athenians as follows:

Yes; to me, ye citizens of Athens, in preference to others, this command is due;—for this I must needs begin, since on this Alcibiades hath attacked me;—and I also am myself deserving of the trust. In relation to those things which have caused me to be loudly censured; those very things give honour to my ancestors and to myself, and of public emolument also to my country. The great magnificence I displayed at the public solemnities hath raised in the Grecians an idea of Athens far beyond its actual

strength; though, previous to this, they entertained the hope of being able totally to war her down. For I am the man who brought seven chariots thither, more than any private person ever furnished out before; who carried off the first, and the second, and the fourth prize; and, in all other respects, supported my quality as a victor. Such things, it must be owned, are declared to be honoured by the laws of Greece; and, whenever achieved, they leave a high opinion of power behind them. The splendid figure I have made at home, whether in exhibiting entertainments for the public, or any other method of munificence, may naturally excite the envy of Athenians, but are to strangers instances of our grandeur. And that man's extravagant spirit is not useless to the public, who, at his own private expense, does service not merely to himself, but to a whole community. Nor can it imply injustice, for a person whose sentiments are generous and exalted, to soar above the ordinary level; since, should he afterwards be reduced to a state of depression, no man is to share in his reverse of fortune. As therefore in calamity we are not to expect even civil salutations, let others in the meantime submit, as in justice they ought, to that assuming behaviour which prosperity inspireth; or, at least, let equality of demeanor be first shown by him who demands it as a debt from another. I am indeed aware, that persons of such uncommon elevation, and all in general, who, in some splendid qualities, outshine the crowd, must, so long as they live, be the objects of spleen, chiefly to those who claim equality with them; and, in the next place, to those amongst whom they are conversant; and yet, to succeeding generations, they leave an ambition of claiming affinity to them, though quite groundless and chimerical; and to their country, whatever it be, the haughty boast, that they were not aliens, were not offenders, but citizens of its own growth, and patriots of true renown and worth. Of such reversionary honours I own myself ambitious; and, in order to succeed in the pursuit, have ever rendered my name illustrious in private life; and, as to my public behaviour, reflect, Athenians, whether I am inferior to any person whatever, in performing good services to my country. For I am the person, who, without throwing you into hazard or expense, have brought the strongest powers of Peloponnesus to act in your concurrence; who reduced the Lacedæmonians to

stake their all upon the fortune of one day at Mantinea. It is true they came off victorious from the contest; but have not even yet so far resumed their spirits as to dare to act offensively.

"Such are the exploits which my greener years, nay even that unnatural giddiness imputed to me, hath achieved; which, by insinuating language, hath made the Peloponnesian strength to ply before it, and, giving energy to my frantic humour, hath now persuaded the world that it is no longer to be dreaded, whilst, therefore, I flourish in this manner, whilst Nicias yet continues to be esteemed fortunate, lay hold of that service we are each of us able to perform; and by no means repeal the decree of our expedition to Sicily, as if intended against a people we are not able to encounter.

"For in Sicily the cities swarm with crowds of promiscuous, disunited inhabitants; inhabitants for ever used to sudden revolutions and to perpetual fluctuations. And hence, not one of those crowds is equipped with such arms as are requisite to defend a native soil, or to secure even personal safety; nor is the region supplied with the needful stores of resistance. It is the habit of each, either to execute his purpose by artful language, or to wrest it from the public by sedition. These are all his resources; and, if they fail, at the worst, he barely shifts his habitation. It is therefore improbable that a rabble, so jumbled together, will ever be unanimously guided by one concerted plan, or combine together for its just execution. Each moment they will be veering about to such expedients as happen most to soothe their caprice; and the more, upon account of these seditions, in which, we are informed, they are already embroiled.

"Their number of heavy-armed, it must also be observed, is not so large as the pompous accounts of fame have made it; nor does the sum total of the Grecians amongst them turn out so considerable as each city hath computed for her own. But Greece, in this manner ever addicted most terribly to belie her own numbers, hath been found, in the present war, scarce able to provide herself with arms.

"Such, according to the best informations I have been able to collect, is the present condition of affairs in Sicily. Nay, there are means within our reach still more to facili-

tate its reduction. For we shall obtain the concurrence of many barbarians seated there, who, from inveteracy against the Syracusans, will join us to attack them. Neither can any obstacles accrue from the situations of our affairs nearer home, if you only view it in a just and proper light.

"The bravery of our fathers, though opposed by the very same enemies, who at present is urged, should we sail for Sicily, must be behind us, though opposed by all the power of the Mede, erected this our empire, by the resource of their superiority in naval power. The Peloponnesians, farther, have never less hopes of being a match for us than at every juncture, even though their strength be all its maturity of vigour. It is true, they have it ever in their option to make inroads into our dominions, even though we wave this expedition; but, at sea, they never can be able to hurt us: the fleet we shall leave behind will be amply sufficient to make head against them.

"By what plausible arguments, therefore, can we excuse our behaviour, should we pusillanimously desist? what evasion can we find to deny our confederates the succour demanded? We are bound in honour, by the oaths we have sworn, to undertake their maintenance. Unavailing is the pretext, that they have done such good offices for us. Our alliance with them was not made on the condition of their doing hither to bring us succour, but of giving full employ to our enemies there, as might effectually deter them from coming hither. This ready road to empire, as not Athenians only, but every people who have risen to a summit of power, by experience know, is ever to succour those who implore our protection, whether they be Greeks or barbarians. For, had it been the constant method to cherish indolent inactive measures, or minutely to litigate who in justice ought to be protected, the enlargement of our empire had been but trifling, or rather we had been liable to the loss of our original portion. For a state invested with superior power is not only openly opposed in the field, but recourse is had to every pretension to prevent their appearance in it. Neither is it in our power to prescribe exact or arbitrary limitations to our own empire; but we are by necessity compelled to cabal against some, and with a high hand to keep others in subjection; because, should we relax our command over others we endanger our own auth-

and those we will not awe may become masters. Nor, farther, ought peace to be so much the object of regard to you as it is to other people, unless you new-model your government, and render it conformable to that of our neighbours.

Weigh therefore these arguments; and be convinced, that thus only our interest is capable of any considerable advancement,—if we proceed against Sicily, and execute the expedition in order to deject the haughty Peloponnesian, by so plain an instance how much we advise them, how little fond we are at present of his inactive interval, and how eager to be again with a Sicilian voyage. And, by saying thus, there is probability on our side, in case we subdue the people there, we regain the sovereignty over all Greece; or, worst, we shall depress the Syracusan power: the latter point alone will be an important service to ourselves and our allies. But, in case measure of success attends us, our ships enable us to secure our acquisitions, or at least our departure; for, though the whole of the Sicilians combine together against us, we shall be absolute masters of our own fate.

Let not therefore the words of Nicias, circulated merely for the service of sloth, and to raise dissensions between the young and the old, disconcert your plan. But let the usual course take place, observant of which our fathers, at whose consultations both the elders and the youths assisted, exalted this state to its present height; and do you now, adhering to the established practice, endeavour farther exaltation. Remember also, that youth and age, if debarred one another's reciprocal assistance, lose all their influence and light; that, on the other hand, from the freshness of youth, and the moderation of the middle-aged, and the consummate prudence of old, when tempered harmoniously together, the most perfect strength must infallibly result; that a state, which supinely gives way to sloth, in other things, for want of exercise must inevitably droop and pine away, and the whole of its skill grow old and obsolete; but, when engaged in uninterrupted conflict, it is continually improving by practice, and will gain a perfect habit of surmounting every obstacle; not by a trade of words, but by active perseverance.

“Upon the whole, I am firmly convinced, that a state which hath been accustomed to full

employ, must soon droop into destruction if it resigns itself to sloth; and that such persons take the best method of infallibly securing their welfare, who adhere most steadily to their present customs and laws, though possibly better might be substituted in their stead.”

In this manner Alcibiades spoke. And the Athenians, moved by his arguments,—which were also seconded by the entreaties of the Egestean and Leontine exiles, who, standing forth in the assembly, implored their protection, and, reminding them of their oaths, adjured them to redress their wrongs,—declared for the expedition with a warmer zeal than at any time before, Nicias was convinced by this, that whatever dissuasion he could allege would be quite incapable to change their resolves. Yet as possibly, by a minute detail of the immense preparations he was going to demand, he might cause them at once to change their sentiments, he stood up again, and re-addressed them as follows:

“I perceive, Athenians, that your resolutions are fixed on this expedition beyond the power of dissuasion; and may its event be such as your wishes portend! But I shall once more beg leave to communicate to you my own sense of the affair.

“According to the best informations I have been able to procure, we are now going to invade a number of powerful cities, cities independent of one another, nor standing in need of public revolutions, which people who cringe under the yoke of slavery might readily embrace, in order to render their condition more supportable. Nor is it, farther, to be presumed, that they will readily exchange their own liberty for subjection to us, as they are numerous, at least for one island, and many of them inhabited by Grecians. For, without reckoning Naxos and Catana, which I hope, upon account of their affinity to the Leontines, will side with us, there are no less than seven provided in all respects with as good martial habiliments and stores as our own armies; and more particularly those against which we chiefly bend our course, Selinus and Syracuse. These cities abound with soldiers heavily armed, with archers, and with darters. They have a great number of triremes, and plenty of hands to man them. They possess a large quantity of wealth, not only in private purses, but in their public treasuries. So rich are even the Selinuntians. And to

the Syracusans, farther, a tribute is paid by several barbarians. But the points in which they most of all excel us, are, that numerous cavalry of which they are possessed, and corn of their own growth sufficient to answer all demands without foreign importations. An armament, therefore, simply naval, will by no means be sufficient to cope with such a strength. A large land force must accompany the naval, if we are desirous of performing such achievements as may be worthy the greatness of our plan, and would not be debarred an opportunity of landing by their numerous cavalry. And this will be yet more needful, should the cities, alarmed at our approach, combine together against us, and no other friends but the Eggesteans join us, or supply us with a body of cavalry sufficient to countenance our landing. It would be a terrible disgrace, should we be compelled by force to give over our design, or to send for a larger supply, as if our counsels at first setting out were rash and ill-concerted. We must steer at once against them with preparations in all respects well-proportioned to the design, since we know that we are bound to a land far remote from our own, and are under many disadvantages to grapple with our foes. It will not be now your employment to march to the relief of your dependents seated near to Athens against a hostile invasion, where all the needful supplies would be brought to your camp out of the territories of friends: but you are to roam to a distant climate, where you cannot call one inch of ground your own, and from whence, in the four winter months, you will scarcely be able to send a messenger to Athens.

"In my opinion, therefore, it is incumbent upon us to carry thither large parties of heavy-armed, to be raised out of our own citizens, our allies, and our dependents, and an additional strength of Peloponnesians, if we are able to procure it by persuasion or by pay. Our archers and slingers must be also numerous, that we may be able to make good our descent in spite of the Sicilian horse. We must also be attended by supernumerary vessels, that we may be enabled with greater ease to fetch in necessities for our army. We must also carry with us from Athens, in our tenders, a great quantity of corn, such as wheat and barley, parched; with bakers, some of whom, for certain wages, must be obliged to grind, that, if our armament lie any where weather-bound,

we may not stand in need of the necessities of life; for so numerous as we must be, it will not be possible for every city to receive us. All other provisions must be laid in by ourselves to the utmost of our power, and we must trust for nothing to the care of others.

"But what concerns us most is, to carry from hence a fund of money as ample as we can raise. As for that which the Eggesteans pretend is already laid up for our use, conclude it to be so only so far as words are current. For, unless we set out from Athens, not handsomely provided as well as those we are to encounter,—but, equality in strength for battle alone accepted, in all other respects far surpassing them in every needful appointment,—we shall hardly be able to reduce who are to be reduced, or even to protect who are to be protected. We should regard ourselves in the character of people who are going to seek a new settlement among aliens and enemies; and, as such, are necessitated to render themselves victors of the spot the very day they land; or to rest assured, if they then miscarry, that the whole of that region will be in arms against them. Of this I own myself afraid; against this I am convinced that by repeated consultations we ought timely to provide; and, after all, must trust still farther to the goodness of our fortune, hazardous, as we are but men. Yet hence, I should be glad to set out in this enterprise with as little occasion as possible to rely on uncertain fortune, and to be amply provided with every expedient for a successful expedition; for these, to my apprehension, are the real means to secure the public welfare, and the safety of us who are destined for the voyage. But, if any man thinks my reasons chimerical, I am ready to resign my command to his superior abilities."

In this manner Nicias delivered himself, with a view, if possible, to discourage the Athenians from proceeding, by so vast a demand of articles requisite to the design; or at least, that, in case he must be obliged to undertake the service, he might set out with such ample expedients of security.

Yet all this bulky and embarrassing demand of appointments could not raise in the Athenians the least aversion to the expedition, but rather fastened their eagerness upon it more intensely than ever; and Nicias prevailed on that side of the question where he hoped to have been defeated. It was now

universally agreed, that his advice was just and proper; and, if obeyed, the expedition must be attended with all imaginable security. All ranks of men were now equally seized with a fondness for the voyage; for such as were advanced in years were confident that a career of success must attend the enterprise, and that so formidable an armament could not possibly miscarry; the younger sort were animated with the desire of seeing so remote a clime, and gratifying at large the curiosity of their tempers, assured that safety would attend their course; the bulk of the populace and the soldiery in general were pleased with their present assignment of pay, and the hope of enlarging dominion, which would afford them perpetual employ and subsistence. The passions of the generality were for these causes so vehemently elated with the project, that such as could by no means approve were afraid to oppose it by a vote, lest they might be censured as men who malevolently opposed the public glory. And by this all opposition was effectually quashed.

At length, a certain Athenian, standing forth from amongst the crowd, and calling aloud upon Nicias, told him, "he must no longer cast about for evasions, nor meditate delays; but declare expressly now, in the presence of them all, the particulars of the preparations which the Athenians should vote him."

Nicias, though sorry at his heart, was obliged to reply, that, "in order to be exact he ought to consult more leisurely with his colleagues. But, so far as he could judge in this sudden manner, they ought to set out with a fleet consisting of at least one hundred triremes; that the Athenians themselves ought to furnish as many transports for heavy-armed soldiers as was possible, and to send for an additional number from their dependents; that the number of heavy-armed, both of Athenians and dependents, should at least be five thousand, and, if possible, more; that to these the rest of their preparations should be proportioned, such as archers to be levied at home, and procured also from Crete, not forgetting slingers; and, in fine, that whatever should be judged in any degree expedient should be provided in good time, and carried along with them in the fleet."

This the Athenians had no sooner heard, than they instantly voted, "that the generals were invested with absolute authority, to de-

termine the numbers of the expedition, and the whole procedure of the voyage, at their own discretion, as might best promote the public welfare."

In pursuance of this, the preparations were immediately in hand. Summonses for the quotas adjusted were sent to their dependents, and the levies at home went briskly forwards. Athens was now finely recovered from the pestilence and a long-continued destructive war; both in a multitude of young men now arrived at the vigour of their age, and an increase of the public revenues by favour of the peace. By this means all the needful supplies were more easily provided; and thus were the Athenians busied for the present in fitting out their armament.

But, at this very juncture, almost all the statues of Mercury, wherever found within the precincts of Athens, and according to the established custom they were very numerous, both in the porches of private houses and the public temples, ¹***** had their faces disfigured in the space of one night. The authors of this outrage were not known; but large rewards were offered by the state in order to discover them, and a decree was also passed that, "If any person knew of the commission of any other impiety of the same nature, he should boldly inform the public of it, whether he were a citizen, or a foreigner, or a slave."

This accident in truth made a deep impression on their minds. For it was construed as a bad omen in regard to the expedition in hand, and as an evidence of some terrible combination to introduce innovations and an overthrow of the democracy.

An information was at length given in by some sojourners and their footmen, relating indeed not at all to the Mercuries, but to the defacements of other images committed formerly by some young men in a frolicsome and drunken mood; and now, farther, "they

¹ I have omitted two words in the original, because I cannot translate them with any precision or clearness. They are $\kappa\tau\epsilon\gamma\gamma\epsilon\mu\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma\ \epsilon\pi\epsilon\gamma\alpha\gamma\mu\epsilon\iota\alpha$, *opus quadratum*, says one Latin translator; *opus ex lapido quadrato*, says another. Mr Hobbes hath it, Mercuries of square stone; how such a description can be applicable to a statue will be hard to conceive. Whether they allude to the inclosure in which the statues were erected, or to the form of the pedestals, or whether a Mercury was carved on any or all the sides of a square stone, I am not able to decide. The Mercuries were very numerous; and many of them, it is certain, were strange, uncouth, and very bungling performances.

had celebrated the mysteries¹ in private houses by way of mockery ;" and amongst others they also accused Alcibiades. The party most inveterate against him caught readily at this charge. As he was the main obstacle to the advancement of their own popularity and credit, they concluded, that, in case they could rid themselves of him, they might at once become leaders of the state. Hence they aggravated the charge, and bellowed aloud, that "those mystic frolics, and the defacements of the Mercuries, struck at the very foundations of the democracy ; and that none of these outrageous acts had been committed without his participation." They alleged, as a circumstance that corroborated the charge, the whole tenor of his behaviour, flagrantly licentious, and quite inconsistent with a democratical constitution.

Alcibiades endeavoured forthwith to clear himself the best he could from all appearances of guilt, and declared himself ready, before he entered upon the voyage, to submit to a trial, (for the armament was now almost completed,) and, if proved to be guilty, to suffer the penalties of law ; and only, if acquitted, to take upon him the command. He conjured them, farther, "to receive no calumnious accusations against him in his absence ; but if he was really guilty, to put him instantly to death ;—that, in common prudence it could not be justified, to intrust to a person, so heavily charged, with the command of so large an armament, before his innocence had been regularly explored."

But his enemies—apprehensive that, in case he was brought to an immediate trial, he would be supported by all the favour of the soldiery ; and that the people, whose idol he was, might possibly relent, because in compliment to him the Argives and some of the Mantineans accompanied the expedition,—opposed and put off the prosecution. They put the management of this point into the hands of a set of orators, who urged that "for the present he might proceed in his voyage, that the expedi-

tion ought not to be deferred on his account, and upon his return a day should be assigned for his trial." Their design was to gather more heavy matter against him, which in his absence could be more easily effected, and then to recall him and force him to his trial. In short, it was resolved that "Alcibiades should go the voyage."

Things being thus determined, and the year now advanced to the middle of summer, the fleet set sail for Sicily. Orders had been issued before for the bulk of the confederates, and victualling-ships, and small craft, and all the tenders in general, to repair to, and assemble together at Coreyra ; that, from thence, in a body, they might cross the Ionian to the cape of Japygia. But such as were subjects of Athens, and such of the confederates as were then in the city, marching down to the Piræus on the appointed day by morning's dawn, went on board the ships in order to weigh and be gone. They were conducted thither by a great crowd, it may be said by the whole crowd of Athens, both citizens and strangers. The former attended, to perform the parting decorums where their several attachments claimed it ; some to their friends, some to their relations, some to their own sons. The whole company moved along with a medley of hope and lamentation ; with hope, that success would attend their course ; with lamentation, lest they might never meet again. The sad recollection occurred—to how great a distance from their native soil they were going to be sent ! and now that the hour of departure was come, and when this moment they were going to be dismissed into scenes of danger, the impressions of terror were felt with much keener sense than when the expedition was only decreed. However, at the sight of their present strength, of the numerous expedients of a prosperous enterprise which their eyes beheld, their spirits were again elated.

As for the strangers and bulk of the crowd, they attended merely for the pleasure of gazing at the means intended to accomplish a great and stupendous design. For never did any one state of Greece, before this time, equip by its own strength such a powerful armament. It was the finest and most glorious fleet that to this day the world had seen. It is true, in number of ships and heavy-armed on board, that which sailed against Epidaurus under command of Pericles, and that also against

¹ The sacred mysteries celebrated by the Athenians at Eleusis. Plutarch relates, that the informers were brought in by one Androcles, a demagogue, a virulent foe of Alcibiades. They deposed, that one Theodorus acted the part of the crier, Polytion of the torch-bearer, Alcibiades that of the hierophant, and many of his intimates assisted and were initiated in solemn and formal mockery.

idea under Agnon, were by no means inferior. For those carried four thousand heavy-armed soldiers, all native Athenians, with three hundred horsemen: the number of their triremes a hundred; fifty more were furnished by Lesbians and Chians, besides a large number of confederates who attended those expeditions. But then they were fitted for a voyage of comparison trifling, and in a slight and peculiar manner.

On the contrary, the present equipment was fitted for a length of time, and completely out for both services, as occasion might arise, either of the sea or of the land. The sailing, at the great expense of the captains of several triremes and of the state, was elaborate. The pay assigned by the state to every mariner was a drachma¹ a-day. A number of new ships for the battle and there was sixty; that of transports for the war-armed, forty. The several captains of triremes were very choice in making up crews, and gave to such of the mariners seated on the uppermost bench, and to the rest, a gratuity out of their own pockets over and above the public pay. They had farther adorned their vessels with images and all kind of sumptuous decorations. It was the high ambition of every single captain, to have his ship excel all the rest of the fleet in splendour and in swiftness.

The land-force was distinguished by the richness of their levies and their arms; and the individuals vied with one another in the richness of their accoutrements and equipage whatsoever. It happened also on the same account that a warm contention was kindled amongst them, under what officers should be ranged; and opportunity afforded to the rest of Greece, to construe the whole as a mere ostentation of their power and opulence rather than an effective equipment against war. For, were a computation to be formed, of the public disbursements of the state on this occasion, and the private expenses of the whole soldiery;—of the state, what prodigious sums they had already advanced, and what additional sums the generals were to carry along with them;—of the soldiery, what each expended on his own equipage, every captain on the decoration of his vessel, and to how much greater charges he was still liable;—

without taking into the account the vast list of necessaries which, over and above the public allowance, each private person was obliged to lay in for so long a voyage, or the goods which a soldier or trader might take with him on board for the sake of traffic;—the amount of talents now carried out of Athens would turn out exceeding large.

Nor was it merely for the strangeness of the enterprise or the splendour of its show, that the armament was noised abroad, but also for the numerous force with which it was provided to attack the foe; for the remoteness of the voyage, great as ever they had undertaken from their native clime, and that prodigious expectation which was raised of the event; in order to which the state had now exerted itself quite beyond its strength.

When the whole force was got on board the fleet, when the stowage of all necessary stores and all baggage whatever was completely adjusted, silence then was proclaimed by sound of trumpet: but the solemn prayers for a successful expedition were not offered from every vessel apart, but in behalf of all united, by the voice of a herald. The goblets mingled with wine ran the circle of the whole armament and every crew as well as the commanders poured out the libations, and drank success and happiness out of gold and silver cups. The whole crowd that stood upon the beach, both of citizens and such strangers as were there and wished them prosperity, joined with them in the public prayer. And now, the psalm being sung and the libation finished, they put out to sea.² After moving off at first in a line ahead,

¹ Many incidents are related by Plutarch, in the life of Nicias, in regard to the denunciations of the priests against this expedition, the coining and wresting of oracles both for and against it, and omens which portended nothing but misfortune. Mere human foresight, and a consciousness, that the means were not equal to the end proposed, gave the wisest and steadiest part of the Athenian community a sad apprehension of the event. Socrates constantly declared against it; and assured his friends, it would draw after it the destruction of the state: this his presentiment, soon became the public talk. Meton, the Astronomer, who was named to a post of high rank in the expedition, feigned himself mad and set his house on fire. Others deny that circumstance of his counterfeiting madness; and say, he set his house on fire by night, and appeared next morning on the forum in an abject manner, and begged of his fellow-citizens, in order to comfort him under so great a misfortune, to excuse his son, who was to have commanded a trireme, from going the voyage. An incident, farther, at the very time of the departure of

each vessel made afterwards the best of her way to Ægina. And this armament made all possible haste to reach Coreyra, where the force of their allies by which they were to be joined was already assembled.

Though the intelligence of such an intended invasion had been brought to Syracuse from several quarters, yet for a long course of time they would yield no credit to its truth. Nay more, when an assembly was convened, such speeches as follow were made by different persons; some believing the accounts received in relation to this armament of the Athenians; others pronouncing them absolutely false. On this occasion Hermocrates, the son of Hermon, standing forth in the assembly, and as one convinced in his own mind that all such accounts were true, addressed and advised his countrymen thus:

"It will probably be my own fate, as it hath been the fate of others, to be disbelieved, when I speak of this intended invasion as a matter of truth and certainty. And I also know, by experience, that both those who vent and those who retail such accounts of things as seem incredible, are so far from effectually persuading, that they generally incur the imputation of madness. Yet no such apprehensions shall intimidate or strike me dumb, when such a weight of danger hovers over my country; when in my own heart I am convinced, that I am more clearly enlightened on the point than any other person whatever.

"For I assert that to be a matter of the highest certainty, which you hear only with a fit of stupid surprise, that the Athenians have already set sail against us with a numerous force both for the service of the sea and the land. The pretext alleged by them is, execution of treaties with the Egæstians and the restoration of the Leontines; but the true motive is their ambition to enslave Sicily, and above all this our own Syracuse, which if once reduced, they are well assured that nothing will be able afterwards to give a check to their

the grand fleet, gave many persons vast concern. The women were then celebrating the rites of Adonis, in which many representations of deaths and funerals were exhibited all over Athens; and the women, according to custom, were making heavy moan and lamentation. This struck sad forebodings into people who laid stress on such incidents, that this expensive and mighty armament, though now so vigorous and magnificent would soon moulder into ruin.

arms. Taking it therefore for granted that they will be immediately upon us, in what manner you may make the most of our defence in the present posture of your affairs, be careful that through contempt you be unprovided, nor through incredulity al means of preservation. Nor, farthe who are convinced of their immediate danger, be terrified at the boldness of their undertaking. For they will no hurt us more than we shall be enabled to lie upon them. Nor are they more than we can reach, because they invade us with an armament; since this, in regard to Sicilians, will plead more abundant cause; for, terrified at the foe, they are disposed with higher warmth of friendship to operate with us. And if thus, in these affairs, we are either enabled to defend ourselves, or merely to force their retreat, schemes unexecuted and their ambition disappointed, (for I am not in the least doubtful that their sanguine expectations can be gloriously successful,) such events would reflect glory upon you, and complete what we hope.

"It is a truth evinced by facts, that considerable armaments of either Grecian or barbarians, which have been sent out on expeditions, have returned successful; farther, are our present invaders more numerous than the Syracusans than their friends of the neighbouring states; strength mere hostile dread will cement them fast together. If therefore, though they want of needful supplies, they incur no danger on a foreign shore; if they prove victorious, though chiefly through their own conduct; the whole honour must however be ours, as if we had ruined their projects by our management. Even these very Athenians are indebted to a parallel coincidence of the vast enlargement of their strength and the vast enlargement of their strength, when the Medes, who gave our empire the blow at Athens, was, contrary to human expectation, disconcerted by errors that were purely his own. A such fortunate coincidence, in our own affairs, we have at present all imaginable reason to expect.

"Let us therefore with active resolution turn our domestic affairs into a posture of defence and despatch our ambassadors to the king to keep firm in our friendship such as a

friends, and to endeavour to procure the friendship and concurrence of the rest. Nay, our embassies regularly complete the whole circuit of Sicily, where they may represent the common danger which equally threatens them. Let them, farther, cross over to Italy to secure for us their defensive alliance, or at least to negotiate a denial of reception to the Athenians. I also judge it advisable to send to Carthage: for even the Carthagenians are exempted from the present dangers, but have been ever under apprehensions of receiving from them a visit at Carthage. It may perhaps effectually occur to their thoughts, that, should they now abandon us, the storm must extend itself to them; by which they may be determined either secretly or openly, by the expedient or other, to vindicate our cause. They were their inclination equal to their power, no people on the globe could so easily resist us. For they are possessed of an immensity of wealth, which gives an easy and complete completion to the schemes of war and every human enterprise. Let us send farther, to Lacedæmon and Corinth, requesting the despatch of immediate succours hither, and the renewal of the war against the Athenians. There is one point more, which in my opinion is more critical and important than all the rest: and which, though perhaps, inured to you are to domestic indolence, it may not be your ready approbation, I shall however yet recommend. Would all of us in general were inhabitants of Sicily, or at least would we Syracusans, with what other people we can get to assist us, put out instantly to sea with all the ships we have in readiness, victualled but for the space of two months; could we then give these Athenians the sting either at Tarentum or cape Japygia, there convince them, that before they enter the lists of war for the conquest of Sicily, they must fight for their passage across the strait;—we should then strike them with the most terror, and infinitely perplex them with the thought that from a friendly port we shall be forth to guard our out-works (for Tarentum will readily receive us), whilst they have no tract of sea to pass with all their cumbersome train, and must find it hard, through long a voyage, to be always steering in the circular order. As their course must thus be slow, and must advance only in exact conformity to orders, we should have a thousand op-

portunities to attack them. If again they clear their ships for action, and in a body bear down expeditiously upon us, they must ply hard at their oars; and, when spent with their toil, we can fall upon them. Or, in case that may not be judged advisable, we have it always in our power to retire into the harbour of Tarentum. And thus the Athenians, if in constant expectation of being fought with at sea, they must make their passage with a small portion only of their stores, will be reduced to great distress on coasts which will afford them no supply. Should they choose to continue in their station, they must infallibly be blocked up in it. Should they venture a passage, they must unavoidably leave their tenders and store-ships behind; and as they have no assurance of a hearty reception from the cities on the coasts, must be terribly dismayed.

“It is my firm opinion, that amidst that great perplexity of thought which must result from these obstructions, they will never presume to sail from Corcyra; or, at least, whilst they are agitating the forms of procedure, and sending out spy-boats to discover our numbers and position, the season of the year must be protracted to winter; or, utterly dispirited at so unexpected a resistance, they will give up the voyage. This I more readily expect, as I am informed that their most experienced commander hath been forced into office against his inclination, and would gladly lay hold of the pretext to desist, if such a show of resistance could be made by us as would preserve his honour from suspicion. And I am perfectly convinced that rumour will increase and aggravate our strength. Now the sentiments of mankind are constantly adjusted by rumours: parity of danger is supposed, when an enemy declares he is ready to begin the attack; and such an enemy is always more dreaded than he who betrays an intention merely to defend himself against an enemy’s assaults. Such excess of fear must now fall to the lot of the Athenians. They are invading us, with the fond presumption that we shall not fight. They think they have grounds for such a presumption, because we have not concurred with the Lacedæmonians in their demolition. But when, to their bitter disappointment, they find we have the courage to act offensively, the suddenness of our efforts will terrify them more than all the reality of our expected strength could have done.

"Determine therefore to execute with bold and ready resolution the plan I have proposed; or, if this must not prevail, with the utmost expedition to get all things at home in readiness for war. And let each Syracusan be firmly convinced, that contempt of an enemy ought never to be shown but in the heat of action; that the conduct of those men must tend most highly to the public preservation, who, alarmed by a decent fear, judge it needful to prepare with all caution and alacrity, as if the danger was instant at our doors. But these our enemies are actually coming; they are already (I know it well) upon the voyage; they are this moment only not in sight."

In this manner Hermocrates spoke his sentiments. But the popular assembly of the Syracusans was embroiled with much variance and contention. One party cried out, that "it was all a joke; the Athenians durst not think of invading them." Another, "Hermocrates had truth and reason on his side." A third, "Let them come; what damage can they do us which we are not able heartily to repay them?" Others betrayed an open contempt at the whole account, and laughed at it as downright ridiculous. The party was but small which gave credit to Hermocrates, and trembled for the future. At length, Athenagoras stood up, who being the first magistrate of the people, and whose credit at this time was highest with them, delivered himself as followeth:

"The man who wishes the Athenians may not be so mad as to come hither and run themselves headlong into our subjection, is either a coward or a traitor to his country. But for those who vent such news, and endeavour to frighten you by the terrible recital, at their audaciousness, truly, I am not in the least surprised; but I am greatly so at their folly, if they imagine their views can escape detection! Poor abject souls, quite dispirited within through their own pusillanimity, are glad to spread consternation throughout a whole community; that under the general panic, their own may lie veiled and undistinguished. And such is the effect which the present informations may be ready to produce; not from any grounds of truth and certainty, but the fictions and falsehoods of an iniquitous cabal, who are ever dabbling in the practices of faction.

"But you, Syracusans, I exhort, to apply your good sense on this occasion, and search

after probability; not by considering such accounts as these men have pompously detailed, but such enterprises as a wise and abundant enlightened people (for such I esteem the Athenians) are likely to undertake. For the probability is there, that, leaving the Peloponnesians on their backs, when the war at home is not yet brought to any settled conclusion, they would wilfully embark into another of less importance? For my part, I am persuaded they rest well contented, that, so many so powerful states as we Sicilians are, we have not yet thought proper to invade them.

"But, allowing these informations true, that they are actually coming,—I am fully persuaded, that Sicily is better able than Peloponnesus to war them down, by how much, in all respects, it is better furnished with the resource of war; and that this our Syracuse alone is far superior in strength to that, which double that armament, which by report threatens its invasion. For I know, assuredly, that no horse can follow in their train; farther, none can be procured for them in this country, if we abate an inconsiderable part of which the Eggesteans may furnish. And I know, that a body of heavy-armed, equal in number to our own, can never be transported by them across such a length of sea. The enterprise is bold indeed, to attempt so long a voyage hither with only light and nimble troops, and to bring all those military stores, the want of which must be excessively large, in order to attack so great a city. Shall I therefore be terrified at vain reports? I, who am fully persuaded, that, if the Athenians were possessed of a city on our coasts as considerable in all respects as Syracuse itself, and should dare to provoke us; if, masters of the neighbouring territory they should from thence make war upon us;—even with such advantages they would with difficulty escape a total destruction. And what therefore, in all human probability, must be their fate, when all Sicily to a man will be combined to oppose them? For now their war must issue from a camp on the beach of the sea, of which their ships must form the ramparts. They will not be able to make long excursions from their tents and magazines of needful stores, as our cavalry will bridle and control them. But, in short, it is my firm opinion that they never will be able to accomplish a descent, so far am I convinced that our force is in all respects superior.

"I am well persuaded, that all those obstacles, which I have hitherto recited, their own wise reflections have suggested to the remembrance of the Athenians, and deterred them from hazarding their own ruin; and that our own malcontents amuse us with fictitious accounts of things, that neither have nor can have existence. This is by no means the first occasion on which I have been able to detect their schemes. I am no stranger to their constant attempts of fomenting faction, ever intent as they are, by forgeries like these, or more malicious than these, or even by the open efforts of sedition, to strike a panic amongst the Syracusan people, and to seize the helm of your government. And I have reason to apprehend, that, amongst the many projects they attempt, some one at length may be fatally successful. But this must be charged to our own pusillanimity, who exert no precautions to avert impending miseries, nor bravely oppose the storm, though we perceive it to be gathering around us. And from hence it unavoidably results, that our state is seldom blessed with a season of tranquillity, but feels the bitter lot of sedition on sedition, of more numerous struggles against factions within than public hostilities without; nay, sometimes tyranny and despotic rule have been our portion.

"To guard the present times from such disastrous contingencies, shall be my constant endeavour; and, if favoured with your concurrence, my care shall be successful. To this end I must prevail upon you, who are the many, to co-operate with me, whilst I inflict upon these artificers of faction the punishment they deserve, not barely for overt commissions, (for in these they are not easily caught,) but for all the treacherous plots which, how desirous soever, they are not able to execute. For we ought not only to award our vengeance on the open outrages of an enemy, but to disarm his malice by wise precaution; because the man who will not thus in time disarm it, will feel its blow before he is aware.

"On the few I have also to bestow, partly some reproofs, partly some cautions, and partly some instructions. For chiefly by these methods I judge it feasible to deter them from their factious designs. Let me therefore request from you, ye youths of Syracuse, the solution of a point which hath frequently occurred to my own imagination—What is it

you would have?—An immediate possession of the government of your country?—Why, the very laws of that country declare you incapable of it. And these very laws were intended, rather to exclude you, so long as you are unequal, than to give you a disgraceful rejection when you shall be equal, to the trust. But, farther,—are you not piqued at heart at being placed upon the same rank and level with the bulk of your fellow-citizens? And where would be the justice in awarding distinctions of honour and trust to those who are in no respect differenced from others? It may perhaps be urged that a democracy is repugnant to the dictates both of wisdom and justice; that the most opulent members of a state are entitled to its highest honours, are best able to superintend the public welfare. But to this I reply, that, in the first place, by the word people is signified a whole community, including its every individual; but an oligarchy means only a party; in the next place, that men of opulence are the most suitable guardians of the public treasure; that men of understanding and experience are best qualified to advise; but the many, after hearing, are the best judges of measures. And thus, by a democracy, equality of right and of privilege is most fairly preserved, as well to the separate members as to the whole community. An oligarchy indeed bestows an ample portion of dangers on the many, but in beneficial points it not only assumes the larger share to itself, but by an unbounded rapacity monopoliseth the public harvest.—These are the ends which the men of power, and the raw inexperienced youths amongst you, ambitiously pursue; ends incompatible with the welfare of a great and flourishing state. The accomplishment of these, I say, you have this very moment in agitation; though the world cannot furnish such a set of fools, if you perceive not the pernicious tendency of your schemes. Nor can any set of Grecians, within my knowledge, equal either your brutality or your villany, if with open eyes you dare proceed. Lay hold then at once of sound information, or repent if already informed, and unite in the infallible advancement of the general welfare of the whole community. And let the men of probity amongst you rest perfectly satisfied, that thus they shall obtain a proper share, nay more than a share, in those emoluments which will equally redound to all their country. But,

in case you give into different schemes, the hazard is great; the whole of your plan will be baffled and confounded.

"Trouble us therefore no farther with your informations, as we are privy to and shall certainly disconcert the views of their authors. For the Syracusan state, even though the Athenians actually invade us, will repel their efforts with a magnanimity worthy of herself; and we have already a set of brave commanders, who will effectually manage the point. But, if not one tittle of these intended invasions be true, which is my firm opinion, the state will not be struck into a panic by your rumours, will never place the command of her forces in your hands, so as to rivet a voluntary servitude upon herself. She, on the contrary, will exert her own vigilance and discretion; she will interpret the rumours you have spread as so many acts against her welfare, and will not give up her liberty to accounts expressly forged to terrify the ear; but, aware in time, by no means to intrust herself into your management, will leave no possible method of defence untried."

Thus spoke Athenagoras. But here one of the generals rising up prevented any other person from continuing the debate, and put an end to the present heats by delivering himself thus:—

"It is contrary to all decorum, both for those who speak to pour forth calumniations against one another, and for those who hear to receive them with attention. At present, we are rather concerned to yield regard to the informations which are brought us, that every individual and this community may be timely prepared to repel the invaders. And, if this should prove at last to be mere superfluity of care, yet what harm can possibly accrue from such an equipment of the state with horses, and arms, and such other habiliments as are the glory of war? We ourselves shall take all proper care of the provisions of war and the levy of soldiers; and at the same time shall circulate our messengers to the cities around us, and watch the appearance of the foe; and shall expedite every point judged needful in the present emergence. Some care of these points hath already been taken, and, what more we shall perceive to be expedient, we shall on the proper occasions communicate to you."

When the general had expressed himself thus,

the Syracusans broke up the assembly and departed.

The Athenians, with the reinforcements of their allies, were by this time all arrived at Corcyra. And the first thing done by the commanders was, to take a review of the whole equipment, and to settle the order in which they were to anchor and form their naval disposition. They also divided it into three squadrons, and cast lots for the command of each; to the end that, in the course of the voyage, they might be well supplied with water, and the harbours, and the proper necessaries, whenever they might chance to put in; that, in other respects, a better discipline might be kept up, and the men be more inured to a ready obedience, as being under the inspection of an officer commander in each several division. These points being settled, they despatched their vessels to Italy and Sicily, to pick up informations, what cities on those coasts would give them a reception. And their orders were, to come back in time and meet them upon their voyage, that they might be advertised into what ports they might safely enter.

These previous points being adjusted, the Athenians, with an equipment already swollen to so great a bulk, weighing anchor from Corcyra, stood across for Sicily. The total of their triremes was a hundred and thirty-four, to which were added two Rhodian vessels of fifty oars. One hundred of these were Athenian, and, of this number, sixty were tight ships fit for service; the rest were transports for the soldiery. The remainder of the fleet consisted of Chians and the other allies. The total of the heavy-armed on board was five thousand one hundred men. Of these, fifteen hundred were citizens of Athens enrolled; seven hundred were Athenians of the lowest class (called Thetes,) who served by way of mercenaries. The rest of the force consisted of the quotas of their alliance; some of their own dependencies five hundred belonged to the Argives; the number of Mantineans and mercenaries was two hundred and fifty; the archers in the whole amounted to four hundred and eighty; and of these, eighty were Cretans. There were some hundred Rhodian slingers, and a hundred and twenty light-armed Megarean exiles. And one horse transport attended, which carried thirty horsemen.

So great an equipment sailed out at first

begin the war. And, in the train of this equipment, went thirty storeships laden with corn, and carrying on board the bakers, and masons, and carpenters, and all things requisite in the works of fortification; and also a hundred sail of small vessels, which necessity demanded to attend the ships that carried the stores. A large number also of small craft and trafficking vessels, sailed voluntarily in company with the fleet, for the sake of traffic. All which now, in one collected body, stood away from Corcyra across the Ionian gulf.

The whole armament being got over to cape Japygia, or to Tarentum, as they severally could make the passage, sailed along the coast of Italy,—where not one city would receive them, would grant them a market, or suffer them to land, barely permitting them to anchor and to water,—though at Tarentum and Locri even that was denied them,—till they arrived at Rhegium, a promontory of Italy. At Rhegium the whole fleet was now assembled; and without the city (for an admission into it was refused them) they formed an encampment within the verge of Diana's temple, where also they were accommodated by the Rhegians with a market.

Here, having drawn their vessels on shore, they lay some time for refreshment; and had a conference with the Rhegians, in which they pressed them as they were of Chalcidic descent, to succour the Leontines who were also Chalcidians. Their answer was, that "they should side with neither party, but whatever measures were judged expedient by the other Italians they should conform to those." The Athenians' councils were now solely bent on the affairs of Sicily, in what manner they might most successfully make their approaches. They also waited for the return of the three vessels from Egesta, which had previously been despatched thither: longing earnestly for a report about the state of their treasure, whether it was really such as their envoys at Athens had represented.

To the Syracusans, in the meantime, undoubted advice is brought from several quarters, and by their own spies, that "the fleet of the enemy lies at Rhegium." The truth of this being uncontested, they prepared for their defence with the utmost attention, and were no longer duped by incredulity. They also sent about to the Siculi; to some places, their agents, who were to keep a watchful eye upon

their conduct: and, to others, ambassadors. And into those towns upon the coast, which were exposed to a descent, they threw a garrison. In Syracuse, they examined if the city was provided with the proper means of a defence, by a careful inspection of the arms and the horses; and all other points were properly adjusted, as against a war coming swiftly upon them, and only not already present.

The three vessels detached beforehand to Egesta, rejoin the Athenians, yet lying at Rhegium, with a report that "the great sums which had been promised them were quite annihilated since they saw only thirty talents¹ in specie." Upon this the commanders were instantly seized with a dejection of spirit, because their first hope was thus terribly blasted; and the Rhegians had refused to concur with their attempts, upon whom they had made their first essay of persuasion, and with whom they had the greatest probability of success, as they were by blood allied to the Leontines, and had ever shown themselves well-disposed to the Athenian state. The Egestean affair had indeed taken no other turn than what Nicias fully expected, but the other two commanders were quite amazed and confounded at it.

The trick, made use of by the Egesteans, at the time that the first embassy went thither from Athens to take a survey of their treasures, was this;—Having conducted them into the temple of Venice at Eryx, they showed the offerings repositied there, the cups, the flagons, and the censers, and the other furniture of the temple, in quantity by no means small. These, being all of silver, presented to the eye a vast show of wealth, far beyond their intrinsic value. Having also made entertainments in private houses, for those who came in the vessels of the embassy, they amassed together all the gold and silver cups of Egesta: they borrowed others from the adjacent cities, as well Phœnician as Grecian; they carried their guests about from one house of feasting to another; and each exhibited them as his own property. Thus, all of them displaying generally the same vessels, and great abundance appearing at every place, the Athenians who made the voyage were prodigiously surprised at the splendid shows. Hence it was that, on their return to Athens, they enlarged with a kind of emulation which should magnify it most, on the immensity of

¹ £5812 10s. sterling.

wealth they had seen at Egæta. In this manner, being deceived themselves, they obtruded the same fallacy upon others; but now, when the true account was spread amongst them, that "there was no such wealth at Egæta," they were much censured and reproached by the soldiers.

The generals, however, held a consultation about the methods of proceeding. And here it was the opinion of Nicias, "that with their whole armament they should stand immediately against Selinus, the reduction of which was the principal motive of the expedition; and, in case the Egæteans would furnish the whole armament with the proper supplies of money, their councils might then be regulated accordingly; but, otherwise, they should insist on their maintaining the sixty sail of ships which had been sent expressly at their own request; then, abiding by them, they should reconcile their differences with the Selinuntians, either by force of arms or negotiation; they afterwards might visit other cities, and display before them the mighty power of the Athenian state; and, having given such conspicuous proofs of their alacrity to support their friends and allies, might return to Athens; provided that no sudden and unexpected turn of affairs might give them opportunity to do service to the Leontines, or bring over some other cities to their interest; ever intent not to bring their own state into danger by a needless profusion of blood and treasure."

Alcibiades declared "That it could never be justified, if, after putting to sea with so great an armament, they should return with disgrace, and no effectual service done to their country; that, on the contrary they ought, by heralds despatched expressly, to notify their arrival in these parts to all the cities except Selinus and Syracuse; that, further, they should try what could be done with the Siculi, in order to persuade some of them to revolt from the Syracusans, and to strike up treaties of alliance and friendship with others, that so they might provide a resource of provisions and reinforcements; that the first trial of this kind should be made upon the Messenians, who lay in the finest situation for favouring their passage and descent into Sicily, which must open to them the most convenient harbour and station for their armament: thus, gaining the concurrence of the cities, and certain from whom they might depend upon assistance, the

way would then be open for them to make attempts upon Syracuse and Selinus, in case the former refused to make up the quarrel with the Egæteans, and the latter to suffer the re-plantation of the Leontines."

The opinion of Lamachus was diametrically opposite, since he advised it "to be the most judicious measure to stand at once against Syracuse, and to try their fortune before that city with the utmost expedition, whilst they were yet not competently provided for resistance, and their consternation was still in its height: because every hostile force is always most terrible on its first approach; and, in case it protract the time of encountering the eyes of its foes, they must recover their courage through familiarity with danger, and then the sight of an enemy is more apt to inspire contempt; but, should they assault them on a sudden whilst yet their approach is with terror expected, the victory must infallibly be their own:—in this case, all things would co-operate with them to terrify the foe; such as, the sight of their numbers, which now only could appear in their greatest enlargement; the forebodings of their hearts what miseries were like to ensue; and, above all, the instant necessity they must lie under of hazarding a battle: that, moreover, it was likely, that numbers of the enemy might be surprised yet roaming abroad in the adjacent country, as still they were incredulous of the approach of the Athenians; or, even though the Syracusans were safely retired with all their effects into the city, the army must needs become masters of prodigious wealth, if they should besiege the city, and awe all around it; that, by taking this step, the other Sicilians would be more discouraged from succouring the Syracusans, and more easily inclined to concur with the Athenians, and all shifts and delays to keep clear of the contest till one side was manifestly superior, would be precluded." He added farther, that "they should take care to possess themselves of Megara, which was now deserted and not far from Syracuse either by sea or land, as it would afford a fine station for their ships to lie in, would shelter them upon a retreat, and give expedition to their approaches."

But, though Lamachus delivered his sentiments thus, he soon gave up his own opinion and went over to that of Alcibiades. And in pursuance of this, Alcibiades with his own single ship passed over to Messene; and, having

gained a conference with the Messenians about an alliance offensive and defensive, when no arguments he brought could persuade, when on the contrary they returned this answer, that "into their city they would not receive them, though they were ready to accommodate them with a market without the walls," he repassed to Rhegium. And immediately the generals, having manned out sixty ships with the choicest hands of the whole fleet, and taken in a requisite stock of subsistence, steered away for Naxos, leaving the rest of the armament at Rhegium under the care of one of those in the commission.

After a reception granted them into their city by the Naxians, they stood away from thence to Catana. And, when the Cataneans refused to receive them, (for in that city was a party strongly attached to the Syracusans,) they put into the river Terias. After a night's continuance there, the next day they sailed for Syracuse; keeping the rest of the fleet ready ranged in the line of battle ahead. But they had attached ten beforehand, who were ordered to enter the great harbour of Syracuse, and to examine what naval force lay there ready launched for service, and to proclaim from their decks as they passed along the shore—that "the Athenians are come into those parts to replace the Leontines in their own territory, as they were bound in point both of alliance and consanguinity; that whatever Leontines therefore were now residing at Syracuse, should without fear come over to the Athenians, as friends and benefactors."

When the proclamation had been made, and they had taken a view of the city and its harbours, and of the adjacent ground, what spots were most convenient for a descent and the commencement of the war, they sailed back again to Catana. A council of war had been held in that city, and the Cataneans were come to a resolution, "not to receive the armament;" but, however, they granted an audience to the generals. At which, whilst Alcibiades harangued, and the inhabitants of Catana were all in the public assembly, the Athenian soldiers, without giving any alarm, pulled down a little gate of a very sorry structure, and then, entered the city, walked up and down in the market. But such of the Cataneans as were of the Syracusan party no sooner found that the army was got in, than, struck into a sudden consternation, they stole presently out of

the city. The number of these was but trifling. The rest of the inhabitants decreed an alliance with the Athenians, and encouraged them to fetch over the remainder of their armament from Rhegium.

This point being carried, the Athenians having passed to Rhegium, were soon with the whole of their fleet under sail for Catana, and, on their arrival there, they formed a proper station for their ships and men.

But now intelligence was brought them from Camarina that "if they would come to countenance them, that city would declare on their side;" and that "the Syracusans are busy in manning their fleet." With the whole armament therefore they steered along the coast, touching first at Syracuse. And when they found that no fleet was there in readiness to put to sea, they stood off again for Camarina; and there, approaching the shore, they notified their arrival by the voice of a herald. Admittance was however refused them, the Camarineans alleging that "they were bound by solemn oaths to receive only one single ship of the Athenians, unless of their own accord they should require a larger number." Thus disappointed they put out again to sea, and, having made a descent on some part of the Syracusan territory, they picked up a booty, till the Syracusan cavalry making ahead against them and cutting off some of their light-armed who were straggled to a distance, they re-embarked, and went again to Catana.

On their return thither they find the Salaminian arrived from Athens to fetch back Alcibiades, by public order of the state, to take his trial for the crimes charged against him by his country, and also some others of the soldiery who attended him in the expedition, against whom informations had been given that they were guilty of impiety in the affair of the Mysteries, and against some of them in that of the Mercurios. For the Athenians, after the departure of the fleet, continued to make as strict an inquisition as ever into the crimes committed in regard to the Mysteries, and also in regard to the Mercuries. What sort of persons the informers were, was no part of their concern, but, in the height of jealousy, giving credit indiscriminately to all, through too great a deference to men of profligate and abandoned lives, they apprehended and threw into prison the most worthy citizens of Athens; esteeming it more prudent by pains and tortures to detect the

fact, than that a person of irreproachable character, when once accused through the villany of an informer, should escape without the question. For the people, having learned by tradition how grievous the tyranny of Pisistratus and his sons became at last; and, what is more, that it was not overthrown by themselves and Harmodius, but by the industry of the Lacedæmonians; lived in a constant dread of such another usurpation, and beheld all these incidents now with most suspicious eyes. But, in fact, the bold attempt of Harmodius and Aristogiton took its rise merely from a competition in love. The particulars of which I shall here unfold more largely, to convince the world, that no other people, no not even the Athenians themselves, have any certain account, either relating to their own tyrants or the transactions of that period.

The truth is, that Pisistratus dying possessed of the tyranny in a good old age, not Hipparchus (as is generally thought) but Hippias, the eldest of his sons, was his successor in power. Harmodius being at this time in the flower of his youth and beauty, Aristogiton a citizen of Athens, nay a citizen of the middle rank, doated upon and had him in his possession. But, some attempts having been made upon Harmodius, by Hipparchus the son of Pisistratus, he rejected his solicitations, and discovers the whole affair to Aristogiton. The latter received the account with all that anguish which a warm affection feels; and, alarmed at the great power of Hipparchus, lest by force he might seize the youth, he instantly forms a project, a project as notable as his rank in life would permit, to demolish the tyranny. And, in the meantime, Hipparchus, who, after making a second attempt upon Harmodius, was equally unsuccessful in his suit, could not prevail upon himself to make use of force; but, however, determined, upon some remote occasions which might cover his real design from detection, and was actually studying an opportunity to dishonour the youth.—For the power he had was never exerted in such a manner as to draw upon him the popular hatred, and his deportment was neither invidious nor distasteful. Nay, for the most part, this set of tyrants were exact observers of the rules of virtue and discretion. They exacted from the Athenians only a twentieth of their revenue; they beautified and adorned the city; took upon themselves the whole conduct of the wars; and

presided over the religious sacrifices. In all respects, the state was governed by the law already established, except that they always exerted their influence to place their own creatures in the first offices of the government. Several of their own family enjoyed the same office of archon at Athens; and, amongst others, Pisistratus, the son of Hippias the tyrant, who bore the same name with his grandfather, and, in his archonship, dedicated the altar of the twelve gods in the public forum, and that of Apollo in the temple of the Pythian. The people of Athens, having since made additions to it in order to enlarge the altar in the forum, by that means effaced the inscription: but that in the Pythian is yet legible, though the letters are wearing out apace, and runs thus:

Pisistratus, from Hippias born,
Of Pythian Phœbus, radiant god of day,
Chose thus the temple to adorn,
And thus record his own superior sway.

But, farther, that Hippias succeeded in the government as the eldest son, I myself can positively aver; as I know it to be so, and have examined all the accounts of tradition with much greater accuracy than others. But any one may be convinced of the fact by what I am going to subjoin.—Now, we have abundant light to prove, that he was the only one of the legitimate brothers who had any sons. So much the altar attests, and the column erected for a perpetual brand of the injustice of the tyrants in the citadel of Athens. In the latter, the inscription makes no mention of any son, of either Thessalus or Hipparchus; but nameth five sons of Hippias, who were brought him by Myrrhine, the daughter of Callias, the son of Hyperochidas. It is certainly most probable that the eldest son was married first; nay, he is named the first after his father on the upper part of the column. And there were good reasons for this preference; because his seniority gave him this rank; and because he succeeded to the tyranny. Nor can it in any light seem probable to me, that Hippias, on a sudden and with ease, could have seized the tyranny, had Hipparchus died when invested with it, and he had only one day's time to effect his own establishment. The reverse is the truth; that, having for a length of time been familiarized to the expectation, having rendered himself awful to the citizens, and being supported by vigilant and

trusty guards, he received and enjoyed his power with abundant security. He never had cause, as a younger brother must have had, to work his way through perplexities and dangers, as in that case he could not by practice have been made an adept in the affair of government. But was accidental, and owing entirely to subsequent misfortunes, that Hipparchus got the title, and passed in the opinion of succeeding ages for one of the tyrants.

On Harmodius, therefore, who was deaf to his solicitations, he executed his resentment in the manner pre-determined. For, a summons having been delivered to a sister of his, a young virgin, to attend and carry the basket in some public procession, they afterwards rejected her; alleging she never had nor could have been summoned, because she was unworthy of the honour. This affront highly provoked Harmodius; but Aristogiton, out of zeal for him, was far more exasperated at it. The points needful to their intended revenge were concerted with the party who concurred in the design. But they waited for the great Panathenæa, to strike the blow; on which festival alone, without incurring suspicion, such of the citizens as assisted in the procession might be armed and gathered together in numbers. It was settled, that they themselves should begin; and then, the body of their accomplices were to undertake their protection against the guards of the tyrant's family.

The persons made privy to this design were but few, from a view to a more secure execution of it. For they presumed that even such as were not in the secret, when the attempt was once in whatever manner begun, finding themselves armed, would seize the opportunity, and readily concur to assert their own freedom. When therefore the festival was come, Hippas, repairing without the walls to the place called Ceramicus, and there attended by his guards, was prescribing and adjusting the order of the procession. Harmodius and Aristogiton, each armed with a dagger, advanced to execute their parts. But, when they saw one of their accomplices in familiar conversation with Hippas, (for Hippas was affable and courteous to all men,) they were struck with fear; they imagined the whole of their plot had been betrayed, and that already they were only not apprehended. Now, therefore, by a sudden turn of resolution, they determined, if possible, to snatch a timely revenge upon him by whom they were aggrieved, and on whose account

they had embarked into so dangerous an affair. In this hurry of thought they rushed back into the city, and met with Hipparchus at the place called Leocorium; where, without any regard to their own safety, they made an instant assault upon him. And thus, in all the fury of passion, one actuated by jealousy, and the other by resentment, they wounded and they kill him. As the people immediately ran together, Aristogiton by favour of the concourse escapes for the present, but, being afterwards seized, was unmercifully treated; but Harmodius is instantly slain on the spot.

The news of this assassination being carried to Hippas at the Ceramicus, he moved off immediately; not to the scene of action, but towards the armed accomplices in the procession, before they could be informed of the fact, as they were stationed at a distance. He artfully suppressed on his countenance all sense of the calamity; and, pointing to a certain spot, commanded them aloud to throw down their arms and file off thither. This command they obeyed, expecting he had something to communicate to them. But Hippas, addressing himself to his guards, orders them to take away those arms. He then picked out, man by man, from amongst them, such as he designed to put to the question, and all upon whom a dagger was found: for, by ancient custom, they were to make the procession with a spear and a shield.

In this manner truly, from the anguish of irritated love, this conspiracy took its rise, and this desperate attempt was executed by Harmodius and Aristogiton, from the impulse of a sudden consternation. But, after this, the tyranny became more grievous upon the Athenians. Hippas, who was now more than ever alarmed, put many of the citizens to death; and cast his thoughts about towards foreign

¹ And yet so violently were tyrants detested at Athens, that the memory of Harmodius and Aristogiton was ever after honoured there, as martyrs for liberty and first authors of the ruin of tyrants. Their praises were publicly sung at the great Panathenæa. No slave was ever called by their names. Praxiteles was employed to cast their statues, which were afterwards set up in the forum: Xerxes indeed carried them away into Persia, but Alexander afterwards sent them back to Athens. Plutarch hath preserved a smart reply of Antipho the orator, who will appear in this history, to the elder Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuse. The latter had put the question, which was the finest kind of brass? "That," replied Antipho, "of which the statues of Harmodius and Aristogiton were made."

powers, to secure himself an asylum abroad in case of a total reverse at home. To Æantidas therefore, the son of Hippoclus, tyrant of Lampsacus,—to a Lampsacene though he himself was an Athenian,—he married his daughter Archedice, knowing that family to have a powerful interest with king Darius. And the monument of that lady is now at Lampsacus, and hath this inscription :

From Hippias sprung, with regal power array'd,
Within this earth Archedice is laid ;
By father, husband, brothers, sons, allied
To haughty thrones, yet never stain'd with pride.

For the space of three years after this, Hippias continued in possession of the tyranny at Athens ; but being deposed in the fourth by the Lacedæmonians, and the exiled Alcæonides, he retired by agreement to Sigæum ; from thence, to Æantidas at Lampsacus ; and from thence, to king Darius : and with a command under him, he marched twenty years after to Marathon ; and, though much advanced in years, served in that war with the Medes.

The people of Athens reflecting on these past transactions, and recollecting all the dismal narratives about them which tradition had handed down, treated with great severity, and deep suspicions, all such as were informed against in relation to the Mysteries : and they construed the whole procedure as the dawning of a plot to erect an oligarchical and tyrannical power. And as their passions were inflamed by such apprehensions, many worthy and valuable citizens were already thrown into prison. Nay, it seemed as if their inquisition was to have no end, since from day to day their indignation gave into more increasing severity, and numbers were constantly arrested. Here, one of those¹ who had been imprisoned on suspicion (and a suspicion too of being most deeply concerned in the crime) is persuaded, by one of his fellow-prisoners, to turn an evidence, no matter whether of truth or falsehood. Many conjectures have passed on both sides ; but no one, neither at that time nor since, had been able to discover the men who were really concerned in the affair. The

¹ This person, according to Plutarch in Alcibiades, was Andocides the orator, a man always reckoned of the oligarchical faction. And one Timæus, his intimate friend, who was a man of small consideration at Athens, but remarkable for a penetrating and enterprising genius, was the person who persuaded him to turn informer.

argument which prevailed upon this party was, "the necessity for his taking such a step, even though he had no hand in the commission, since by this he would infallibly purchase his own safety, and deliver the city from its present confusion. For he must be more secure of saving his life by such voluntary confession on a promise of indemnity than he could possibly be, should he persist in an avowal of his innocence, and be brought to a trial." In short, this man became an evidence, both against himself and against others in the affair of the Mercuries.

Great was the joy of the Athenians upon this, as it was thought, undoubted discovery. And as they had been highly disgraced before at their inability to detect the criminals, who had so outrageously insulted the multitude, they immediately discharged this informer, and all other prisoners whom he did not name as accomplices. Upon such as he expressly named, the judicial trials were held. Some of them they put to death, as many as were prevented by timely arrests from flying from justice ; but they pronounced the sentence of death against the fugitives, and set a price on their heads. Yet all this while, it was by no means clear, that those who suffered were not unjustly condemned. Thus much however is certain, that by such proceedings the public tranquillity was restored.

In regard to Alcibiades, the Athenians were highly incensed against him, since the party which were his enemies, and had made their attacks upon him before his departure, continued still to inflame them. And now, as they presumed the truth had been detected in relation to the Mercuries, it appeared to them, beyond a scruple, that he must also have been guilty of the crimes charged against him about the Mysteries, upon the same ground of a secret combination against the democracy.

At this critical period of time, when the public confusion was in all its height, it further happened, that a Lacedæmonian army, though by no means large, advanced as far as to the isthmus, to execute some scheme along with the Bœotians. This was interpreted to the prejudice of Alcibiades, as if they had now taken the field at his instigation, and not on any account of obliging the Bœotians ; and that "had they not happily apprehended in time such as had been informed against, Athens had now been infallibly betrayed." Nay, for

the space of a night, they kept guard under arms, within the city, in the temple of Theseus.

About the same time, also, the friends of Alcibiades at Argos were suspected of a design to assault the people. And those hostages of the Argives who were kept in custody among the islands, the Athenians on this occasion, delivered up to the people of Argos, to be put to death on these suspicions.

Thus reasons flowed in from every quarter for suspecting Alcibiades. Desirous therefore to bring him to a trial and to execution, they accordingly despatched the Salaminian to Sicily, to order him and such others as they had informations against to repair to Athens. But it had been given them in charge to notify to him, that "he should follow them home in order to make his defence," and by no means to put him under arrest. This arrangement was owing to a desire of preventing all stir in the army or in the enemy; and, not least of all, to their willingness that the Mantineans and Argives should continue in the service, whose attendance in the expedition they wholly ascribed to the interest Alcibiades had with them.

In pursuance of this, Alcibiades on board his own ship, and accompanied by all those who were involved in the same accusation, sailed away from Sicily with the Salaminian for Athens. And when they were got to the height of Thuria, they no longer followed; but quitting their ship were no longer to be seen. Censured as they were, they durst not in fact undergo a trial. The crew of the Salaminian exerted themselves immediately in the search after Alcibiades and his companions; but, when they found the search was ineffectual, they gave it up, and steered away for Athens. And Alcibiades, now become a fugitive, passed over in a vessel soon after from Thuria¹ to Peloponnesus. But the Athenians, upon his thus abandoning his defence, pronounced the sentence of death against him and his associates.

¹ Somebody at Thuria, who knew Alcibiades, asked him, why he would not stand a trial, and trust his country? "In other points I would; but, when my life is concerned, I would not trust my own mother, lest she should make a mistake, and put in a black bean instead of a white one." And, when he was afterwards told, that his countrymen had passed the sentence of death against him, he briskly replied—"But I'll make them know that I am alive." *Pistarch in Alcibiades.*

After these transactions, the Athenian generals who remained in Sicily, having divided their whole armament into two squadrons, and taken the command of each by lot, set sail with all their united force for Selinus and Egesta. They were desirous to know, whether the Egesteans would pay down the money: to discover also the present posture of the Selinuntians; and to learn the state of their quarrels with the Egesteans. In their course, keeping on the left that part of Sicily which lies on the Tyrrhene gulf, they arrived at Himera, which is the only Grecian city in this part of Sicily; and, when denied reception here, they resumed their course. Touching afterwards at Hyccara, a Sicanian fortress, but an annoyance to the Egesteans, they surprise it; for it was situated close upon the sea; and having doomed the inhabitants to be slaves, they delivered the place into the hands of the Egesteans, whose cavalry was now attending on the Athenian motions. The land forces marched away from hence through the territories of the Siculi, till they had again reached Catana; but the vessels on board of which were the slaves, came back along the coasts.

Nicias had proceeded from Hyccara directly to Egesta, where, after transacting other points and receiving thirty talents,² he rejoined the grand armament at Catana. And here they set up the slaves to sale,³ and raised by the money paid for them⁴ one hundred and twenty talents.

They also sailed about to their Sicilian allies, summoning them to send in their reinforcements. With a division also of their force they appeared before Hybla, a hostile city in the district of Gela, but were not able to take it. And here the summer ended.

Winter now succeeding, the Athenians begin immediately to get all things in readiness for an attempt upon Syracuse. The Syracusans were equally intent on making an attack upon them. For, since the Athenians had not thought proper, during their first panic and consternation, to fall instantly upon them, such a protraction re-inspired them day after day with new reviving courage: since, farther, by cruiz-

² £5812 10s. sterling.

³ Among the rest, Nicias sold at this sale Laïs the famous courtesan, at this time a very young girl, whom her purchasers carried to Corinth, where she set up and drove a prodigious trade indeed. *Pistarch in Nicias.*

⁴ £23,250l. sterling.

ing on the other side of Sicily, they seemed to affect a remoteness from them; and, though showing themselves before Hybla, and attempting the place, they had not been able to carry it, the Syracusans began now to treat them with an open contempt. They even insisted, as might be expected from a populace who are high in spirits, "that their generals should lead out towards Catana, since the enemy durst not venture to march against them." The Syracusan horsemen also, sent daily out to observe their motions, rode boldly up to the camp of the Athenians, insulting them in other respects, but especially with this sneering demand, "Whether they were not rather come to gain a settlement for themselves on a foreign shore, than to replace the Leontines in their old possessions?"

The Athenian generals, informed of these bravadoes, were desirous to seduce the whole strength of Syracuse to as great a distance as possible from that city, that they might snatch an opportunity of transporting thither their own forces by favour of the night, and seize a proper spot whereon to fix their encampment, without any obstruction from the enemy. They were well convinced, that their point could not be so easily accomplished, should they endeavour to force a descent in the face of the enemy, or by a land-march should give them an early notice of their design. For, in such cases, their own light-armed, and that cumbersome train which must attend, as they had no horse to cover their motions, must suffer greatly from the numerous cavalry of the Syracusans: but, by the other scheme, they might pre-occupy a spot of ground, where the cavalry could not give them any considerable annoyance. Nay, what is more, the Syracusan exiles who followed their camp, had informed them of a piece of ground convenient for their purpose near Olympiæum.

In order therefore to accomplish the point, the generals have recourse to the following artifice.—They despatch an emissary, of whose fidelity they were well assured, and who might also pass with the generals of Syracuse as well affected to their cause. The person employed was a Catanæan. He told them "he was sent by their friends in Catana," with whose names they were acquainted, and knew well to be of that number in Catana which persisted in steadfast attachment to them: he said farther, that, "the Athenians reposed themselves by

night within the city at a distance from the arms; and that in case they (the Syracusans) on a day prefixed, would with all the forces of their city appear by early dawn before the Athenian camp, the Catanæans would shut up those within the city and set fire to their sleeping, by which means they might force the Athenians to their trenchments and render themselves masters of the camp; that, farther, the party of Catanæans that would co-operate with them in this scheme, was very large, and already prepared to execute these points he was now sent to propose."

The Syracusan generals, whose ardour other contingencies had already inflamed, and who had formed a resolution, even previous to such encouragement, to march their forces towards Catana, without the least reserve gave implicit credit to this emissary; and, having instantly pitched upon a day for execution, dismissed him. They also (for by this time the Catanæan and some other auxiliaries had joined them) issued out their orders for the whole military strength of Syracuse to march out at the day appointed. No sooner therefore went all the needful preparations adjusted, and the time at hand at which they were to make their appearance, than—on the march for Catana, they halted one night upon the banks of the Symæthus, in the Leontine district. But the Athenians, when assured they had thus taken the field, decamping instantly with the whole of their force, and with all the Sicilian and other auxiliaries who had joined them, and embarking themselves on board their ships and transports, steered away by night for Syracuse. And, early the next dawn, they landed on the intended spot near Olympiæum, intent on forming and securing their encampment. The cavalry of the Syracusans, in the meantime, came up first to Catana; and discovering that the whole Athenian army had put to sea by night, they return with this intelligence to their foot. Upon this, the whole army, soon wheeling about, returned with all speed to the defence of Syracuse.

In the meantime, the Athenians, as the enemy had a long way to march, formed an encampment on an advantageous spot without the least obstruction. On it, they were possessed of the advantage of fighting only at their own discretion, and the Syracusan horse could not give them the least annoyance, either during or before an engagement. On one side, they were flanked by walls, and houses, and trees

and a marsh; and on the other by precipices. They also felled some trees that grew near; and, carrying them down to the shore, they piled them into a barricade for the defence of their ships; and to cover them on the side of Dascon. They also expeditiously threw up a rampart, on the part which seemed most accessible to the enemy, of stones picked out for the purpose, and timber, and broke down the bridge of the Anapus.

Thus busied as they were on fortifying their camp, not so much as one person ventured out of the city to obstruct their proceedings. The first who appeared to make any resistance, were the Syracusan cavalry; and, when once they had shown themselves, the whole body of their infantry was soon in sight. They advanced first of all quite up to the Athenian works; but, when they perceived that they would not sally out to fight them, they again retreated: and, having crossed the road to Helorum, reposed themselves for the night.

The succeeding day, the Athenians and allies prepared for engagement, and their order of battle was formed as follows:—The Argives and Mantineans had the right, the Athenians the centre, and the rest of the line was formed by the other confederates. One half of the whole force, which was ranged in the first line, was drawn up by eight in depth. The other half, being posted near the tents, formed a hollow square, in which the men were also drawn up by eight. The latter were ordered, if any part of the line gave way, to keep a good look-out and advance to their support. And within this hollow square they posted all the train who attended the service of the army.

But the Syracusans drew up their heavy-armed, which body consisted of the whole military strength of Syracuse and all the confederates who had joined them, in files consisting of sixteen. Those who had joined with auxiliary quotas, were chiefly the Selinuntians; and next, the horse of the Geloans, amounting in the whole to about two hundred: the horse also of the Camarineans, about twenty in number, and about fifty archers. But their horsemen they posted to the right, being not fewer in number than twelve hundred; and next to them, the darters.

The Athenians being now intent on advancing to the charge, Nicias, addressing himself in regular order to the troops of the several states,

animated them to the fight by the following harangue, repeated in turn to the whole army.

“What need, my fellow-soldiers, of a long exhortation, since we are here, determined, and resolute for action? for this our present arrangement seems to me a stronger confirmation of your courage, than any words could be, how eloquently soever delivered, if we were inferior in strength. But when, Argives, and Mantineans, and Athenians, and the flower of the isles, we are here assembled together,—how is it possible, when such brave and numerous allies are to fight in company, that we should not entertain a steadfast, nay the warmest hope, that the victory will be our own? nay more, as we have to do with a promiscuous crowd, the mob of a city, not selected for service, as we have had the honour to be; and who, it must be added, are but Sicilians; who, though affecting to despise us, will never sustain our charge, because their skill is far beneath their courage.

“Let every soldier farther recall to his remembrance, that he is now at a vast distance from his native soil, and near no friendly land but what you shall render such by the efforts of your valour. Such things I am bound to suggest to your remembrance, the reverse, I am well convinced of what your enemies utter for their mutual encouragement. They undoubtedly are roaring aloud—‘It is for your country you are now to fight.’ But I tell you, that from your country you are now remote; and, as such, must either conquer, or not without difficulty ever see it again, since the numerous cavalry of the enemy will press hard upon our retreat. Call therefore to mind your own dignity and worth; advance with alacrity to assault your foes; convinced that your present necessities and wants are far more terrible than the enemy you are to engage.”

When Nicias had finished this exhortation, he led on his army towards the encounter. But the Syracusans were not yet prepared, as by no means expecting to be charged so soon; and some of the soldiers, as the city lay so near, were straggled thither. These however came running with all eagerness and speed to gain their posts; too late upon the whole; but as each of them met with any number intent on action, he ranged himself in their company. The Syracusans, to do them justice, were not deficient in alacrity or cou-

rage, neither in the present battle nor any of the following. They maintained their ground gallantly so long as their competence of skill enabled them; but when that failed them, they were forced, though with reluctance, to slacken in their ardour. However, though far from imagining that the Athenians would presume to begin the attack, and though obliged in a hurry to stand on their defence, they took up their arms, and advanced immediately to meet their foe.

In the first place, therefore, the flingers of stones with either the hand or the sling, and the archers, on both sides, began the engagement; and alternately chased one another, as is generally the case among the bodies of the light-armed. In the next place, the soothsayers brought forwards and immolated the solemn victims; and the trumpets summoned the heavy-armed to close firm together, and advance.

All sides now began to face; the Syracusans to fight for their country; each soldier amongst them for his native soil, to earn, for the present his preservation, and for the future his liberty.—On their enemies' side, the Athenians to gain possession of a foreign country, and not to damage their own by a dastardly behaviour; the Argives and voluntary part of the confederates, to procure for the Athenians a happy accomplishment of their schemes, and again to visit their own country, to which they were endeared, victorious and triumphant; and that part of the confederacy which attended in obedience to the orders of their masters, were highly animated by the thought, that they must earn their safety now at once, or, if defeated now, must for the future despair, and then, secretly actuated perhaps by the distant hope, that, were others reduced to the Athenian yoke, their own bondage might be rendered more light and easy.

The business being now come to blows, they for a long time maintained the ground on both sides. It happened, farther, that some claps of thunder were heard, attended with lightning and a heavy rain. This caused a sudden consternation in the Syracusans, who now for the first time engaged the Athenians, and had gained very little experience in the affairs of war. But by the more experienced enemy, these accidents were interpreted as the ordinary effects of the season; and their concern was rather employed upon the enemy, whom

they found no easy conquest. But the Argives, having first of all defeated the left wing of the Syracusans, and the Athenians being afterwards successful in their quarter of the battle, the whole Syracusan army was soon thrown into disorder, and began the flight. The Athenians however did not continue the pursuit to any great distance; for the Syracusan cavalry, as they were numerous and unbroken, put a stop to the chase by attacking those parties of heavy-armed whom they saw detached for the pursuit, and driving them back into their own line. Having pursued only so far as they could in an orderly and secure manner, they again retreated and carried a trophy.

But the Syracusans, who had rallied again in the road to Helorum, and were drawn up as well as the present posture of affairs would permit, send a strong detachment from that body for the guard of Olympiseum, apprehensive that the Athenians might otherwise seize the treasures that were deposited there. And, this being done, with the remainder of their force they retired within the walls of Syracuse.

The Athenians in the meantime made no advances against Olympiseum; but, after gathering together the bodies of their slain, and laying them upon the funeral pyre, they passed the night on the field of battle.

The next day they delivered up their dead under truce to the Syracusans, of whom and their allies there had perished about two hundred and sixty men; and then gathered up the bones of their own. Of the Athenians and their allies about fifty in all were slain. And now, with all the pillage they had made of the enemy, they sailed back to Catana.

This was owing to the season of the year, now advanced to winter. It was no longer judged possible for them to be able to continue the war in their present post before they had procured a supply of horse from Athens, and had assembled others from their confederates in Sicily, that they might not be entirely exposed to the horse of the enemy. They were also intent on collecting pecuniary aids in those parts, and some were expected from Athens.—“They might also obtain the concurrence of some other cities, which they hoped would prove more tractable, since they had gained a battle: they wanted, farther, to furnish themselves with provisions and all necessary stores, which might enable them

early in the spring to make new attempts on Syracuse." Determined by these considerations, they sailed back to Naxos and Catana, in order to winter there.

The Syracusans, after they had performed the obsequies of their slain, called a general assembly of the people. And on this occasion Hermocrates, the son of Hermon, (a man who was inferior to none in all other branches of human prudence, who for military skill was in high reputation, and renowned for bravery,) standing forth among them, endeavoured to encourage them, and prevent their being too much dispirited by their late defeat.

He told them, "that in courage they had not been worsted, but their want of discipline had done them harm: and yet the harm suffered by that was not near so great as they might justly have expected; especially when, no better than a rabble of mechanics, they had been obliged to enter the lists, against the most experienced soldiery of Greece; that what hurt them most was too large a number of generals, and the multiplicity of commands which was thence occasioned, (for the number of those who commanded was fifteen,) whilst the bulk of their army observed no discipline, and obeyed no orders at all: but were only a few skilful generals selected for the trust, would they only be intent this winter on training their bodies of heavy-armed, and furnish others with arms who had none for themselves, in order to enlarge their number as much as possible and inure them to settled exercise and use,—he assured them, thus, in all probability, they must upon the whole be too hard for their foes, as their natural portion of valour was great, and skill would be attained by practice: that both of these would progressively become more perfect; discipline, by being exercised through a series of danger; and inward bravery would merely of itself increase in gallant confidence, when assured of the support of skill; as to generals, that few only, and those invested with absolute power, ought to be elected and confirmed by a solemn oath from the people, that they were permitted to lead the army where and how they judged best for the public service. For by this means, what ought to be concealed would be less liable to detection, and all the schemes of war might be directed with order and a certainty of success."

The Syracusans, who had listened to this dis-

course, decreed whatever he proposed. They elected Hermocrates himself to be a general, and Heraclides the son of Lysimachus, and Sicanus the son of Hecæstus; these three. They also appointed ambassadors to go to Corinth and Lacedæmon, to procure the alliance of those states, and to persuade the Lacedæmonians to make hotter war upon the Athenians, with an open avowal that they acted in behalf of the Syracusans; that, by this means, they might either be obliged to recall their fleet from Sicily, or might be less able to send any reinforcements to the army already there.

The Athenian forces, which lay at Catana, soon made an excursion from thence to Messene, expecting to have it betrayed into their power. But all the steps taken previously for the purpose, were totally disconcerted. For Alcibiades, upon his quitting the command when recalled to Athens, being convinced within himself that exile must be his portion, betrayed the whole project (as he had been in the secret) to such persons at Messene as were attached to the Syracusans. The first step this party took was to put to death all the persons against whom he informed. And at the time of this attempt, being quite in a ferment and under arms, they carried their point, so that those who wished to give it were obliged to refuse admission to the Athenians. The Athenians, therefore, after thirteen days' continuance on that coast, when the weather began to be tempestuous, when their provisions failed, and no hope of success appeared, returned to Naxos*,¹ where, having thrown up an entrenchment round their camp, they continued the rest of the winter. They also despatched a trireme to Athens, to forward a supply of money and horsemen to join them without fail, by the beginning of the spring.

The Syracusans employed themselves this winter in fortifying their city. They inclosed Temenites within their new works, and carried their wall through all that length of ground which faceth Epipolæ, that, in case they should be unable to keep the field, the enemy might have as little room as possible to raise counter-works of annoyance. They also placed a garrison at Megara, and another in Olympiæum.

¹ In the original is added *καὶ Θέρμους*. But all the editors and note-writers give it up, and own they can make nothing of it.

And all along the sea they drove rows of piles, wherever the ground was convenient for descents. Knowing, also, that the Athenians wintered at Naxos, they marched out with all their force against Catana. They ravaged the territory of the Catanæans; and, after burning the tents and camp of the Athenians, they returned home.

Having also had intelligence, that the Athenians had sent an embassy to Camarina, under favour of a treaty made formerly with them by Laches, to try if it were possible to procure their concurrence; they also despatched an embassy thither, to traverse the negotiation. For the Camarinæans were suspected by them, as if they had not cordially sent in their quota of assistance for the first battle, and lest for the future they might be totally averse from acting in their support, as in that battle they had seen the Athenians victorious, and so, induced by the former treaty they had made with the latter, might now declare openly on their side.

When therefore Hermocrates and others were arrived at Camarina from Syracuse, and, from the Athenians, Euphemus and his colleagues in the embassy, an assembly of the Camarinæans was held, in which, Hermocrates, desirous to give them a timely distaste against the Athenians, harangued them thus:

"Our embassy hither, ye men of Camarina, hath not been occasioned by any fears we were under, that you might be too much terrified at the great equipment with which the Athenians have invaded us; but rather by our knowledge with what kind of arguments they would impose on your understanding, by which before we had an opportunity to remonstrate, they might seduce you into a concurrence. Sicily in fact they have invaded, upon such pretext as you have heard them give out; but with such intentions as we have all abundant reason to suspect. And to me it is clear, that their schemes have no tendency to replant the Leontines, but rather to supplant us all. For, how is it reconcilable with common sense, that a people, who have ever been employed in the ruin of the states which are neighbouring to Athens, should be sincere in re-establishing a Sicilian people; or, by the bonds of consanguinity, hold themselves obliged to protect the Leontines, who are of Chalcidic descent, whilst on the Chalcidæans of Eubœa, from whom these others are a colony, they hold fast-rivettèd the yoke of slavery? No; it is the same cruel

policy, that subjugated the Grecians in that part of the world, which now exerts itself to glut their ambition in this.

"These are those very Athenians, who, formerly, having been elected their common leaders by the well-designing Ionians and other confederate body which derived from them their descent, on the glorious pretence of avenging themselves on the Persian monarch, abused their trust by enslaving those who placed confidence in them; charging upon them with deserting the common cause, others with their mutual embroilments, and all, at length, with different but specious criminations. And on the whole, these Athenians waged war against the Mede, not in the cause of Grecian liberty, as neither did the other Grecians in the defence of their own: the former fought not indeed to subject the rest of Greece to the Mede, but to their own selves; the latter, merely to obtain a change of master; the master not inferior in policy, but far more abundant in malice.

"But, though Athens, on manifold accounts, be obnoxious to universal censure and reproach, yet we are not come hither to prove how justly she deserveth it, since your own conviction precludes the long detail. We are much more concerned at present to censure and reprove ourselves, since, with all the examples before our eyes of what the Grecians in those parts have suffered, who, for want of guarding against their encroachments, have fallen victims to their ambition,—since, with the certain knowledge that they are now playing the same sophistries upon us,—“the replantation of their kindred Leontines,”—“the support of the Egestæans, their allies,”—we show no inclination to unite together in our common defence, in order to give them most signal proof, that in Sicily are neither Ionians, nor Hellenes, nor islanders, who will be always, though ever changing their master, one with to the Mede, and soon after to whoever will please to govern;—but, on the contrary, that we are Dorians, who from Peloponnesus, that seat of liberty and independence, came to dwell in Sicily. Shall we, therefore, protract our union, till, city after city, we are compelled to a submission? we, who are convinced that thus only we can be conquered, and when we even behold that thus our foes have dressed up their plan; amongst some of our people scattering dissensions, setting others to war down each

other for the mighty recompense of their alliance, cajoling the rest as may best soothe the pride or caprice of each, and avail themselves of these methods to work our ruin? We even indulge the wild imagination, that though a remote inhabitant of Sicily be destroyed, the danger can never come home to ourselves; and that he who precedes us in ruin is unhappy only in and for himself.

"Is there now a man amongst you who imagines, that merely a Syracusan, and not himself, is the object of Athenian enmity, and pronounceth it hard that he must be exposed to dangers in which I only am concerned? Let such a one with more solidity reflect that, not merely for what is mine, but equally also for what is his own, he should associate with me, though within my precincts; and that this may be done with greater security now, since as yet I am not quite destroyed, since in me he is sure of a steadfast ally, and before he is bereaved of all support may hazard the contention. And let him farther rest assured, that it is not the sole view of the Athenian to bridle enmity in a Syracusan; but, under the colour of that pretext, to render himself the more secure, by gaining for a time the friendship of another.

"If others, again, entertain any envy or jealousy of Syracuse, for, to each of these, great states are generally obnoxious, and would take delight in seeing us depressed, in order to teach us moderation, though not totally destroyed, from a regard to his own preservation,—these are such sanguine wishes, as, in the course of human affairs, can never be accomplished; because it is quite impossible, that the same person shall build up airy schemes to soothe his own passions and then insure their success. And thus, should some sinister event take place, quite sunk under the weight of his own calamity, he would perhaps be soon wishing again, that I was so replaced as to excite his envy. Impossible this, for one who abandoned my defence, who refused beforehand to participate my dangers,—dangers, though not in name, yet in reality, his own. For, if names alone be regarded, he acts in the support of my power; but, if realities, of his own preservation.

"Long since, ye men of Camarina, it was incumbent on you, who are borderers upon us, and must be our seconds in ruin, to have foreseen these things, and not to have abetted our

defence with so much remissness as you have hitherto done it. You ought to have repaired to our support with free and voluntary aid; with such as, in case the Athenians had begun first with Camarina, you would have come with earnest prayers to implore from us: so cordial and so alert you should have appeared in our behalf, to avert us from too precipitate submissions. But these things never were; not even you, nor any other people, have showed such affection or alacrity for us.

"From timorousness of heart you will study perhaps to manage both with us and the invaders, and allege, that there are treaties subsisting between yourselves and the Athenians. Yet these treaties you never made to hurt your friends, but to repel the efforts of your foes, should they dare to attack you. By them you are bound to give defensive aid to the Athenians when attacked by others, and not when they, as in the present case, injuriously fall upon your neighbours. Remember that the Rhegians, though even of Chalcidic descent, have refused to concur with them in replanting the Leontines, who are also Chalcideans. Hard, indeed, is your fate, if they, suspecting some bad design to lie lurking under a fair justification, have recourse to the wary moderate behaviour which appearances will not warrant; whilst you, on the pretended ground of a rational conduct, are eager to serve a people who are by nature your foes; and join with most implacable enemies to destroy your own kindred, to whom nature hath so closely attached you!

"In such a conduct there is no justice: the justice lies in abetting our cause, and not dastardly shrinking before the terror of their arms. These arms are not terrible, would we only all combine in our mutual defence; they are only so, if, on the contrary, we continue disunited, the point which the Athenians labour with so much assiduity. For, even when singly against us they entered the lists, and were victorious, yet they were not able to effectuate their designs, but were obliged precipitately to re-embark. If united, therefore, what farther can we have to fear? What hinders us from associating together with instant alacrity and zeal? especially as we soon shall receive an aid from Peloponnesus, who in all the business of war are far superior to Athenians. Reject, I say, the vain presumption, that either it will be equitable in regard to us, or prudential in regard to yourselves,

to take part with neither side, on pretence that you have treaties subsisting with both, there is a fallacy in it, which, though veiled under plausible words, the event will soon detect. For if, through your determination to abandon his support, the party already attacked be vanquished, and the assailant be invigorated by success, what can such absenting of yourselves avail, but to help forwards the ruin of the one, and afford free scope to the pernicious schemes of the other? And how glorious would the reverse of this conduct be, would you exert your efforts to redress the injured, who also by the ties of consanguinity have a right to expect it from you; to guard the common welfare of Sicily; and not suffer your friends, your good friends, the Athenians, to run out into a course of outrage!

"In a word, we Syracusans have now only this to add: that arguments are superfluous, either for the instruction of you or of others, in points whose tendency you know as clearly as ourselves. But we earnestly conjure you, and, if prayers will not avail, we boldly protest against you, that, as the worst designs are formed against us by our eternal foes, the Ionians, you would act as your ought;—if not, that by you we are basely betrayed, Dorians by Dorians. If such must be our fate, if by the Athenians we must be destroyed, they will be indebted for their success to your determinations, but the glory of it will be totally assumed by themselves. Nay, the chief reward they will reap from the victory will be this, to enslave the persons who enabled them to gain it. But then, should the victory rest with us, you are the men from whom we shall exact revenge for all the dangers to which we have been exposed. Examine things, therefore, and declare your resolution, either at once, without embarking into dangers, to put on the Athenian chains; or, with us, to face the storm and earn your preservation; not basely bending to the yoke of foreign tyrants, and preventing an enmity with us which will not quickly be appeased."

In these words Hermocrates harangued the Camarineans: and, when he had ended, Euphemus, ambassador of the Athenians, replied as follows;

"Our journey hither was intended for the renewal of a former alliance; but, as this Syracusan hath taken the liberty to be severe upon us, we lie under an obligation to show the justice of our title to that share of dominion which

we now possess. And the strongest evidence of this he himself hath been pleased to give, by affirming, that Ionians have been eternal foes to Dorians. The fact is incontestably true; since we, who are Ionians, have been necessitated to stand ever upon our guard against the encroaching designs of the Peloponnesians, who are Dorians, who are our superiors in number, and are seated upon our borders. When, therefore, in the close of the Persian invasion, we saw ourselves masters of a navy, we asserted our own independence from the government and guidance of the Lacedæmonians, since no shadow of reason could be found why we should be obedient to them any more than they to us, save only that in this critical period their strength was greater. We were afterwards appointed, by free election, the leaders of those Ionians who had formerly been subject to the monarch. And the preference awarded to us we continue to support; assured that only thus we shall escape subjection to the Peloponnesian yoke, by keeping possession of a power which can effectually awe all their encroachments. And, farther, (that we may come to particulars,) it was not with injustice that we exacted subjection from those Ionians, and inhabitants of the isles, whom the Syracusans we thought proper to enslave, though connected with us by the ties of blood: for they marched, in company with the Medæ, against their mother-country, against us, their founders. They had not the courage to expose their own homes to ruin and devastation, by an honest revolt, though we with magnanimity abandoned even Athens itself. They made slavery their choice, and in the same miserable fate would have been glad to envelop us. Thus solid are the grounds on which we found our title to that extensive rule we now enjoy. We honestly deserve it: since, in the cause of Greece, we equipped the largest fleet, and exerted the greatest ardour, without the least equivocation; and since those others acting, with implicit obedience to the Medæ, did all they could to distress us. To which let it be added, that we were at the same time desirous to obtain a strength sufficient to give a check to the ambition of Peloponnesians. Submissive, therefore, to their dictates, we are not, will not be; because, either in return for the repulse of the barbarian by our single efforts, or in requital of the dangers we bravely encountered in defence of the liberty of those Ionians,—greater than all the rest of Greece

or even they themselves, durst hazard for their own,—we have an undoubted right to empire.

“But, farther, to guard its own liberties and rights is a privilege, which, without either murmur or envy, will be allowed to every state: and now, for the security of these important points to ourselves, have we ventured hither to beg your concurrence; conscious, at the same time, ye men of Camarina, that your welfare too coincides with our own. This we can clearly demonstrate, even from those criminalations which our adversaries here have lavished upon us, and from those so terrible suspicions which you yourselves are inclined to entertain of our proceedings. We are not now to learn that men, who with some high degrees of horror suspect latent mischief, may for the present be soothed by an insinuating flow of words; but, when summoned to action, will so exert themselves as is expedient for their welfare: and, consonant to this, we have already hinted that through fear alone we seized that power which we now possess in Greece; that through the same motive we have ventured hither, to establish our own security in concert with that of our friends; so far from the view of enslaving them to ourselves, that we are solely intent on preserving them from being enslaved by others.

“Let no man here retort upon us,—that all our solicitude for you is unmerited and superfluous. Such a one must know, that, so long as you are safe, so long as you are able to employ the Syracusans, the less liable they will be to send reinforcements from hence to the Peloponnesians for our annoyance: and as this is the real state of things, our concern should most largely be bestowed upon you. By parity of reason it also highly concerns us to replant the Leontines; not in order to render them vassals to ourselves, as their relations of Eubœa are, but to make them as strong and powerful as we are able; that, seated as they then will be on her confines, they may compensate our remote situation in affording a diversion to Syracuse. For, if the view be carried back to Greece, we ourselves are there a match for our foes. The Chalcidean there, whom after unjustly enslaving we are taxed with absurdity for pretending to vindicate here, is highly serviceable to us; because he is disarmed, and because he furnisheth us with a tribute. But, here in Sicily, our interest demandeth, that the Leontines, and the whole

body of our friends, be restored to the full enjoyment of all their liberty and strength.

“Now, to a potentate invested with superior power, or to a state possessed of empire, nothing that is profitable can be deemed absurd; nothing secure that cannot be safely managed. Incidents will arise with which we must temporize, and determine accordingly our enmity or our friendship. But the latter makes most for our interest here, where we ought by no means to weaken our friends, but through the strength of our friends, to keep down and disable our enemies. Of this you ought not to rest incredulous, as you know, that over our dependents in Greece, we either hold tight or slacken the rein, as squares best with the public service. We permit to the Chians and Methymneans the free use of their liberties and laws for a quota of shipping; we do the same to many for an annual tribute, exacted perhaps with somewhat of rigour. Others amongst them, who fight under our orders, are absolutely free, though seated upon islands and easy to be totally reduced, because they are commodiously situated to annoy the Peloponnesian coast. And hence, it may be depended upon, that we shall make such dispositions also here as are most expedient for our own interest, and may best lessen the dread, which, as was said before, we entertain of the Syracusans.

“The point at which they aim is an extent of their rule over you; and when, by alarming your suspicions of us, they have wrought you to their own purpose, either by open force or taking advantage of your desolate condition, when we are repulsed and obliged to abandon your defence, they intend to subdue all Sicily to their yoke. Such the event will unavoidably prove, if at present you adhere to them: for never again will it be easy for us to assemble together so large an armament to give a check to their ambition; nor, when we are no longer at hand for your support, will their strength against you be insufficient. It is vain in any man to indulge an opinion that this may not be the case, since the very train of things evinceth its truth. For, when first you invited us hither, it was not upon the suggestion of any other fear than this, that, should we suffer you to be subjected by the Syracusans, the danger then would extend itself to us. And highly unjust it would be now, if the argument you successfully enforced with us

should lose all its influence upon you, or should you ground suspicions on our present appearance against them, with a force superior to theirs, when you ought much more to entertain an endless distrust of them. The truth is this, that without your concurrence we are not able to continue here. And in case, with perfidy open and avowed, we make seizure of your cities, yet we are unable to retain their possession, remote as they lie from Athens; as cities so large we never could garrison; and as they are farther provided in all respects as well as any on the continent. But, on the contrary, the Syracusans will not rush upon you from a camp upon the beach; but, posted in a city more formidable in strength than the whole of our armament, they are ever meditating your ruin, and, when they have seized a proper opportunity, will strike the blow. They have afforded you instances of this already, and a flagrant one indeed in the case of the Leontines. And yet they have the effrontery now, by words, as if you were so to be deluded, to exasperate you against us, who have hitherto controlled their views, and deterred them to this moment from making all Sicily their prey.

"Our arguments have a tendency directly opposite. We have nothing in view but your certain and assured preservation, when we earnestly conjure you not wilfully to betray the means which at present will result from our union, which we can mutually exert in one another's behalf; and strongly to represent to your own reflections, that, even without the concurrence of allies, a road to your reduction will at any time be open to these Syracusans through their own superior numbers; but an opportunity exceedingly seldom afforded you to make head against them with so large an auxiliary body. And if, from groundless suspicions, you suffer now so large a body to depart either unsuccessful or defeated, yet a time will come when you will ardently wish to see them return, though in a much less proportion of strength, and they have it no longer in their power to cross the sea for your support. Take care, therefore, Camarineans, that neither yourselves nor others be deceived by a too credulous belief of the bold calumniations these Syracusans utter. We have now laid before you the true ground of all those sad suspicions which are fomented against us; but shall again recall them to your remem-

brance by a short recapitulation; that they may have the proper influence upon you.

"We declare, therefore, that we rule in Greece merely to prevent our being enslaved; but are intent on vindicating liberty in Sicily, to suppress that annoyance which might otherwise be given us from hence;—that mere necessity obligeth us to embark in many undertakings, because we have many sinister incidents to guard against;—that now and formerly we came hither to support those Sicilians who have been unjustly oppressed; nor uninvited, but solemnly conjured to take such steps. Attempt not, therefore, to divert our pursuits, either by erecting yourselves into censors of our proceedings, or into correctors of our politics, a point too difficult for you to manage. But, so much of our activity or conduct as you can mould into a consistency with your own welfare, lay hold of that, and employ it to your best advantage; and never imagine that our politics are equally prejudicial to all the world besides, but highly beneficial to the bulk of the Grecians. For, through every quarter, even those which we cannot pretend to control, both such as dread impending mischiefs and such as meditate encroachments,—laying hold on both sides of the ready expectation; the former, that redress may be obtained by our interposition; the latter, that, if we think proper to oppose them, their own safety will be greatly endangered;—both sides, I say, are hence obliged; the latter, to practice moderation, though with regret; the former, to enjoy tranquillity without previous embroilments of the public peace. The security, therefore, which now offers itself to your acceptance, and is always ready for those who want it, you are conjured by no means to reject; but relying, like other communities, on that quantity of support we are able to afford you, put the change for once on the Syracusans; and, instead of being ever on the watch against them, force them at length to be watchful and alarmed for themselves."

Such was the reply of Euphemus. In the meantime the real disposition of the Camarineans was this: at bottom they were well-affected to the Athenians, save only for the ambition they showed of enslaving Sicily; but had ever been embroiled with the Syracusans, through that jealousy, ever to be found in a neighbouring state. But, as the dread of vio-

tory on the side of the Syracusans, who were close upon their borders, if earned without their concurrence, had influenced their measures, they sent a small party of horse to succour them on the former occasion; and looked upon themselves as obliged in policy to serve them underhand in future exigencies, but with all possible frugality and reserve; and, at the present juncture, that they might not betray any the least partiality against the Athenians, as they were come off victorious from a battle, to return the same impartial reply to both. Determined, therefore, by these considerations, they answered,—that, “since a war had broke out between two states, each of which was in alliance with themselves, they judged the only method of acting consistently with their oaths would be, to observe a strict neutrality.” Upon this the ambassadors of both parties took their leaves and departed. And the Syracusans, within themselves, exerted their utmost applications to get all things in readiness for war.

The Athenians, who were now encamped at *Naxos*, opened negotiations with the *Siculi*, to draw over as many of them as was possible into their adherence. Many of these, who inhabited the plains, and were most awed by the Syracusans, stood resolutely out; but the generality of those who were seated in the midland parts, as they were now, and had ever kept themselves uncontrolled, sided at once with the Athenians. They furnished them with corn for the service of the army, and there were some who supplied them with money. And then the Athenians, taking the field against such as refused to accede, forced some to a compliance, and prevented others from receiving garrisons and aids from Syracuse. During winter also they removed again from *Naxos* to *Catana*; and having repaired their camp, which had been burned by the Syracusans, chose to pass the remainder of the winter there.

They also despatched a trireme to Carthage, to ask their friendship, and whatever assistance could possibly be obtained. They sent also to *Tuscany*, as some cities on that coast had made them voluntary offers of assistance. And, farther, they circulated their orders among the *Siculi*, and despatched in particular one to the *Egesteans*, “to send them as large a number of horses as they could possibly procure.” They busied themselves in collecting materials

for circumvallation, such as bricks and iron, and all other necessary stores; being determined to carry on the war with vigour on the first approach of spring.

The ambassadors, who from Syracuse were sent to Corinth and Lacedæmon, endeavoured in their passage to prevail with the Italians “not to look with unconcern on the Athenian proceedings, since they also were equally involved in the danger.” But, when arrived at Corinth, they were admitted to an audience, in which they insisted on a speedy supply, upon the plea of consanguinity; and the Corinthians came at once to a resolution, by way of precedent to others, that, “with all possible ardour they would join in their defence.” They even appointed an embassy of their own to accompany them to Lacedæmon, whose instructions were, to second them in soliciting the Lacedæmonians “to declare open war at home against the Athenians, and to fit out an aid for the service of Sicily.”

At the time that these joint embassies arrived at Lacedæmon from Corinth, Alcibiades was also there. He had no sooner made his escape, attended by his companions in exile, than in a trading-vessel he passed over from *Thuria* to *Cyllene* in *Elea*; and from thence he repaired to Lacedæmon. But, as the Lacedæmonians had pressed to see him, he went thither under the protection of the public faith; for he had with reason dreaded his reception there, since he had acted so large a part in the affair of *Mantineæ*.

It happened farther, that, when a public assembly was convened at Sparta, the Corinthians, and the Syracusans, and Alcibiades, all urged the same request, and were successful. Nay, though the college of ephori, and those who presided at the helm of the state, had dressed up a plan, in pursuance of which they were only to send their ambassadors to Syracuse, to hinder all accommodations with the Athenians, and were quite averse to the supplying them with real succours.—yet Alcibiades, standing up, inflamed the Lacedæmonian fury, and wrought them to his purpose by the following harangue:

“I lie under a necessity, in the beginning of my discourse, to vindicate myself from the calumny which hath been charged against me, lest a jealousy of me might divert your attention from those points which equally affect the

common cause. My ancestors, therefore, having, upon some reasonable grounds of complaint, renounced the privilege of being the public hosts of your embassies at Athens, I am the man who again re-established this hospitable intercourse; who in many other respects endeavoured with great assiduity to oblige you, and particularly in the calamity which fell to your share at Pylus. I cheerfully persevered in these my favourable inclinations towards you, till you yourselves, bent on accommodating your differences with the Athenians, employed my adversaries to negotiate your affairs; and as thereby you invested them with authority, you of course reflected disgrace on me. With reason, therefore, after such provocations, you were afterwards thwarted by me, when I supported the interest of the Mantineans and the Argives, and introduced new measures into the state, in opposition to you. Let therefore such of your number as, chagrined at what they suffered then, continue unjustly their resentments against me, weigh now the force of those reasons on which I acted, and return to better temper. If again I suffer in the opinion of any man, because I have ever manifested an attachment to the interest of the people, let him also learn that his enmity to me on that account is not to be defended. We have borne, from time immemorial, a steadfast unrelenting aversion to tyrants: now the whole of opposition to the despotic power of one is expressed by this word, the people; and on this principle alone our firm and constant adherence to the multitude hath been hitherto carried on and supported. Besides, as the state of which I was a member was purely democratical, I lay under a necessity, in many respects, of conforming my conduct to the established model; and yet I endeavoured to give the public measures a greater share of moderation than the frantic humour of the Athenians was judged capable of brooking. But incendiaries started up; such as, not only in earlier times, but even in our own, have driven the people to more furious measures, and have at length effected—the exile of Alcibiades. But, so long as the state was in my own management, I thought myself justified, could I preserve it in that height of grandeur and freedom, and on the same model of government, in which I found it. Not but that the judicious part of our community are sensible what sort of a

government a democracy is,—and I myself less than others, who have such abundant occasion to reproach and curse it:—but, for madness open and avowed, new terms of abhorrence cannot be invented; though totally to subvert it we could in no wise deem a means of security, whilst you had declared yourselves our foes, and were in the field against us. And all those proceedings of mine, which have proved most offensive to you, are to be charged entirely to such principles as these.

“And now, in relation to these points on which you are here assembled to deliberate, (and I also with you,) and about which I am able to give you a greater light, I am bound to do it,—attend to what I am going to declare. Our principal view in the expedition to Sicily was, if possible, to reduce the Sicilians to a yoke. After them, we intended to do the same by the Italians. We should next have attempted the dominions of the Carthaginians, nay, Carthage itself. Had these our views been successful, either in the whole or in the greater part, we should soon have given battle to the attack to Peloponnesus: assembling for this purpose the whole Grecian force, which those countries thus subdued must have added to our own; taking also into our pay large bodies of Barbarians and Iberians, and other soldiers of those nations which by general consent are famed for the most warlike of all Barbarians. We should have built also great numbers of triremes for the enlargement of our navy, as Italy would plentifully have supplied us with timber; with which blocking up Peloponnesus on all sides, and with our land-forces at the same time invading it by land, (after conquering your cities, some by storm, and some by the regular siege,) we hoped without obstruction to have warred you down, and in pursuance of that, to have seized the empire of universal Greece. With money and all needful stores adequate to this extensive plan, the cities to be conquered in those remoter parts would with all proper expedition have supplied us, without any demands on our own domestic revenues. Such were to be the achievements of that great armament which is now abroad; such, you may rest assured upon the evidence of a person who was privy to every step, was its original plan; and the generals who are left in the command will yet, if they are able, carry it into execution. And I must farther beg leave to tell

you, that, if with timely succours you do not interpose, nothing in those parts will be able to stand before them.

"The Sicilians are a people unexperienced in war; and yet, would they unite and combine together in their mutual defence, they might possibly even now be too hard for the Athenians. But then the Syracusans, abandoned as they are by the rest, and we already have seen their whole force defeated in battle, and who are blocked up in their own harbours by the enemy's fleet, will be unable long to resist the great force of the Athenians which is already there. If, therefore, Syracuse be taken, all Sicily is vanquished at a stroke, and Italy becomes instantly their prey; and then the storm, which, as I intimated before, was to be directed against you from that quarter, will in a short time gather and come pouring down upon you.

"Let no one therefore imagine that the end of your present deliberation is the safety of Sicily, when Peloponnesus itself will be endangered, unless some measures of prevention be executed with speed:—unless you send out a naval force, for the preservation of Sicily, so dexterously appointed, that the hands who man the ships and ply the oar, may, on the instant of their landing, become a body of heavy-armed; and, what in my judgment is better than an army, a citizen of Sparta to take upon him the command, that those who are ready he may discipline to service, and for such to join as on choice would refuse their concurrence: for, by such a step, those who are already your friends will be animated with higher degrees of resolution, and those who fluctuate at present will join you with a smaller sense of fear.

"It behoves you also to make war upon the Athenians at home in a more declared and explicit manner; that the Syracusans, convinced that you have their welfare at heart, may make a more obstinate resistance, and the Athenians be rendered less able to send reinforcements to their troops in Sicily.

"It behoves you farther to raise fortifications at Decelea in Attica; a step which the Athenians have ever most terribly apprehended, and think that in that point alone you have not put their resolution to its utmost trial in the present war; and that assuredly must be pronounced the most effectual method of distressing an enemy, to discover what he dreads most, and then know how to afflict him in his

most tender part: for it is a reasonable conclusion, that they will tremble most at incidents which, should they take place, they are inwardly convinced must most sensibly affect them. As to the benefits which you yourselves shall reap by fortifying Decelea, and of what they shall be debarred, I shall pass over many, and only concisely point out the most important.—By this, all the natural commodities of the country will fall into your hands; some by way of booty, the rest by voluntary contributions. They will instantly be deprived of the profits of the silver mines at Laurium, as well as of the rents of their estates and the fees of their courts. The tributes from their dependents will also be paid with less punctuality; since the latter shall no sooner perceive that you are earnestly bent on war, than they will show an open disregard for Athens.

"That these or any of these points be executed with despatch and vigour, dependeth, ye Lacedæmonians, on yourselves alone. I can confidently aver that all are feasible, and I think I shall not prove mistaken in my sentiments. I ought not to suffer in the opinion of any Lacedæmonian, though once accounted the warmest of her patriots, I now strenuously join the most inveterate foes of my country; nor ought my sincerity to be suspected by any, as if I suited my words to the sharp resentments of an exile. I am driven from my country, through the malice of men, who have prevailed against me: but not from your service, if you hearken to my counsels. Your enmity is sooner to be forgiven, who have hurt your enemies alone, than theirs, who by cruel treatment compel friends to be foes. My patriotism is far from thriving under the injustice I have suffered; it was merely an effect of gratitude for that protection I once enjoyed from my country. Nor have I reason at present to imagine, that against my country I am now going to march, so much as to recover some country to myself, when at present I have none at all. And I judge the person to be a true lover of his country,—not him who, exiled from it, abandons himself without a struggle to his own iniquitous fate, but—who, from a fondness for it, leaves no project unattempted to recover it again.

"As these are my sentiments, I may fairly, ye Lacedæmonians, insist upon your acceptance of my service without diffidence or fear, what

ever dangers or whatever miseries may hereafter result. You well know the maxim, which universal consent will evince to be good,—that if, when an enemy, I hurt you much, when I am now become your friend, I can help you more. Nay, for the latter I am better qualified on this very account, that I am perfectly acquainted with the state of Athens; whereas I was only able to conjecture at yours. And, as you are now met together to form resolutions on points of the highest importance, I conjure you without hesitation to carry your arms at once into Sicily and Attica; to the end that, in the former, by the presence of a small part of your forces, you may work out signal preservations, and at home pull down the present and even the future growth of the Athenians; that, for ages to come, yourselves may reap security and peace, and preside at the helm of united Greece, which will cheerfully acquiesce under your guidance, and pay you a free, uncompelled obedience."

To this purpose Alcibiades spoke. And the Lacedæmonians, who had before some sort of intention to take the field against Athens, though hitherto they protracted its execution, were now more than ever animated to it, when Alcibiades had given them such a detail of affairs, whom they judged to have the clearest insight in them. Thereupon they turned their attention immediately on fortifying Decelea, and sending out a body of succour for the present service of Sicily. They also appointed Gylippus, the son of Cleandridas, to go and take upon him the command at Syracuse; with orders, by concerting measures with the Syracusans and Corinthians, to draw up a plan for the most effectual and most ready conveyance of succours thither.

Gylippus accordingly issued out his orders to the Corinthians, to attend him, without loss of time at Asine, with two ships; and also to expedite the equipment of the fleet which they designed for this service, and to keep them in readiness to sail when opportunity should require. Having so far concerted measures, the ambassadors departed from Lacedæmon.

The Athenian trireme, also, despatched from Sicily by the generals on that post, to demand supplies of money and a body of horse, was by this time arrived at Athens. And the Athenians, on hearing their demands, drew up a decree, to send away supplies to that armament, and a body of horsemen.

And here the winter ended; and the seventeenth year of this war, of which Thucydides hath compiled the history, came also to an end.

YEAR XVIII.¹

On the earliest approach of the spring which led on the following summer, the Athenians, having sailed from Catana, showed themselves on the coast of Megara, in Sicily, at which the Syracusans having dispossessed the inhabitants in the time of Gelon the tyrant (as I have already related,) continued masters of the soil. Having landed here, they ravaged the country; till, approaching a fortress belonging to the Syracusans, and attempting to take it without success, they retired, some by land, and the rest on board the fleet, into the river Tereas; from whence going again on shore, they ravaged the plains and set fire to the growing corn. They also fell in with a small party of Syracusans, some of whom they slew; and then, erecting a trophy, went again on board. They next returned to Catana; and, after victualling there, proceeded from thence, with their whole force, to the attack of Centuripa, a strong fort belonging to the Siculi; and, having made themselves masters of it by a capitulation, they stood away, burning down in their passage the corn of the Inesseeans and Hybleans. Upon returning to Catana, they found there two hundred and fifty horsemen arrived from Athens, though without horses, yet with all the proper furniture, as if they could be better supplied with the former in Sicily; and also thirty archers, mounted, and three hundred talents² in silver.

In the same spring, the Lacedæmonians also took the field against Argos, and advanced as far as Cleonæ; but the shock of an earthquake being felt there, they again retired. And after this, the Argives, making an irruption into the Thyreatis, which borders upon themselves, took a vast booty from the Lacedæmonians, which sold for no less than twenty-five talents.³

And not long after, in the same spring, the popular party at Thespiæ assaulted those in power, but without success. And, though the Athenians marched away to their succour, some of them were apprehended, and others were obliged to take refuge at Athens.

¹ Before Christ, 414. ² 58,125*l*. ³ 4,842*l*. 15*o*

In the same summer, the Syracusans had no sooner received intelligence of the arrival of a body of horsemen amongst the Athenians, and the design of advancing immediately to assault them, than it occurred to their reflections, that, "in case the Athenians could not possess themselves of Epipolæ, (a spot of ground which is only one continued crag, and lies directly above the city of Syracuse,) it would be difficult to enclose them completely round with works of circumvallation, even though they should be defeated in open battle." They applied themselves therefore to the guard of all the approaches to Epipolæ, that the enemy might not on a sudden gain the eminence; for by other methods it was impossible for them to carry that post. Excepting those approaches, the rest of the tract is an impracticable steep, inclining gradually quite down to the city, and commanding the view of every thing within it. Hence, therefore, because it riseth with a continual ascent, it was called by the Syracusans Epipolæ.

As Hermocrates and his colleagues had now formally taken upon him the command, the whole force of Syracuse marched out, by break of day, into a meadow, on the banks of the Anapus, to pass under review; where the first thing they did was to select seven hundred of the choicest men amongst the heavy-armed, to be commanded by Diolimus, an exile from Andrus. These were appointed for the guard of Epipolæ, and to be ready for service, as they were always to keep in a body, on any sudden emergence. But the Athenians, who had mustered their forces on the preceding day, had stood away from Catana, and were come in the night undiscovered to the spot called Leon, which is distant six or seven stadia¹ from Epipolæ, where they disembarked their land-forces, and then sent their ships to lie in the station of Thapsus. Thapsus is a peninsula, joined to the main-land by a narrow isthmus, and jutting out into the sea, at no great distance from the city of Syracuse either by land or water. The naval force of the Athenians, having secured their station by a palisade across the isthmus, lay quiet in their posts; but the land-army, without loss of time, made a running march towards Epipolæ; and mounted by the pass of Euryalus, before the Syracusans, who were yet in the

meadow busied in their review, discovered or were able to advance to prevent them. And now their whole force was in motion to dislodge them; each man with all possible alacrity, and more particularly the seven hundred commanded by Diomilus; but, from the meadow to the nearest spot where they could come up with the enemy, was a march of no less than twenty-five stadia.² To this it was owing that the Syracusans came to the charge in a disorderly manner; and, being plainly repulsed in battle at Epipolæ, were forced to retire within the city. Diomilus also and about three hundred more lose their lives in this engagement.

In pursuance of this, the Athenians, having erected a trophy, and given up the bodies of the slain under truce to the Syracusans, marched down the next day in order of battle to the very gates of the city; but as the Syracusans refrained from sallying out against them, they then drew off, and raised a fort at Labdalum, on the very steepest edge of Epipolæ, looking towards Megara, which they intended as a repository for their baggage and money, whilst themselves might be called off, either to fight or to carry on the works of a siege.

Soon after this they were joined by a body of three hundred Egestean horse, and one hundred more consisting of Siculi and Naïans, and some others in their alliance. The Athenian cavalry was in all two hundred and fifty; they had procured some horses from the Egesteans and Cataneans, and had purchased the rest; so that now they had got together a body of horse amounting in all to six hundred and fifty.

A garrison was no sooner settled in the fort of Labdalum, than the Athenians approached to Tyche; where taking post they built a wall in circle with great expedition, and by the rapidity of their work struck consternation into the Syracusans. Upon this they sallied out with the fixed design of hazarding an engagement, as they saw the danger of dallying any longer. The armies on both sides were now beginning to face each other; but the Syracusan generals, observing that their own army was in disarray, and could not easily be formed in proper order, made them all wheel off again into the city, except a party of their horse: these, keeping the field, prevented the

¹ Above half a mile.

² Two miles and a half.

Athenians from carrying stones and straggling to any distance from their posts. But, at length, one Athenian band of heavy-armed, supported by the whole body of their cavalry, attacked and put to flight these Syracusan horsemen. They made some slaughter amongst them, and erected a trophy for this piece of success against the enemy's cavalry.

On the day following, some of the Athenians began to raise a wall along the northern side of the circle; whilst others were employed in carrying stones and timber, which they laid down in heaps all along the place called Trogilus, near to the line marked out for the circumvallation, which was to reach, by the shortest compass, from the great harbour on one side to the sea on the other. But the Syracusans, who were principally guided by the advice of Hermocrates, gave up all thoughts of sallying out for the future, with the whole strength of the city, to give battle to the Athenians. It was judged more advisable to run along a wall in length, which would cut the line in which the Athenian works were designed to pass, and which, could they effect it in time, must entirely exclude the enemy from perfecting their circumvallation. Nay farther, in case the enemy should come up in a body to interrupt the work, they might give them full employ with one division of their force, whilst another party might raise palisades to secure the approaches; at least, as the whole of the Athenian force must be drawn out to oppose them, they would be obliged to discontinue their own works. To raise, therefore, the projected work, they issued out of the city; and beginning at the foot of the city-wall from below the Athenian circle, they carried on from thence a transverse wall, cutting down the olive-trees in the sacred grove, of which they built wooden turrets to cover their work. The Athenian shipping was not yet come round from Thapsus into the great harbour, But the Syracusans continued masters of all the posts upon the sea, and consequently the Athenians were obliged to fetch up all necessary stores from Thapsus across the land.

When it appeared to the Syracusans that all their palisades and the transverse wall were sufficiently completed, in which the Athenians had given them no manner of interruption, as they were under apprehensions that, should they divide their force, they might be exposed to a defeat, and at the same time were ardently

intent on perfecting their own circumvallation—the Syracusans drew off again into the city, leaving only one band of heavy-armed for the guard of their counter-wall.

In the next place, the Athenians cut off the pipes, which by subterraneous ducts conveyed the drinking-water into the city: and here farther observed that the Syracusans lay within their tents during the heat of the day, but that some had straggled into the town, whilst those posted at the palisades kept a negligent guard; they picked out three hundred of their heavy-armed, and strengthened them with a choice party of their light-armed soldiers, ordered them to march with all possible speed and attack the counter work. The rest of their force was to march another way, since, headed by one of the generals, it advanced towards the city, to employ the Syracusans in case they sallied; whilst the other detachment, headed by the other general, attacked the palisade which covered the support. Accordingly, the three hundred men, and carry the palisade, which those who were posted for its guard abandoned, and fled for shelter behind the works which inclosed the menites. The pursuers however entered them; but were no sooner got in than they were again forcibly driven out by the Syracusans. And here some of the Argives and a small number of Athenians were slain.

But now the whole army, wheeling about, demolished the counter-work, and pulled down the palisade. The piles, of which it was composed, they carried off in triumph, and erected a trophy.

The next morning the Athenians resumed their work of circumvallation, and continued across the crag which is above the marsh, and lies on the quarter of Epipolæ that looks towards the great harbour. This was the shortest cut for their circumvallation down the crag, across the plain and the marsh, till it reached the harbour. Upon this, the Syracusans, being again, raised another palisade, beginning from the city, and stretching quite across the marsh. They also drew up an entrenchment along the palisade, entirely to prevent the Athenians from continuing their works quite down to the sea. The latter, when they had perfected their work along the crag, are busied on demolishing the new palisade and entrenchment of the Syracusans. For this purpose they had ordered their shipping to come about

from Thapsus into the great harbour of Syracuse. They themselves, at the morning's dawn, marched down from Epipolæ into the plain; and then, crossing the marsh, where the mud was hardest and best able to bear, by the help of boards and planks which they laid upon the surface, they carry almost the whole length of the palisade and entrenchment early in the morning, and were soon after masters of the whole. This was not affected without a battle, in which the Athenians were again victorious. The routed Syracusans fled different ways; those who had composed their right, towards the city; and those who had composed their left, towards the river. But with a view of intercepting the passage of the latter, the three hundred chosen Athenians marched with all speed to seize the bridge. The Syracusans, alarmed at this step, as the body consisted of the bulk of their horse, face about on the three hundred, and put them to flight, and then break in upon the right wing of the Athenians. By so unexpected a shock the first band in that wing was thrown into disorder. Lamachus, observing it, advanced to their support from the left, with a small party of archers that happened to be near him, and the whole body of the Argives. Having crossed a ditch that lay between, seconded only by a few, whilst the bulk of his party made a full stop, he is instantly slain;¹ as were also five or six of those by whom he was accompanied. The Syracusans caught up their bodies with all possible expedition, and bore them off to a place of security on the other side of the river. They were in great measure obliged to make a precipitate retreat, since the rest of the Athenian army was now coming up to attack them.

But now, such of the Syracusans as had fled at first towards the city, having gained leisure to observe such turns in their favour, caught fresh courage from the sight; and, forming again into order, stood their ground against that body of Athenians which faced them. They also send a detachment to attempt the

circle on Epipolæ, concluding it to be unmanned for the present, and might at once be taken. This detachment in fact made itself master of the outwork, and demolished it for about ten plethres in length; but the circle itself was defended by Nicias from all their attempts. Nicias, being much out of order, had been left to repose himself within the circle. He therefore issued orders to his servants to set fire to all the machines and the timber which were lying before the wall; for he was convinced that thus alone, in such a total want of hands for their defence, any safety could be earned. The event answered his expectation; for when the flames began to mount, the Syracusans durst not any longer come near, but thought proper to desist and march away.

For now the Athenians, who by this time had chased the enemy from off the plain, were remounting the ascent to defend their circle; and, at the same instant of time, their fleet, conformable to the orders they had received, was standing into the great harbour. The Syracusans upon the high ground beheld the sight; which occasioned them and the whole Syracusan army to retire precipitately into the city; concluding themselves no longer able, without an augmentation of their present strength, to hinder the completion of the Athenian works quite down to the sea.

After this, the Athenians erected a trophy, and, in pursuance of a truce, delivered up their slain to the Syracusans, and received in exchange the body of Lamachus, and of those who fell with him.

The junction of their whole armament, both of their land and naval force, being now completed, they began again, from Epipolæ and the crag, to invest the Syracusans with a double wall, which they were to continue quite down to the sea. The necessary provisions to supply their army were brought in from all the coasts of Italy. Many also of the Siculi, who had hitherto stood aloof, declared now for the Athenians, and came into their alliance, who were farther joined by three vessels with fifty oars from Hetruria.

All other points equally contributed to elevate their hopes. For the Syracusans had begun to despair of being able to sustain the siege, as they had no glimpse of any approaching succour from Peloponnesus. They were tossing to and fro amongst themselves some proposals for an accommodation, and had

¹ Plutarch, in the life of Nicias circumstantiates the manner in which the old general lost his life in character. Callicrates, a good soldier, but of great impetuosity, rode at the head of the Syracusan horse. Being challenged out by Callicrates, Lamachus alone engaged personally with him. Lamachus received the first wound: he then returned the blow, and dropped. His antagonist fell at the same time, and they both expired together

even sounded Nicias upon that head, who, by the death of Lamachus, was left invested with the sole command. Nothing definitive was however concluded, though (as might reasonably be expected from men in high perplexity, and more straitly besieged than ever) many proposals were made to him, and many more were agitated within the city. The distresses, also, which environed them at present, struck into them mutual suspicions of one another: nay, they even divested of their charge the generals who were in authority when these distresses came upon them, as if all was owing to their misconduct or treachery, and chose in their stead Heraclides, and Eucles, and Tellias.

In the meantime, Gylippus, the Lacedæmonian, and the ships from Corinth, were come up to Leucas, designing with the utmost expedition to pass over from thence to Sicily. But terrible accounts came thick upon them here, and all agreed in broaching the same untruth, that "Syracuse was completely invested on all sides." Gylippus upon this gave up all hopes of saving Sicily; but, having the preservation of Italy still at heart, he and Pythen the Corinthian, with the small squadron at hand, consisting only of two Laconic and two Corinthian vessels, crossed over the Ionian gulf with all possible despatch to Tarentum. The Corinthians, besides their own ten now fitting out, were to man two belonging to the Leucadeans, and three more belonging to the Ambraciots, and follow them as soon as possible.

The first step of Gylippus, now arrived at Tarentum, was to go in quality of ambassador to Thuria, claiming privilege for it, as his father had been a denizen of that state; but, finding himself unable to gain their concurrence, he weighed from thence and stood along the coast of Italy. But in the Terinean gulf he met with a hard gale of wind, which in his gulf, when in a northerly point, blows generally with great and lasting violence, and now drove

him from his course, and blew him out into the open sea, where he stood again the rebuff of another violent storm, but at length reached Tarentum. He there laid his vessels on ground, which had been damaged in the bad weather, and refitted them for service.

When Nicias found that he was on his passage, he betrayed an open contempt of trifling a squadron, as the Thurians had already done before him. It appeared to him, that so petty a squadron could only be fitted out for piratical cruizes, and therefore he sent out no detachments to hinder his approach.

About the same time of this summer, the Lacedæmonians, with their own domestic forces augmented by the junction of their allies, made an irruption into Argos, and ravaged great part of that territory. The Athenians put out to sea with thirty sail to succour the Argives, which procedure was, beyond all denial, the clearest violation of the treaties between them and the Lacedæmonians. Hitherto they had only exercised robberies upon them from Pylius; and, making descents rather on any other coast of Peloponnesus than Laconia itself, had left it to the Argives and Mantineans to make war against them. Nay, though the Argives had frequently pressed them, that with an armed force they would barely land on the Laconic coast, and, after committing not so small a ravage in their company, immediately to retire, they had positively refused. Now, under the command of Pythodorus, Læspodias, and Demaratus, they made a descent at Epidaurus-Limera and Præsis, committed large devastation on the adjacent country, and afforded the Lacedæmonians a specious and justifiable pretext to act offensively against Athens.

When the Athenian fleet was sailed homewards from Argos, and the Lacedæmonians also were withdrawn, the Argives broke into Phliasia, where they laid waste part of the Lacedæmonian territory, and made some slaughter of the people, and then returned to Argos.

THE
PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

BOOK VII.

the siege of Syracuse is carried on so vigorously by Nicias, that the Syracusans think of a surrender. At this crisis arrive the Peloponnesian succours and Gylippus the Spartan, which giveth a new turn to the siege. A counterwork is raised, to stop the Athenian circumvallation; engagements ensue. Nicias is now in a bad situation. He sendeth home a succinct detail of affairs by letter. A reinforcement is ordered him from Athens, under the command of Demosthenes. The Lacedæmonians resolve to renew the war at home.—YEAR XIX. Atlea invaded, and Decelea fortified. A naval engagement in the harbour of Syracuse, in which the Athenians were superior. In the meantime Athens is sadly distressed by the enemy. A massacre at Mycalesus. A sea-fight on the coast of Achaia. A second engagement in the harbour of Syracuse, to the advantage of the Syracusans. The reinforcement arriveth from Athens. Demosthenes attempts Epipolæ without success. Debates about raising the siege, which at length is resolved. The instant they are embarking the moon is eclipsed, upon which superstition dismayeth them. The Syracusans attack them both by land and water. The Athenians are treated in every engagement; at length lose all their shipping. They retreat by land, are pursued, sadly distressed, and totally subdued. Nicias and Demosthenes are taken prisoners and put to death.

Gylippus and Pythen, when they had refitted their ships, stood along the coast from Tarentum to Locri Epizephyrii. Here they received certain information, that Syracuse was yet completely invested, and that a succour might be thrown into the town by the aid of Epipolæ. They went next to consult,—whether, “keeping Sicily on the right, should endeavour at all hazards to enter Syracuse by sea; or, with Sicily on their left, should steer first to Himera; from whence, aided by the forces of that state and what additional strength they could persuade to them, they should march thither overland.” It was determined to go first to Himera, especially as the four Athenian vessels were not yet arrived at Rhegium, which Nicias trusted, upon the certain intelligence that they were now at Locri, had detached to observe them. To be beforehand, therefore, with this movement, they pass through the straits, and, being touched only at Rhegium and Messene, were at Himera; whilst, in the latter place, they prevailed upon the Himereans to concur with them in the war, and not only to intrust

their troops under their command, but even to supply with arms such of the mariners as had navigated the vessels, and were therefore unprovided; for their shipping they had drawn ashore, and laid up at Himera. The Selinuntians also, by a messenger despatched on purpose, they had summoned to meet them, with all their united strength, at a determined place upon their route. The Geloans also, and some of the Siculi, promised to attend with a party, though by no means considerable. The latter of these were disposed better than ever to the service, since Archonides was lately dead, (who, reigning over some of the Siculi seated in these parts, and having a great influence over them, had declared for the Athenians,) and since Gylippus appeared to them to be sent from Lacedæmon with a full purpose to do them service.

And now Gylippus,—having assembled an army, which consisted of about seven hundred of those who navigated or came on board his vessels, and for whom he had provided arms; of heavy-armed and light-armed Himereans, amounting together to a thousand men and one

hundred horsemen; of some light-armed Selinuntians; a small party of Geloan horse; and a body of Siculi, in all a thousand,—began his march for Syracuse.

The Corinthians in the meantime were sending out the other ships, as fast as they could equip them for the service, to follow with all possible expedition from Leucas: and Gongylus, one of the Corinthian commanders, who with a single ship set out last from Leucas, is the first who arrives at Syracuse; and that but a small space of time before the approach of Gylippus. Finding therefore, upon his arrival, that the Syracusans were going forthwith to hold a public assembly, in which the terms of putting an end to the war were designed to be adjusted, he dissuaded them from so precipitate a step, and animated their drooping resolutions by strong assurances, that "other ships would instantly arrive;" and that "Gylippus, the son of Cleandridas, was sent thither by the Lacedæmonians to take upon him the command." The Syracusans accordingly resumed their spirits, and immediately marched out of the town, with the whole of their strength, in order to meet Gylippus; for by this time they had received intelligence that he was actually approaching.

Gylippus, upon his route, had made himself master of Iegas, a fortress belonging to the Siculi; and now at the head of his army, drawn up in order of battle, he comes up to Epipolæ. Having mounted by the pass of Euryalus, as the Athenians had done on their first approach, he marched, in conjunction with the Syracusans, toward the Athenian circumvallation. He happened to arrive at that critical juncture, when the Athenians had completely finished seven or eight stadia¹ of the double wall extending to the great harbour, when, in consequence, but a very small part remained incomplete; and on which they were labouring with their highest application. On the other side of their circle, towards Trogius, the stones for completing their work had been laid ready in heaps almost down to the beach, and some parts of their work on that side stood but half completed, though others had received the finishing hand. To such extremity of danger were the Syracusans now reduced.

Gylippus and the Syracusans coming thus

suddenly upon them, the Athenians at first were struck with consternation: but formed, however, in order of battle, to give them a reception. But Gylippus, having ordered his forces to halt, despatcheth a herald to the Athenians, proclaiming that, "in case they would evacuate Sicily within the space of five days, with their arms and baggage, he would readily grant them a truce." Such offers they received in a contemptuous manner;² and, disdaining to return an answer, ordered the herald to move off. And now both sides were busy in marshalling and disposing their men for battle.

But Gylippus, who had made an observation that the Syracusans were in great confusion, and could not easily be formed into proper order, made his army fall back into more open ground. Nicias gave them no disturbance whilst they were making this motion; but, without advancing, stood close under his works: and, when Gylippus found that the enemy would not move forwards to attack him, he made his forces wheel off to the high ground called Temenites, where they reposed themselves for the night.

The next morning he drew up the greatest part of his army before the works of the Athenians, to prevent their sending out succours to more distant posts: for he had detached a party to attack the fort of Labdalum, which he carried by storm, and put all the garrison found within it to the sword. Labdalum was so situated, in regard to the Athenian posts, that they could have no view of what was transacting there. The same day also an Athenian trireme, as it was entering the harbour, is taken by the Syracusans.

After so much success, the Syracusans and allies set about raising a counterwork along Epipolæ. Beginning at the city, they carried it upwards towards the single wall which had an oblique inclination; and intended that, in case the Athenians could not stop its completion, it should entirely exclude them from per-

¹ Nicias (says Plutarch) disdained to return an answer. But some of his soldiers laughed outright, and asked "if, at the arrival of a mantle and staff from Sparta, the Syracusans were become so full of spirits as to despise the Athenians; who had lately given up to the Lacedæmonians three hundred of their countrymen who had been their prisoners, all of them better soldiers, and who combed their hair, too, much better than Gylippus."

² About three-quarters of a mile,

fecting their circumvallation. The Athenians, having perfected their works to the sea, had now remounted the eminence; and, as some parts of their work were but weak, Gylippus drew out his army by night, and was marching to demolish those: but the Athenians, who passed the night without their works, were no sooner aware of it, than they also marched away to defend them. Upon which, Gylippus, finding them alarmed, desisted, and made his army retreat to their former posts. This, however, occasioned the Athenians to raise those parts of their wall to a greater height, and to take the guard of it upon themselves, as amongst the body of their confederates they had divided the guard of the rest of their works, allotting a proper charge to each.

Nicias also judged it expedient to fortify the spot called Plemmyrium. Plemmyrium is a point of land over against Syracuse, which jutting out before the great harbour, renders the mouth of it very narrow. "If this were fortified," he thought, "the importation of necessaries for the army would be better secured; because then, from a smaller distance, they could at any time command the harbour where the Syracusan shipping lay; and, should it be their ill fortune to be straitened by sea, might easier fetch in supplies than in the present station of their fleet at the bottom of the great harbour." Now also he began, with greater attention than before, to study how to distress them by sea; convinced, since the arrival of Gylippus, how little room he had to hope for success by land. To this spot therefore he ordered his fleet, and drew his land-forces down, and immediately erected three forts. In these the greatest part of the baggage was laid up; and the transports and tight ships were immediately stationed there. To this project, however, the havoc that afterwards ensued amongst the seamen is principally to be ascribed; for, as they suffered in this station under scarcity of water, and the mariners were frequently obliged to fetch both water and wood from a distance, since near at hand they were not to be had, the Syracusan horse, who were masters of the country, slaughtered them in abundance. The Syracusans had posted a third part of their cavalry at their fortress of Olympisum, to bridle the marauding excursions of the enemy at Plemmyrium.

Now also Nicias received intelligence that the other Corinthian ships were in their passage. To watch their approach, he therefore

detached twenty sail, who were appointed to cruize about Locri, and Rhegium, and the capes of Sicily, in order to intercept them.

Gylippus in the meantime was employed in building the counter-wall along Epipolæ, making use of the stones which the Athenians had laid ready in heaps for the continuation of their own work. It was also his daily custom to draw up the Syracusans and allies in order of battle, and lead them out beyond the point of the counter-wall: which obliged the Athenians to draw up likewise, to observe their motions. And, when Gylippus judged he could attack them with advantage, he instantly advanced; and, the charge being given and received, a battle ensued in the space between their respective works; but so narrow, that no use could be made of the Syracusan and confederate horse. The Syracusans and allies were accordingly defeated. They fetched off their slain by truce; and the Athenians erected a trophy. But Gylippus, having assembled the army round him, thought proper to make this declaration in the presence of them all:—that "the defeat was not to be charged on their want of bravery, but on his own indiscretion; he had deprived them of the service of their own cavalry and darters, by ranging his battle in too confined a spot between the works; that he would now again lead them out in a more judicious manner." He exhorted them, therefore "to imprint it strong on their remembrance, that as in real strength they were not inferior, it would be intolerably disgraceful, if they, who to a man were Peloponnesians and Dorians, should not manifest themselves so resolutely brave, as to conquer and drive out of their country a parcel of Ionians and islanders, and a promiscuous rabble of hungry adventurers." Having addressed them thus, he lay on the watch to seize a proper opportunity; and as soon as he had gained it, led them on again to the charge.

It was the opinion of Nicias, and in general of all the Athenians, that "though it was not their own interest to bring on an engagement, yet it highly concerned them to put a stop to the counter-work which the enemy was raising to hinder their progress;" for, by this time the wall of the Syracusans had only not over-reached the extreme point to which the Athenians had brought their circumvallation, "and, should it be extended farther it would give the enemy this double advantage;

—a certainty of conquest whenever they thought proper to fight, and a discretionary power not to fight at all." Determined by these considerations, they drew out in order to give the Syracusans battle.

Gylippus soon began the engagement. He had now drawn up his heavy-armed without the works, and at a greater distance from them than before. He had posted the cavalry and the darters on a wide and open spot, yet unoccupied by the works on either side, and posted them so that they flanked the Athenians. In the ardour of the engagement, the cavalry broke in upon the left wing of the Athenians, which was ranged against them, and entirely routed them. In consequence of which, the remainder of the army was soon defeated by the Syracusans, and in the greatest disorder retired for shelter behind their works. And night no sooner came on, than the Syracusans, without loss of time, began to carry forwards their own works, which they soon extended beyond the Athenian circumvallation; by which they gained this great point, that they could no longer be invested on all sides by the Athenians; and the latter, though masters in the field, were henceforwards effectually stopped from perfecting their circumvallation.

After this, twelve ships of the Corinthians, and Ambraciots, and Leucadians, the remainder of the squadron designed for this service, having given the Athenian guard-ships the slip, came into the harbour of Syracuse: they were commanded by Herasimides, a Corinthian. By these the Syracusans were now assisted in carrying on their work, till it was completely joined to the traverse wall.

Gylippus now made a circuit over Sicily in order to promote the common cause; and to procure additional forces for the services both of land and sea; and to solicit the concurrence of such states as hitherto had manifested, either no great inclination, or an open repugnance, to join in the present war. Other ambassadors also were despatched, by the Syracusans and Corinthians, to Lacedæmon and Corinth, instructed to solicit a speedy reinforcement, to be transported into Sicily either in trading vessels, or in boats, or by any other expeditious methods, since the Athenians had also sent for reinforcements from Athens. The Syracusans also assigned complements of men to their shipping, and sedulously trained them to the service of the sea, as designing on this element

also to try their fortune; nay, they laboured with alacrity and application to increase their strength in all respects.

Nicias, being sensible of this, and considering that the strength of the enemy and his own inability became daily greater, despatched his messengers also to Athens, a custom he had never observed, and upon all occasions, to report the particulars of his proceedings. But in the present situation it was more requisite than ever; since now he was convinced that he was environed with dangers; and unless, with the utmost expedition, they recalled their troops, and sent them another, and that a strong reinforcement, no hopes of preservation remained. Apprehensive, farther, that the persons he should send, either through want of proper address, or through defect of courage, or a passion to satisfy the populace, might suppress the truth, he sent a true account of things in a letter wrote with his own hand. By this method he concluded that his own sentiments of things could not be concealed or invalidated by messengers; that the Athenians would be informed of the truth, and might accordingly adjust their resolutions. These messengers therefore departed, instructed to deliver the letter which he intrusted to their care, and what farther they were to say by word of mouth. Nicias in the mean time kept within the limits of his camp, more anxious to guard his shattered forces from annoyance, than to plunge into fresh and spontaneous dangers.

In the close of this summer, Eucleon, an Athenian general, marched, in conjunction with Perdicas and a large body of Thracians against Amphipolis; yet could not render himself master of that city. But then, setting out from Imereum, he brought his triremes about into the Strymon, and blocked it up on the side of the river. And here this summer ended.

In the beginning of winter the messengers from Nicias arrived at Athens; where they gave such accounts of things as he had charged them to give, and resolved such questions as were asked them. They also delivered his letter; which the clerk of the state stood up and read aloud to the Athenians. The contents were these:

"ATHENIANS,

"THE many letters from time to time received from me have given you all proper information, so far as relates to past transactions

and it is now high time you should be made acquainted with our present situation, that your counsels may be adjusted in a proper manner.

"After, therefore, we had defeated, in several engagements, the Syracusans, against whom you sent us out, and when we had thrown up those works before their city within which we are at this moment lying, Gylippus the Lacedæmonian came upon us, at the head of an army, brought from Peloponnesus, and augmented by the troops of some Sicilian states. In the first battle he is routed by us; but in the last, pressed hard by their numerous cavalry and darters, we have been forced to retire within our intrenchments. Being therefore obliged, by the superior numbers of the enemy, to discontinue our circumvallation, we are this moment lying upon the defensive. Nor indeed are we able to draw out our whole force for action, as detachments of our heavy-armed are remotely employed in the guard of our works. They have farther run up a single wall to cut our lines; so that there remains no longer a possibility for us to complete the circumvallation, unless, reinforced by a numerous body of troops, we are enabled to assault and demolish the counterwork. And, in consequence of this, we, who designed to besiege others, may with much more propriety be said to suffer a siege ourselves, at least by land: for we dare not make any distant excursions into the adjacent country, for fear of the horse.

"What is more; they have sent ambassadors to Peloponnesus, to solicit reinforcements. Gylippus also is making the tour of the Sicilian states, with a view to obtain the concurrence of such as are at present neutral, and to prevail with the rest to intrust their additional levies for the service both of land and sea under his command: and, according to my present intelligence, they are fully bent to attack, at one and the same time, our intrenchments, with their land-forces by land, and with their ships by sea. And though I say, by sea, let not the sound be too terrible in your ears: for they know very well the present state of our navy; which, though at first a most complete equipment, for the cleanness of the ships and the health and vigour of the seamen, yet at present hath scarce a ship which is not leaky; so long have they been necessitated to keep the sea, whilst their hands have daily been mouldering away: for in fact, we have no opportunity to

lay them dry and careen them; as we are under continual apprehensions of being attacked by the ships of the enemy, equal, nay superior, in number to our own. That they will attempt it, we have most certain ground to believe; but the seasons of doing it are entirely in their own option; which also enables them to preserve their vessels ever fit for service, as they are not necessitated to be continually in action to strike awe into others: nay, we should hardly be able to do the like, though the number of our shipping were much larger than it is, or though we were exempted from the necessity we now lie under of keeping guard with them all. For, in case we make the least abatement of our vigilance, we should be distressed for want of necessaries, which even now we fetch in with difficulty in the very teeth of the enemy. To this must be ascribed the great waste of our seamen which hath already been made, and whose number lessens from day to day; since, obliged to fetch wood, and water, and forage, from remote places, they are intercepted by the enemy's horse. Even our servants, who have nothing to dread from our ruined condition, desert us daily. And such foreigners, as were forced on board our fleet, depart with impunity to their own cities; whilst others, who were allured to the service by the greatness of our pay, and imagined they were rather come to plunder than to fight, when, contrary to their hopes, they behold the enemy possessed of a numerous fleet, and making a brave resistance in every quarter, some catch at the least pretext to go over to the enemy, and others make shift to skulk away,—never again to be retrieved in so wide a country as Sicily. Nay, some of those, who, having attended us hither from Athens, and since prevailed with the captains of triremes to accept of the service of Hyccarian slaves in redemption of their own, have by this means subverted our naval discipline.

"I am writing to men well enlightened in naval affairs, and perfectly convinced, that the flower of an equipment is but of short duration, and how few of those on board are skilled at steering the vessel or managing the oar. But what gives me the most acute vexation is this,—that, though commander-in-chief, I am utterly unable to put a stop to these disorders; since your tempers, Athenians, are hard to be managed; and am quite at a loss from whence to repair the waste that hath been made of our

seamen. The enemy have abundant resources everywhere at hand, whereas necessity points not only one to us,—that place from whence we had who now remain, and who are for ever lost: for Naxos and Catana, the cities which still persevere in our alliance, are unable to recruit us. And, should the enemy get one circumstance more in their favour,—that the towns of Italy, which at present supply us with food, deterred by the discovery of our low condition and the non-appearance of a reinforcement from Athens, go over to the Syracusans,—the war will be finished to their hands without costing them a blow, and we shall be left to the mercy of the enemy.

"I could have sent you much more pleasing accounts of things, but none so proper to give you a clear idea of the posture of your affairs here, and such as you ought to have before you proceed to deliberate upon them; and at the same time,—as I am by no means a stranger to Athenian tempers, since I know you to be fond of hearing what will give you pleasure, but are afterwards inflamed with anger if any article in event drops short of your expectation,—I thought it highly concerned my own safety to tell you nothing but the truth. And let me here conjure you, to entertain no resentment either against private soldiers or commanders; since, in labouring those points which are the principal ends of the expedition, they have fully done their duty.

"But, since all Sicily is in arms against us, and since our enemies expect a reinforcement from Peloponnesus, resolve, without loss of time, that, as your forces are not sufficient to keep the enemy in play, they must either be recalled, or be reinforced with a body not inferior to the first equipment, with both a land and a naval force, and a large pecuniary supply. For myself, I must insist that a successor be sent me; since I am quite disabled, by a nephritic disorder, from continuing in the command: and I think I have just title to expect my dismissal from you; since, in the vigour of my life, I have been intrusted by you with several commands, in which I did you some signal services.

"Whatever you determine, put it in execution on the first approach of spring; and, above all things, keep clear of delays: for the ready supplies given the enemy in Sicily, will soon enable them to act; and those expected from Peloponnesus, though they must be longer in

coming up, yet, depend upon it, that, unless you exert your utmost vigilance, some of them will steal hither, as before, through all your guards, and some will infallibly be here before you." Such were the advices brought them by the letter of Nicias. The Athenians, however, when they had heard it read, would not so far comply with the request of Nicias as to give him his dismissal; but that, afflicted as he was in body, the whole burden of affairs might not lie too heavily upon him, they appointed two persons, already in Sicily, Menander and Euthydemus, to assist him in the command, till those, who by the public vote should be joined with him in the commission, can arrive. They also decreed him a reinforcement, consisting both of a land and naval force, to be levied amongst the Athenians upon the roll and their dependents; and, for colleagues to share in the command, Demosthenes the son of Alcistenes, and Eurymedon the son of Thucles. Eurymedon, by order, began his passage for Sicily about the winter solstice, at the head of ten sail of ships, and with a supply of twenty talents of silver;¹ empowered, farther, to assure them, that "a large reinforcement will soon come up, as the state had seriously interested itself in their welfare." Demosthenes staid behind to forward the equipment, and was intending to set out on the first approach of spring. He was busied in assembling together their contingents from the dependent states, and in levying amongst them both money, and shipping, and soldiers.

The Athenians farther sent out twenty sail, to cruise on the coasts of Peloponnesus, and to take care that no one passed over from Corinth and Peloponnesus into Sicily. For the Corinthians, upon the arrival of the ambassadors, and the advice they brought, that "the face of affairs was much altered for the better," (priding themselves in the reflection that their former equipment had arrived in time to contribute to this turn,) became now more alert than ever, and got transports in readiness to carry over a body of their own heavy-armed into Sicily, whilst the Lacedæmonians were intent on doing the same from other parts of Peloponnesus. The Corinthians, farther manned out five and twenty sail; designing to hazard an engagement with the guard-ships stationed at Naupactus, or to disable the Athe

¹ 3,875*l.* sterling.

us who lay there from giving their transports least molestation, by keeping their own men ready ranged in order of battle in the face of that squadron.

The Lacedæmonians also were preparing for invasion of Attica, in pursuance of a former action, and in compliance farther with the same instances of both Syracusans and Corinthians. They had no sooner heard of the movement intended to be sent by the Athenians to Sicily, than, by making a diversion, designed to stop its execution. Alcibiades also continued warmly importuning them to execute his plan of fortifying Decelea, and proceeded briskly with the war. But the reasons which at this present juncture animated the Lacedæmonians most, were, that the Corinthians, if engaged in a double war both against themselves and against the Sicilians, would become a much more expeditious conqueror; and, farther, the Athenians were the aggressors in violating treaties. In the present war they were well convinced the first blow was chargeable on their own heads, since the Thebans had surprised Plataea, and the treaties were in fact subsisting. Nay, contrary to an express stipulation in a preceding treaty, that "arms should never be taken against the party which was willing to abide a judicial determination," they themselves refused to submit to a trial, though claimed by the Athenians. To a conduct so ungenerous they concluded that their ill success in war ought fairly to be imputed; and replied, with self-accusations, not only on the injury they had suffered at Pylus, but on all other losses in every quarter of the war.

Now, since the Athenians, with an equipment of thirty sail, had committed devastations in Epidaurus, at Prasie, and at other places, continued to infest their dominions by expeditions from Pylus; nay, as often as disputes had intervened about the intent of articles in the last treaty, in which the Lacedæmonians appealed to a judicial determination, the others haughtily refused it; concluding hence, that the Athenians were become as guilty aggressors now as themselves had been on the former occasion; with cheerful presages of success, they determined for war. In order to supply the demands of this winter, from their allies, they demanded this winter, from their allies, contingents of iron, and got all the necessaries in readiness to execute their plan of fortification. Resolved at the same time to

transport an aid to Sicily in vessels of burden, they began to levy it at home, and exacted the quotas of augmentation from their confederates. And thus the winter ended; and the eighteenth year of this war, of which Thucydides hath compiled the history, came also to an end.

YEAR XIX.¹

The following spring no sooner approached, than, at an earlier date than on any former occasion, the Lacedæmonians and allies invaded Attica; and Agis, the son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, had the command of the army. At first they ravaged the country, particularly the plains; and this being done, having allotted out the work in portions to the several states, they set out about fortifying Decelea. Now, Decelea is distant at most but one hundred and twenty stadia² from the city of Athens, and lies at the same distance, or very little more, from Bœotia: but in the plain, and on the finest spot of ground, from whence effectually to annoy them, was their fortress raised; and might be seen from the very walls of Athens.

In this manner the Peloponnesians and allies erected a fortress within Attica itself; whilst, in the same portion of time, their friends in Peloponnesus embarked a body of heavy-armed on board their transports, and sent them off for Sicily. For this service the Lacedæmonians picked out from the very best of the Helots, and of those citizens of Sparta who were newly enfranchised, from both together, six hundred heavy-armed, and appointed Hecritus, a Spartan, to command them. And the Bœotians sent three hundred heavy-armed, commanded by Xeno and Nicon of Thebes, and Hegesander of Thespis. These were first embarked at Tænarus in Laconia, and thence put out to sea.

Soon after these, the Corinthians sent away five hundred heavy-armed; some from Corinth itself, others hired from the Arcadians; and appointed Alexarchus, a Corinthian, to command them. The Sicyonians also sent two hundred heavy-armed along with the Corinthians, and at their head Sargeus, a Sicyonian.

But the five and twenty sail of Corinthians, which launched out to sea in the depth of winter, lay ranged in an opposite station to the

¹ Before Christ 413. ² About twelve miles.

twenty Attic at Naupactus, to give leisure for the embarkation of the heavy-armed on board the transports from Peloponnesus. On this account, principally, they were manned and fitted out to sea, that they might divert the attention of the Athenians from the transport-fleet that was now putting out, and fasten it wholly upon the hostile appearance of these triremes.

In the meantime, the Athenians, even during the fortifications in hand at Decelea, and at the earliest approach of spring, sent out thirty sail to cruise on the coasts of Peloponnesus, under the command of Charicles, the son of Apollodorus. His instructions were, farther, to touch at Argos, and to summon them, in conformity to the treaty of alliance, to embark a body of heavy-armed on board the fleet.

Demosthenes, also, according to promise, they sent away for Sicily, with a numerous fleet, consisting of sixty ships of Athens and five of Chios, on board of which were twelve hundred enrolled Athenians, and as large a number of islanders as with the utmost industry they had been able to draw together. They had also amassed, from their other confederates subject to Athens, all manner of supplies they were able to furnish for carrying on the war with vigour. But Demosthenes was farther instructed to sail at first in company with Charicles, and assist him in the cruise on the coasts of Laconia. Demosthenes, therefore, having stood over to Ægina, continued there till the remainder of his force, which was yet behind, had completely joined him, and Charicles had taken on board the Argive auxiliaries.

About the same time in this spring Gylippus also returned to Syracuse, at the head of as large a force as he had been able to collect from the several states, with whom his persuasions had been effectual; and, having convened the Syracusans, he told them that—"they ought to man out as large a number of shipping as they possibly could, and try their fortune in a naval engagement: such a step, he had reason to hope, might be attended with consequences which would amply compensate the danger, and invigorate the war."

These instances of Gylippus were well seconded by Hermocrates, who took uncommon pains to encourage his countrymen to attack the Athenians by sea.—The latter, he told them, were far from enjoying their naval skill as an hereditary right, or a privilege from time

immemorial exclusively their own. In fact, they were by nature landmen much more than the Syracusans; and necessity alone, in the Medish invasion, had forced them to try their fortune at sea: by enterprising men, as the Athenians were, such as were most daring in opposing them must needs be regarded as the most formidable enemies. True—they had been used to intimidate their neighbours, not by a real superiority of strength, but by their daring enterprising genius; and now, by the same methods, themselves might become formidable even to Athenians." He assured them, "for his own part, he was perfectly convinced that the Syracusans, if by an effort of bold resolution they would on a sudden attack the Athenian fleet, might reap more benefit from the terror which such a step would strike upon the foe, than could accrue to the Athenians from their superior skill when compared with Syracusan inexperience." He pressed them therefore "to try their fortune by sea, and bid adieu to fear."

Thus animated by Gylippus, and by Hermocrates, and by others, the Syracusans were eagerly bent on action by sea, and manned out their fleet. And, when the whole was ready for service, Gylippus, by favour of the night, at the head of his land-army, marched down to the forts at Plemmyrium, intending to assault them on the land-side. The triremes of the Syracusans, at the same instant of time, as had been concerted beforehand, to the number of thirty-five, are sailing up out of the great harbour, whilst forty-five were going about out of the lesser harbour where their dock lay. The latter went round, designing to complete their junction with the other squadron, and then in a body to stand against Plemmyrium, that the Athenians on both sides might be thrown into confusion. The Athenians lost no time, but instantly manned out sixty vessels. With twenty-five of the number they engaged the thirty-five Syracusan in the great harbour; with the rest they went to meet the other squadron, that was coming about from the dock. A smart engagement immediately ensued, in the mouth of the great harbour. The dispute was a long time obstinately maintained; one side exerting themselves to clear the passage, but the other to obstruct it.

In the meantime, Gylippus,—as the Athenians posted at Plemmyrium had flocked down to the sea-side, and with their utmost atten-

tion were looking at the battle on the water,—Gylippus seizeth the opportunity; and no sooner had the morning dawned, than, to the great surprise of the enemy, he attacks the forts. He first makes himself master of the largest of the three, and afterwards carries the two lesser, the defendants of which, seeing the largest so easily taken, had abandoned their posts; nay, on the surprisal of the first, those who had manned it, throwing themselves on board the boats and a transport that lay at hand, found no small difficulty in getting away to the camp; for, as the Syracusans had now the better of the engagement with their squadron in the great harbour, they detached one of their nimblest triremes to pursue the fliers. But, at the time the other two forts were carried, the Syracusans were plainly vanquished, which gave them who abandoned the last an opportunity to sail away without obstruction. For that Syracusan squadron, that was engaged before the harbour's mouth, having forced their way through the Athenian fleet, by sailing forwards in a disorderly manner and continually running foul one upon another, gave the Athenians an opportunity to regain the day. For this squadron they soon routed, and afterwards that, within the harbour, by which they had been vanquished. They also sunk eleven ships of the enemy, and made a slaughter of all their crews, those of three ships excepted, to whom they granted quarter; and all this with the loss only of three ships on their own side. Having afterwards drawn ashore the shatters of the Syracusan fleet, and piled them into a trophy on the little isle before Plemmyrium, they retired to their main encampment.

Thus unsuccessful were the Syracusans in their naval engagement. They had carried, however, the forts at Plemmyrium; and, to signalize each of their acquisitions, they erected three several trophies. One, also, of the two forts that were taken last they levelled with the ground, but the other two they repaired and garrisoned.

In this surprisal of the forts, many were slain, and many were made prisoners, and a great stock of wealth repositied there became the prize of the enemy. For, as the Athenians had made use of these forts by way of magazine, much wealth belonging to merchants, and corn in abundance, were found within; much also of the stores belonging to the captains of the ships of war, inasmuch as forty masts for

triremes, and other materials of refitment, had been laid up there; and three triremes were hauled ashore to be careened. Nay, this surprisal of Plemmyrium was one of the chief, if not the greatest source of all the distress which the Athenian army suffered in the sequel; for no longer was the sea open to them for the secure importation of necessary supplies. From this time the Syracusans rushed upon them from thence, and awed all their motions. The convoys could no more get in without fighting their way. Besides that, in all other respects, it struck a great consternation, and even a dejection of mind amongst the troops.

The next step taken by the Syracusans was to send out to sea a squadron of twelve ships, under the command of Agatharcus, a Syracusan. One of these ships was to proceed to Peloponnesus, and land an embassy there, which had instructions, "to notify a present hopeful posture of affairs, and to press the prosecution of the war in Greece with all possible vigour." The other eleven stood over to the Italian coast, having received intelligence, that a number of small vessels, laden with stores for the Athenians, were coming up. They intercepted and entirely destroyed most of these; and the timber on board them, which was ready wrought for the Athenians to frame together into ships, they burnt to ashes on the shore of Caulonia. This done, they stood away for Locri; and, whilst they lay in that road, one of the transports from Peloponnesus, having on board the heavy-armed from Thespie, came in. The Syracusans removed those heavy-armed into their own ships, and returned with them to Syracuse.

The Athenians with twenty sail were stationed at Megara, in order to intercept their return; where one ship alone, with all the crew, fell into their hands. They were not able to come up with the rest; since, eluding all pursuit, they recover with security their own harbours.

There happened also a skirmish, in the harbour of Syracuse, about the piles which the Syracusans had drove down in the sea before their old docks, that their vessels might ride in safety behind them, the Athenians be unable to stand in amongst them and do any damage to their shipping. Close up to those piles the Athenians had towed a raft of prodigious size, on which turrets and parapets to

cover the defendants were erected, whilst others in long boats were fastening cables round the piles, and, by the help of a machine convenient for the purpose, craning them up; and such as they broke, a set of divers sawed off close at the bottom. The Syracusans in the meantime were pouring their missive weapons upon them from the docks, which were plentifully returned by those posted on the raft. In short, the Athenians plucked up most of the piles, but one part of the staccade was exceeding difficult to be demolished, as it lay out of sight; for they had driven down some of the piles in such a manner, that their heads emerged not above the surface of the water. This rendered all access exceeding dangerous; since, ignorant where they lay, a pilot would be apt to bulge his vessel as if it were upon a shelf. But even these, the divers, for a pecuniary reward, searched out and sawed away. And yet, as fast as this was done, the Syracusans drove down a fresh set of piles. The contrivances both of annoyance and prevention were strenuously exerted on both sides, as might justly be expected from two hostile bodies posted so near one another; the skirmishings were often renewed, and every artifice of war was successively practised.

The Syracusans, farther, had despatched embassies, composed of Corinthians, and Lacedæmonians, and Ambraciots, to the cities of Sicily, "to notify the surprisal of Plemmyrium, and to give a just representation of the naval engagement in which they had been defeated, not so much by the strength of the enemy as by their own confusion; in other respects to assure them, that their hopes of success were high, and that they firmly depended on receiving soon an aid from them, composed both of a land and naval force: since the Athenians were also in expectation of a reinforcement from Athens, the approach of which, would their friends anticipate, the Athenians at present there must be totally destroyed, and the war brought at once to an end." Such schemes were now in agitation in Sicily.

But Demosthenes, when he had assembled the whole of the armament with which he was to pass over to the relief of those in Sicily, weighing from Ægina, and standing over to Peloponnesus, he completes his junction with Charicles and the squadron of thirty sail of Athenians under his command; and, as a body of heavy-armed had been taken on board the

latter from Argos, they steered together for the coast of Laconia. And here first they ranged in part Epidaurus Limera; and proceeding from thence to that part of Laconia which lies over-against Cythera, and where stands the temple of Apollo, having ravaged part of the adjacent country, they enclosed and fortified a neck of land which might serve as a receptacle to such of the Helots as deserted the Lacedæmonians; from thence, handitti-like, as was done from Pylus, to infest the country. This convenient spot was no sooner taken in than Demosthenes stood away for Corcyn, that he might take on board the auxiliaries there, and make the best of his way to Sicily. But Charicles staid till he had put the place into a state of secure defence, and fixed a garrison in it. This being done, he carried back his squadron of thirty sail to Athens; and the Argives at the same time received their dismission.

This summer there arrived at Athens thirteen hundred Thracian targeteers, of those called Machærophori, and who are originally Dians. This body was intended to have been sent with Demosthenes into Sicily; but as they arrived not till after his departure, the Athenians had resolved to send them back again to their own homes in Thrace. To retain them merely for the sake of the war waged against them from Decelea, they thought would plunge them in too large an expense, since the pay of every soldier was a drachm a day. For now, since Decelea, which had been fortified this spring by the joint labours of the whole united army, continued to be garrisoned by detachments from the several states, which at certain intervals of time relieved one another in a regular succession, it gave terrible annoyance to the Athenians, and caused amongst them such havoc of their effects, and such a destruction of their men as threw them into great distress. All preceding incursions of the enemy, having been only transient, had left them in the peaceable enjoyment of their lands for the rest of the year; but now, as they awed the country by one continued blockade, and as by intervals they received considerable augmentations to enable them to give greater annoyance, as even the regular garrison was periodically obliged to scour the country and

der for their own subsistence, and as Agis, of the Lacedæmonians, who with the diligence prosecuted the war, in person led all the operations,—The Athenians sorely pressed: for they were debarred whole produce of their own lands; more twenty thousand of their slaves had del to the enemy, and a large part of these mechanics of the city; their whole stock deep and labouring cattle was lost beyond ve; their horses,—as the horsemen were ad every day to mount, either to ride to Decelea, to awe the excursions of that ion, or to guard some important posts in ountry,—their horses were either lamed by ng incessantly over hard or rugged ground, wounds were disabled for service; the consupplies of provisions for the city, which to be fetched from Eubœa to Oropus, o be brought in from thence through Deas the shortest passage, were now forced round the cape of Sunium by sea, which derably enhanced their price. For want of foreign commodities the city was equalstressed; and Athens was now reduced merely a place of arms. To keep guard ae battlements by day, the citizens were ed successively to relieve one another; the whole body of the city, except the men, mounted guard by night. The latter under arms without, the rest on the conguard of the city-walls, and this for a mer and winter without any intermission, reduced to a very low condition. But point which pressed hardest upon them having two wars at once upon their hand: yet their obstinacy had rose to so high a , as, had it not been visible to all the l, the bare mention of its possibility would been quite incredible; for who would believed, that this people, so closely blockp at home by the Peloponnesians, should a to give up Sicily? nay, should persevere unabating zeal, to carry on the siege of use, a city in no respect inferior even to ns itself? that they should exhibit such an ishing proof of their strength and their ge to the eyes of Greece; where upon the reaking out of the war, some people had ined, that in case the Peloponnesians inl Attica, they could not hold out above ear entire, though others had allowed two, and others three, but nobody a r space? and that, in the seventeenth year

after the first invasion of this kind, they should attempt the conquest of Sicily; and, when deeply gashed in every part, by one war already upon their hands, should wilfully plunge into another, as formidable in all respects as that waged against them from Peloponnesus? But now, when, besides what they had suffered already, they were terribly annoyed from Decelea, and other incidents had exacted from them very large disbursements, their finances were reduced to a very low ebb. At this period, therefore, instead of the tribute paid them by their dependents, they exacted a twentieth of the value of all commodities imported and exported, which they thought would replenish their coffers faster than the former method; for their disbursements were not as they had been in preceding times, but had been inflamed in the same proportion as the scenes of war had been enlarged, whilst their annual revenue was constantly decreasing.

Unwilling, therefore, in the present ebb of their treasures, to defray the charge of this body of Thracians, who came too late for Demosthenes, they sent them back to their own country with all possible haste. Diitrephes was the person pitched upon to conduct them home; and was instructed, that, "In the passage (for they were to go through the Euripus) he should employ them, if opportunity offered, against the enemy." He landed therefore near Tanagra, and in a hurrying manner carried off a booty from thence. About the shut of evening he also crossed the Euripus from Chalcis of Eubœa; and, having landed his Thracians in Bœotia, led them against Mycalessus. His design was not discovered that night, though he halted at the temple of Mercury, which is distant from Mycalessus but sixteen¹ stadia at most. But early the next morning he assaulted this city, which is of large extent; he carries it on the first attack, as there was no guard to resist him, and the inhabitants could never have imagined that a maritime body would have marched so far into the country to make attempts upon them. The wall, besides, was weak: in some places it was fallen, and the remaining part of it was low; and the gates, from too great a confidence of security, had been left open. No sooner were the Thracians broke into Mycalessus, than they gutted both

¹ More than a mile and a half.

houses and temples; they massacred the inhabitants, showing no regard to either old age or youth, but venting their fury on all that came in their way; they butchered even the women and the children; nay, all the labouring cattle, and every creature that had life which came before their eyes; for the Thracians, when once their fury is inflamed, are as insatiable of blood as any other the greatest savages in the barbarian world. On this occasion the confusion was terrible, and every ghastly method of destruction was exemplified in act; they even fell upon the public school, which was a very large one, when the youth of the town were but just got in, and hacked all the children to pieces. And thus this whole city was involved in a calamity, a greater than which no city had ever felt; nay, a calamity unexpected and dreadful indeed!

The Thebans had no sooner intelligence of it, than they marched to their assistance; but came not up with the Thracians till they were retired to some distance from the town, where they recovered from them their booty, and, having put them to flight, continued the chase down to the Euripus and the sea, where the vessels which had brought them lay at anchor. Here they make a slaughter of most of those who endeavoured to get on board, but could not swim; since the persons left in the vessels, when they saw what passed on the shore, put them off beyond their reach. But, in the other parts of the retreat, the Thracians behaved with some gallantry against the Theban horse, which attacked them first; since, sallying frequently out on the pursuers, and rallying again after the discipline of their country, they made good their retreat; and thus few of this body were destroyed. A number, farther, who staid behind in the city to plunder, were found there and put to the sword. The whole number of the slain amongst this body of thirteen hundred Thracians amounted to two hundred and fifty men; though, in return, they killed, of Thebans, and others who accompanied by way of aid, of horse and heavy-armed together, about twenty, and Skirphondas of Thebes, one of the rulers of Bœotia; the lives of some more Mycæssians were also lost in their company. Such was the calamity which fell to the unhappy lot of Mycæssus; and which, for excess of horror, is more to be deplored than any other of the tragical events of this war.

Demosthenes, who, after marking out the

fortification, had stood away from Laconia to Corcyra, surprising a transport vessel which rode at anchor in the road of Phia of the Eleæ, on board of which a number of heavy-armed Corinthians were to pass over into Sicily, sinks that vessel. But the mariners, having saved themselves by flight, found afterwards another vessel, and proceeded in the voyage.

From hence Demosthenes came up to Zæcynthus and Cephallene; where he took their heavy-armed on board, and sent for those of the Messenians from Naupactus. He also crossed over to the opposite continent of Acarnania, to Alyzia and Anactorium, both belonging to the Athenians. Thus employed as he was in augmenting his force, Eurymedon, returning from Sicily, whither he had been sent in the winter to carry a supply of money for the army, meets him; and, amongst other intelligence, relates, that "he had heard, since he was upon his return, that Plemmyrium had been taken by the Syracusans." Conon, also, who commanded at Naupactus, came to them with advice, that "the five and twenty sail of Corinthians which lay over-against their squadron had not quitted that station, and even threatened them with an engagement." He exhorted, therefore, these commanders to detach some vessels thither, since their squadron at Naupactus, consisting only of eighteen ships, was not a match for the enemy, whose squadron amounted to twenty five. Upon this, Demosthenes and Eurymedon detach ten of the prime sailers, amongst those under their own command, to follow Conon for the reinforcement of the squadron at Naupactus.

The two former continued to assemble forces for the grand expedition. Eurymedon, for this purpose, sailed to Corcyra, commanded them to man out fifteen ships, and selected himself the heavy-armed for the service; for, as he was returned from carrying the stores, he joined himself with Demosthenes in the command, in pursuance of the prior nomination. Demosthenes was collecting a body of slingers and darters from the towns of Acarnania.

The ambassadors from Syracuse, who were sent round to the Sicilian cities after the surprisal of Plemmyrium, had succeeded in their negotiations; and having assembled a large body of succours, were intent on bringing them up. Nicias, who had gained an early intelligence of their motion, sends to such of the Siculi, as lay upon their route and were in

alliance, (namely, the Centoripes and Halyans and others,) "by no means to yield a passage to the enemy, but to assemble in body and obstruct their march." It was impossible for them to reach Syracuse by any route; for the Agrigentines had refused a passage through their territories. Now, before, the Sicilians being on their march, Siculi, in compliance with the request of the Athenians, had placed three different ambuscades in their way. From these rushing suddenly upon them, as they were advancing in a careless manner, they destroyed about three hundred men, and all the ambassadors, excepting one Corinthian. And this Corinthian brought up afterwards to Syracuse all those who escaped by flight, the number of whom amounted to fifteen hundred.

About the same time the Camarineans also brought up a body of succours, consisting of five hundred heavy-armed, three hundred darters, three hundred archers. The Geloans also brought them a squadron of about five sail, beside three hundred darters and two hundred horse-

Now almost all Sicily, except the Agrigentines, (for these still adhered to their neutrality,) all the rest of the island, I say, who hitherto had stood aloof to observe events, joined themselves against the Athenians, in behalf of Syracuse: though the Syracusans, after the blow they had just received from the Siculi, thought it not proper to attack the Athenians suddenly upon a sudden.

But Demosthenes and Eurymedon, having completed their embarkations at Corcyra on the continent, at the head of this united and powerful armament, crossed over the Italian to cape Iapygia; and, standing away from thence, reach the Chirades, islands of Iapygia. Here they take on board their fleet a party of Iapygian darters, to the number of five hundred, and one hundred more of the Messapian nation; and, after they had renewed a friendship of ancient date with Artas, (who, being king of these islands, supplied them with the vessels,) they proceed to Metapontium in Italy. Upon the plea of an alliance subsisting between them, they prevail upon the Metapontians to furnish them out three hundred more, and two triremes, with which augmentation they stood along the coast to Thuria; where, at their arrival, they find that the party, who had acted against the Athenian interest, had in

a late sedition been driven out of the city. Desirous here to take a view of the whole armament, and to know whether any part had straggled and was left behind; hoping, farther, to prevail upon the Thurians to join them with their forces in the most cordial manner, and, since their welfare was connected with that of Athens, to declare the friends and foes of the Athenians to be equally their own; they staid some time at Thuria, and completed their designs.

To return to the Peloponnesians. About the same portion of time, their squadron of five and twenty sail, which, to favour the passage of the transports to Sicily, lay ranged in opposition to the fleet at Naupactus, having now made all things ready for an engagement, and equipped out some additional vessels, which had almost equalized their number to that of the Athenian ships, take their station in Rhypica, near Erinus of Achaia. As the place in which they rode was bent in the form of a crescent, the land force of the Corinthians and the adjacent confederates, who marched to their assistance, was posted upon each wing of the squadron, on the jutting necks of land, whilst the ships drawn up close together composed the centre of their arrangement, and Polyarchus the Corinthian commanded the fleet.

The Athenians, with three and thirty sail, under the command of Diphilus, weighed from Naupactus and stood in against them. At first, the Corinthians lay still without motion; but, so soon as it was judged necessary for them to act, and the signal flag was accordingly hoisted, they advanced to charge the Athenians, and an engagement ensued. The contention was maintained a long time on both sides. Three of the Corinthian vessels are destroyed, whilst not a single ship on the Athenian side was sunk, though seven were disabled for service by blows they had received from the enemies' beaks, by which their forecastles had been shattered by the Corinthian ships, made firm and compact for this very purpose by stays on each side of the beak. The event of the engagement remaining doubtful, from whence both sides took occasion to claim the victory, the Athenians however being masters of all the shatters of the enemy's fleet, which the wind drove right into the sea, and which the Corinthians made no efforts to recover, they dropped away from each other. Yet no kind of pursuit was attempted, and no prisoners

were taken by either : for the Corinthians and Peloponnesians, who fought close under the shore, were by that enabled to make an easy escape ; but, on the Athenian side, not even a single ship was sunk. And, yet, when the Athenians were sailed back to Naupactus, the Corinthians immediately set up a trophy, as if the victory was their own, because they had disabled a larger number of the enemy. They farther looked upon themselves as not defeated, because their enemies were not clearly victorious : for it is the way with the Corinthians to pronounce themselves victors if they are not sadly beaten ; whereas, the Athenians esteem themselves defeated if they have not made a signal conquest. But, farther, when the Peloponnesians were retired from their station, and the land army was dismissed, the Athenians erected a trophy. The spot they chose, whereon to place this token of their victory, was distant about twenty stadia from Erineus, the station in which the Corinthians rode. Such was the event of this naval engagement.

Demosthenes and Eurymedon, so soon as the Thurians had got in readiness seven hundred heavy-armed, with three hundred darters, to attend them in the expedition, ordered the fleet to coast along the shore towards the Crotoniatæ ; whilst themselves, after having taken a review of all their land army upon the banks of the Sybaris, marched them over land through the Thuriatæ. But when they were advanced to the river Hylia, they were met by a message from the Crotoniatæ, intimating to them, that " their consent should never be given for the passage of this army through their dominions ;" upon which they wheeled off downwards towards the sea and the mouth of the Hylia, where they halted a night, and were joined by the whole body of the fleet.

The next morning they re-embarked and proceeded along the coast, touching at every city, except Locri, till they arrived at Petra in the district of Rhegium.

But during this interval, the Syracusans, who had received advice of the approach of the reinforcement ; determined to make another attempt with their fleet and the whole augmented body of their land army, which they had assembled together for this very design of attacking the Athenians again before the reinforcement arrived. But, like men who in the former

action had clearly perceived what would give them advantages over the enemy, they had made some alteration in the structure of their vessels : having shortened the heads of their ships, they made them more firm and compact, and fastened very substantial stays to each side of the beak ; they strengthened these again by rafters of six cubits in length, which were laid along the ribs both within and without, in the same manner as the Corinthians had strengthened the whole prow of their ships for the last naval engagement against the squadron at Naupactus. By these means the Syracusans concluded they should gain an advantage over the ships of the Athenians, which were of a different structure, as in the prow they were but weak, because of their usual practice, in an engagement, not to charge a-head, but by tacking about to strike upon the sides :—that, farther, should the battle be fought in the great harbour, where sea-room would be small and the ships be crowded, this must be also an advantage in their favour ; since, darting themselves a-head, they must needs shatter the prows of the enemy, when with compact and solid beaks they struck against such as were hollow and weak :—that again, for want of sea-room, the Athenians would be too much straitened to make their tacks, or to run through their lines, which were points of attack on which they chiefly relied ; they were determined to the utmost of their power to check all attempts of the latter sort, and the narrow space in which they must engage would of itself prevent the former ; and now they intended with dexterity to turn to their own advantage the method of striking ahead, which on the former occasion appeared to be an error in the masters ; that hence infallibly the day must be their own ; for the Athenians, if once repulsed, would not have room to go round and return to the charge, since thus they must directly be forced on the shore, which lay but a small distance from their camp, and would sadly cramp them up ; that they themselves must be masters of the rest of the harbour, whilst the enemy, crowded together, in case they should be forced to give way, must be driven into narrow compass, and even falling foul on one another, a total confusion and disorder must certainly follow ; for, what hurt the Athenians most, in all their naval engagements, was their inability to make use of the whole harbour for tacking about or returning to the

¹ About two miles.

in the same manner as the Syracusans : at last, finally, the Athenians could not possibly get out into wider sea, as the entrance of the harbour and the space behind the lines of ships were in their own command ; nay, other vessels would co-operate, such as Plemmy, which would now oppose any attempt of retreat, and the very nature of the harbour's narrowness, which was exceeding narrow.

such a project the Syracusans had given increase to their former skill and strength ; animated more than ever by the thought of glory improved from their errors in the forgoing engagement, they sallied out to encounter the enemy both with their land and naval force. Alcibiades showed himself, a small portion of before the rest, at the head of the infantry, whom, sallying out of the city, he drew near the Athenian entrenchment, in that spot where it faced the city. Then the son of Olympias, to a man, as well armed as horsemen, with all the light-armed parties of the Syracusans, came and stood up on the other quarters ; and, immediately after, the ships of the Syracusans and allies came sailing forwards.

The Athenians at first imagined that at least they were threatened only with an assault by land ; but when, on a sudden, they saw the fleet bearing down against them, they were struck with confusion. Some of them were taking post upon and without the entrenchments, to make head against the assaults ; others were sallied forth to encounter the troops from Olympias, and those from the remoter parts coming on with full speed, a numerous body of horsemen and darters. The fleet was hurrying on board to man the ships or to give what assistance they could on the beach : and no sooner were the provisions and implements on board, than seventy-five ships stood out to meet the enemy ; but then the number of the enemy's vessels was about 100.

That part of this day was spent in advancing and retreating from one another, in reciprocal endeavours to seize advantage ; but neither side was able to execute any remarkable piece of service, excepting that the Syracusans sunk one or two of the Athenian ships ; upon which they parted, and at the same time the land army drew off from the entrenchments.

The day following the Syracusans lay quiet, 42

affording the enemy no room to guess at their future designs.

But Nicias, conscious to himself that hitherto no advantages had been gained by sea, and fully expecting that the enemy would repeat their attempt, obliged the captains of the triremes to repair their ships if anywise damaged, and stationed the transports before the piles, which they had driven down in the sea, to secure the ships, and lock up as it were that space in which they lay. The transports he ranged in a line, at the distance of the breadth of two plethra¹ from one another ; that, in case a ship was repulsed, it might run in hither as a place of security, and might again stand out without any molestation. In perfecting these dispositions the Athenians were all this day employed from morning to night.

The next day, the Syracusans, earlier in the morning than before, and with the same parade of their land and naval force, came out to attack the Athenians. Now again, facing each other in the lines of the engagement, they spent great part of the day in the same endeavours as before to over-reach and surprise one another ; till at length Aristo, the son of Pyrrhus, a Corinthian, and the most expert seaman in the fleet of Syracuse, persuades the commanders of that fleet to despatch their orders to the magistrates within the city,—“ with all expedition to bring the provisions which were for sale down to the beach of the sea, and hold the market there ; nay, farther, to compel all those who had any meat to sell to offer it instantly on the beach, that the mariners might come ashore and dine under the sides of their vessels ; so that, after a short repast, they might this same day unexpectedly fall upon the Athenians.” This counsel being approved, the necessary orders were despatched away, and the market was furnished out. Then suddenly the Syracusan fleet fell back, and stood away towards the city ; where, disembarking with all possible haste, they took their repast.

But the Athenians, who ascribed this dropping off of the enemy to a consciousness of their own inferiority, quitting their own ships as if there was nothing farther to be done, diverted their attention to their own affairs, and especially to prepare a refreshing meal for

¹ A plethron is said by some to contain 1,414, by others, 1000 square feet.

themselves, confident there would be no engagement on this day. But, on a sudden, the Syracusans, repairing on board, stood out a second time to give them battle. Then the Athenians, in much hurry and confusion, and most of them still fasting, re-embarking without any regularity or order, with great difficulty, after a considerable interval, stood out to receive them. For a certain space, each stood upon their guard, and declined the charge. At length it occurred to the Athenians, that it was imprudent to dally so long, and exhaust their spirits by the mere labour of the oar, which ought rather to be exerted on an expeditious attack. Upon which animating one another with a shout, they darted upon the enemy, and the engagement began.

The Syracusans received the shock without giving way, and, keeping the heads of their vessels right against the enemy, executed their project, and with their strengthened beaks shattered the forecastles of the Athenian ships; whilst their darters, who were ranged along the decks, galled the Athenians sorely with their missive weapons; though not near so much as did the crews of some light Syracusan boats, which scoured about the enemy's fleet; sometimes getting under their wards and gliding along the sides of their vessels, and from these close positions aiming their darts at the mariners. In fine, the Syracusans, persevering in this manner to gall their foes, were masters of the day; whilst the Athenians, being put to flight, were obliged to retire, through the intervals of the line of transports, into their own station. The Syracusan ships pursued as far as to this line of transports; but were obliged to stop there, for fear of the machines¹ which hung upon the yards of the transports to bar all approach. Two ships, indeed, of the Syracusans, elevated with success, approached too near, and were sunk; and another, with all her crew, was taken by the enemy. And now the Syracusans, who in the action had sunk seven ships of the enemy, had damaged many, had taken many prisoners, and made great slaughter, judged it proper to retire. They then erected trophies as victorious in two engagements, and plumed themselves in the assurance, that by sea, they had the superi-

ority over the enemy; presuming, at the same time, that they must soon be victorious also by land: upon which they got every thing in readiness to attack them once more on both elements.

But, at this crisis, Demosthenes and Epimedon arrive, at the head of the reinforcement from Athens; which consisted of seventy-three sail of ships, including foreigners; of about five thousand heavy-armed of their own and their confederate troops; beside a considerable number of darters, as well Bertram as Grecian, and slingers, and archers, and a complete supply of all military stores. The first appearance of this grand reinforcement struck the Syracusans and their allies with no small consternation. It looked as if the war must be endless, and themselves exposed to dangers that knew no bounds. They saw that, in spite of the annoyance which Decælea, now fortified, gave them, the Athenians were armed before Syracuse with another armament as great and as formidable as the former; and that, in every view, the strength of Athens must be quite insurmountable. And now also the Athenians, who remained of the former armament, re-inspired from that dejection of spirit into which a series of misfortunes had plunged them.

Demosthenes, after taking a view of the present posture of affairs, thought it absolutely necessary to avoid delays, and keep clear of those errors which had done so much prejudice to Nicias: for Nicias, at his first appearance, struck an universal consternation; and yet, by declining the immediate attack of Syracuse, and loitering a whole winter away at Catana, he became an object of contempt; and Gylippus had time to land a succour from Peloponnesus, which disconcerted all his measures. That succour, however, the Syracusans could never have sent for, had Nicias assaulted them on his first approach; for, deluding themselves with the thought that they were a match for their foes, they would have found, by and experience, that they had indulged a cruel mistake, and must the same moment have been invested on all sides: and, in such a state, though they had invited those succours, yet no effectual relief could have been obtained from them.

Demosthenes, therefore, reflecting on their past mistakes, and sensible that he himself at this very moment, on the first day of his ar-

¹ Called *dolphins*, from their form. They were masonry, made of lead, and hung upon the sail-yards by cords and pulleys; and, when thrown into the enemy's ships, either burst or sunk them.

appeared most terrible in the eyes of the
7, resolved without loss of time to im-
the present consternation which his re-
ement had struck amongst them. He
r took notice, the counterwork of the Sy-
ans, by which the Athenians had been ex-
d from perfecting their circumvallation,
sted only of a single wall; and, in case
sights of Epipolæ could again be regained,
the camp which at first had been occupied
, that work might easily be carried, since
efendants could not now be able to with-

the Athenian strength;—he determined
fore to put this project in execution;
ng that, in case it succeeded, it would be
ans of bringing the war to a speedy con-
on: for, if the scheme took place, the sur-
st of Syracuse must soon follow; at worst
ould draw off the army, and not waste the
of those Athenians who were employed
is service, and the strength of the whole
to no manner of purpose.

ow, therefore, the Athenians began to act
ively; and, in the first place, sallying out
their camp, they ravaged the country along
nks of the Anapus, and were now again,
the first approach, masters without con-
oth by land and sea; for in neither
at durst the Syracusans any longer come
o check their motions, abating what
resistance was made by the cavalry and
s from Olympieum.

the next place, Demosthenes thought
to try what could be done against the
of the enemy by the help of machines.

When, upon applying them, those ma-
were fired by the Syracusans, who from
of their works made a gallant defence;
though the army attacked in several
as at once, they were every where re-
; he determined to waste no longer time
the trial; but, having prevailed with
and his other colleagues in command
ent to the scheme he had formed to re-

Epipolæ, he proceeded to put it in exe-
- Yet, by daylight, it was judged im-
le for them either to march or to mount
scent without being discovered. Upon
aving issued out his orders, that every
ould take with him subsistence for five
and that all masons and carpenters should
l the march, with proper store of missive
ons, and all needful materials for rais-
ew works in case the attempt was suc-

cessful, he put himself, about the first sleep, at
the head of the whole army, and, assisted by
Eurymedon and Menander, marched towards
Epipolæ. But Nicias was left behind in the
intrenchments.

When now they were advanced to the pass
of Euryalus, by which the first army gained
formerly the ascent, they are yet undiscovered
by the Syracusan guards; and, mounting the
heights, surprise the fort which was there man-
ned by the Syracusans, and slaughter some of
the defendants. But the majority flying a-
main towards the camps, of which there were three
among the advanced intrenchments of Epipolæ,
(one of Syracusans, a second of other Sicilians,
and a third of the confederates,) they spread
the alarm, and also notified the enemy's ap-
proach to the six hundred Syracusans, who at
first were selected for the guard of this quarter
of Epipolæ. These sallied out instantly to stop
their progress; and Demosthenes, with his
Athenians, falling in with them, put them to
flight, after they had made a gallant stand.
Upon this success, they immediately pushed
forwards, that they might improve the present
ardour of the soldiers to the immediate comple-
tion of those points for which they had made
this bold attempt. Another party, which had
been advancing all along without a check, sur-
prised the counterwork of the Syracusans; of
which, since abandoned by its defendants, they
were throwing down the battlements.

But now the Syracusans, and their confede-
rates, and Gylippus with the body under his
command, marched out of their intrench-
ments: yet, having been attacked in so daring
a manner amidst the darkness of the night,
they had not recovered their surprise when
they fell in with the Athenians; and thus, not
able to stand the first shock, they were obliged
to give way for a time. But, as the Athenians
pushed forwards with great irregularity, as if
the victory was quite their own; eager, farther,
to make themselves masters of all the tract
not yet cleared of the enemy, for fear lest,
should they slacken in their ardour, the ene-
my might have time to rally in a body,
—the Boeotians first put a stop to their ca-
reer; and, rushing boldly upon them, rout-
ed and put them to flight. By this turn the
Athenians were thrown into so much disorder
and confusion, that the particulars which fol-
lowed cannot easily be gathered, neither from
themselves nor their antagonists: for, even

in daylight, when objects are clearest to the sight, men present in a battle are not able to see all that passeth; each single combatant can barely relate what happened about his own person. When, therefore, armies engage amidst the darkness of the night (though this is the only instance of it between powerful armies in the present war,) how is it possible to come at the knowledge of the several incidents? The moon indeed shone at this time; but then they only saw one another as objects appear by moon-light, so as to discern the appearance of human bodies, but not to distinguish between friends and enemies. The heavily-armed, farther, numerous on both sides, were too much crowded for want of room. One party of the Athenians was already clearly defeated; another, unbroken by the first attack upon them, was pushing forwards. Of the remainder of their army, a great part had already mounted the ascent; yet some were still busied in mounting up; but none of these, when they were got upon the eminence, knew which way to advance: for, before them (as the rout was begun) there was one grand medley of confusion, and the tumult was so loud that no sounds could be distinctly heard. The Syracusans and their confederates were animating one another with loud exultations (for the season of the night made all signals useless) to complete the blow, and were clearing before them all that came in their way: but the Athenians were prying about for one another, and regarded every thing they met, even though they fell in with their own friends, as the flight was now begun, for an assured enemy. Obligated, farther, by frequent iterations, to demand the word, as the only method to distinguish one another, (all calling out aloud for it at the same instant of time,) they heightened the general distraction, and clearly discovered their own word to the enemy. But then they had not equal opportunities to discover that of the enemy; because, as the latter were now the victors and kept more in bodies, it was less liable to detection. Hence it came to pass, that, though a stronger party of the Athenians fell in with a weaker party of their foes, yet they judged it best to fly; because they were sensible that their own word was divulged; and, as they could not return the word of the Syracusans, they must unavoidably be cut to pieces. But what had the greatest effect, and did most hurt to the Athenians, was the sing-

ing the pean; since that used on both sides, being nearly the same, raised the utmost confusion. And, when the Argives and Corinthians, and all others of Doric descent, who were with the Athenians, began from time to time their pean, it struck the same alarm into the Athenians as when the enemy themselves sang it: so that, in short, falling in amongst one another in different quarters of the army, when once the confusion was rose to a height, (friends against friends, and citizens against fellow-citizens,) they not only impress a reciprocal terror, but proceed to blows with so much fury that they could not easily be parted. The pursuit was briskly followed; in which many of them, plunging headlong down the precipices, were dashed in pieces, because the pass downwards from Epipolæ was too narrow for their numbers. But, of those who from the heights got down into the plain, many, and all in general who came in the first armament, since better experienced in the country, escaped in safety to the camp: whereas, of the last comers, some, straggling into by-ways, were bewildered in a country to which they were utter strangers, and at break of day was cut to pieces by the Syracusan horse, who scoured the plains.

On the day following, the Syracusans erected two trophies on Epipolæ; one on the summit of the pass, and the other where the Boeotians first stopped the enemy's progress. The Athenians also obtained a truce, to fetch off their dead; the number of which was large,¹ both in their own troops and those of their allies; and yet more arms were taken by the enemy than bore proportion to the slain: for, of the number of light-armed who were pushed to the brink of the precipices, and, throwing away their shields, were obliged to leap down, though some perished by the fall, yet others escaped with life.

But, after this, the Syracusans, highly animated again with this fresh unexpected turn in their favour, sent out Sicanius, at the head of fifteen sail, to Agrigentum, now embroiled in a sedition, with orders to exert the utmost of his power to reduce it to their obedience. Gylippus also made once more the tour of Sicily, to levy another army; confident that, with such a reinforcement, he could carry the

¹ Plutarch puts it at two thousand; but Diodorus Siculus says it was two thousand five hundred.

intrenchments of the enemy by storm, so affairs had taken such a favourable turn at Epipolæ.

In the meantime, the Athenian generals were employed in the needful consultations on the last misfortune and the present universal dejection of their troops. They saw that all their attempts were blasted by ill success and that the soldiers were chagrined at continuance of so fruitless a service: for a pest spread amongst their people from a noble cause; from the present season of the year, in which the human body is most subject to disorders, and the marshy unwholesome ground on which they were encamped; besides that, in every respect, their situation appeared desperate and quite beyond the power of remedy.

The opinion of Demosthenes was therefore very repugnant to a longer continuance before Syracuse. He urged "the immediate execution of the scheme he had formed before made the late dangerous attempt upon Epipolæ; which since it had miscarried should no longer protract their departure, but yet the season of the year was proper for their voyage homewards, and they had strength enough in the last reinforcement to effect their passage in spite of the enemy." He affirmed, "It would be more conducive to the public welfare to turn their arms against those who were erecting fortifications in Attica itself, than against the Syracusans, whose reduction now was almost impracticable and that it was madness to persist any longer in a siege which dissipated the wealth of the state in fruitless vain expenses." In this manner Demosthenes declared his sentiments.

As for Nicias, though convinced within himself that their affairs were in a bad situation, yet he was unwilling with his own mouth to confess a low condition, or that a departure should be decided by the general votes of a public council, or all that passed must be reported to the enemy; because, should the determination be formed in this manner, the execution could not go forwards without the enemy's consent. Besides, as he knew the state of the army somewhat more perfectly than others, he imagined there were grounds to hope that the state of the latter would soon become worse than their own, would they only continue to resist the siege. A want of supplies must

soon reduce them to great straits; and this the sooner, as, by the accession of the last squadron, themselves were now again masters of the sea. And, what is more, in Syracuse itself there was a party which wished to see the city fall into their hands. These had despatched their agents to Nicias, and insisted he should not quit the siege. Yet, thus enlightened as he was, in reality he knew not how to act, as his mind was balanced between two measures, which equally required mature deliberation. But, for the present, he openly declared himself in council against drawing off the army. He told them, "he was perfectly well assured that the Athenians would never forgive him, should he carry their troops from Sicily without peremptory orders; that the affair would not then lie under the cognizance of such as were here advised it, and with their own eyes were convinced of the necessity of such a step; but of men who would form their judgments upon the spiteful calumniations of others, and the influence some malicious demagogues would have over their understandings, by which their fate would be determined." He farther represented, that "many, nay, the greater part of the soldiers, who now formed the troops, and make such tragical outcries about the perils that environ them at present, would change their notes so soon as they were landed again at Athens, and ascribe their return to the treachery and corruption of their commanders." For such reasons, he declared, "as he was well acquainted with Athenian tempers, he would choose, rather than be undone at Athens by base criminations and an unjust sentence, to hazard the last extremity, and perish, if so it must be, under the violence of the enemy." He maintained, however, that "the state of the Syracusans was worse than their own. The demand upon them for the pay of foreigners was large; their expenses in securing the outworks of Syracuse were high; they had now supported a large navy for the space of an entire year; want therefore must soon come upon them, and they must shortly be totally distressed; because the sum of two thousand talents¹ they had already expended of their own stock, and had even contracted a large debt beside. And, in case they abate of their present punctuality or making good the appointments of the forces they have on foot, their

¹ 387,500*l.* sterling.

strength must moulder away; since it consisted, not like the Athenians, of troops which must serve, but of such as were only discretionary aids." He concluded with "the necessity they lay under, from the ties of duty, to continue the siege with vigour, and by no means expose a superior strength to ruin, through a false presumption that they were inferior in point of supplies."

Nicias expressed himself on this occasion with an air of neat confidence, as a person perfectly well acquainted with the state of Syracuse and the failure of money there, and because there was a party within the city which acted in favour of the Athenians, and had advised him, by their agents, "by no means to raise the siege." And, what is more, he placed a stronger dependence now upon the fleet than ever he had done before the late unsuccessful engagement.

As to the proposal of continuing the siege, Demosthenes would not yield the least degree of attention to it: "If the army must not evacuate Sicily without a peremptory order from Athens, but must persist in this destructive service, he judged it would be better to draw them off to Thapsus or to Catana, where they might find opportunity enough to make incursions with the land army upon the territories of the enemy, and, by committing devastations, might highly distress them. Their fleet might then engage in the open sea: not in a space confined and straitened, which was the greatest advantage to the enemy, but in sufficient sea-room, where all their superior skill might fairly be exerted, where they would be able to make their attacks, and bear down again upon the foe with greater agility, and more violent shocks, than could be done in the liminary space of a close pent-up harbour. Upon the whole, he affirmed, that his consent should never be given to a longer continuance in their present posts, but he was for moving off with all possible expedition, and they had not a moment to lavish upon delay."

Eurymedon then declared that his sense of things coincided with that of Demosthenes; and, Nicias persisting in the contrary opinion, a fit of languor and suspense ensued, attended with the secret imagination that the positiveness of Nicias resulted from some stronger hopes of success he had conceived above his colleagues. And in this manner the Atheni-

ans fell into dilatory measures, and continued in their camp before Syracuse.

But in this interval Gylippus and Sicanus returned to Syracuse: Sicanus, truly appointed of Agrigentum, for he was no farther than Gela when the sedition in favour of the Syracusans was brought to a cable period; but then Gylippus was at the head of a numerous body, consisting of levies made in Sicily, and the heavy troops from Peloponnesus, who in the spring had put to sea on board the transport, but were over last from Africa to Selinus; for in Africa they had been driven by contrary winds, and, having there been furnished by the Carthaginians with two triremes and a set of pilots, they coasted along the African shore, they relieved the Evesperitæ, then blocked up by the Libyans. The latter they defeated in a battle; and, proceeding from thence along the shore, they reached Neapolis, a Carthaginian mart, from whence lies the shortest cut to Sicily, being only a passage of two days and night. Hence therefore they stood across, and landed at Selinus.

With this accession of strength, the Syracusans instantly prepared to attack the Athenians again both by land and sea. But the Athenian generals,—finding they had received so large an augmentation, and that the position of their own affairs was so far from being changed for the better, that day after day grew worse in every respect, and, what was worst of all, that their troops were quite exhausted with fatigue and sickness,—they repented now in earnest that they had not done off in time; and, as Nicias now no longer proposed that step with the same vehemence as he had done before, but merely endeavoured that it should not be determined in public council, they issued out orders, with the utmost secrecy, that the whole armament should hold themselves in readiness to put to sea upon a signal given. But, all things now ready, the very moment they are going to embark, the moon is eclipsed, for it was now the time of the full. The bulk of the army, struck with the awful appearance, call out upon the generals to halt: and Nicias, always addicted too much to superstition and such vulgar scruples, positively declared, that "it should no more be debated whether they should remove or not, till the three times nine days were past which the

measures prescribe on such occasions." So, this reason, a longer stay was forced upon Athenians who had been too dilatory already.¹

The Syracusans, who had soon an intelligence of their designs, were now more animated ever to press briskly on the Athenians, as on who had given proof of their own inward conviction that they were no longer a match

at the bulk of an army or a fleet should be frightened such appearances, is no wonder at all: they are ignorant; and the most daring of them in other respects have been much addicted to superstition. But cannot help being surprised at the ignorance and credulity of Nicias; one cannot help pitying and deploring the folly of a man who had so good a heart. He expatiates largely on this occasion. "Even Igar," says he, "at this time were well apprised of an eclipse of the sun was often occasioned, about the time of the change, by an interposition of the moon: so to the moon, by the interposition of what body, on a sudden, at the full, its light fades away or variety of colour, was not easy for them to conceive."

They thought it a strange occurrence, and sent for as a prognostic of great calamities. The first philosopher who wrote a clear and bold solution of the enigma and obscuration of the moon, was Anaxagoras, who now had not been long dead; nor was his action in every body's hands, but concealed, imparted to a few, and that with caution and assurances of mystery. The world could not bear that naturalists and reformers, as they were then styled, should seem to strain the divine power by quaint argumentations, and operations, and necessary consequences. For attempts Protagoras was banished; and Pericles, much ado, procured the release of Anaxagoras thrown into prison. Nay, Socrates, who never parted with any of these points, was however put to upon the charge of philosophizing. It was not the glory of Plato shone abroad; who, by his reproachable life, and subjecting natural necessities to a divine and sovereign power, cleared away all reputations from studies of this kind, and, by a mathematical beginning, opened a field to other sciences. Thus his friend Dion, at what time he was setting out on Zacyntus against Dionysius, was not at all deterred by an eclipse of the moon, but landed safely at Syracuse, and ejected the tyrant. It was the misfortune of Nicias, at this juncture, not to have even a skilful seer with him; for his intimate, Stilbides, who trusted much of his superstition, had died a little before this portent, as Philochorus says, was not one, but an excellent good one, for a flying army; acts which are accompanied with fear stand in need of concealment, and light is ever an adversary to

them. Besides, after eclipses of the sun or moon, it was usual custom, as Autocleides hath informed us, to abstain only a three days' cessation from business. But Nicias persuaded himself that a complete revolution of fortune ought to be waited for; as if with his own eyes he had not seen her shine bright again, when she passed the shadow and the earth's interposition, throwing up all attention to other points, he mindlessly but sacrificially, till his enemies attacked
"*Life of Nicias.*"

for their foes either by sea or on land; since, with other thoughts, they never could have projected a re-embarkation. Apprehensive, at the same time, that, should they remove to any other quarter of Sicily, they would become more difficult of reduction, they saw the necessity of engaging them by sea without a moment's loss, whilst yet they had an advantage in compelling them to fight. Upon this, they ordered the complements of men on board their ships, and exercised their crews as many days as was judged sufficient. But, when opportunity offered of acting with advantage, on the first day they assaulted the Athenian intrenchments; and, a party of heavy-armed and horsemen, though not numerous, sallied out at some of the ports to beat them off, they cut off some of the heavy-armed from the rest of that party, and, having put them to flight, followed the pursuit. As the spot, farther, on which the assault is made, was narrow, the Athenians lost seventy horses and a small number of their heavy-armed. Nothing more happened on this day, as the army of the Syracusans now made their retreat.

But, on the day following, they stand out with their fleet,² to the number of seventy-six ships; and, at the same time, the land army marched up to the intrenchments. The Athenians launched out, with fourscore and six, to give them a reception; and thus, charging one another, an engagement ensued. Eurymedon commanded the right wing of the Athenian fleet, and endeavoured to over-reach and surround the ships of the enemy. For this purpose, he opened his line, and stood along too close to the land; which gave the Syracusans and their allies, who had now defeated the centre of the Athenians, an opportunity to intercept him in the bottom and recess of the harbour, where they slay Eurymedon himself, and destroy the ships which had separated in his company: and, this done, they gave chase to the whole Athenian fleet, and drove them ashore.

¹ Plutarch adds, that, "on this occasion, the very lads came out in fishing-boats and skiffs, taunting and insulting the Athenians. One of these lads, Hieracides, of a noble family, who had advanced too near, was in great danger of being intercepted by an Athenian vessel. But Polikles, the uncle of the lad, alarmed for his safety, charged instantly with the ten triremes he had under his command. The rest of the Syracusan fleet, now alarmed for Polikles, ran in at once, and brought on a general engagement."—*Life of Nicias.*

Gylippus now, perceiving that the ships of the enemy were defeated and drove aground quite wide of the piles and their camp, formed instantly a design to make slaughter of the men as they were leaping on shore, and of giving the Syracusans an opportunity easily to draw off all the ships from land of which they were entire masters. At the head, therefore, of one division of the land-force, he marched down to the pier to second the fleet. The Tyrrhenes happened to have been posted nearest by the Athenians; who, seeing a body of the enemy running down thither in a disorderly manner, advanced eagerly to meet them; and, charged briskly on the van, put them to flight and drive them into the lake of Lysimelia. But, soon after, a reinforcement of Syracusans and their allies coming up, the Athenians also advanced with speed to succour their friends, and, trembling for their ships, soon came to an engagement with them, and, after routing, pursued them amain. They slaughtered now a great number of the heavy-armed; and, what was more, preserved the far greater part of their fleet, and towed again to their former moorings all their ships, except eighteen, which the Syracusans and their allies made prizes, and put all the men on board them to the sword. With a view, farther, to destroy the rest by setting them on fire, they filled an old transport ship with facines and combustible matter, and, as the wind blew right upon the Athenians, set her on fire, and let her drive in amongst them. The Athenians, trembling for the ships, put all their engines instantly at work to extinguish the flames; which having at length effectuated, and kept this fire-ship clear of their own vessels, they were delivered from this imminent danger.

After this the Syracusans erected a trophy for their victorious engagement on the water, and for the interception of the party of the heavy-armed before the intrenchments, where they had taken so many horses. The Athenians also did the same, for the repulse given by the Tyrrhenes to the land-forces of the enemy, and their being chased into the lake, and the larger success they afterwards obtained with the rest of their army.

But now, when, beyond the reach of doubt, the Syracusans, though at first alarmed at the large reinforcement of shipping brought against them by Demosthenes, had gained a signal victory by sea, the Athenians were plunged

into a total dejection of spirit: they were thunder-struck by the reverse of misfortune little expected; and began to repent, with much more bitterness of thought, that they had ever engaged in so fatal an expedition. They had invaded states, whose polity was almost of a piece with their own, whose form of government was popular, like that of Athens, and which flourished in shipping, in commerce, and each article of power: and yet, finding themselves unable to give any measure of success to their projects by introducing dissensions amongst them through political cabalments, nor even by a powerful force, superior to that of their foes, able to ward off the blows they had received, they had fallen headlong into great anxieties; and now, only beaten as they were at sea, one thought of which they never could hitherto have conceived, their despondency became more violent than ever.

From this time the Syracusans scoured the whole harbour without having any thing to fear. They had also formed a scheme of barring up its mouth; that the Athenians, though never so intent upon it, might for the future not have it in their power to steal away. Their care and diligence were no longer employed on the view alone of their own preservation, but on the larger view of ruining the Athenians. They concluded, and justly too, that the latter turn in their favour had given them the ascendancy over these invaders: and, could they but compass the total overthrow of this body of Athenians and their allies, the grand achievement would strike all Greece with admiration. Nay more, all other Grecians must reap the fruits of such success; of whom some would in an instant recover freedom, and others be delivered from the fear of losing it; for the remaining strength of Athens would never be able to stand against that weight of war with which she must be soon encompassed about. And thus, could they (Syracusans) be the glorious authors of such desirable events, they must infallibly become objects of wonder not only to all the present age, but to latest posterity. And of a truth, considered in such a light, it was great and glorious ambition, to aim at the conquest, not only of the Athenians, but also of their whole extensive and combined alliance; and this, not merely to earn laurels for themselves, but for the auxiliaries also who had engaged in their cause, since, exposed in the

front of the war with the Lacedæmonians and Corinthians, they had subjected their own state to the fury of a storm which threatened them all, and, by their own personal valour in naval engagements, had contributed most to such a height of success.

The various people, now got together at this one city of Syracuse, were so very numerous, as to be exceeded only by the comprehensive roll of those who, in the series of the present war, sided either with the states of Athens or Sparta. The catalogue is subjoined of those, who mustered in the offensive and defensive armies at Syracuse; who fought against or in behalf of Sicily; who joined for the reduction or preservation of this island, not so much from just and lawful motives, or a concurrence resulting from the ties of blood, as from policy, or interest, or direct compulsion.

The Athenians, truly, in quality of Ionians, had voluntarily come hither against the Syracusans, who were Dorians; attended by those who spoke the same dialect and used the same institutions with themselves, the Lemnians, and Imbrians, and those Æginetæ who were the present possessors of Ægina. The Hestians, farther, now inhabiting Hestia in Eubœa, as an Athenian colony, had joined in the expedition. Of the remaining numbers, some came along with them because they were dependents: some, though independent, because they were confederates: and some there were who attended merely for their pay. The dependents and tributaries were the Eretrians, and Chalcideans, and Styrensiens, and Carystians, from Eubœa; from the islands, the Ceans, and Andrians, and Teians; from Ionia, the Milesians, and Samians, and Chians; of these the Chians, being not subjected to a tribute, but only to furnish a quota of shipping, though independent at home, yet followed their arms. And all these hitherto recited were Ionians and Athenian colonies, excepting the Carystians, for these last are Dryopes; but, as subjected to Athens, not so much from choice as Ionians, as by mere compulsion, they now followed their masters against Dorians. To these were added Æolians; the Methymneans, for instance, who were to furnish shipping, but were exempted from tribute; the Tenedians, farther, and Ænians, who were tributaries; but these, being Æolians, were now compelled to fight against other Æolians; namely, their own founders, the Bœotians, who adhered to

the Syracusans. The Plateans did the same, and were the only Bœotians that acted against Bœotians upon the justifiable pretext of lasting enmity. The Rhodians, farther, and Cytherians attended, though both of Doric descent: the Cytherians, truly, who are a Lacedæmonian colony, bore arms at this juncture on the Athenian side, against the Lacedæmonians under the command of Gylippus; and the Rhodians, Argives by descent, were obliged to turn their arms against the Doric Syracusans; nay, against the Geloans, a colony of their own, now acting in concert with the Syracusans. Of the people of the isles on the coast of Peloponnesus came the Cephalenians and Zacynthians; independent, in fact, but through their situation, controlled in some measure by the Athenians, who are masters of the sea. The Corcyreans, farther, who were not only of Doric, but, what is more, were even of Corinthian original, as being a colony of the latter, and by blood allied to the former, from compulsion, as they gave out for a colour, though in truth from deliberate malice, since opposing the Corinthians, whom they hated, followed the Athenians with an ardour inferior to none. The Messenians also, now styled Messenians of Naupactus, and those from Pylus, which was still held by the Athenians, were brought along to the war; to whom must be added a small party of Megarean exiles, who by a sad reverse of fortune now took part against the Selinuntians, who were also Megarean. The residue of the confederates were engaged rather upon free and spontaneous choice. The Argives, for instance, not more from obligations of subsisting treaties, than the rancour they bore the Lacedæmonians, and the gratification of private spleen, though Doric, yet followed the Ionic Athenians against their Doric kindred. But the Mantineans and the rest of the Arcadians, who were mercenaries, and eternally habituated to act against any foe pointed out to them, were now so far influenced by gain as to regard those Arcadians as their enemies, who came over on this occasion in company with the Corinthians. The Cretans also and Ætolians were there, allured by an advantageous pay; and thus it happened that the Cretans, who, in concert with the Rhodians, had founded Gela, readily took part, for the sake of gain, not with but against a colony which themselves had planted. There was also a body of Acarnanian auxiliaries, partly induced to join by the pay they received, but

principally by their personal regard for Demosthenes and their attachment to the Athenians. And thus have we run them over to the utmost boundary of the Ionian gulf. Of the Italic nations, the Thurians, and those Metapontians whom intestine feuds had reduced to the necessity of fighting for subsistence, joined their arms; and, of the Sicilian, the Naxians, and Cataneans; of barbarian, the Ægesteans, who were the first movers of this grand contention, and the major part of the Siculi; and, out of Sicily, some of the Tyrrenes, from enmity to the Syracusans, and the mercenary Iapygians. So many nations were assembled together at present under the command of the Athenians.

The auxiliaries, on the side of the Syracusans, were the Camarineans, who bordered close upon them, and the Geloans, who are situated next the Camarineans. To proceed regularly: as the Agrigentines were neutral, the Selinuntians next occur, who are seated beyond the Agrigentines, since they inhabit that tract of the island which faceth Africa. Then the Himereans, the only Grecian people who inhabit that part of the island which lies off the Tyrrhene sea, and were the only body which came from thence to the aid of Syracuse. The several nations of Greek descent settled in Sicily, being all Doric, and independent, acted together in concert. Of the barbarous people they had those Siculi alone who did not openly revolt to the Athenians; but, out of Sicily, the Lacedæmonians sent them a citizen of Sparta to command, and a body of Neodamades and Helots. By a Neodamas is meant a citizen newly enfranchised. The Corinthians alone aided them both with shipping and a land force, in conjunction with the Leucadians and Ambraciots, by blood allied to Syracuse. From Arcadia also came a body of mercenaries, sent by the Corinthians; and the Sicyonians, who acted on compulsion; and of those who dwell without the Peloponnesus were the Bœotians. But, beside these foreign aids, the Sicilians, as possessed of great and powerful cities, furnished out in all respects a much greater and well-appointed force; for by them a numerous body of heavy-armed, of ships, and horses, and other kinds of military force, in an amazing abundance, were raised and brought to Syracuse. And yet it must be said, that the domestic force of the Syracusans was more to be considered than all

the rest, from the greatness of their state, and the immediate urgency of those perils which they were environed.

These were the aids, the numerous aids, assembled together by the contending parties, and at this juncture all these were present on each side of the contest; and from this either neither party received any accession.

The Syracusans therefore and their commanders thought, since the signal victory they had gained upon the water, it would be a happy exploit, and highly for their glory, to make the whole extensive camp of the Athenians their prize, and cut off their retreat on both elements, both by land and sea. With this project, they immediately barred up the great harbour, the mouth of which is about eight stadia^a wide, with a line of triremes placed side by side, and other vessels and boats moored fast together by anchors; and got every thing besides in readiness, in case the Athenians should venture on another engagement. Their every view was now become large and aspiring.

When the Athenians saw the harbour thus barred up, and perceived, farther, the whole of the enemy's designs, it was judged high time to go to consultation. The commanders of the different bodies were called to council, with the generals; in which,—upon representations made “of the great distress to which they were reduced, and that they had not a stock of provisions ample enough for their immediate subsistence, (for, bent on sailing away, they had sent already to Catana to countermand any fresh convoys,) and, unless they could recover their mastery at sea, it would be impracticable for the future to obtain a supply,”—they came to a final resolution, “To quit their intrenchments on the higher ground, and before the station of their shipping to raise a circular work, of as little compass as possible, but sufficient to serve for a magazine and hospital, and to this only to assign a guard; as for the rest of the land army, they were to oblige every soldier to go on board, that all the ships, which yet were undamaged, or had been laid up for want of hands, might be completely manned: and thus they must fight their passage out of the harbour; and, if it succeeded, make directly for Catana; but, if repulsed, they would burn their shipping, and, moving off in one body by land, would endeavour, by the most

^a Near a mile.

expeditious marches, to reach the nearest place that would receive them, whether Barbarian or Grecian."

Such was the plan resolved on, and which they began immediately to execute; for now, abandoning their upper intrenchments, they drew down to the beach, and manned the whole of their shipping, on board of which they forced, without exception, all such as had youth and vigour enough to be of service there. The whole number of ships, they were by this means enabled to man, amounted to a hundred and ten. They also placed on board the fleet a large number of archers, the darters of the Acarnanians, and other foreign auxiliaries; and provided in all other respects for action, as well as their condition would permit or the nature of the project required.

When things were thus in great forwardness, Nicias, taking notice that the soldiery was much dejected by the great defeats, which, contrary to their wonted custom, they had received by sea, and yet desirous to hazard another engagement as soon as possible, because pinched for want of necessary subsistence, he gathered them all round about himself, and endeavoured to raise their drooping spirits by the following exhortation, the first of the kind he had ever made:

"My fellow-soldiers, whether of the Athenian or the confederate troops! the bold attempt we are now going to make is of equal concern to each individual amongst us; since, not more for victory over our foes than for the preservation of ourselves and our country, we are now to fight; and, if our naval efforts be crowned with victory, each of us may again be blessed with the sight of his own native city. Away, therefore, with these faces of despair, this painful dejection, fit only for a raw unexperienced multitude, who, unsuccessful in their first attempts, for ever after bid adieu to hope, and by unmanly fears anticipate misfortunes!

"As for you, Athenians, who form so considerable a part of this assembly, experienced as you are in such variety of warfare!—and you also, our allies, who have ever fought under our banners!—recall to your reflection the unexpected turns of war; encourage the hope that fortune may at length declare for us, and determine once more to engage the foe with a spirit, worthy of that numerous strength of which by ocular demonstration you see yourselves this moment possessed. Those points,

of which we perceive we may avail ourselves against the narrowness of the harbour's mouth, against such a multitude of vessels as will be crowded together, and against that particular disposition of soldiers on their decks, from which on the former occasion we suffered so much,—all these, I must tell you, are as well adjusted as our present condition will permit, by the united care of us your generals and your own masters: for many archers and darters shall now line your decks, and that crowd of soldiers, which, when we engage in the open sea, we never can use, because the vessels would be too heavily laden to allow the proper exertion of our skill; that crowd, I say, in this pent-up contracted space, shall give to our naval battle the strength and stability of a land engagement. We have also devised the proper means to compensate the inferior structure of our ships; and, in return for the consolidated beaks of our enemy, have provided the ships with grappling irons, which will hold fast a vessel that hath run against you from getting clear, provided those on board will perform their duty; because, as necessity enforceth us now to fight a mere land battle from our decks, it highly concerns us neither to be beat off ourselves, nor to suffer them to get clear from our grapple; especially when all the ambient shore, excepting the small tract now occupied by our own army, is hostile in regard to us. Mindful of these things, it behoves you to fight it out so long as strength and vigour shall enable you, and never suffer yourselves to be driven on such a shore; but, when once your ship hath grappled with a foe, never once to think of losing your hold, till you have cleared the enemy's decks of all the defendants. But these points I give in charge to the heavy-armed, not less than to the seamen; since this method of engagement is more particularly your province, and since it still remains within your power to earn a glorious victory, by putting your land method into practice. But the seamen I exhort, and with my exhortations mingle my entreaties, not to shrink too much under the sensibility of past defeats, as your decks are now better armed in all respects than they were before, and as the number of the shipping is enlarged. Recall the idea of that heart-delighting privilege, of which you are now to secure the continuance:—to you I speak, who, though not of Athenian extraction, have hitherto been regarded and honoured

as Athenians; and, for speaking well our language, and appropriating our manners, have been admired through the whole extent of Greece, have participated the benefits of our large-extended empire, not less than ourselves in point of profit, and much more than ourselves in striking awe into your vassals, and being exempted from the attacks of injustice. Since, therefore, you alone have freely shared our empire with us, you are bound by all the ties of honour, by no means to desert its present vindication. Then, in open despite of those Corinthians whom you have so often conquered, and of those Sicilians not one of whom durst look us in the face so long as the vigour of our fleet was unimpaired, drive your foes before you, and strike into them the plain conviction—that your military skill, though struggling with weakness and misfortunes, is yet far superior to all their strength and luck united.

“But to the native citizens of Athens amongst you, I must once more suggest, that you have now no longer in your docks such another fleet as this, nor have left behind you such another body of heavy-armed. If, therefore, your immediate fate be any thing less than victory, your enemies will sail and be directly at Athens; and the remainder of our forces there will no longer be able to repulse the united assaults of their domestic foes and such foreign invaders. Nay, the infallible result must be, that you at once put on the chains of Syracusans, against whom you are conscious with what intentions you at first came here, whilst your country must be forced to submit to a Lacedæmonian bondage. Now, therefore, summon all your courage, to earn the day in which your own liberty and that of Athens is to be the victor's prize: and let each individual amongst you, invigorate himself with the thought; nay, let it throw spirit and life into the whole army,—that those who are now to engage on board this present fleet are the whole of the land and naval force of your country; are the surviving supports of the state, and the great name of Athens. In so momentous a conflict, whoever amongst you excels in military skill or inward bravery, that person had never so fine an opportunity to give demonstration of his superior worth, or to perform a great service for himself or for the welfare of his country.”

Nicias, after he had finished this earnest ex-

hortation, ordered them to repair directly to their posts on board the fleet.

As all this hurry of preparation lay within their view, Gylippus and the Syracusans could not escape the conviction that the Athenians were bent on another engagement. They had, moreover, received intelligence of the new project of the grappling irons. As, therefore, they had provided against every thing bearing on that project, they also made provision to counterwork that project. For this purpose, they had covered the prows and almost the whole gannet of their ships with hides; that, when the grappling iron was thrown, it might slip off and catch no hold. And no sooner were all their preparations completed, than the Syracusan generals, in concert with Gylippus, animated their men to engage with resolution, by the following harangue.

“That your past achievements have been glorious indeed, and for the acquisition of great honour and glory that you are now on the brink of engaging, the generality of you, ye Syracusans and confederates, are well convinced, and need not at present to be informed; for otherwise you could never have persisted so far in this warm career of bravery and success: but, if there be a man amongst you whose sense of things drops short of their real position, we shall now throw upon it the most full illustration.

“This land, our property, the Athenians have invaded; aiming, in the first place, at enslaving Sicily; and, had this design succeeded, at inflicting an equal fate on Peloponnesus and the rest of Greece. And yet these very Athenians, who enjoy already the largest tract of empire that any ancient or modern state of Greece hath at any time enjoyed, you are the first who have bravely resisted; and of that navy, on which they erected their encroaching pile of power, are plainly the victors in several engagements; as again, in that which now approaches, you will assuredly beat them. For men who have received such severe checks in a point for which they so highly plumed themselves, will for the future have a much wiser opinion of their own merit than if they had never conceived so high a value of it; and when all their towering pretensions are so unexpectedly blasted, their subsequent efforts must of course drop short of their real strength: and this, you may rest assured, is the present state of yonder Athenians. And by parity, in regard to ourselves, that propo-

tion of strength we enjoyed at first, with which, though far inferior in skill, we boldly and successfully presumed to withstand them, must now be suitably enlarged; and, with the farther accession of this inward assurance, that we are really the best, since we have beat the best seamen in the world, our hopes of success are in every light redoubled; and then human experience teacheth us, that, in every competition, the warmest hope is ever accompanied with the greatest resolution.

"But farther, those late alterations which they have introduced among their shipping, in order to equalize and balance ours, have been a long time familiar to our own practice; and each of their new preparations we shall dexterously improve to our own advantage: for when, contrary to the long and inveterate discipline of their fleet, there are crowded together upon their decks a numerous body of heavy-armed, as well as another numerous body of mere *terra firma* darters, as they may properly be styled,—when thus Acarnanians and other landmen are forced on board, who even sitting would be unable to poise and direct their weapons,—how can they avoid endangering their vessels! or, jumbled confusedly together, and tottering under motions to which they are not inured, how can they escape a total disorder?"

"What still makes more against them, the multitude of their shipping will only serve the more to embarrass them; and let this dispel the fears of those who may be afraid of engaging against their superior numbers; for a multitude of ships in a contracted space will be more slow in executing orders, and are at the same time most easily exposed to the annoyance which our preparations are contrived to give them. And now attend to the true and real situation of the foe, as from good intelligence we are enabled clearly to declare it to you.

"Environed on all sides with misfortunes, and distressed in a present want of the necessities of life, they are become quite desperate: and hence, though they have resigned all confidence in their real strength, yet in the fury of despair they are throwing themselves upon the decision of fortune; that either, if the passage can be forced, they may launch out to sea; or, that project failing, may attempt a retreat by land;—as if to a worse condition than their present it were not in the power of fortune to reduce them. Warned, therefore, with brave

resentments, let us also try the encounter against such wild confusion, and against the fortune of our inveterate foes now treacherously bent to finish their destruction. Let us charge with the full conviction, that on an enemy, who would justify their invasion on the principle of redressing wrongs, it is most fair and equitable to satiate all the fury of revenge; nay more, that vengeance on a foe is an appetite of nature, and commonly said to be the sweetest of all human enjoyments. But that those men yonder are our foes, our most bitter unrelenting foes, you need no farther proofs; since, bent on enslaving this our country, they first made the voyage; and, had this their odious project been successful, on our citizens they had inflicted the most cruel torments, on our wives and children the most indecent enormities, and on Syracuse the most ignominious appellation. In a work of so just retaliation, to indulge a tenderness of mind, or to think it gain to let them depart without additional revenge, will be a matter of just reproach; for the latter is all they will be able to effect, even though at length they may be victors. But to us, could we execute the fair and equitable wishes of our hearts, by inflicting upon them the punishment they well deserve, and in setting the liberty of all Sicily, as it hath been ever enjoyed by us, beyond the reach of any future insults, how glorious must such achievements be! for such critical moments of adventure are most rarely to be met with; which, if unsuccessful, can do the least disservice; but, if successful, draw after them the most valuable acquisitions."

When the Syracusan generals, seconded by Gylippus, had finished this their exhortation to their own soldiers, they also, in their turn, repaired immediately on board their fleet, as they found was already done by the Athenians.

But Nicias, whose mind was surcharged with present cares, sensible how extreme the danger, and how nearly approaching, since this very moment they were only not in motion; and once more reflecting, that, as generally happens in affairs of such prodigious moment, some points might yet be left imperfect, something of energy, and weight, and influence, be yet left unsaid; he called out again upon every single captain of the fleet, addressing himself separately to them, with the honourable mention of their fathers, themselves, and their tribe; and conjuring each, by his own distinguishing

splendour, whatever it was, "not now to betray it, nor tarnish those hereditary virtues on which their ancestors had founded their glory;" reminding them earnestly of the uninterrupted freedom of their country, and the privilege they had ever enjoyed of living in it quite free and uncontrolled; asserting other arguments, such as with men who had their all so much at stake, might have influence and weight; no matter now how trite or hackneyed by frequent repetitions, or how equally applicable to every case, as fetched from the endearments of their wives, and their offspring, and their paternal gods; such as from every topic, in a plunge of horror and distress, are rung in the ears of men, as likely to animate and persuade. And thus at last, though fearful that not even yet he had said enough, but all that the time would permit, he parted from them; and placing himself at the head of the land-army, marched down to the beach; where he drew them up in as large a line as they could possibly form, that their appearance might have the greater effect in emboldening those on board the fleet.

And now Demosthenes, and Menander, and Euthydemus, (for these went on board to command the fleet,) getting clear from their moorings, stood away directly towards the barricade of the harbour, and that interval of its mouth not yet completely barred, in order to clear the passage. The Syracusans also and their allies had now launched forth against them with their usual number of ships. A detachment of these were so stationed as to guard the passage; the rest were spread circularly quite round the harbour, that on all sides at once they might attack the Athenians, and their land army on the beach might second them on approaches to the shore. The Syracusan fleet was commanded by Sicanus and Agatharcus, who were respectively stationed in each of the wings, whilst Pythen and the Corinthians composed the centre.

When the Athenians were come up to the barricade, they ran boldly at it; and by the violence of the first shock they beat off the vessels ranged about it, and were intent on clearing away the whole barricade. But here, the Syracusans and allies falling in amongst them from every quarter, a general engagement ensued, not only at the barricade, but in every part of the harbour. Obstinate it really proved, and such a battle as they had never fought before. Great, in truth, was the ardour of the

seamen on both sides, in running upon the enemy, whenever the word was given; and great was the art exerted by the officers, in attack, and defence, and reciprocal contest. The soldiers on board exerted all their effort, that, when ship came close with ship, no stretch of military skill should be omitted in the hatches. Every individual, abiding firmly in his post, strained all his diligence to signal his own behaviour. But, as numerous ships were falling in together amongst one another in little sea-room, and so large a number never fought before in so small a space, (since the amount of both fleets fell little short of two hundred,) the direct incursions with the beak were few, because room was wanting for turns and passages; but boardings were frequent, as the vessels were continually running foul on one another, or in sheering off met with others which were coming on. And, so long as a vessel was in her approach, those on the hatches poured plentifully against her whole showers of javelins, and arrows, and stones; but, when they were once come to grappling, the soldiers, closing in firm battalion, endeavoured by force to board one another. Nay, it most frequently happened, through the straitsness of sea-room, that, the very moment one party boarded the enemy, the very same moment they were also boarded themselves, as two vessels lay often along side of an enemy; nay, sometimes more, by necessity mingled and squeezed fast together. In the meantime, the care of the officers was not confined to one single point, but distracted on all sides by a whole round of perils: they were here intent on their own defence, and there on the annoyance of the enemy. And, farther, the prodigious crash that was made by such a number of ships, running at the same instant upon one another, struck such dismay and loss of hearing, that the voices of those who issued out orders could no longer be distinguished. Loud, besides, were the exhortations and shouts of the officers on both sides, partly in conformity to rule, though swelled at present by the ardour of contention. Amongst the Athenians it was shouted amain—"to force the passage, and now or never to exert their utmost stretch of bravery to earn a safe return to their native country:"—amongst the Syracusans and their allies—"how glorious it would be to hinder their escape, and by present victory for every one amongst them to increase the growing

honours of his country!" The commanders also, on both sides, if they saw a vessel dropping off before it was overpowered by the enemy, called out aloud by name on the captain, demanding on the Athenian side, "did they retire on the wild presumption that yonder most hostile shore would prove more friendly to them than the open sea, which by long prescription they had claimed as their own province?"—But on the Syracusan—"would they, who were perfectly assured that the Athenians wanted nothing so much as to escape, would they fly first from those who were flying?" The land-army, farther, of each party upon the beach, whilst yet the battle was alternately fluctuating on the water, felt the utmost anxiety and the most painful conflict of mind; earnestly bent, as the one domestic party was, "on gaining accumulated honours;" but fearful, as the other invading party was become, that "their condition might soon become worse than it was already:" for the whole hope of the Athenians centering at present in that fleet, their anguish for the event was more acute than ever they had felt, and was aggravated by their own position on the beach, which gave them a clear uninterrupted prospect of all that passed in the battle upon the water. The scene was but at a trifling distance from their eyes; and, as the looks of all of them were not at the same instant fastened upon the same spectacle, if any saw their own party prevailing, they grew at once exalted, and immediately began an invocation to the gods, that the efforts of their friends might be crowned with success; whilst another party, beholding those who were vanquished, uttered a loud shriek which ended in a groan; and, by the sight of such affecting turns, were more subdued in spirit than those who were actually engaged in this medley of horror. Others, farther, who were intent upon a quarter of the engagement where the event was yet in suspense, and no judgment amidst such confusion could be formed, adjusted the contortions of their bodies to their inward fears, and passed that interval in extremity of anguish; for, each single moment, they were within a little of escaping or being sunk. And thus, in one and the same army of Athenians, so long as the event was under decision, a whole medley of noises was heard together;—shrieking—shouting—victory!—undone!—undone!—and all other sounds, of various import, which, in such

extremity of danger, a numerous body of men may be forced to utter.

Those, farther, on board, were equally sensible of all the quick alternatives of passion; till at last, after the battle had for a long time been obstinately maintained, the Syracusans and allies put the Athenians to open flight; and, plying briskly in the chase, with obstreperous clamour and loud exultations, drove them upon the beach. And here, the land-soldiers which had served on board, excepting such as had been taken in the deeper water, leaping in all parts, as they severally could, on the shore, run in great confusion for shelter to the camp. The army on the beach, with passions no longer diversified, but with one and the same uniform vehemence, having expressed their resentment of the horrible conclusion by a loud shriek and a hearty groan, some hurried along the beach to succour the shipping; others to defend what yet remained of their intrenchments; whilst a third party, and the bulk of the army, confined their whole care to themselves, and were solely intent on their own personal preservation. The horrid consternation, in which this moment they were universally plunged, was greater than Athenians had ever felt before. They suffered now what on a former occasion they had made others suffer at Pylus. There the Lacedæmonians, having first lost their fleet, had the farther mortification to see all their gallant Spartans in the island undone. And now the desperate condition of the Athenians offered no glimmering of safety on the land, unless some miraculous contingency should take place in their favour.

After an engagement so hardy and well disputed, after the sinking of a large number of ships and the death of numbers on both sides, the Syracusans and their allies, who were masters of the day, took up the shatters and the dead. This being done, they sailed in triumph to the city, and erected a trophy.

But the Athenians, quite sunk with the weight of their present misfortunes, never so much as once entertained the thought of recovering their shattered vessels or their dead, but were contriving how to decamp by favour of the approaching night. Demosthenes, upon this, repairing to Nicias, declared it as his own opinion, that, "manning at once the whole number of their vessels, they should exert

their utmost efforts to force their passage out of the harbour early the next dawn ;" affirming that " they had still a larger number of shipping fit for service than the enemy : " for the Athenians had yet about sixty left, whereas, those of the enemy were under fifty. Nicias came into the proposal, but when both joined in issuing proper orders for the execution, the seamen flatly refused to go on board. Dispirited as they were by the last great blow, they had resigned all hope of ever beating these enemies again. No measure now remained but a retreat by land, on which the universal attention was henceforth employed.

Hermocrates, the Syracusan, had conceived a suspicion that such a step would be taken by them ; and, foreseeing what difficulties might arise if so large an army should march across the country, and, posting themselves afresh on Sicilian ground, should again resume their spirits and renew the war against Syracuse, he waited upon those in authority, and suggested to them, that, " they ought not, by any rules of policy, to let the enemy steal off by night ; (inserting here his own sentiments of the affair ;) but that all the Syracusans and their allies, sallying out in a body, should pre-occupy and secure the roads, and in good time beset and put strong guards in all the passes." The magistrates were sensible, as much as he who gave this advice, how reasonable it was, and declared themselves for its execution : but then, " the men, who now, indulging their joy for the late victory, were intent on recreations, and as besides it was a festival-time, for this very day they were performing the anniversary sacrifice to Hercules, in all probability would refuse to march ; because, transported as they were with success, the generality no doubt were celebrating the festival with good cheer and wine ; and any thing might sooner be hoped from them than obedience to an order for taking up their arms and sallying forth at a minute's notice." As the magistrates were convinced that things would so turn out, the scheme was judged impracticable, and Hermocrates could in no wise prevail. But he thought of an artifice to play off against the foe : afraid lest the Athenians, dislodging quietly by night, might possess themselves of the most difficult passes before any opposition could reach them, he despatcheth some of his most trusty friends, under an escort of horse, to the Athenian camp so soon as it

was dark ; who, riding up so near to the trenches that their words might be distinctly heard, and calling out aloud on some person to come forth, since they were a party out from his friends in Syracuse to bring him some intelligence, charged them to carry word immediately to Nicias, " by no means to stir off the army by night, because the Syracusans had beset the roads ; but to defer his march till day-light, when he had leisure to make the proper dispositions." And after delivering this message they rode off, whilst those who received it went and reported it faithfully to the Athenian generals.

Wrought upon by this piece of intelligence, in which they were far from suspecting any fraud, they continued all night in their posts ; and then, as they had not dislodged at once in a hurry, they thought it advisable to stay there but one day longer, that the soldiers might pack up and carry away with them as large a part as was possible of their necessary stores. The rest of the baggage it was agreed should be abandoned to the enemy ; they were only to carry off, each person for himself, what was absolutely necessary for food and raiment.

But, in this interval, the Syracusans and Gylippus, by sallying out with the land-forces, had gained a march before them, had blocked up the roads along the country by which it was judged the Athenians would march, and had posted strong guards upon all the fords of brooks and rivers ; nay, their detachments stood ready drawn up in battalia to beat off the enemy from the most convenient passes. Standing out farther into the harbour with their fleet, they dragged from the shore the Athenian shipping. Some few of these they burnt, as the Athenians had designed to do ; but the residue at their leisure, from the spot where each lay stranded, they took in tow and carried away to the city. And, this being done, when Nicias and Demosthenes judged that they had completed such preparations for their march as were absolutely needful, the dislodgment of the whole army was put in execution on the third day from the naval engagement.

Terrible indeed it was, not only when viewed in one particular light, as that they retreated because they had lost the whole of their fleet, and all their mighty hopes had terminated in such personal danger to themselves, and such as even boded the ruin of Athens ; but the very abandoning of the camp presented to their

might the most cutting spectacles, and struck each soul amongst them with heart-piercing anguish; for, as the dead lay uninterred upon the surface of the earth, when the remains of an old acquaintance, thus miserably laid out, arrested the eyes of a soldier, he was instantly seized with regret and horror. But the living, who on account of wounds and sickness were left behind, were causes of much greater affliction to the sound than were even the dead, and in truth were much more to be deplored than those who had no longer a being; for, bursting out into prayers and lamentations, they occasioned a wild irresolution of thought; earnestly entreating that they might not be left behind, and screaming out aloud on each by name, as they saw a friend or an acquaintance, or an old comrade, moving off; throwing their arms about their necks, and so dragged along whilst they could keep their hold; but, when strength and bodily vigour failed and left them destitute of resource, they gave them the last adieu, not without a shower of curses and a hideous howl. By such cutting incidents the whole army was filled with tears and a wild irresolution; so that they could not depart without the highest regret, though from a spot so hostile, where they had suffered more than tears could alleviate; and the dread of more, which yet might be impending, was inexpressible. Dejection of the head and self-accusation were general through all the troops; and they resembled nothing less than a large subjugated city, whose numerous inhabitants were escaping from the fury of a sack; for the amount of those who were now marching off together, was not less than forty thousand men.

Of these, the generality carried off merely what necessary subsistence they had scraped together; but the heavy-armed and horsemen, contrary to custom, were now obliged to carry their own sustenance themselves beneath their armour; some, because they had none, others, because they durst not trust their servants. The desertions had for a long time been large, but of late in greater numbers than ever. Neither were they thus provided with sufficient stores; for there was no longer any corn to be found in the camp. Nay, truly, the general calamity and equability of misfortunes which, in many cases alleviate the pain as numbers are involved, were unable to render the present evils in any degree supportable; especially when the thought occurred, from what a height of splen-

dour and preceding glory, to what a plunge and miserable state they were now reduced! for a most cruel turn of fortune this really proved to a Grecian army; who, coming hither to enslave others, were departing now with the sad alternative of fearing to be made slaves themselves; and, instead of the prayers and peans with which they first began the voyage, were now dislodging with omens that portended nothing but misery: those, farther, who came hither as lords of the ocean, were now stealing away by land, from henceforth to be saved, not by naval skill, but the perseverance of a land-army. However, all these reflections put their patience nothing on the stretch, in comparison of that weight of misery which this very instant was hovering over their heads.

Nicias, perceiving the whole army to be overwhelmed in despair, and sunk in this plunge of distress, addressed himself severally to the troops, exhorted, and comforted, by every topic which occurred, each single party, whom he visited by turns, elevating his voice far beyond the ordinary pitch, to suit the earnestness of his heart, in hope that, the louder he spoke, the more extensive effect it might have upon the hearers.

"Even yet, and in the present low ebb of our fortune, my dear countrymen and confederates, we ought to encourage hope. Instances may be given of armies who have been rescued from a deeper plunge of dangers than that which is now our portion. Nor ought you to torture yourselves with too painful regret at what you suffer, or at the unmerited miseries which this moment environ you about. Even I myself, who have much less room to boast of a constitution superior to hardships than the meanest soldier in your ranks, (for your own eyes can witness to how low a state my bodily infirmities have reduced me,) who, however, in the continued happiness of my former course of life, or in any other regard, am inferior to none amongst you,—yet am buffeted now, by the storms and outrages of fortune, as cruelly as ever were the vilest and most abject of my fellow-creatures. It is true, I have ever habitually worshipped the gods, with a conscientious deference to established laws; and have made justice and beneficence to man the constant practice of my life. Upon the strength of this, when I looked forwards to the future, my mind is enlivened with invigorating hope; though I own these misfortunes, so far undeserved,

strike no little terror on my thoughts. But better times, perhaps, may be approaching; for sure our enemies have been blessed with an ample measure of success; and, though some deity may have frowned at first on this our expedition, yet by this time his wrath must be fully wreaked upon us. We are not the first instance of a people who have wantonly invaded the possessions of another; many such offences have taken their rise from the impulse of human passions, and have been punished with such a measure of vengeance as human nature was able to endure. Good reason, therefore, have we now to hope for a milder fate from the offended deity; who, depressed as we are, seem objects of compassion more than of resentment. Cast, therefore, your eyes on the fine bodies of heavy-armed, and the goodly numbers, which even now compose your retreat; and let the sight revive and cheer your drooping spirits. Conclude that, wherever you choose to halt, you are of yourselves that instant a mighty community; such as no other Sicilian people can presume to stand before, should you attack; nor to dispossess, wherever you think proper to settle. But, that your march be orderly and safe, be that the care of each individual amongst your ranks, made warm and earnest by the thought,—that, on whatever spot you may be compelled to fight, on that, if crowned with victory, you regain a country and a bulwark of your own. But then, your march must be continued both day and night, with unabating speed, because our stock of provision is but scanty; and, can we but reach some friendly territory belonging to the Siculi, who, from their excessive dread of the Syracusans, will ever preserve their attachment to us, conclude yourselves that moment to be beyond the reach of danger: send, therefore, your messengers beforehand to them, with orders to meet us on our route and bring us the needful supplies of food. On the whole, my fellow-soldiers, rest assured that the last necessity enjoins you to be resolutely brave; since to cowardice now no place of shelter is any longer open; and only if you stem the efforts of your foes—can you again be happy in the enjoyment of those scenes your eyes so fondly regret; and can Athenians re-erect the extensive power of the Athenian state, how low soever it may be fallen at present: for they are men who make a state, not walls nor ships by men abandoned.”

With these words of encouragement, Nicias ran regularly through all the ranks of the whole army; careful at the same time, if he saw any parties straggling from the main body, and quitting the order of the march, to fetch them up and replace them. Demosthenes exerted himself as diligently in his own department, encouraging his troops with the same energy and ardour of address. The body under Nicias, drawn up in a square, led the van of the march; that under Demosthenes brought up the rear: whilst the baggage-men, and the numerous crowd that attended the camp, marched within the centre of the heavy-armed.

When they were advanced to the place of fording the Anapus, they find a body of Syracusans and allies drawn up in battalia there to oppose the passage. But, putting these to flight, they gained the passage of that river, and advanced into the country beyond; though their march was terribly harassed by the incursions of the Syracusan horse, and by the missile weapons which the light-armed of the enemy poured in from time to time amongst them. And yet in this day's march, the Athenians wrought about forty stadia,¹ and halted for the night upon an eminence.

On the ensuing day, by early dawn, they were again in motion, and advanced about twenty stadia;² when, descending into a certain plain, they halted and formed an encampment. Their design in this was to fetch in some provisions, for the adjacent country was inhabited, and to get a proper supply of water to carry along with them; for in the country beyond, through which their route was fixed, no springs were to be met with for the length of several stadia. But, during this halt, the Syracusans advancing beyond them, throw up a work across their route to stop their farther progress. The spot chosen for this was a strong eminence, flanked on both sides by an inaccessible crag, and known by the name of *Acraum-Lepas*.

On the day following the Athenians resumed their march; but the horse and numerous darters of the Syracusans and allies stopped their advance, the latter pouring in their weapons upon, and the former riding up and disordering their ranks. For a long time, it is true, the Athenians maintained the skirmishes against them; but at length they retreated

¹ About four miles.

² Two miles.

again to their last encampment. And now all farther supplies of provisions were totally cut off; it being no longer possible to fetch in any, for fear of the horse.

But, decamping early in the morning, they continued their march, and forced their progress to the eminence which was fortified by the new work. Here they found the Syracusan infantry drawn up before them in firm and deep battalia, posted also on the strong eminence they had occupied on purpose; for the pass was very narrow. The Athenians marched up and assaulted the work; but, being pelted by showers of darts from the eminence, which was very steep, and so gave those upon it a great advantage in throwing their weapons home, and finding themselves unable to force it, they again drew off, and attempted it no farther. It happened, at the same time, that some claps of thunder were heard, accompanied with rain, effects not unusual in this season, as the year was now in autumn; and yet these accidents contributed still more to dispirit the Athenians, who concluded that every thing now acted in combination for their destruction. During this interval of inaction, Gylippus and the Syracusans send off a detachment of their forces to throw up a work in their rear, where the enemy had already passed. But the Athenians sent also a detachment of their own body, which prevented its execution; and, after this, wheeling off with their whole body more into the plains, they halted there for the night.

The next morning they began to move forwards again. And now the Syracusans, besetting them quite round in a circle, poured volleys of darts and arrows amongst them, and wounded numbers. If, indeed, the Athenians sallied out against them, they retreated; but when the Athenians drew back, they then pressed upon their retreat; and, falling in chiefly amongst their rear, if at any time they put small parties to flight, they struck a consternation into the whole army. But, for a long time, in such a train of skirmishings, the Athenians made good their ground; and advancing afterwards the length of five or six stadia,¹ they halted in a plain. Here also the Syracusans no longer molested them, but withdrew to their own camp.

This night it was determined by Nicias and Demosthenes, that,—since the army was re-

duced to so low a condition, and began already to be pressed with a total failure of provisions; since, farther, large numbers had been wounded in the many incidental assaults of the enemy;—they should first kindle a great number of fires, and then march the whole army off, no longer by the route which they had first projected, but by another towards the sea, quite contrary to that which the Syracusans had already pre-occupied and guarded. The residue of the march was no longer pointed towards Catana, but to the other coast of Sicily, towards Camarina, and Gela, and the cities in that quarter, both Grecian and Barbarian. In pursuance of this, a large number fires being kindled, they dislodged in the dead of night.

This part of their retreat (as is the general fate of armies, but especially of the greatest, ever subject to fears and panics, particularly when moving in the night and on hostile ground, and conscious, farther, that the enemy is close at their heels) was made in a sad and disorderly manner. The column, indeed, under Nicias, which composed the van, kept firm together in a body, and quite out-matched the rest of the army: but that under Demosthenes, being one half, at least, if not the major part, of the whole force, was separated from the van, and came on in great confusion and disorder. However, by the dawn of day, they reached the coast; and, gaining the great road which is called the Helorine, took their route along it, that, after they had reached the river Cacyparis they might pierce upwards along the course of that river into the heart of the country; for thus they hoped to meet with the Siculi, whom they had summoned to be ready on their route. But, when they had gained the sight of that river, they found its banks already occupied by a Syracusan guard, busy in throwing up a rampart and palisado to defend its passage. This party they soon dispersed, and passed the river, and from thence advanced towards another river, the Erineus; for thus their guides had planned their route.

In the meantime the Syracusans and allies, when the day was clearly broke, and they knew the Athenians were stole off, began in general to throw heavy imputations on Gylippus, as if the Athenians had made their escape through his connivance. Yet, beginning the pursuit with all possible expedition, (and it was easily discoverable what route they had taken,) they

¹ About half a mile.

come up with them about the hour of repast: and, as they fell in first with the column under the orders of Demosthenes, which composed the rear, and had moved in a more slow and disorderly manner than the van, because the darkness of the night had so highly incommoded and confounded their march, they immediately charged them and fought. The Syracusan cavalry beset them quite round, (the more easily, indeed, as they were separated from the van,) and drove them into one crowded heap. But the column under Nicias was now fifty stadia¹ before them; for Nicias led them forwards with great celerity, concluding that their safety consisted, not in lingering voluntarily at so critical a period, or exposing themselves to an engagement, but in pushing forwards with their utmost speed, and fighting only when by absolute necessity they were compelled to fight. But then Demosthenes was involved in a much more laborious and continued toil; because, as he filed off last, the enemies were left upon his rear; and, soon convinced that they had begun the pursuit, he was obliged, not so much to move forward, as to draw up his troops in the order of battle, till by such necessitated lingering he is environed by them, and himself and the body of Athenians under him are thrown into high tumult and confusion. For now, hemmed in as they were on a certain spot, surrounded quite round by walls, and whence the issues both on one side and the other were full of olive-trees, they were terribly galled on their flanks by the darts of the enemy. This kind of annoyance the Syracusans wisely chose to give them, and to decline all close engagement; because, to hazard the latter against enemies now become quite desperate, they judged would make more for the advantage of the Athenians than of themselves: though, at the same time, a kind of frugality, inspired by the great career of success they had already obtained, taught them not to exhaust their strength on superfluous encounters, and persuaded them that thus they might effectually subdue and make this great army their prisoners. When, therefore, for the whole remainder of the day, they had galled them on all sides with missile weapons, and now perceived that the Athenians and their allies were reduced to a miserable plight, by the wounds which they had received and

the other calamities which lay hard upon them, Gylippus, in concert with the Syracusans and allies, causeth a herald to proclaim;—first, that “such inhabitants of the isles as would come over to them should rest in the secure enjoyment of their liberty:”—upon which, some cities, though not many, went over to them:—and, in the next place, after some time, a surrender is agreed on of the whole body of troops commanded by Demosthenes, on the terms, that “they should deliver up their arms, and no one should suffer death, either by public execution, or the miseries of a prison, or the want of necessary subsistence.” Thus this whole body, to the number of six thousand men, surrendered themselves prisoners, and produced all the silver they had about them, which they were commanded to throw into the hollows of shields, four of which in this manner were filled full with spoil; and these prisoners the victors immediately led away to Syracuse.

But Nicias and the column under his command arrived the same day on the banks of the Erineus; and having passed that river, halted on an eminence. The day following the Syracusans, coming up to his post, notified to Nicias, that “those under Demosthenes had surrendered,” and summoned him to follow their example. Incredulous of the fact, he begs leave to send out a horseman to discover the truth; who upon his return affirming that “they had actually surrendered,” Nicias sends an intimation to Gylippus and the Syracusans, that he was ready to stipulate, in the name of the Athenians, that “whatever sums the Syracusans had expended in this war should be fairly reimbursed, on condition the forces under his command might have free departure; but, till the money could be paid, he would leave with them a number of Athenians as hostages for performance, a man for a talent.”

Gylippus and the Syracusans refused the offer; and, resuming offensive measures, ranged their parties quite round the eminence, and poured in their missile weapons upon them till the evening. This body of troops was also sadly distressed for want of bread and necessary subsistence. Watching, however, for the dead and silent hours of the night, they were then determined to continue their march. They accordingly take up their arms; the Syracusans perceive it, and sing the pean of alarm. The Athenians were thus convinced that they

¹ About five miles.

not dislodge without being discovered, and banded their arms again, all but one party of a hundred men; for these having forced slaves a passage through the guards, off in the night as fast as it was possible. Soon as the day appeared, Nicias at the head of his troops led them forwards. But the Syracusans and allies pressed upon him on all sides in the usual manner, pouring in volleys of spears and javelins. The Athenians made great effort of their way to reach the river Assinaros not only because, annoyed on all sides by the irruption of the numerous cavalry and fighting parties, they concluded they should be glad of these could they once pass that point; but also through bodily fatigue and a want of desire to extinguish their thirst. So, therefore, they are upon the bank, they rush into the river; no longer observant of their own safety, but each single soldier intent on passing out of the army. And the enemy, who pressed hard upon them, had rendered the river already a business of toil: for, obliged to wade, they were to go down in confused heaps, to fall and trampled upon one another; embarrassed by their spears and luggage, with instant destruction; others, entangled in the crowd, were carried away by the current. The hither bank of the river was filled with Syracusans; and, it being very steep, they poured down their darts on the Athenians, numbers of whom were lying greedily of the stream, confusedly mixed together in the hollow of the water. The Peloponnesians, plunging in after them, made a great slaughter of those who were in the river. The water was immediately discoloured with blood: but the river, polluted with mud and gore, deterred them from drinking it greedily, nor many from fighting desperately for a draught. But, in short, when the carcasses of the dead began to lie heaped one upon another in the river, and the whole army was become a continued carnage; of some in the river; some who were making off from the banks, as horsemen of the foe; Nicias surrenders himself prisoner to Gylippus, into whose power those who were to fall sooner than into that of the Syracusans. He told him, that "he himself the Lacedæmonians might decide his fate

as best pleased themselves; but entreated that a stop might be put to the slaughter of his soldiers." Upon this, Gylippus issued out orders to give quarter; and thus they carried off the remnants of this body as prisoners of war, such excepted as were secreted by their captors, the number of which was large. Having, farther, detached a party in pursuit of the three hundred, who in the night had broke through the guard, they also made them prisoners. The whole number now collected together as the public prize was not large; but very numerous were they who were clandestinely secreted. Not a town in Sicily but was crowded with them, since these had not surrendered upon terms like those under Demosthenes. A considerable number had also perished; for this was a terrible slaughter; nay, there was no one greater in the course of the Sicilian war; and in the preceding skirmishes, which had happened very frequently during the march, not a few had been slain. Yet, notwithstanding all this, many made their escape; some from the scenes of action, and others from their prisons, from whence, they afterwards gained an opportunity to run away. These repaired to Catana, as a safe resort.

And now the Syracusans and allies in one grand collective body, having amassed together as large a number of prisoners as they possibly could, and all the spoils, returned in triumph to Syracuse. The bulk of prisoners, whether of the Athenians or their confederates, whom they had taken, they thrust down into the quarries, concluding that from such a confinement they could not possibly make escapes; but Nicias and Demosthenes, in spite of all the remonstrances of Gylippus, they butchered: for Gylippus imagined, that the finishing of this war would invest himself with pre-eminent degrees of glory, if, besides the rest of his achievements, he could carry home to the Lacedæmonians the generals of the enemy. It had, farther, so happened, that one of these, that is Demosthenes, was regarded as their most inveterate enemy, because of his exploits against them in the island Sphacteria and Pylus; and the other, Nicias, as their most sincere well-wisher, from his behaviour on those very incidents. For Nicias had strenuously exerted himself in behalf of those Lacedæmonians who were made prisoners in the island. It was he who prevailed with the Athenians to sign the treaty, in pursuance of

According to Diodorus Siculus, the number of the amounted to eighteen thousand men.

which they were released. For such services done them, the Lacedæmonians had a kindness for him; and it had been chiefly owing to his assurance of this that he surrendered himself prisoner to Gylippus. But a party of the Syracusans, as was generally reported, fearful, because they had kept up a correspondence with him, lest, if put to the torture, he might now, amidst the general prosperity, involve them in trouble; others also, and, not least of all, the Corinthians, lest, as he was rich he might purchase the connivance of his keepers to get his liberty, and then again might have influence enough to foment fresh stirrs to their prejudice; obtained the concurrence of their allies, and put him to death. For these, or reasons most nearly neighbouring to these, was Nicias doomed to destruction; though the man, of all the Grecians in the present age, who least deserved so wretched a catastrophe, since his whole life was one uniform series of piety towards the Deity.¹

As for those who were doomed to the quarries, the Syracusans treated them at first with outrageous severity. As great numbers were crowded together in this hollow dungeon, the beams of the sun, in the first place, and then the suffocating air, annoyed them in a more terrible manner, because the aperture was left uncovered; and each succeeding night, the reverse of the preceding day, autumnal and nipping, through such vicissitudes, threw them into strange disorders. Thus straitened as they were for room, they did whatever they had to do on one and the same spot; and the carcases of those who died lay heaped up promiscuously together, as some expired of their wounds, and others perished through the vicissitudes of air they suffered, or some other such deadly cause. At length the stench became intolerably noisome; and they were farther oppressed with hunger and thirst: for, during the space of eight months, the allowance to each was only a cotyl² of water and two cotyls³ of bread a-day. Nay, whatever species of misery numbers cooped up in so close a confinement might be liable to suffer, not one of these but pressed cruelly upon them. They were all thus thronged and dieted to-

gether for seventy days: but, after this all but the Athenians, and such of the Lians and Italians as had joined with the invasion, were sold out for slaves.⁴

What the whole number of prisoners is hard exactly to relate; but, however could not be fewer than seven thousand. This proved to be the greatest Grecian of all that happened in the course of the and, in my opinion, of all that occur whole history of Greece; since the victors was most glorious, and to the quished most calamitous; for in every they were totally overpowered, and the series in no respect had any mitigating short, root and branch, as is common their land-army and their shipping was ruined; nay, nothing belonging to the exempted from destruction; and few all their numbers, had the good fort revisit their native country.

Such were the transactions in Sicily.

* "The decent and engaging behaviour of Sicilians was of great service to them; for by either soon obtained their liberty, or were esteemed and caressed by their masters. Some were indebted for their freedom to Euripides Sicilians, it seems, were fonder of the muses than were even the people who lived in itself. If the strangers, who were often rescued Sicily, brought them any specimens or models of poetry, they learned them by heart, and with light communicated them to their friends. It that several, who by this means earned their went afterwards to wait upon Euripides, in their gratitude; assuring him, some of them, that had been released from slavery for teaching others what pieces of his writings they were able to repeat; and others, that, when vagabonds and defeated, they had been supplied with meat as for singing some of his lines. This is not to be wondered at: since even a Caunian vessel, while hard chased by pirates, and endeavouring to refuge into a Sicilian harbour, was however rescued by force; till at length, being asked whether he repeat any of Euripides's verses, they answered affirmatively; upon which they obtained immediate reception and refuge." *Plutarch in the life of J*

* Some Iambic verses of an unknown author found at the end of this book in the later Editions; and I beg the reader to accept the translation of them:

The pride of glory, the exalted height,
The frequent trophies on the land and sea,
The long career of well-deserved success,
On which their great forefathers tower'd aloft,
Whilst Persia trembled at the Athenian name,
Now droop'd at once!—A chaos soon succeeds,
Of anarchy, destruction, and distress:
Low shob'd the state, as high it erst had stood.

¹ Mr. Hobbes, in his translation, has omitted this last comma.

² Little more than half a pint.

³ About 32 solid inches.

THE

PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

BOOK VIII.

ews of the overthrow in Sicily causeth a great consternation at Athens. All Greece is in combination
 ant them; and their dependents are meditating revolts.—YEAR XX. Revolt of the Chians. An alliance
 on Darius Nothus and the Lacedæmonians. The war transferred to Ionia. Battle of Miletus. A second
 nee between Darius and the Lacedæmonians. Proceedings at Chios. Revolt of Rhodes. The politic con-
 of Alcibiades: his intrigues. A sedition among the Athenians at Samos in favour of an oligarchy. Phry-
 na counterplots Alcibiades. A third alliance between Darius and the Lacedæmonians.—YEAR XXI. Phry-
 nags at Chios. The democracy overturned in several places of the Athenian jurisdiction; and at Athens,
 the influence of Antipho, Phrynichus, and Theramenes. A council of four hundred take upon them the
 rament. The army at Samos declares for the democracy, recalls Alcibiades, and elects him general.
 was full of factions. Phrynichus stabbed. A tumult; in the midst of which the fleet of the enemy ap-
 ars in sight. Battle of Eretria; and revolt of Eubœa. The four hundred are deposed; and a new form of
 rament settled at Athens. The banishment of Alcibiades repealed. Battle of Cynos-Sema.

YEAR XIX.

th the news was reported at Athens,
 relief for a long time was given,—even
 th the most creditable part of the soldiery,
 had made their escape from this disastrous
 cas, proved it by a circumstantial relation,
 at so total a destruction was become their
 But no sooner were they convinced of
 ality, than their resentments bust forth

March, from report, tells an odd story on this oc-
 casion.—“A stranger, who (it seems) had come ashore
 Piræus, and had set him down in a barber’s shop,
 to talk about the overthrow in Sicily, as a point
 not known at Athens. The barber, hearing it before
 the person had the news, ran with all speed up in-
 to the city; and, having first, informed the magistrates
 spread the report in an instant all over the forum.
 Excitation and tumult at once ensued. The magis-
 trates convened an assembly of the people, and produc-
 ed the barber before them. He was called upon to tell
 whom he had the news; and when he could not
 the person, being looked upon as an idle fellow and
 turber of the public peace, he was immediately tied
 to the wheel, and a long time whirled round upon it,
 several persons arrived who gave a minute and cir-
 cumstantial account of the whole.” *Life of Nicias.*

against those of the orators who had advised
 and recommended the expedition, as if their
 own suffrages had never concurred to its exe-
 cution. They farther vented their gall against
 those retailers of oracles and foretellers of fu-
 ture events, against all in general, who, pretend-
 ing privity to the will of heaven, had elevated
 their hopes with the certain conquest of Sicily.
 On all sides now all manner of disasters envi-
 roned them about; and never had Athens been
 thrown into so great a consternation and dejection
 as at the present juncture: for now, be-
 side what each private family suffered, as the
 public at the same time had lost the bulk of its
 heavy-armed and horsemen, and that flower of
 its youth which they saw it impossible to re-
 place, they were sorely dejected. Conscious,
 farther, that they had not shipping sufficient in
 their docks for a fresh equipment, nor money
 in the public treasury, nor even hands to man
 what vessels they had left, they gave up all
 hope of deliverance in the present plunge.
 Their enemies from Sicily, they imagined,
 would soon enter the Piræus with a powerful

navy, especially as they were flushed with such a career of success; and their enemies nearer home, would now, for a certainty, redouble their preparations, and with the utmost resolution fall upon them at once both by sea and land, and be further strengthened by the revolt of their own temporising confederates. At last, however, they agreed it was their duty to do what might yet be done; not basely to abandon their own preservation, but to fit out a navy, by collecting from all possible resources both timber and money;—and timely to secure their own dependent states, above all Eubœa—and to reduce the expenses of the civil administration with all possible economy;—and to lodge the sovereignty in the hands of a select body of old experienced statesmen, whose maturer counsels might, if possible, yet extricate the state from its present misfortunes. Such an effect had the general consternation now upon them, an effect not unusual with a people, that they became heartily disposed to order their government aright. And, as to such resolutions they came to, they proceeded, farther, to put them in execution: and the summer ended.

In the beginning of the ensuing winter, animated by the terrible blow the Athenians had received in Sicily, the whole body of Greece was alert against them. Even such as had hitherto observed a strict neutrality, without so much as waiting for a formal invitation to accede, thought it incumbent upon themselves no longer to be absent from the war, but voluntary to enter the lists against the Athenians. Not a state but reasoned thus,—that “themselves also these Athenians, had they succeeded in Sicily, would undoubtedly have attacked;” and then concluded,—that, “as the war for certainty was very nearly finished, it would be glorious for them to have a hand in its completion.” But the old confederates of the Lacedæmonians, as their desires were greater, so they exerted themselves now with higher alacrity than ever to procure a speedy relaxation of their heavy burdens. Yet, in a most remarkable manner, such states as were dependent upon Athens manifested their readiness to revolt, even beyond the bounds of caution; since now they formed their judgments in all the warmth of indignation, and could discern no probable method by which the Athenians could retard their ruin for another summer.

All these circumstances coinciding, the Lacedæ-

monian state became prodigiously alert above all, with the expectation, that the confederates of Sicily, with a powerful reinforcement, as their natives must now of necessity act in concert, would be with them, in a short time, and would be very early in the spring. In view their hopes were gallant and elate. They determined to go on with the war without delay; concluding that, if once brought to a conclusion, they should ever for the future be released from such dangers as had been threatened from Athens, in case Sicily had been reduced; and, should they now defeat their competitors, must remain for the future the supreme leaders of Greece, without the possibility of a reverse.

Instantly, therefore, Agis their king, in the depth of winter, rallying forth a body of troops from Decælea, marched against the confederacy, levying sums of money for the service of the marine. Turning his view to the Melian gulf, he took a large boat, and sailed to the Ceteans, against whom their enmity had been of long duration, which he converted to his use. He also compelled those who were seated in the Pthiotis, and in the states in this quarter dependent on them, in spite of all the complaints and murmurs of the Thessalians, to give him some host for their good behaviour, and to furnish him with money. He disposed of these hosts in the safe custody at Corinth, and spared no pains to get them over into the alliance.

The Lacedæmonians, farther, circulated an order among the states, for the building of a hundred sail of ships. They taxed the Argives and the Bœotians to furnish, respectively, twenty-five; the Phocians and Locrians, ten; the Corinthians fifteen; the Aeginetians and Pellenians, ten; the Sicyonians, ten; the Megareans, and Troezenians, and Epidaurians and Hermionians, ten. They went with all other needful preparations, and might prosecute the war briskly upon the approach of spring.

The Athenians, on the other hand, were remiss in preparing for their own defence, since, in pursuance of the plan they had formed, they were busy during all the winter in the building of ships, having collected prodigious quantities of timber; and in fortifying the harbours, so that the navigation of their victuallers to the coast might be preserved from interruption. They also evacuated the fortress

sonia which they had raised in the voyage to Sicily; and in all respects, where they judged themselves involved in any less needful expense, they contracted their disbursements with the utmost frugality. But their principal care was, keeping a close eye upon their dependents, that they might not revolt.

Amidst these employments of both parties, which were nothing less than most earnest preparations on all sides, as if war was just in its commencement, the Eubœans took the lead, and sent ambassadors this winter to treat with Agis, about a revolt from the Athenians. Agis accepted what terms they proposed; and sends for Alcámenes, the son of Sthenelaidas, and Melanthus, from Lacedæmon, to pass over as commanders into Eubœa. Accordingly they arrived, with a body of citizens newly enfranchised,¹ to the number of about three hundred; and Agis was preparing for their transportation. But in this interval the Lesbians arrived, with declarations of their readiness to revolt; and, as they were seconded by the recommendations of the Bœotians, Agis is persuaded to put off for a time the affair of Eubœa, and began to expedite the revolt of the Lesbians, having assigned them Alcámenes for their governor, who was to have passed over to Eubœa. The Bœotians promised to send them ten ships, and Agis, ten. These points were transacted without the privity of the Lacedæmonian state: for Agis, so long as he continued at Decelea, having under his command the army of the state, was invested with a power of sending detachments whithersoever he thought proper, and to levy men and money at his own discretion: and it may with truth be affirmed, that the confederates, during this period, paid a much greater deference to him than to the state of Lacedæmon; for, having a powerful force under his own orders, he was formidable in his every motion. And thus he arbitrarily settled the negotiation of the Lesbians.

But then the Chians and the Erythræans, who were also desirous to revolt, addressed themselves, not to Agis, but at Lacedæmon. In their company also went thither an ambassador from Tissaphernes, who was lieutenant for Darius, the son of Artaxerxes, in the maritime provinces of Asia. Even Tissapher-

nes concerned himself now to inflame the Peloponnesian ardour, and promise them large supplies. For lately he had been summoned by the king to make returns of the revenue of his government; which not being able to exact from the Grecian cities, because of the Athenians, he was run into a large arrear. He concluded, therefore, that could he demolish the Athenians, he then with great ease might levy the tributes; what is more, might make the Lacedæmonians confederates to the king; and might at length convey to him, either alive or dead, Amorges, the bastard son of Pisistratus, who had revolted in Caria, as the king had expressly commanded. The Chians, therefore, and Tissaphernes, were now negotiating this point in concert.

Calligitus, the son of Laophon, a Megarean, and Timagoras, the son of Athenagoras, a Cyzicene, both exiles from their native places, and refuged with Pharnabazus, the son of Pharnabazus, arrive at Lacedæmon about the same point of time, commissioned by Pharnabazus to procure an aid of shipping for the Hellespont, by which he might be enabled (the very same thing as Tissaphernes desired) to work the revolt of the cities within his district from the Athenian obedience, because of the tributes, and expeditiously to gain for himself the credit of having procured for his master the alliance of the Lacedæmonians. As the agents of Pharnabazus and those also of Tissaphernes were negotiating the same point, though apart from each other, a great debate arose among the statesmen at Lacedæmon; one party insisting, with vehemence, that an aid of shipping and a land force should be sent to Ionia and Chios; another party, that they should be sent first to Hellespont. The Lacedæmonians, however, complied by far the soonest with the demands of the Chians and Tissaphernes. Alcibiades, indeed, espoused the cause of the latter, from an extraordinary zeal to mark hereditary friendship to Endius, who at this juncture presided in the college of ephori. On this account it was, that the family of Alcibiades, in compliment to this friendship, had taken a Lacedæmonian name; for this Endius was the son of an Alcibiades. Yet, previously, the Lacedæmonians despatched Phrynias, a person born and educated in those parts, to Chios, to inspect the state of affairs there, and report, whether they had so large a number of shipping as they pretended, and their situa-

¹ Neodamodes.

tion in other respects equalized the fine account they had given of it. Accordingly, when Phrynīs had reported, "that all the accounts they had heard were true," the Chians and Erythræans were instantly admitted allies. They voted, farther, to send them forty sail of shipping, as there were already assembled at Chios not fewer than sixty from places which the Chians named. Ten of these they designed to despatch, as soon as possible, under the command of Melanchridas, who was appointed admiral. But afterwards, the shock of an earthquake being felt, instead of Melanchridas they sent Chalcideus; and, instead of ten, equipped in Laconia only five ships for their service.

Here the winter ended; and the nineteenth year of this war came also to an end, of which Thucydides hath compiled the history.

YEAR XX.¹

Summer now coming on, as the Chians were most earnestly soliciting the despatch of the ships, and also afraid lest the Athenians should get notice of their transactions,—for the whole of the negotiation had been carried on without the knowledge of the latter,—the Lacedæmonians send to Corinth three citizens of Sparta, to prevail with that state for the transportation of their ships with all possible expedition across the isthmus, from the other sea into that which lies towards Athens, that all in a body might stand away for Chios; as well those which Agis had destined for the service of Lesbos as the rest. The whole number of shipping belonging to the alliance, now assembled together there, amounted to thirty-nine.

But Calligitus, truly, and Timagoras refused, in the name of Pharnabazus, to have any participation in the expedition to Chios; nor would part with the money they had brought with them, which was five and twenty talents,² to disburse this equipment. They intended to get another fitted out, which should sail away under their own orders.

As for Agis, when now he perceived that the Lacedæmonians were determined to go first to Chios, he no longer suffered his own projects to clash with those of the state; but the confederates now assembling at Corinth proceeded to draw up a plan of operations. It was ac-

cordingly agreed, that they should go first to Chios, under the command of Chalcideus, who fitted out the five ships in Laconia; from thence to Lesbos, under the command of Alcamenes, whom Agis had destined for that service; in the last place they should proceed to Hellespont, and in this service it was agreed beforehand, that Clearchus, the son of Ramphias, should take upon him the command. But the first step should be the transportation of a moiety of their shipping across the isthmus, which were immediately to stand out to sea, that the attention of the Athenians might be less engaged upon such as were already in their course than on those which were to follow: for now they determined to cross the sea in an open insulting manner, as they contemned the present impotence of the Athenians, because they had no considerable force anywhere at sea.

When these resolutions were formally completed, they immediately transported one and twenty ships. Expeditious sailing was earnestly solicited; but the Corinthians declared a reluctance to go the voyage till they had celebrated the Isthmian games, which were at hand. To remove this obstacle, Agis declared himself ready to have the whole procedure charged to his own account, that they might be cleared from a breach of the Isthmian cessation. The Corinthians not complying with this proposal, and delay necessarily resulting from it, the Athenians gained by this an earlier discovery of the negotiation of the Chians; and, despatching Aristocrates, one of their generals, charged them openly with the guilt of such a procedure. The Chians as strenuously denying the charge, they commanded them to send away their shipping forthwith to Athens by way of pledge for their safety.

The Chians accordingly sent seven. But the detachment of these was entirely owing to the popular party of that island, who had been kept in utter ignorance of the late negotiation. The few who were privy to it, had no mind to incur the popular resentment before they were enabled to stem its fury; especially as now they had resigned all hope of the arrival of the Peloponnesians, whose motions were exceeding dilatory.

In the meantime the Isthmian games were solemnized; and at these the Athenians, who had the regular invitation sent them, assisted in form. The practices of the Chians became

¹ Before Christ, 412.

² 4843l. 15s. sterling

here more apparent to them than ever. No sooner, therefore, were they returned to Athens, than they put all the needful expedients in readiness, to prevent the squadron which was to sail from Cenchreæ, from passing undiscovered.

When the festival was over, the latter, with one and twenty sail, under the command of Alcámenes, stood out to sea in order for Chios. And the Athenians, advancing against them, at first with an equal number of ships, stood off again into open sea; but, when the Peloponnesians would not follow them far, but stood into the land, the Athenians disappeared; for, having amongst their number the seven ships of the Chians, they thought it not safe to trust them. But, having afterwards manned out others, to the amount of thirty seven, they drive the enemy along the coast into Piræus of the Corinthians: this is a desert harbour, and the last upon the confines of Epidauria. One ship, indeed, which the enemy came up with at sea, the Peloponnesians lost; but all the rest they drew together to a station within the harbour. Here the Athenians attacked them, on the water with their ships, and by land with a party sent purposely on shore. The attack was attended with great confusion, and carried on in a disorderly manner. The party of the Athenians which attacked from the land, disable the bulk of the squadron, and kill the commander, Alcámenes; some also of their own people perished in the action. But when the dispute was ended, they posted a sufficient number of their ships to lie facing those of the enemy; and with the remainder anchor near a little isle, on which, as it lay at a small distance, they form an encampment, and send away to Athens for a reinforcement.

In favour of the Peloponnesians came up, on the day following, not only the Corinthians, but soon after a number also of others, from the adjacent country, in aid of the squadron; who, perceiving that the preservation of it would be a work of laborious toil on so desert a coast, were sadly perplexed. Some argued vehemently for setting the ships on fire; but at length it was concluded to draw them ashore, and, encamping with their land forces round them, to guard them from the enemy till some convenient opportunity should offer of getting them away. Agis, also, when informed of their situation, sent to them Thermo, a citizen of Sparta.

To the Lacedæmonians the first advice that had been sent was this,—that “the squadron had set sail from the isthmus;” for orders had been given Alcámenes by the ephori, that, when this point was executed, he should despatch a horseman to them. And immediately then they had determined to despatch away the commander Chalcideus, accompanied by Alcibiades, with the five ships of their own equipment; but, at the instant they were ready to move off, the news arrived,—that “the squadron had been drove into Piræus.” Dejected by this unexpected event, because they had stumbled in the very first entrance on an Ionian war, they no longer persisted in the design of sending away their own ships, but even thought of recalling some of those which were already at sea. But, as this was discovered by Alcibiades, he again persuades Endius, and the other ephori, by no means entirely to give up the expedition; assuring them, that “by a timely despatch they yet might make that island, before any information of the disaster which had befallen the squadron could reach the Chians; and of himself, were he once in Ionia, he could easily effectuate the revolt of the cities, by opening their eyes in respect to the weakness of the Athenians and the hearty and vigorous interposition of the Lacedæmonians, since on these topics he should be heard with greater deference than any other person whatever.” He also privately encouraged Endius with the prospect of “great glory to himself, if through him Ionia could be brought to revolt, and the king be made confederate to Lacedæmon, whilst Agis had no hand in these masterly strokes of policy;” for he happened now to be at variance with Agis.¹ By such

¹ No reasons are here assigned for the variance between Alcibiades and Agis. Numbers of probable ones might occur from the different tempers and manners of the persons; but we learn, from Plutarch, that Alcibiades had been intriguing with Timea, the wife of Agis, and had had a son by her who was called Leotychides, disowned afterwards by Agis and incapacitated from succeeding to the throne. Alcibiades was always disolute; and yet this (it seems) was merely to gratify his pride, since he declared his intention in this intrigue to have been that his descendants might reign at Sparta. This fine gentleman from Athens was exceeding agreeable in the eyes of her Spartan majesty; even though his deportment at Sparta was such, as if he had been trained from his birth in the severe discipline of Lycurgus. He was a thorough Spartan—shaved close, plunged into cold water, could make a meal on dry bread, and feast on black broth. One would think, says Plutarch, he had never kept a cook in his life,

insinuations Alcibiades prevailed upon the Ephori and Endius, and sailed away with the five ships, in company with Chalcideus, the Lacedæmonian; and the voyage they performed with all possible expedition.

About the same time, the sixteen ships which had been at the war of Sicily under the orders of Gylippus, regained in safety the Peloponnesian ports. They had been intercepted near Leucadia, and terribly harassed by twenty-seven sail of Athenians, commanded by Hippocles, the son of Menippus, who was stationed there to watch the return of the fleet from Sicily. Yet only a single ship was lost. The rest, escaping the Athenian chase, arrived safe in the harbour of Corinth.

But Chalcideus and Alcibiades, who were now upon their voyage, stopped and detained whatever they met, that their course might not be divulged: and, touching first at Corycus on the main, and there setting at liberty such as they had detained, and gaining a conference with some of the Chians who were privy to their designs, by whom being advised to make directly for the harbour of Chios, without any formal notification, they arrive there, entirely unexpected by the Chians. By this, the many were thrown at once into astonishment and terror; but the few had so conducted matters, that the council was that moment sitting; in which Chalcideus and Alcibiades being admitted to speech it—that “many other ships are coming up,”—but suppressing all mention of the squadron blocked up at Piræus, the Chians declare a revolt from the Athenians; and the Erythræans soon follow their example.

So far successful, they passed on with three ships to Clazomenæ, and cause that city also to revolt. Instantly upon this, the Clazomenians crossed over into the continent, and fortified Polichne, to be a place of safe resort for themselves, in case obliged to quit the isle they occupied at present. All the revolters, in short, were warmly employed in fortifying their towns, and making preparations for war.

At Athens soon the news arrives of the revolt of Chios. They were now convinced that horrid and apparent dangers already environed them about, and that the rest of their dependents would not long be quiet, when the most powerful state amongst them had thrown

off the yoke. Now, therefore, the thoughtful talents,¹ which through all the course of the war they had religiously refrained from employing, the penalties being discharged which the law inflicted upon him who should move, whoever should vote it, amidst their profound consternation, they decreed “should be employed in the public service, and that a large number of ships should by this means be equipped;—that, farther, from the squadron which blocked up Piræus, eight ships should immediately be detached;” which, accordingly, quitting the blockade, pursued the squadron under Chalcideus, but, being unable to come up with them, returned again. This detachment was commanded by Strombichides, the son of Diotimus—that “soon after twelve others, under the orders of Thrasycles, should repair to Chios, there also to be detached from the same blockade.” Having, moreover, detached off the seven vessels belonging to the Chians which assisted in forming the blockade at Piræus, they set at liberty the slaves who were on board them, and threw all the freemen into prison. But, to replace the whole number detached from the blockade of the Peloponnesians, they lost no time in fitting out other vessels and sending them to that post. They had also a scheme for the expeditious equipment of thirty more. Great, indeed, was their ardour; and nothing of small importance was taken in hand, as the point in agitation was no less than the recovery of Chios.

In the mean time, Strombichides, with the eight sail of ships, arrived at Samos; and taking with him one Samian vessel, stood onwards to Teos, and required of them “to have no participation in the present commotions.” From Chios, also, Chalcideus was now coming over to Teos, with a fleet of three and twenty sail; and the land force of the Clazomenians, and also of the Erythræans, attending his motions, was marching thither by land: but Strombichides, having timely notice of their approach, put out again before their arrival. Standing out aloof into open sea, he had a view of this numerous fleet in their course from Chios; upon which he fled again to Samos. But the enemy followed in pursuit.

The Teians, who at first refused admittance to the land forces, when now the Athenians

never seen a performer nor ever worn a Milesian robe.
Life of Alcibiades.

¹ 193,750*l.* sterling.

plainly fled, thought proper to open their gates. Here the bulk of them were inactive for a time, attending the return of Chalcideus from the pursuit. But, when time wore on without his appearing, they demolished of their own accord the wall which the Athenians had built on the side of Teos facing the continent. In this they were also assisted by a small party of Barbarians, who in this interval had joined them, and were commanded by Tages, the deputy of Tissaphernes.

But Chalcideus and Alcibiades, when they had chased Strombichides into Samos, having furnished the mariners of the Peloponnesian vessels with proper arms, leave them as a garrison in Chios. Having manned their vessels afresh at Chios, with an addition of twenty others, they stood away for Miletus, as meditating its revolt. This was owing to Alcibiades; who, having an interest in persons of the first rank among the Milesians, made it a point to effectuate their accession before the fleet should come up from Peloponnesus, and to secure the whole honour to the Chians and himself, and Chalcideus and Endius who had sent him, in pursuance of his engagements to work the revolt of the cities with the sole power of the Chians and with Chalcideus. Having therefore performed the greatest part of their voyage thither without being discovered, and prevented by a small portion of time Strombichides, and also Thrasycles, who was lately come up from Athens with twelve ships, and in junction with the former followed after them, they caused Miletus to revolt. The Athenians, indeed, with nineteen sail, arrived upon their heels; but, as the Milesians denied them a reception, they took their station at Lade, an adjacent isle.

The first alliance between the king and the Lacedæmonians was made immediately after the revolt of Miletus, by Tissaphernes and Chalcideus, as followeth:

“On these terms the Lacedæmonians and confederates make an alliance with the king and Tissaphernes—

“Whatever region or cities the king possesseth and the ancestors of the king possessed, be those the king’s.

“And, out of those cities, whatever sums of money or any other supply went to the Athenians, let the king and the Lacedæmonians and confederates jointly stop, that the Athe-

nians may no longer receive those sums of money, nor any other such supply.

“And the war against the Athenians let the king and the Lacedæmonians and confederates jointly carry on.

“And be it unlawful to put an end to the war against the Athenians without the consent of both the contracting parties; of the king on one side, of the Lacedæmonians and confederates on the other.

“If, farther, any revolt from the king, be they declared enemies to the Lacedæmonians and confederates.

“And, if any revolt from the Lacedæmonians and confederates, be they declared enemies, in the same manner, to the king.”

This alliance was now formally concluded.

Immediately after this, the Chians, who had manned out ten additional ships, stood away to Anæa, being desirous to pick up some information of what was doing at Miletus, and at the same time to cause the revolt of the cities. Here, being reached by an order from Chalcideus to return back to Chios, with an intimation that Amorges with a land army would soon be upon them, they sailed away to the temple of Jupiter. From hence they descry sixteen ships, which Diomedon was bringing up from Athens, from whence he had sailed somewhat later than Thrasycles. Upon this discovery they fled amain with a single ship to Ephesus, but with the rest of their fleet to Teos. Four indeed of the number, which their crews had abandoned, the Athenians take; yet all the hands escaped on shore; but the remainder reach in safety the city of the Teians. After this, the Athenians stood away into Samos. But the Chians, putting again to sea with the residue of their ships, and attended by a land force, caused Lebedos to revolt, and also Eræ. And, these points carried, both the land force and the squadron returned respectively to their own homes.

About the same time, the twenty sail of Peloponnesians, which had been chased into Piræus, and lay blocked up there by an equal number of Athenians, having made an unexpected sally upon the enemy, and got the better in a naval engagement, take four of the Athenian ships: and sailing away for Cenchreæ, were again fitting out for the voyage to Chios and Ionia. Astyochus also came down thither from Lacedæmon as admiral, in

whose hands the whole command at sea was now lodged.

When the land army had quitted Teos, Tisaphernes in person came thither with a body, and, after completely demolishing those parts of the wall before Teos which were yet left standing, marched away.

Not long after his departure, Diomedon, arriving there with ten sail of Athenians, in order to gain a reception, made a truce with the Teians. From thence he coasted along to Eræ, and assaulted the place; but, not being able to take it, he sailed away.

Coinciding with this in point of time, an insurrection was made at Samos by the people against the nobility. The Athenians, who with three ships were then lying at Samos, assisted the former. On this occasion the Samian people massacred about two hundred persons, all of the nobility. Four hundred others they condemned to exile; and, having divided amongst themselves their lands and houses, and obtained from the Athenians a decree of being governed by their own constitutions, as men whose fidelity was no longer to be suspected, they assumed the whole civil administration, leaving no share of it in the hands of the landed gentry, and absolutely prohibiting to the people all alliance for the future with them, so as neither to give their daughters to them nor ever to marry theirs.

After these transactions, during the same summer, the Chians, proceeding with unabating ardour, left nothing undone to compass the revolt of the cities. Even without Peloponnesian aid they made them visits with their own single force; and, desirous at the same time to involve as large a number as possible in their own dangers, they undertake a voyage with thirteen sail of ships to Lesbos. This squared exactly with the Lacedæmonian plan; which was, to make the second attempt upon that island, and from thence to proceed to Hellespont. The land force, at the same time, of such of the Peloponnesians as were at hand, and their adjacent allies, attended their motions by the route of Clazomenæ and Cyme: these were commanded by Eualas, a Spartan; but the fleet was under the orders of Deixias, a native of those parts. And those ships, steering first towards and arriving at Methymne, cause its revolt.* * * *

* From what follows it looks as if some words were

But Astyochus, the Lacedæmonian admiral in chief, putting to sea from Cenchræ, where he had taken upon him the command, with four sail of shipping, arrives at Chios. And, the third day after his arrival there, twenty-five sail of Athenians, commanded by Leon and Diomedon, reached the isle of Lesbos; for Leon had been lately sent from Athens with a reinforcement of ten. On the very evening of that day, Astyochus put out again to sea, with the addition of one Chian ship, and stood away for Lesbos to give them all the assistance in his power. Accordingly he toucheth first at Pyrrha, proceeding from thence the day following to Eressus, where information meets him that Mitylene had been taken by the Athenians at a shout; for the latter, as their arrival was entirely unexpected, standing boldly into the harbour, seized at once all the Chian vessels; and then landing, and gaining a victory over such as made head against them, became masters of the city. Astyochus, informed of this event by the Eressians, and the Chian ships under the command of Eubulus from Methymne:—which, having been left in the harbour at that place, had fled at once when Mitylene was taken; three of them came up safe to Astyochus, but one had fallen into the hands of the Athenians;—Astyochus now desisted from proceeding to Mitylene. Having effectuated the revolt of Eressus, and provided the inhabitants with arms, he ordered the soldiers from on board his own squadron to march by land, under the command of Eteonicus, towards Antissa and Methymne; whilst himself, with his own ships and the three Chian, advanced along the shore towards the same places. He hoped the Methymnæans, upon the sight of this succour, would resume their spirits and abide by their revolt. But, when every thing in Lesbos seemed to act in concert against his scheme, he took his landmen again on board, and made the best of his way back again to Chios. The forces, farther, that had attended the motions of his squadron, and which were to have proceeded with him to Hellespont, were dismissed to their respective cities. After this, they were joined at Chios by six ships, which were sent thither by the

wanting here. The Latin translators have endeavoured to supply it, thus:—"And the Chians, leaving four ships here for the defence of the place, stood away with the rest to Mitylene, and caused it to revolt."

confederate fleet of Peloponnesians assembled at Cenchreae.

The Athenians in the meantime were employed in resettling the state of affairs in Lesbos. Standing across from thence, and demolishing Polichne, on the continent, lately fortified by the Clazomenians, they removed all the latter back again to their city in the isle, excepting such as were authors of the revolt; for these had retired to Daphnus. And thus Clazomenæ once more became subject to the Athenians.

The same summer, the Athenians, who with twenty ships had stationed themselves at Lade to awe Miletus, having made a descent at Panormus in the Milesian territory, kill Chalcideus the Lacedæmonian, who with a handful of men endeavoured to repulse them. The third day after this action, they re-embarked; but first erected a trophy; which the Milesians thought proper to demolish, as not fixed on a spot which was the property of the victors.

Leon, also, and Diomedon, at the head of the Athenian fleet on the station of Lesbos, assembling together what force they could from the Oinussæ islands, which lie before Chios, and from Sidusa and Pteleum, fortresses of their own in Erythræa, stood away from Lesbos in a body, and carried on the war by sea against the Chians. The land soldiers on board them were some of the heavy-armed of the public roll of Athens, now pressed into this service. At Cardamyle they landed; and at Bolissus, having routed in battle a body of Chians that made head against them, and done great execution upon them, they reduced all the places in that quarter of the island. At Phanæ also they fought a second time with great success; and, a third time, at Leuconium. But as, after these repeated defeats, the Chians no longer showed themselves in the field to oppose them, the victors made cruel ravage on that rich and fertile country; and which, from the invasion of the Medes to the present period of time, had been totally exempted from the miseries of war. For, next to the Lacedæmonians, the Chians are the only people who (as far as I have been able to observe) have enjoyed a series of public prosperity with a steady and uniform moderation, and, in proportion as their state increased in wealth and power, made suitable accessions to its domestic splendour and security. Nay, even their late revolt, if

this should chance to be ascribed to a want of judicious and cautionary measures, they never ventured to declare, till they had fortified the hazardous step with numerous and gallant confederates, and saw plainly that the Athenians, (as even the Athenians themselves could not possibly deny,) after the blow received in Sicily, were plunged into the lowest depth of impotence and distress. If, therefore, they proved mistaken, it was one of those cases inseparable from the constant mutability of human affairs, where numbers were involved in the same mistake with themselves, who yet in their judgment were perfectly convinced that the entire ruin of Athens was fast approaching.

Now, therefore, blocked up as they were by sea, whilst their lands all around were ravaged by the enemy, a party amongst them were concerting the method of delivering up the city into the hands of the Athenians. But those in the administration, getting wind of their design, refrained indeed from making a bustle about it in public; but, fetching over Astyochus, the Lacedæmonian admiral in chief, with his four ships, from Erythræa, they consulted how to prevent the execution of the plot by the mildest and most gentle methods, either by taking hostages for the fidelity of the suspected, or some other such cautionary expedients. In this posture stood affairs at Chios.

But, from Athens, in the close of the same summer, one thousand five hundred heavy-armed Athenians and a thousand Argives, (for five hundred Argives, who were but light-armed, the Athenians had equipped in the manner more complete,) with the addition of a thousand confederates, in eight and forty sail of ships, including the transports of the heavy-armed, and put under the command of Phrynichus and Onomacles and Skironidas, sailed away to Samos, and, thence stretching over to Miletus, encamped themselves before it. The Milesians marched out into the field, to the amount of eight hundred heavy-armed, assisted by the Peloponnesians who came over with Chalcideus and a body of foreign mercenaries furnished by Tissaphernes. Tissaphernes also assisted them in person with an aid of cavalry: and thus battle was joined against the Athenians and confederates. The Argives, of whom a whole wing was composed, advanced before the rest of the line; and, contemning their enemy too much, as Ionians, and unable to stand their shock, they charged in a disorderly

manner, are routed by the Milesians, and no less a number than three hundred of their body are destroyed. But the Athenians beat first the Peloponnesians, and then cleared the field of the Barbarians and all the rabble of the enemy, yet came not at all to an engagement with the Milesians: for the latter, returning towards the city from the chase of the Argives, no sooner perceived that their own side was vanquished than they quitted the field of battle. The Athenians, therefore, as victors, posted themselves under the very walls of Miletus. It is observable, that, in this battle, the Ionians had on both sides the better of the Dorians: for the Athenians beat those Peloponnesians who were ranged against them; and the Milesians did the same by the Argives. But now, after erecting a trophy, as the town was seated on an isthmus, the Athenians were preparing to cut it off by a work of circumvallation; concluding that, "if they once could get possession of Miletus, they should easily complete the reduction of the other states."

It was now about the shut of evening, and advice is brought them that "five and fifty sail of ships from Peloponnesus and Sicily are only not at hand." For, from Sicily, where Hermocrates the Syracusan strenuously advised to go on with what yet remained in regard to the total demolition of the Athenians, twenty sail of Syracusans and two of Selinuntians came over. The Peloponnesian fleet, which had been fitting out, was now ready for service; and both these were sent out in conjunction, under the orders of Theramenes the Lacedæmonian, who was to carry them to Astyochus the admiral in chief. They arrived first at Eleus, an island before Miletus. Being there informed that the Athenians lay before Miletus, they departed thence; and, steering first into the gulf of Iasus, were desirous to pick up information how things went at Miletus. Alcibiades had now rode to Teichiussa in the Milesian; in which quarter of the gulf the fleets had come to anchor for the night, and receive there a full account of the battle. Alcibiades had been present at it, and had given his assistance to the Milesians and Tissaphernes. He therefore earnestly pressed them, "unless they were desirous to see all Ionia lost, and all their great expectations blasted at once, to repair with all possible expedition to the succour of Miletus, and by no means to suffer it to be invested by a circumvallation." In pursuance

of this it was resolved, that at the first dawn of day they would stand away to its succour.

But Phrynichus, the Athenian commander, when advised from Lerus of the certain arrival of this united fleet, even though his colleagues declared openly for keeping their ground and hazarding an engagement by sea, protested boldly, that "such a step, for his own part, he could not take; and, were he able to hinder it, that neither they nor any one should force him to it: for, since it would be afterwards in their power, when they had got better intelligence of the numbers of the enemy, and made what possible accessions they could to their own, and when they had prepared for action in a ample and leisurely manner,—since it would be still in their power to fight, the dread of a shameful or reproachful imputation should not bend him to risk an engagement against his judgment. It could be no matter of reproach to the Athenians to retire with their fleet when the exigencies of time required it; but, in every respect, it would be highly reproachful to them should they fight and be vanquished. He would not, therefore, involve the state, not only in reproach, but in the greatest of dangers;—the state which, but just now respiring from the terrible blows it had received, scarce thought it prudential with most ample preparation to choose voluntary hazards, or even, when the last necessity demanded, to strike first at the enemy,—why now, when no necessity compelled, must it be thrown into wilful spontaneous dangers?" He exhorted them, therefore, "without loss of time to carry the wounded on board, to re-embark their troops, and, securing what baggage they had brought along with them, to leave behind what booty they had got from the enemy, that their ships might not be too deeply laden, and make the best of their way to Samos; and from thence, after collecting together what additional force they could, to watch for and seize the seasons of advantage to attack their foes." The advice of Phrynichus, thus given, was prevailing, and accordingly was put in execution. He was regarded, not only on the present but on future occasions, not only for this, but all the subsequent instances of his conduct, as a man of an excellent understanding.

In pursuance of this, the Athenians, so soon as the evening was closed, made the best of their way from Miletus, and left the victory imperfect. And the Argives, without making

the least stay, chagrined as they were at their late defeat, departed immediately from Samos to return to Argos.

The Peloponnesians, early the next dawn, weighing from Teichiusa, stand into Miletus. After one day's stay in that harbour, on the next, having augmented their squadron with the Chian ships which had formerly been chased in company with Chalcideus, they determined to go back again to Teichiusa to fetch off what stores they had landed there. Accordingly, when they were thus returned, Tissaphernes, being come up with his land army, persuades them to stand directly against Iasus, in which his enemy Amorges at that instant lay. Thus, falling on Iasus by surprise, the inhabitants of which expected none but an Athenian squadron, they become masters of it. In this action the Syracusans were the persons who gained the greatest honour. Amorges, farther, the bastard son of Pissuthnes, who was a revolter from the king, was taken prisoner by the Peloponnesians. They delivered him up to Tissaphernes, that if he pleased he might send him to the king, in obedience to his orders, Iasus, farther, they put to the sack; and the army made on this occasion, a very large booty, for this city had ever been remarkable for its wealth. They gave quarter to the auxiliaries in the service of Amorges: and, without committing the least insult upon them, took them into their own troops, as the bulk of them were Peloponnesians. They delivered up the town into the hands of Tissaphernes, as likewise all the prisoners, whether slaves or freemen, upon covenant to receive from him a Doric stater¹ for each. This being done, they again repaired to Miletus; and from hence they detach Pædaritus, the son of Leon, whom the Lacedæmonians had sent expressly to be governor of Chios, to march over land to Erythræ, having under his command the auxiliaries who had served under Amorges; and appoint Philippus to command at Miletus. And the summer ended.

The winter now succeeding, after Tissaphernes had garrisoned and provided for the security of Iasus, he repaired to Miletus, and distributed a month's subsistence, in pursuance of his engagements at Lacedæmon, to all the ships, at the rate of an Attic drachma² to each mariner by the day; but for the remainder of

time he declared he would only pay at the rate of three oboli,³ till he had consulted the king's pleasure; and, in case his master's orders were for it, he said, he would make it up a complete drachma. But as Hermocrates, the Syracusan commander, remonstrated sharply against this usage, (for Theramenes, not regarding himself as admiral, since he was now at the head of the fleet merely to carry it up to Astyochus, was very indolent about the article of pay,) it was at length compromised, that excepting the five supernumerary ships, the crews of the rest should receive more than three oboli a man: for to the five and fifty ships he paid three talents⁴ a month; and, for the rest, as many as exceeded that number, pay was to be furnished at the rate of only three oboli a day.

The same winter, the Athenians now lying at Samos had been reinforced by the arrival of

¹ Half a drachma.

² There is manifestly a fault here; for τρις, three, in the original, should be read τριακοντα, thirty, talents a month. Mr Hobbes hath taken the pains to compute, and finds that the Peloponnesian ships carried eighteen men a piece. What? only so small a crew as eighteen men for a ship of war with three banks of oars? or, where the complement was perhaps two hundred, did Tissaphernes only pay a tenth part of that number? Xenophon, in the first book of his Greek history, enables us to set all to rights. Lysander is negotiating with Cyrus for an increase of pay. Cyrus insists upon the former agreement made by Tissaphernes, that every ship should receive but thirty minæ a month. The daily pay of each was of course one mina, or one hundred drachmas: whence it appears, that, at three oboli, or half a drachma, a man, the pay of sixty ships, each carrying two hundred men, would be just thirty talents. Thirty talents, therefore, paid to fifty-five ships for a month, were two talents and a half above three oboli a day. And hence it seems pretty clear, that the complement of a Peloponnesian ship of war was two hundred men.

I have another proof at hand, which will confirm what hath already been said, and serve at the same time to ascertain the number of men on board a ship of war. In the sixth book Thucydides says, the Egæteans brought to Athens sixty talents, as a month's pay for sixty ships. He says also, that in the Sicilian expedition the daily pay of the Athenian seamen was raised to a drachma a man. Now a talent a month, reckoning thirty days to the month, is two minæ a day; and two minæ are just two hundred drachmas. Hence, it is plain, the complement of an Athenian ship was two hundred men; and, according to the former computation, that of a Peloponnesian ship was, as might reasonably be expected, exactly the same. This is a farther confirmation that there is a mistake in the printed copies of the original, as was said above; where, instead of three talents, which amount but to 5817. 5s. sterling, should have been read thirty talents, amounting in English money to 58127. 10s.

¹ 17. 12s. 3½d.

² 7½d.

five and thirty sail from Athens, under the command of Charminus, and Strombichides, and Euctemon; and they had farther assembled all their ships from Chios, and others. A resolution was therefore taken, after assigning each his peculiar command by lot, to make up against it with a naval force, and awe Miletus; but to send against Chios both a naval and a land force; and this accordingly they put in execution. For, in fact, Strombichides, and Onomacles, and Euctemon, with a squadron of thirty sail and a body of transports, which had on board a detachment from the thousand heavy-armed which came against Miletus, stood away for Chios, as this service had fallen to them by lot; but the rest of the commanders who now remained at Samos, having under them seventy-four ships, were quite lords of the sea, and sailed boldly up to awe Miletus.

Astyochus, who happened at this juncture to be in Chios, selecting hostages as a prevention against treachery, thought proper for the present to desist, when he heard of the arrival of the squadron under Theramenes, and that their engagements with Tissaphernes were much altered for the better. But, taking with him ten sail of Peloponnesians and ten of Chians, he putteth to sea; and, having made an attempt upon Pteleum, though without success, he crossed over to Clazomenæ. He there summoned such of the inhabitants as were attached to the Athenians to remove with their effects up to Daphnus, and leave him in possession of the place; Tamus, farther, the subgovernor of Ionia, joined with him in the summons. But, when the inhabitants rejected this offer, he made an assault upon the city, which had no fortifications; yet, miscarrying in the attempt, he put off again to sea in a hard gale of wind, and reached, with those ships that kept up with him, to Phoea and Cyme: but the rest of the squadron was by stress of weather forced over to the isles which lie near to Clazomenæ,—Marathusa, and Pele, and Drimussa; and, whatever effects belonging to the Clazomenians had by way of security been deposited there, during eight days' continuance, which the stormy weather obliged them to stay, they partly plundered and partly destroyed; and having secured their booty on board, got away to Phoea and Cyme, and joined Astyochus. But, whilst he was yet in this station, ambassadors reach him from the Lesbians, imparting to him their desires to revolt.

Him, indeed, they persuade; but, when the Corinthians and the rest of the confederates declared their repugnance, because of the former miscarriage, he weighed from thence and made sail for Chios. And now, a storm dispersing his squadron, at last they all come in, though from different quarters to which they had been driven, and rejoined him at Chios.

The next step to this was the junction of Pædaritus; who, being now at Erythræ, after marching by land from Miletus, passed over in person with the troops under his command to Chios. He had also with him about five hundred soldiers, taken out of the five ships under Chalcideus, who had been left behind with their arms.

But now, the Lesbians notifying again their readiness to revolt, Astyochus, in a conference with Pædaritus and the Chians, "maintaining the necessity of going thither with a squadron to support the revolt of Lesbos; since, in consequence of it, they must either enlarge the number of their confederates, or, even though miscarrying in the design, must hurt the Athenians." But they were deaf to this suggestion; and Pædaritus positively declared that he should not be attended by the ships of Chios. Upon this, taking with him five sail of Corinthians, a sixth ship belonging to Megara, and one more of Hermione, and all the Laconian which he himself brought thither, he stood away from thence to his station at Miletus, uttering grievous threats against the Athenians, that, "how low soever they might be reduced, they should never receive any succour from him." Accordingly, touching first at Corycus of Erythræ, he moored there for the night. The Athenians, who, from Samos, with a considerable strength, were now sent against Chios, were lying at the same distance of time on the other side of the cape, but stationed that neither party knew of the nearness of the other. At this juncture, a party of Erythræans, who had been prisoners at Samos and released from thence, are coming to Erythræ to betray that place." Astyochus put out again immediately for Erythræ: and, though narrowly, on this occasion, did he escape falling into the hands of the Athenians. Pædaritus, farther, had made the passage upon the affair; and both having joined him, he made necessary inquiries about those who were accused of this piece of treachery, were

found the whole to have been a plot of the prisoners at Samos merely to recover their liberty, they pronounced them innocent, and so departed; the latter to Chios; but the other, in pursuance of his first designation, made the best of his way to Miletus.

In the mean time the armament of the Athenians, having sailed round from Corycus to Arginum, falls in with three long vessels of the Chians, and no sooner had descried than they gave them chase. And now a violent storm ariseth, and the vessels of the Chians with great difficulty escape into harbour: but, of the Athenian squadron, three, which had most briskly followed the chase, are disabled and driven ashore at the city of the Chians: the crews of them were partly made prisoners, and partly put to the sword. The rest of the fleet got into a safe harbour which is known by the name of Phenicus, under the Mimas. From hence they afterwards took their course to Lesbos, and got all in readiness to raise fortifications.

From Peloponnesus, the same winter, Hippocrates the Lacedæmonian, putting out to sea, with ten sail of Thurians commanded by Doriæus, the son of Diagoras, and two colleagues, with one ship of Laconia, and one of Syracuse, arriveth at Cnidus. This place was now in revolt from Tissaphernes. Those of Miletus were no sooner advised of the arrival of this squadron, than they sent them orders, with one moiety of their ships to keep guard upon Cnidus, and with the other to post themselves at the Triopium, in order to take under their convoy the trading vessels, which were in their course from Egypt. The Triopium is a point in the territory of Cnidus, jutting out into the sea, and a temple of Apollo. But the Athenians, informed of their designs, and standing away from Samos, take six of the ships which were stationed at the Triopium: the crews, indeed, quit their ships, and reach the shore. This being done, the victors sailed directly to Cnidus; and, making an assault upon that city which was quite unfortified, had very nearly taken it. On the next day they renewed the assault. Yet as the inhabitants had taken care to make it more secure by favour of the night, and the men, escaped from the vessels taken at Triopium, had thrown themselves into the place, they did less damage than on the preceding day. After scouring and laying

waste the territory of Cnidus, they sailed back to Samos.

About the same time, Astyochus having re-joined the fleet at Miletus, the Peloponnesians were still abounding in all the needful expedients of war. Good pay was regularly advanced them, and the soldiers had store of money yet remaining of the rich booty they made at Iasus. The Milesians, farther, sustained with alacrity the burden of the war. It was, however, the opinion of the Peloponnesians, that the first treaty made with Tissaphernes by Chalcideus was in some articles defective and less advantageous to themselves. Upon this they drew up and ratified a second in the presence of Theramenes. The articles of it are these:

“Stipulated, by the Lacedæmonians and confederates, with king Darius and the sons of the king and Tissaphernes, that peace and amity subsist on the following conditions:

“Whatever province or city soever belongeth to king Darius, or did belong to his father or ancestors, against them in a hostile manner, not to march, and no injury to do, are bound both Lacedæmonians, and confederates of the Lacedæmonians. Not to exact tribute from any such places, are bound both Lacedæmonians and confederates of the Lacedæmonians. Neither shall king Darius, nor any subject of the king, march in a hostile manner against, nor do any injury to, the Lacedæmonians and confederates.

“But, in case the Lacedæmonians or confederates need any assistance whatever from the king; or the king from the Lacedæmonians and confederates; whatever either party can convince the other to be right, let that be done.

“Be the war against the Athenians and confederates carried on by both parties in strict conjunction. And, in case an accommodation be taken in hand, be it settled by both parties acting in conjunction.

“But, whatever army be brought into the territories of the king at the request and summons of the king, the king to defray the expense.

“And, if any of the states, comprehended in this league with the king, invade the territories of the king, the others to oppose and act with all their power in defence of the king.

“And, if any province belonging to the king, or subject to his dominion, invade the

territory of the Lacedæmonians or confederates; the king to oppose, and with all his power to defend the party invaded."

When the finishing hand was put to this treaty, Theramenes, after delivering up the fleet to Astyochus, puts to sea in a fly-boat, and entirely disappears.

But the Athenians from Lesbos, having now made their passage and landed their forces in Chios, and being masters of the coast and sea, fortified Delphinium; a place remarkably strong by nature towards the land, abounding, farther, with harbours, and seated at no considerable distance from the city of the Chians. And now the Chians, dispirited by the many defeats they had already received, and, what is worse, far from being actuated by general unanimity, (but, on the contrary, Tydeus the Ionian and his adherents having been lately put to death by Pædaritus for atticizing, and the rest of the citizens obliged by necessity to submit to the few, each individual amongst them suspecting his neighbour,)—the Chians now remained quite inactive. Thus, for the reasons above-mentioned; they neither looked upon themselves, nor the auxiliaries under Pædaritus, as a match for the enemy. Yet, as their last resource, they send to Miletus, requesting Astyochus to come over to their succour. But, as he was deaf to their entreaties, Pædaritus sends a letter to Lacedæmon about him, which accused him of injustice. And to this situation were brought the Athenian affairs at Chios.

Their squadron also at Samos made several visits to the squadron of the enemy at Miletus; but, as the latter refused to come out to engage them, they returned again to Samos, without committing any hostilities.

From Peloponnesus, in the same winter, twenty-seven sail of ships, equipped by the Lacedæmonians for Pharnabazus, at the instance of his agents, Calligitus the Megarean, and Timagoras the Cyzicene, put out to sea, and made over to Ionia, about the solstice. Antisthenes the Spartan was on board as admiral. With him the Lacedæmonians sent also eleven Spartans, to be a council to Astyochus; in the number of whom was Lichas, the son of Arcesilaus. To these an order was given, that, "when arrived at Miletus, they should in concert act in all respects as might be best for the service; and this squadron, or one equal in strength, or larger or smaller, at their

own discretion, should proceed to Hellespont for the service of Pharnabazus, and be sent away under the command of Clearchus the son of Ramphias, who accompanied them in the voyage; and, in case it was judged expedient by the council of eleven, to dismiss Astyochus from the chief command, and substitute Antisthenes." On account of the letters of Pædaritus, they began to suspect the former. This squadron, therefore, standing out to sea from Melea, arrived first at Melos; and, falling in with ten sail of Athenians, they take and burn three of them, which their crews had abandoned. But, apprehensive that those Athenian ships which had escaped might advertise the fleet at Samos of their approach, as was actually the case, they stretched away for Crete; and, for better security, keeping a good look out, and taking more time, they made land first at Caunus of Asia. From thence, as being now beyond the reach of danger, they despatch a messenger to the fleet at Miletus, to attend and bring them up.

But, about the same juncture of time, the Chians and Pædaritus, not bearing to acquiesce under the dilatory answers of Astyochus, pressed him, by repeated messages, "to come over with the whole of his force, and relieve them from the present blockade; and by no means, to look indolently about him, whilst the most important of the confederate states in Ionia was shut up by sea, and by land exposed to rapines." For, the domestics of the Chians,—being many in number, nay, the largest that any one community except the Lacedæmonians kept, and accustomed, because of their multitude, to be punished with extraordinary severity for their misdemeanors,—no sooner judged that the Athenian forces, by throwing up works, had gained a sure footing in the island, than large numbers of them at once deserted to the enemy, and were afterwards the persons who, as perfectly well acquainted with the country, committed the heaviest depredations. The Chians, therefore, urged, that "the last necessity called upon him, whilst yet there was hope or a possibility of success remaining, (the works round Delphinium yet incomplete, and a larger circle even still to be taken in and fortified for the security of the camp and the fleet,) to undertake their relief." Upon this, Astyochus, who, to verify his threats, had never before thought seriously about it, being now convinced that the whole confederate

body was bent on their preservation, determined in person to go to their succour.

But, just at this crisis, advice is brought him from Caunus, that "twenty-seven sail of ships and the assistant-council of Lacedæmonians are arrived." Concluding, upon this, that every other point ought to be postponed to this large reinforcement, that his junction with it might be effected in order to invest them with the sovereignty of the sea, and that the Lacedæmonians who came to inspect his own conduct might securely finish their voyage; throwing up immediately all concern for Chios, he sailed away for Caunus. But, having landed in his passage at Cos Meropidis, the inhabitants of which had refuged themselves in the mountains, he rifled the city, which was quite unfortified, and had lately been tumbled into ruins by an earthquake, the greatest that had been felt there in the memory of us now living. By excursions, also, through all the country, he made prize of all he found, excepting seamen; for such he dismissed unhurt.

From Cos advancing by night to Cnidus, he is dissuaded by the Cnidians from landing his men; but, on the contrary, without loss of time to get out to sea, and make head against twenty sail of Athenians, which Charminus, one of the commanders from Samos, had under his orders, and with them was watching the approach of the twenty-seven sail coming up from Peloponnesus, which Astyochus was now going to join. For they at Samos had received from Miletus advice of their coming, and Charminus was appointed to cruise for them about Cyme, and Chalcæ, and Rhodes, and the coast of Lycia; and by this time he knew, for a certainty, that they were laying at Caunus.

Astyochus, therefore, without loss of time, stood away for Cyme, with a view to surprise the ships of the enemy at sea before they could get any advice of his approach. A heavy rain and thick cloudy weather occasioned the dispersion of his vessels in the dark, and sadly disordered him.

When morning broke, the fleet being widely separated and the left wing driven already within the view of the Athenians, the remainder yet driving in confusion about the island, Charminus and the Athenians launch out against them with all possible expedition, though with fewer than twenty sail, imagining this to be the squadron from Caunus whose

approach they were to observe; and, proceeding instantly to action, they sunk three and disabled others. They had by far the better in the action, till the numerous remainder of hostile ships appeared, to their great consternation, and encompassed them round on all sides. Then, taking to open flight, they lost six of their ships; but with the remainder reach in safety the isle of Teuglussa, and from thence proceed to Halicarnassus.

This being done, the Peloponnesians, putting back to Cnidus, and the twenty-seven sail from Caunus completing here their junction with them, they put out again to sea in one body; and, after erecting a trophy at Cyme, returned again to their anchorings at Cnidus.

The Athenians, on the other hand, had no sooner been informed of the engagements of the squadrons, than with the whole of their fleet they put out from Samos, and made the best of their way to Cyme. And yet against the fleet at Cnidus they made no sallies, as neither did the enemy against them; but, after taking up the tackling of the vessels left at Cyme, and making an assault upon Lorima on the continent, they returned to Samos.

The whole united fleet of the Peloponnesians, now lying at Cnidus, was busy in refitting completely for service; and the Lacedæmonian council of eleven had a conference with Tissaphernes, who was now come to them, in which they notified to him their dislike of some things in past transactions; and, in regard to the future operations of war, debated in what manner they might be carried on for their joint benefit and convenience. But Lichas was the person who scrutinized most closely into the past, and expressed a dissatisfaction with both treaties; affirming, that "even the last settled by Theramenes was far from being good; but that terrible it would be, should the king now claim, upon that pretext, the possession of that tract of country of which either he or his ancestors had formerly been masters: for thus he might be enabled once more to enslave all the islands, and Thessaly, and Locri, quite as far as Bœotia; whilst the Lacedæmonians, instead of freeing, would be obliged to impose the Median subjection on, the Grecians. He insisted, therefore, that a better treaty should be made, or at least the former should be instantly disannulled; for on terms like the present they would scorn to take pay from the king." Nettled at this, Tissa-

phernes went from them in a fit of choler, without bringing affairs to any kind of settlement.

The scheme now next in agitation was a voyage to Rhodes, which the most powerful persons there had by embassies solicited them to undertake. They were full of hopes to bring into their subjection an island by no means inconsiderable either for number of mariners or soldiers; and at the same time judged themselves able, by their present alliances, to defray the expense of their fleet without requesting pay from Tissaphernes. Accordingly, this winter, with great despatch, they put to sea from Cnidus; and, arriving first at Camirus, on the Rhodian coast, with ninety-four ships, they struck a consternation into the multitude, who knew nothing of past transactions, and were the sooner tempted to abandon their dwellings as the city was not guarded by the least fortification. The Lacedæmonians, afterwards, summoning to a conference these, and the Rhodians also from two other cities, Lindus and Ielysus, persuaded them to revolt from the Athenians. Rhodes accordingly went over to the Peloponnesians.

At the same juncture of time, the Athenians, who had discovered their design, put out with their fleet from Samos, earnestly bent on preventing the scheme. They were seen indeed out at sea by the enemy, but made their appearance a little too late. For the present, therefore, they put back to Chalce, and from thence to Samos; and afterwards, making frequent trips from Chalce, and Cos, and Samos, they warred against Rhodes.

The Peloponnesians exacted from the Rhodians a sum amounting to about two and thirty talents;¹ and having laid their ships aground, continued with them eighty days without subjecting them to any farther imposition.

During this interval of time, nay, extended farther back, before they undertook this enterprise against Rhodes, the following transaction happened:

Alcibiades, after the death of Chalcideus and the battle of Miletus, falling under the suspicion of the Peloponnesians, and through them a letter having been sent from Lacedæmon to Astyochus to put him to death,—for he was an enemy to Agis, and his treachery in other respects was become notorious,—Alci-

biades, I say, fearful of his life, withdrew himself first to Tissaphernes, and in the next place, did all in his power to undermine what interest the Peloponnesians had in him. Grown at length his dictator in every affair, he abridged their pay; that, instead of an Attic drachma,² three oboli only should be given them, and that too with no punctuality. He advised Tissaphernes to remonstrate with them, that "the Athenians, who through a long tract of time had gained experience in naval affairs, paid only three oboli to their seamen,—not so much through a principle of frugality, as to prevent their seamen from growing insolent through too much plenty; some of them would otherwise render their bodies less fit for fatigue, by having wherewithal to purchase those pleasures by which weakness is occasioned; and others would desert, and leave their arrears to balance their desertion." He instructed him farther, how, by seasonable gratuities to the commanders of ships and generals of the states, he might persuade them all to acquiesce in his proceedings, excepting the Syracusans; for, amongst these, Hermocrates alone made loud remonstrances in behalf of the whole alliance. Nay, Alcibiades himself took upon him to give the denial to such states as petitioned for money; making answer himself, instead of Tissaphernes, that, for instance, the Chians were void of all shame; who, though the most wealthy of the Grecians, and hitherto preserved by the auxiliary efforts of others, yet are ever requiring strangers to expose their lives and fortunes to keep them free." As for other states, he maintained "they acted basely, if, when subjected to vast expenses before they revolted from the Athenians, they refused to lay out as much, nay, a great deal more, in their own defence." He was also dextrous at proving, that "Tissaphernes, since now he supported the war at his own private expense, was in the right to be frugal; but assuredly, when returns were made him from the king, he would make up the present abatement of pay, and do strict justice to every single state." He farther suggested to Tissaphernes, that "he should not be too much in a hurry to bring the war to a conclusion; or entertain the wish, either by bringing up the Phœnician fleet which he had provided, or by taking into pay a larger

¹ 6200*l.* sterling.

² Six oboli, or 7½*d.* sterling.

number of Grecians, to turn the superiority at land and sea in favour of the Lacedæmonians. He ought rather to leave both parties pretty nearly balanced in strength; and so enable the king, when one of them became troublesome, to let the other party loose against them: whereas, should the dominion in both elements be given exclusively to either, he would then be distressed for want of sufficient power to pull down the triumphant state; unless at a prodigious expense, and through infinity of danger to himself, he should choose to enter the list in person and war them down. The risks incurred by the other method were far more eligible, because attended with a smaller proportion of expense; and his master might lie by with perfect security, whilst he was wearing out the Grecians by their own reciprocal embroilments." He moreover hinted to him, that "the Athenians were the best suited of the two to share the dominion with him; because they were less desirous of power on the continent, and by their peculiar turn of politics and military conduct were better adapted for this purpose. They would be glad, at the same time, to subdue the maritime parts to their own yoke, and to that of the king all Grecians whatever who live upon the continent. The Lacedæmonians, on the contrary, came thither with the sole passion to set them free; nor in common prudence could it be judged likely, that men, who were this moment employed to deliver Grecians from the yoke of Grecians, would in that case be stopped by any thing but a superior force from delivering them also from the yoke of barbarians." He advised him, therefore, "in the first place, to wear out the strength of both; and, after clipping as much as possible the wings of the Athenians, then instantly to drive the Peloponnesians from off his coast."

The larger part of this advice Tissaphernes determined to follow, so far at least as may be gathered from his actions; for, satisfied by this means with Alcibiades, as a person who on these points gave him sound advice, and resigning himself up to his guidance, he paid but sorrowly their subsistence to the Peloponnesians, and would not suffer them to engage at sea. By the constant pretext that the Phœnician fleet was coming up, and then with so great a superiority of strength the war might be brought to a clear decision, he ruined all operations of war; he suffered the vigour of their fleet, which

in fact was strong and mighty, insensibly to moulder away, and disconcerted them so openly, in other respects, that his motives in doing it were no longer to be concealed.

Such was the advice which Alcibiades gave to Tissaphernes and the king, when he had opportunities, and which he really thought to be the best in policy; but at the same time he had deep in his heart and in his study his own return to his country; assured, within himself, that, if he preserved it from a total destruction, he might find a time to compass his own restoration: and nothing, he judged, could expedite his purpose more, than if it appeared to the world that Tissaphernes was his friend; which also was verified by fact.

For, when the Athenian troops at Samos perceived that he had so strong an interest with Tissaphernes, and Alcibiades had already paved the way by sending intimations beforehand to the men of influence and authority amongst them, how desirous he was "they should patronise his return with the consent of the persons of the greatest honour and worth in their company; since only under an oligarchy, but not under an iniquitous cabal or that democracy which had formerly banished him, could he even desire it;—and, thus recalled, he would come and join his cares with theirs for the public welfare, and procure them farther the friendship of Tissaphernes;"—when, more than this, the officers of those Athenians at Samos, and the men of highest authority amongst them, were voluntarily inclined to put an end to the democracy;—the method of bringing it about began to be agitated first in the army, and from thence soon made a stir in Athens itself.

Some persons passed over from Samos, to concert matters with Alcibiades; who gave them room to hope that "he could render first Tissaphernes, and in the next place the king, their friend, if they would dissolve the democracy; since, on this sole condition, could the king be assured of their sincerity." This contributed to enhance their sanguine expectations, that on this their affairs might take a new turn, in which men of first rank in the community, who in the present management were most depressed, might recover the administration, and gain the ascendant over their enemies. Returning, therefore, to Samos, they took in the most proper persons there to be assistants to the scheme; and to the many made public

declarations, that "the king might be made their friend, and supply them with money, were Alcibiades recalled, and the democracy suspended." The effect of these declarations on the many was this, that, though for the present they were chagrined at the scheme in agitation, yet, soothed by the flattering hope of the royal subsidies, they refrained from all manner of tumult.

But the set which was caballing in favour of an oligarchy, after such open declarations to the multitude, reconsidered the promises of Alcibiades amongst themselves, and with a larger number of their associates. The scheme was judged by all the rest to be feasible and sure; but Phrynichus, who was yet in the command, declared a total dislike of it. It appeared to him (which was really the case) that "Alcibiades cared as little for an oligarchical as a democratical government; and that no other thought lay seriously at his heart than to throw the present government into some state of confusion, which his friends might so far improve as to carry his recallment. Of consequence, the first point themselves should guard against was, not to be thrown into seditions for the benefit of the king. It was not probable, (he plainly told them,) when the Peloponnesians had gained a power by sea equal to their own, and were masters of cities not the most inconsiderable amidst the king's dominions, that the latter should turn the balance in favour of the Athenians, in whom he hath no confidence at all, whilst he might firmly depend upon the friendship of the Peloponnesians, who had never done him any harm. As for confederate states, to whom they were to give a certain pledge of future oligarchy by setting up that government amongst themselves, he told them he was well assured that on that account neither such as had revolted would the sooner return, nor such as were at present their own would the longer continue in their duty; since the point on which their wishes turned was, not to be enslaved by an oligarchy rather than a democracy, but to recover their liberty, indifferent equally to either form. As for those of their fellow-citizens to whom was given the appellation of worthy and good, even they would perplex the train of government as much as the people, when, by cajoling that people, and authoritatively leading them into a series of bad measures, they would principally regard their own private emoluments: and,

should they be subjected to the caprice of such, to die by violence and without a trial must be the general fate; whereas the people was a sure resource in seasons of extremity, and ever tempered the fury of the great. He was well convinced, the states, enlightened by a long tract of experience, judge of their government in the same light. Upon the whole, therefore, the negotiations of Alcibiades, and all at present upon the carpet, could in no wise be approved by him."

The party, however, associated together in this design, abiding by their former determinations, resolved to proceed to their execution, and were preparing to send Pisander and others by way of deputation to Athens, to set on foot the negotiations concerning the return of Alcibiades, the dissolution of the popular government there, and the gaining over Tissaphernes to the Athenian friendship.

Phrynichus,—now convinced that the return of Alcibiades would be brought upon the carpet, and the Athenians assuredly grant it; apprehensive, farther, that, from the opposition he had given it at their consultations, he should then be exposed to his resentments, as one who had endeavoured to stop it,—hath recourse to the following project: He sends to Astyochus, admiral in chief of the Lacedæmonians, who yet continued in the station of Miletus, a secret hint, by letter, that Alcibiades is ruining their affairs, by endeavouring to gain over Tissaphernes to the Athenians;" and, after giving him a clear explanation of other matters, he pleaded "the candour of Astyochus in his own excuse, if he desired in this manner to ruin his mortal foe, though with some prejudice to the welfare of his country." But Astyochus had given up all thoughts of putting Alcibiades to death, especially as now he never came within his reach; yet, on this occasion, making a visit to him and Tissaphernes at Magnesia, he communicates to them the advices sent him from Samos, and becomes himself an informer. He is accused by report, not only on this but many other occasions, to have made court to Tissaphernes for his own private lucre; and, for the same reason, when the pay was not fully rendered before, he suffered it much more pliantly than in duty he ought to have done. Alcibiades sends away immediate notice to the managing party at Samos, that the treachery of Phrynichus was detected by his own letter, and insists upon it that he be

put to death. Phrynichus, terribly alarmed, and pushed to the very brink of destruction by such a discovery, sends again to Astyochus, blaming his indiscretion on a former occasion in not keeping his secret, and assuring him that "now he was ready to deliver up to his fury the whole force of the Athenians at Samos," (distinctly reciting to him the particulars by which, as Samos was unfortified, the whole scheme might be accomplished,) and that "undoubtedly he ought not to be censured if, when his unrelenting foes had reduced him to such extremity of danger, he chose to do this, or even more than this, rather than be destroyed by their rancour." But this proposal also Astyochus communicates to Alcibiades.

Phrynichus, perceiving in time that Astyochus betrayed him, and that notice each moment was only not arrived from Alcibiades about the contents of his last, anticipated the discovery, and becomes himself informer to the army, that "the enemy had resolved, as Samos was unfortified, and the whole of their fleet not securely stationed within the harbour, to endeavour a surprise: of this he had gained the most certain informations; and therefore Samos ought necessarily to be put into a posture of defence with the utmost expedition, and proper guards in every respect be appointed." He himself commanded, and consequently was empowered to see this put in execution. All hands were instantly at work on the fortification; and Samos, though otherwise intended soon to be, was by this piece of artifice immediately secured. And, no long time after, came letters from Alcibiades, importing that "the army was betrayed by Phrynichus, and in pursuance of it the enemy was coming to surprise them." Their opinion of the good faith of Alcibiades was not in the least established by this: it was argued, that, as he was privy to the plans of the enemy, from a principle of enmity he had fastened upon Phrynichus the charge of being their accomplice. By the last notification, therefore, he was so far from hurting him, that he only confirmed his evidence.

Yet subsequent to this, Alcibiades continued to make use of all his address and persuasion with Tissaphernes to gain him over to the Athenians, who in fact stood most in terror of the Peloponnesians, because they had a larger fleet at hand than the Athenians; but was inwardly inclined, were it any how feasible, to

comply with his suggestions; especially as, ever since the jar at Cnidus about the treaty of Theramenes, he had been exasperated against the Peloponnesians: for that jar had already happened at the time of their expedition to Rhodes; and the suggestion of Alcibiades, formerly mentioned, that "the views of the Lacedæmonians were to set the cities free," was yet more verified by the behaviour of Lichas, who had affirmed, that "it was an article never to be suffered in treaty, that the king should have those cities of which either himself or his ancestors had at any time been possessed. And in truth Alcibiades, as one who had important concerns at stake, continued with much zeal and assiduity to ingratiate himself with Tissaphernes.

The Athenian deputies, with Pisander at their head, who were sent from Samos, had no sooner reached Athens than they obtained an audience from the people; where, after touching in a summary manner upon many other advantages, they expatiated chiefly on this, that "by recalling Alcibiades, and making an alteration in the democratical form of government, they might gain the friendship of the king and a superiority over the Peloponnesians." Large was the number of those who would not hear the proposal against the democracy. The enemies, farther, of Alcibiades were loud in their clamours, that "shameful it would be if so enormous a transgressor of the laws were recalled; one, to whose crimes, in point of the mysteries, the Eumolpids and Ceryces¹ had borne solemn attestation, the consequence of which was his exile; nay, had farther denounced a curse upon those who should restore him." Pisander, interposing to put a stop to this violent opposition and these tragical outcries, addressed himself apart to each of these opponents, and asked them singly, "Whether any hope they had left of saving

¹ These were sacerdotal families at Athens, descended from Eumolpus and Ceryx. The former of them instituted the Eleusinian mysteries; and it was the grand privilege of his descendants to preside at and regulate those sacred rites. Who Ceryx was, and what the particular privileges of his descendants, any farther than that (according to Suidas) they were "holy and venerable," is not agreed. All of them were commanded to pronounce the solemn curse on Alcibiades when he was out-lawed. Yet one priestess, (as Plutarch relates,) Theano, the daughter of Menon, refused to obey; alleging, that "it was her duty to bless, and not to curse."

their country, now that the Peloponnesians had as many ships upon the sea as they had themselves, but a larger number of confederate states, besides supplies of money from the king and Tissaphernes, whilst themselves were quite exhausted, unless somebody could persuade the king to declare in their favour?" And when those, to whom the demand was put, replied in the negative, he proceeded to make them this plain declaration—"And yet this turn in your favour can never take place, unless we temper our form of government with greater moderation, and intrust the administration in the hands of the few, that the king may have room to place confidence in us: for we are at present to consult about the very being of the state, and not to litigate the forms of its administration. The sequel may again enable us to return to the primitive form, if we find it expedient; and we shall recover Alcibiades, the only man alive who is able to accomplish the point."

The people, in fact, upon the first mention of an oligarchy, were stung to the heart: yet afterwards, convinced by Pisander that no other resource was left, dispirited by fear, and encouraged at the same time by a distant hope that another change might in the sequel be brought about, they yielded up the point to the necessity of the state. Accordingly they passed a decree, that "Pisander and the ten joined with him in the deputation should pass the sea, and negotiate the affair with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades, in the method judged by them most conducive to the public service." At the same time, as Pisander had preferred a charge of mal-administration against Phrynichus, they discharged him and his colleague Skirondas from their commands, and sent away Diomedon and Leon to take upon them the command of the fleet. The article, with which Pisander charged Phrynichus, was the betraying of Iasus and Amorges. The truth is, he thought him by no means a proper person to be let into a share of their intrigues with Alcibiades.

And thus Pisander—after visiting in order all the several juntos of the accomplices, already formed in the city with the view to thrust themselves into the seats of judicature and the great offices of state; and exhorting them severally to act with unanimity, and by general concurrence to labour the demolition of the popular government; and, after adjusting all previous

measures to guard best against dilatory proceedings—repasseth the sea to Tissaphernes, accompanied by his ten associates in the deputation.

In the same winter, Leon and Diomedon, being arrived at their post, at the head of the Athenian fleet, made an expedition against Rhodes; and there they find the ships of the Peloponnesians hauled ashore. They made a descent upon the coast; and, after defeating in battle such of the Rhodians as made head against them, they stood away for Chalce, and for the future carried on the war more from thence than from Cos; for in that station they were better enabled to watch the motions of the Peloponnesian fleet.

But at Rhodes arrived Xenophantidas, a Lacedæmonian, despatched by Pædaritus from Chias, with advice that "the works of the Athenians were almost perfected; and unless, with the whole of their shipping, they come over to relieve them, all is lost at Chios." A resolution accordingly was taken to endeavour their relief; but, in the mean time, Pædaritus, at the head of his body of auxiliaries and the Chians, with all the force he could assemble together, sallied out against the rampart which the Athenians had raised around their ships, demolished a part of it, and made himself master of those vessels which were hauled ashore. The Athenians ran from all quarters to their defence; and, having first engaged and put to flight the Chians, the rest of the forces under Pædaritus are also defeated. Pædaritus is killed, as were numbers also of the Chians, and many arms were taken. And, after this, the Chians were blocked up by sea and land more closely than ever, and a terrible famine raged amongst them.

The Athenian deputation, headed by Pisander, having reached Tissaphernes, enter into conference about terms of accommodation. Alcibiades now,—as the conduct of Tissaphernes was still dubious and wavering, since he stood in great awe of the Peloponnesians, and adhered to that rule of policy he had learned from him, "to war both sides out,"—Alcibiades now had resource to another piece of refinement, causing Tissaphernes to insist upon such exorbitant terms that no accommodations could ensue. Tissaphernes, truly, seems to me to have proceeded in this manner from his own voluntary motives, because fear was predominant in him; but in Alcibiades it was

purely art; since, as he found the other would not agree upon any terms whatever, he affected to strike the conceit into the Athenians that it really was in his power to manage him at pleasure, and that he was already wrought to their purpose and willing to come to terms, whereas the Athenians would not offer enough. For Alcibiades himself made such extravagant demands, (since, though Tissaphernes assisted at the conference, the other managed it,) that, though the Athenians had yielded to the far greater part, yet the breaking off the treaty would be thrown at their doors. It was insisted, beside other demands, that "all Ionia should be given up," and, what is more, "all the islands on the Ionian coast;" and other points. The Athenians seeming to acquiesce in these, at length upon the third meeting, lest the smallness of his own influence should be plainly detected, he demanded leave "for the king to build a fleet, and to sail along the Athenian coasts, wherever, and with whatever force he pleased." Here all accommodation was over: the Athenians, concluding these points insuperable, and that they were abused by Alcibiades, broke off in indignation and return to Samos.

In the same winter, immediately after breaking off the conference, Tissaphernes repairs to Caunus with intention to bring the Peloponnesians again to Miletus, and to form other compacts with them the best he should be able, to supply them farther with pay, and by all means to stave off an open rupture. He was in fact apprehensive, that, should so large a fleet be deprived of subsistence, or, necessitated to engage with the Athenians, should suffer a defeat, or should the mariners quit their vessels, the Athenians then would carry their point without thanks to him: but his greatest fear was this, lest for the sake of subsistence they should ravage the continent. Upon all these considerations, and the prudential motives arising from each, co-operating with his principal maxim of balancing the Grecians against one another, he sent for the Peloponnesians, pays them their arrears of subsistence, and makes the following treaty, the third of the kind, with them:

"In the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius, Alexippidas presiding in the college of Ephori at Lacedæmon, articles are signed, in the plain of Mæander, between the Lacedæmonians and confederates on one side; and

Tissaphernes, Hieramenes, and the sons of Pharnacus, on the other; concerning the affairs of the king and those of the Lacedæmonians and confederates.

"The whole of the king's dominions situate in Asia belong to the king; and all his own dominions let the king govern as to him seemeth meet.

"The Lacedæmonians and confederates are not to enter the dominions of the king to commit any act of hostility whatever; nor he those of the contracting parties for any act of hostility whatever.

"And in case any of the Lacedæmonians or confederates enter in a hostile manner the dominions of the king, the Lacedæmonians and confederates are bound to restrain them: and, in case any subjects of the king act in a hostile manner against the Lacedæmonians and confederates, be the king also bound to restrain them.

"Tissaphernes shall pay subsistence to the ships now upon the station, according to the rates agreed on, till the king's fleet come up.

"But the Lacedæmonians and confederates, so soon as the king's fleet shall be come up, shall have it in their own option to maintain, if they please, their own fleet; or, in case they choose to take subsistence from Tissaphernes, he is bound to supply them. Yet the Lacedæmonians and confederates, at the expiration of the war, shall repay to Tissaphernes whatever sums they may thus receive from him.

"When the king's fleet cometh up, let the ships of the Lacedæmonians, and those of the confederates, and those of the king, carry on the war in concert, by the joint counsels of Tissaphernes and of the Lacedæmonians and confederates.

"And, whenever a peace with the Athenians be thought advisable, it shall be concluded by the joint consent of both parties."

The treaty was made and ratified in these terms. And, after this, Tissaphernes employed himself with diligence to bring up the Phœnician fleet, as hath been mentioned, and duly to perform all the branches whatever of his engagements. At least he was willing to convince the Peloponnesians, by the measures he took, that he was heartily in earnest.

In the close of this winter the Bœotians got possession of Oropus by treachery, though an Athenian garrison was in it. The business

was effectuated by the management of a party of Eretrians, and those Oropians who were plotting the revolt of Eubœa. For, as this town was situated over-against Eretria, it was impossible but, whilst in Athenian hands, it must terribly annoy both Eretria and the rest of Eubœa. Having therefore thus gained Oropus, the Eretrians repaired to Rhodes, inviting the Peloponnesians to come over to Eubœa; but their inclinations were rather to relieve Chios, now sadly distressed. Putting therefore from Rhodes with the whole of their fleet, they stood away to sea; and having gained the height of Triopium, they descried the Athenian squadron out at sea in a course from Chalce; yet, neither making any motion to bear down upon the other, one fleet pursued their course to Samos, the other put into Miletus. They were now convinced, that, without fighting at sea, they could not possibly relieve Chios.

Here this winter ended: and the twentieth year of this war expired, the history of which Thucydides hath compiled.

YEAR XXI.¹

In the ensuing summer, upon the first commencement of the spring, Dercylidas a Spartan, at the head of an army not considerable for numbers, was sent over-land to Hellespont to effectuate the revolt of Abydus: they are a colony of the Milesians. The Chians also, whilst Astyochus was perplexed about the method of relieving them, were necessitated, by the intolerable closeness of the blockade, to hazard an engagement at sea. It happened, whilst Astyochus was yet in Rhodes, that Leon, a Spartan, who came over with Antisthenes, though merely as a passenger, had arrived at Chios from Miletus, to act as governor after the death of Pædaritus, with twelve sail of shipping draughted from the squadron stationed at Miletus; of these, five were Thurian, four Syracusan, one belonged to Anæa, another was Milesian, and one was Leon's own. Upon this the Chians having sallied out with all their force and carried a strong post from the enemy, and at the same time their fleet, consisting of six and thirty sail, launching forth against the thirty-two Athenian, an engagement followed; and, after a battle hotly maintained on both sides, the Chians and allies, who had not the

worst of the dispute, sheered off again into harbour; for by this time it began to grow dark.

Instantly upon this, Dercylidas, having completed his march from Miletus, Abydus in Hellespont revolts to Dercylidas and Pharnabazus; and two days after Lampeacus did the same.

But intelligence of this having reached Strombichides at Chios, and he, with four and twenty sail of Athenians, including the transports which carried the heavy-armed, stretching thither with all possible expedition, the Lampacenes sallied out to repulse him. He defeated them in battle; and, having at a shout made himself master of Lampacus, which was quite unfortified, he gave up all the effects and slaves for pillage to his men; and, after re-establishing such as were free in their old habitations, proceeded against Abydus. But, finding them deaf to all schemes of accommodation, and himself unable to reduce them by force, crossing over to the spot opposite to Abydus, he garrisons Sestus, a city in the Chersonese, which had formerly belonged to the Medes, and put it in a condition to guard the Hellespont.

During this interval of time, the Chians had very much enlarged their room at sea: and those stationed at Miletus, and even Astyochus, upon receiving the particulars of the late engagement, and advice that Strombichides was drawn off with so many ships, began to be high in spirits. Astyochus, accordingly, arriving at Chios with only two ships, carrieth off along with him what shipping was there, and with the whole force is now at sea, in order to make an attempt upon Samos. But when the enemy there, because mutually embroiled in jealousies, came not out against him, he returned again to the station of Miletus; for, about this time, or rather before, the democracy was overturned at Athens.

The deputation, at the head of which was Pisander, were no sooner returned to Samos from Tissaphernes, than they found their schemes had gained a stronger footing in the army, and that the Samians had been encouraging the men of power amongst the Athenians to join their efforts with them for the erection of an oligarchy, though a party was very busy in opposing them, with a view to quash the projected alteration. The Athenians, farther, at Samos, had in private conferences come to a

¹ Before Christ 411.

resolution—"to think no longer of Alcibiades, since he showed himself so averse to join them, and in fact was by no means a proper person to have a share in an oligarchical administration: but, merely from a principle of self-preservation, as now they were environed with dangers, they should take all possible care that the project should not drop in the execution. —That, farther, they should prosecute the war with vigour, and contribute largely towards it from their own private purses, and answer every other exigence of service, since, no longer for others, but their own sakes, they must continue the struggle." Determined, therefore, to proceed in this manner, they despatch Pisander and half the former deputation once more to Athens, to manage the execution of the project there: to whom, farther, instructions were given, at whatever places in their dependency they should touch upon the voyage, to set up the oligarchy. The other half they sent severally about to other of the dependent states. Diotrephes also, who was now at Chios, but appointed to take upon him the command of the Thracian provinces, they ordered away immediately to his post.

Diotrephes, upon his arrival at Thasus, dissolved the popular government. And, in the second month at most after this, the Thasians fortified their city as men who no longer cared for an aristocracy under Athenian influence, but were in daily expectation of receiving liberty from the Lacedæmonians: for a number of their countrymen, driven out by the Athenians, were now refuged among the Peloponnesians. These were labouring the point with their correspondents in Thasus, to bring off their shipping, and declare a revolt. The present alteration, therefore, fell out exactly to their own wish; their state was restored to its ancient form without any trouble; and the people, who alone were able to disconcert them, were divested of their power. In Thasus, therefore, the event took an opposite turn to what those Athenians who laboured the oligarchy had at heart; and, in my judgment, the case was the same with many other of their dependent states: for, having now their eyes open to their own welfare, and being exempted from the dread of suffering for what others did, they ran into the scheme of a total independence, which they preferred before the precarious situation of being well governed by the Athenians.

Pisander and his colleagues in the course of their voyage observed their instructions, and dissolved the popular governments in the cities where they touched. From some of these they also procured parties of heavy-armed to aid them in the grand project, and so landed at Athens. Here they find affairs in great forwardness, through the activity of their accomplices: for, some of the younger sort having combined together in a plot against Androcles, who had the greatest sway amongst the people, and had also been deeply concerned in banishing Alcibiades, they secretly despatch him. On him, for a double reason, because of his influence with the people, and with the thought that it might oblige Alcibiades, whose recollection was now expected, and through his interest the friendship of Tissaphernes, they chose first to wreak their fury. Of some others also, whose tractability they doubted, they had rid themselves by the same practices. A specious harangue, had, farther, been dressed up for the purpose, that "none ought to receive the public money but such as served the state in war with their persons; that affairs of state ought not to be communicated to more than five thousand, and those to be men who were best qualified, by their estates and personal bravery, to serve the public."

This with the majority of the city had a fair outside, since such as should concur in the change bid fairest for a share in the administration. Yet still the assembly of the people and the council of the *bean*¹ continued their meetings; but then they only passed such decrees as were approved by the cabal. Nay, of this number were all who spoke, and who had previously considered together what should be said upon every occasion. No other person presumed at any time to oppose their motions, through dread of a cabal which they saw was large; or, did any one venture to open his mouth, by some dextrous contrivance he was certainly put to death. Who were the agents in these murders, no inquiry at all; and of who were suspected, no kind of justification. The people, on the contrary, looked on with stupid gaze, and such a fit of consternation as to think it clear gain not yet to have suffered violence, even though they held their tongues; imagining, besides, that the conspiracy had spread much farther than it really had, they were quite

¹ The senate.

dispirited. To discover any certainty of their numbers they were quite unable, because of the great extent of the city and their ignorance how far their neighbours might be concerned. On the same account it was also impossible for him who deeply resented his condition, to bemoan himself in the hearing of another, or to participate counsels for reciprocal defence; he must either have opened his mind to one whom he did not know, or to an acquaintance in whom he durst not confide; for all the popular party regarded one another with jealous eyes, as in some measure involved in the present machinations. Some in fact were concerned who could never have been suspected of oligarchical principles; and these men gave rise to the great diffidence which spread amongst the many, and drew after it the highest security to the schemes of the few, as it kept alive that mutual distrust which reigned among the people.

Pisander, therefore, and his associates, arriving at this very juncture, gave the finishing stroke without delay. In the first place, having called an assembly of the people, they moved for a decree,—“that a committee of ten should be elected with full discretionary power. This committee of ten should draw up the form of a decree, to be reported to the people on a day prefixed, in what manner the state may be best administered.” In the next place, when that day came, they summoned an assembly of the people at Colonus: this is a temple of Neptune without the city, and distant from it about ten stadia.¹ And here the committee reported no other proposal than this,—that it be lawful for any Athenian to deliver whatever opinion he himself thought proper. They then enacted heavy penalties against any man who hereafter should accuse the speaker of a breach of law, or should bring him into any trouble whatever.

This being done, it was now, without the least reserve or ambiguity, moved,—that “no magistrate whatsoever should continue in his post upon the old establishment, nor receive a public salary; but that five presidents² be chosen, who should choose one hundred persons, and each of these hundred should name three persons for associates: that these persons should enter into the senate, be invested absolutely with the administration, and should far-

ther be empowered to convene the five thousand whenever they should deem it proper.”

Pisander was the person who made this proposal, and who also in other respects showed himself openly one of the most zealous to pull down the democracy. But he who contrived the whole of the plan, and by what steps the affair should be thus carried into execution, was Antipho, a man who in personal merit was second to no Athenian then alive, and the greatest genius of his time to devise with sagacity, and ingeniously to express what he had once devised. At the assemblies of the people, or any public debate, he never assisted, if he could possibly decline it, since the multitude was jealous of the great reputation he had gained: yet, in the courts of judicature or appeals to the people, he was the only person who was able effectually to serve those clients who could get him for their patron. And this same Antipho, when in process of time the government of the four hundred was quite demolished, and severely prosecuted by the people, is judged to have defended their conduct, and pleaded in a cause where his own life was at stake, the best of any person that down to this time was ever heard to speak.

Phrynichus, also, was another who singularly distinguished himself in his zeal for the oligarchy. He dreaded Alcibiades, as conscious that he was privy to the whole of the correspondence he had carried on with Astyochus. He proceeded thus, on the supposition that Alcibiades would never be restored by an oligarchical government. And then he was a man in whose capacity and zeal, if once engaged, the greatest confidence might reasonably be placed.

Theramenes, farther, the son of Agnon, a man who both in speaking and acting made no ordinary figure, had a principal share in the dissolution of the popular government: no wonder, therefore, as the business was managed by so many and so able agents, that, spite of every obstacle, it was brought to effect. Grievous, indeed, it was to the Athenian people to submit to the loss of their liberty, a century after the expulsion of their tyrants, during which period they had not only been independent, but accustomed, for above half that space, to give law to others.

To return. When, in the assembly of the people not a soul was heard to oppose the mo-

¹ One English mile.

² Πρεσβυται.

tion, it passed into a law, and the assembly was adjourned. They afterwards introduced the four hundred into the senate, in the following manner.

The whole body of the citizens were daily under arms, either upon the walls or in the field, to bridle the excursions of the enemy from Decelea. Therefore, on the day appointed, they suffered such as were not in the secret to repair to their posts as usual: but, to those in the plot, it had been privately notified,—“by no means to repair to their post, but to lag behind at a distance; and, in case any one should strive to oppose what was now to be agitated, they should take up arms and, quell all opposition.” Those, to whom these orders were previously imparted, were the Andrians and Teians, three hundred of the Carysthians, and other persons now established in Ægina, whom the Athenians had sent thither by way of colony, but were now invited to repair to Athens with their arms to support the scheme. When these dispositions were formed, the four hundred (each carrying a concealed dagger, and guarded by one hundred and twenty youths of Greece, whose hands they had employed when assassination was the point) broke in upon the counsellors of the bean,¹ who were this moment sitting in the senate-house, and called out to them “to quit the place and take their salaries.”² Accordingly they had ready for them the full arrears due to them, which they paid to each as he went out of the house. In this manner the senate, without giving the least opposition, removed themselves tamely from their office; and the rest of the citizens made no effort to check such proceedings, and refrained from any the least tumult.

The four hundred, having thus gained possession of the senate-house, proceeded immediately to ballot for a set of presidents³ from amongst their own body; and made use of all the solemn invocations of the deities and the sacrifices with which the presiding magistrates execute their office. By their subsequent proceedings they introduced considerable alterations in the popular form of government; excepting that, on account of Alcibiades, they refrained from recalling exiles; but, in all

other respects, they ruled with all possible severity. Some persons, whose removal was deemed convenient, though few in number, they got assassinated; some they threw into prison, and some they banished. To Agis, also, king of the Lacedæmonians, who was still at Decelea, they despatched a deputation; notifying “their readiness to accommodate all disputes; and that with greater confidence he might proceed to make up matters with them than with a democracy which was not to be trusted.”

Agis, full of the imagination that the city would not quietly submit to these changes, and that the people would not thus tamely part with their ancient liberty; or, should they now behold his numerous army approaching, that public combustions must ensue amongst them; unable to persuade himself that at the present juncture, they could possibly be kept from tumults,—Agis, I say, returned no proposal of terms to the deputation which came to him from the four hundred. But, having sent for a numerous reinforcement from Peloponnesus, he advanced soon after, with the garrison of Decelea, and the fresh reinforcements, up to the very walls of Athens. He took this step on the presumption that “thus either thrown into utter confusion, they might be mastered whenever he gave the word, or even at the first sight of his approach, through the great confusion which in all probability both must follow within and without; since, to make himself master of the long walls, as there could not be hands at leisure for their defence, he could not fail.”

But when, upon his nearer approach, the Athenians within were thrown into no stir or bustle at all; when even they caused their cavalry, and detachments of their heavy-armed, light-armed and archers, to sally out into the field, who made a slaughter of such as were too far advanced, and became masters of their arms and dead bodies;—finding then he had proceeded upon wrong presumptions, he again drew off his army. After this, he himself, with the former garrison, continued in the post of Decelea; but the late reinforcement, after some continuance in the country, was sent back to Peloponnesus.

Yet, subsequent to this, the four hundred persisted in sending deputies to Agis with as much eagerness as ever; and, he now receiving them in a better manner, with encouragements

¹ The senate of five hundred.

² The stated salary for a senator of Athens was a drachma, or sevenpence three farthings a day.

³ *ἡγεμόνες*.

to proceed, they even send an embassy to Lacedæmon to propose a treaty, being of all things desirous to obtain an accommodation.

They also send to Samos a deputation of ten, in order to satisfy the army, and give them ample assurance that "the oligarchy was not set up for the prejudice either of the state or any individuals, but as the only expedient left to preserve the whole community;—that the number of those, who now had the management, was five thousand and not barely four hundred; and yet, on no occasion whatever, had the Athenians, partly through employs in their armies abroad or other foreign avocations, ever met together, to consult on affairs of state, in a number so large as five thousand." Having instructed them to insert some other alleviating pleas, they sent them away upon the first instant of the change they had made; apprehensive of what actually came to pass, that the bulk of their seamen would never quietly submit to an oligarchical government, and an opposition beginning there, might overturn all that had hitherto been done.

For at Samos some stirrs had already arisen about the oligarchy, and that which is now to be recited happened exactly at the time that the four hundred seized the administration at Athens.

The party which at this juncture was subsisting at Samos against the nobility, and were of the popular side, having now altered their schemes, and followed the suggestions of Pisander ever since his return from Athens, and gained the concurrence of Athenians at Samos, combined together by oath, to the number of about three hundred, and resolved to fall upon their antagonists, as factious on the side of the people. Accordingly, they murder one Hyperbolus,¹ an Athenian, a

¹ This was the person whom the ostracism made in some measure famous, and who made the ostracism quite infamous. Plutarch hath repeated the story thrice. The following extract is taken from the life of Nicias.

"When the opposition was very hot at Athens between Alcibiades and Nicias, and the day for ostracizing was drawing on,—which at certain intervals the people of Athens were used to enforce, and send away into a ten years' exile, some one citizen suspected of designs against their liberty, or odious for being too illustrious or rich,—each of these grand competitors was under grievous apprehensions, and with reason too, that it might be his own lot to be exiled on this occasion. Alcibiades was hated for his way of life, and for his bold and enterprising genius. Nicias was envied on

scurvy fellow, and banished by the ostracism, not from a dread of his influence or weight, but for the profligacy of his life, and his being a public disgrace to his country. In this they were countenanced by Charmides, one of the commanders and some of the Athenians, associated with them, to whom they gave this pledge of their fidelity. Some other acts of the same nature they committed by instructions from them, and had it in agitation to multiply their blows; but those marked out for destruction, getting wind of their design, communicate the whole to Leon and Diomedon, who thought of an oligarchy with high regret, because their credit was high with the people; to Thrasybulus² also and Thrasylius, the former

account of his wealth; his way of living was neither sociable nor popular; as he avoided a crowd, and herded with a few intimates, he gave great distaste; besides, as he had often opposed the caprices of the people, and constrained them to pursue their real interest, he was deep in their displeasure. In short, the contest ran high between the young and military men on one side, and the old pacific Athenians on the other, whilst each were endeavouring to throw the ostracism upon the hated object. But,

Parties ran high, and scoundrels got renown.

Such dissensions in the community gave scope to knaves and incendiaries. There was one Hyperbolus, of Perithadæ, very assuming, without the least reason to be so; however, by dint of impudence working himself into power, and the disgrace of his country so soon as he had made himself conspicuous in it. On this occasion Hyperbolus could have no suspicion of becoming himself the butt of an ostracism; he had a much better title to the gallows. Presuming, on the contrary, that, when either of these great men were exiled, he himself could easily make head against the other, he manifested great pleasure at the contest, and irritated the fury of the people against them both. Nicias and Alcibiades, perceiving his roguish intent, conferred privately together; and, getting their several factions to unite, secured one another, and threw the votes on Hyperbolus. Such a turn at first gave the Athenians much pleasure and diversion; yet soon after they were highly chagrined, by reflecting that making such a scoundrel the object of it was shaming the ostracism for ever. There was dignity even in punishments: the ostracism was of such a nature as to suit a Thucydides, an Aristides, and men of such exalted characters. It was clear honour to Hyperbolus; and gave him room to boast, that, though a scoundrel, he had been distinguished like the greatest and best Athenians; as Plato, the comic poet, says of him,

He always acted worthy of himself,
But quite unworthy of such high reproof:
The shell was new design'd to honour scoundrels.

In a word, no person was ever banished by the ostracism after Hyperbolus; it was he who closed the list."

² Thrasybulus, whose name now first occurs, acted a very high-spirited and noble part in the close of this

a captain of a trireme, and the latter of a band of heavy-armed; and to such others as were judged most likely to stem the fury of the conspirators. These they conjured "not to look calmly on till their destruction should be completed, and Samos rent away from the Athenians, by which alone till now their empire had been preserved and supported." Listening, therefore, to these representations, they privately exhorted every single soldier not to suffer such proceedings, and more earnestly than others the Paralian, since all that sailed in that vessel were citizens of Athens, all free and enemies determined, from time immemorial, to an oligarchy, even when it had no existence. Leon also and Diomedon never went out to sea without leaving them some ships for their guard; inasmuch that, when the three hundred made their attempt, as all these united in their obstruction, but most heartily of all the Paralians, the popular party at Samos was rescued from destruction. Thirty of those three hundred they even slaughtered, and three of the most factious amongst the survivors they doomed to banishment. Then, having published an indemnity for the rest, they continued to support the democracy at Samos.

But the Samians and soldiery despatch the Paralus with all expedition to Athens, having on board her Chæreas, the son of Achestratus, an Athenian, who had borne a considerable share in the last turn of affairs, charged with a notification of these last transactions; for yet it was not known at Samos that the four hundred

had seized the administration. No sooner, therefore, were they come to their moorings, than the four hundred caused two or three of the crew of the Paralus to be dragged away to prison; the residue they turned over from that vessel into another ship of war, and ordered them away as a guard-ship for the station of Eubœa. But Chæreas, sensible in what train affairs were going, had the good fortune to make his escape; and, returning again to Samos, related to the soldiery all that had been done in Athens, exaggerating every point with abundant severity.—That "every citizen was now kept in awe with whips and scourges, and that even their own wives and children daily felt the insolence of those tyrants; nay, they have it now in agitation, that if any on duty at Samos shall presume to oppose their pleasure, immediately to arrest and imprison the whole of their kindred; and in case the former will not submit, to put the latter to death." On many other points he also expatiated, all aggravated with falsehoods.

His audience, in the first instant of their passion, were fully bent on the destruction of all those who had appeared most active for an oligarchy, and in short of all who had any hand in its promotion; but, being stopped by the interposition of others more moderate, and listening to the remonstrance, that "they ought not to accelerate the ruin of their country, now that a fleet of the enemy lay almost ranged against them for battle," they desisted. And, afterwards, those who had openly avowed the design of restoring the democratical form at Samos, namely, Thrasybulus the son of Lycus, and Thrasyllus, (for these had the principal agency in this new revolution,) caused every soldier to swear the most solemn oaths, more especially such as were for an oligarchy, that "they would submit to no form but the democracy, and would act in this cause with general unanimity; and, farther, would zealously prosecute the war against the Peloponnesians, that eternal enemies they would remain to the four hundred, and would enter into no treaty of accommodation with them." All the Samians, farther, that were old enough to bear arms took the same oaths; and henceforth the army communicated all their affairs to the Samians, and gave them an insight into all the dangers which might attend the sequel; convinced that otherwise no safe resource remained

history. "If virtue could be weighed merely by itself, without any regard to outward circumstance, I should not hesitate (says Cornelius Nepos) to prefer him before all the great men in Greece. But I aver, that not one of them ever surpassed him in integrity, in resolution, in grandeur of soul, and true patriotism.—Yet, I know not how it is, though nobody excelled him in real merit, many have outstripped him in point of fame. In the Peloponnesian war, (the part of it which now remains,) Thrasybulus did many things without Alcibiades; Alcibiades did nothing without Thrasybulus; and yet the other, through a happiness peculiar to himself, reaped the glory and benefit of all." So says this elegant Roman writer. The reader will soon see some of Thrasybulus's exploits, separately from and in concert with Alcibiades: but the glory of his life was riding Athens some years after of thirty tyrants at a blow; for which he was rewarded by a wreath of olive, the most honourable recompense his grateful countrymen could bestow upon him. He was ever a firm, intrepid, disinterested patriot; and lost his life at last in the service of his country.

for either ; but, if the four hundred or the enemy at Miletus proved too hard for them, their ruin was unavoidable.

Terrible were the present embroilments of the times, whilst those at Samos were striving to re-establish the democracy at Athens, and those at Athens to force an oligarchical form upon the army. The soldiers, farther, immediately summoned a general assembly, in which they deposed their former commanders, and all such captains of triremes as fell under their suspicions, and then chose others to fill up the vacancies, both captains of triremes and land-commanders, amongst whom were Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus. The last rose up in the assembly and encouraged them by every topic of persuasion ; particularly, that " they had not the least reason to be dispirited, though Athens herself had revolted from them ; for this was merely the secession of a minority from men whose numbers were greater, and who were better furnished for every exigence ; because the whole navy of Athens was their own, by which they could compel dependent states to pay in their former contingents of tribute as fully as if they sailed on such an errand from Athens itself. Even yet they were masters of a city at Samos, a city despicable in no respect, but which once in a former war had well nigh wrested the empire of the sea from the Athenians. The seat of war, in regard to their public enemies, would continue the same as it was before ; nay, by being masters of the fleet, they were better enabled to procure all the needful supplies than their opponents who were now at Athens. It was purely owing to their own peculiar situation at Samos that the others had hitherto been masters of the entrance into the Piræus ; and they soon should be highly distressed if they refused to restore them their ancient polity, since these at Samos could more easily bar them the use of the sea than be barred up by them. What assistances Athens had hitherto given them against the enemy were but trifling, and of no real importance. Nothing could be lost from that quarter ; which was no longer able to supply them with money, since with that they had been supplied by the army ; nor to send them any valuable instructions, for the sake of which alone the troops abroad were submissive to the orders of the state at home. Nay, in some points those at Athens had most egregiously offended since they had overturned

the laws of their country, which those here had preserved, and were exerting their efforts to compel others to the observance of them ; and therefore, in every method of valuation, the men who here provided well for the public welfare, were in no respect worse patriots than the men at Athens. Even Alcibiades, should they grant him an indemnity and a safe return, would readily procure them the king's alliance. And, what had the greatest weight, should they miscarry in every branch of their present designs, many places of refuge lay always open to men possessed of so considerable a fleet, in which they might find fresh cities and another country."

After such occurrences in the assembly convened by the soldiery, and the conclusion of their mutual exhortations, they continued their preparations for war with unremitting diligence. But the deputation of ten, sent from the four hundred to Samos, being informed of these proceedings when they were advanced in their voyage so far as Delos, thought proper to proceed no farther.

About this very time, the Peloponnesians on board the fleet stationed at Miletus clamoured loudly amongst themselves, that " they are betrayed by Astyochus and Tissaphernes ; as the former had already refused to engage, when themselves were hearty and in fine condition, and the fleet of the Athenians was small ; nor would do so even now, when the latter are reported to be embroiled with intestine seditions, and their own ships are daily impairing ; but, under pretext of a Phœnician fleet to be brought up by Tissaphernes, an aid merely nominal, and which would never join them, he was ruining all by dilatory measures. And as for Tissaphernes, it was never his intention to bring up that fleet ; but he was plainly undermining the strength of theirs, by not supplying them constantly and fully with their pay. The time, therefore, they insisted, ought no longer to be thus idly wasted, but an engagement hazarded at once." Yet in such clamours those deepest concerned were the Syracusans.

The confederates and Astyochus himself being affected with these clamours, and having declared in a council of war for engaging the enemy forthwith, as they had received undoubted intelligence of the confusions at Samos ; putting out to sea with the whole of their fleet, amounting to a hundred and twelve sail, and having ordered the Milesians to march

thither over-land, they stood away for Mycale. At Glaucæ of Mycale the Athenians were now lying, with eighty-two ships of the Samian department: for in this quarter of Mycale Samos lies, but a small distance from the continent: but when they saw the fleet of the Peloponnesians approaching, they retired to Samos, judging their own strength insufficient for an engagement with the foe which might prove decisive. Besides, as they had discovered the intention of those at Miletus to venture an engagement, they expected Strombichides from the Hellespont, who was to bring to their assistance the ships on the station of Chios which had gone up to Abydus; and a message had already been despatched to hasten him up. For these reasons they plied away to Samos. The Peloponnesians, arriving at Mycale, encamped upon the shore, along with the land forces of the Milesians and those sent in by the bordering people. On the next day, when they were fully bent on standing directly against Samos, advice is brought them that "Strombichides is come up with the ships from the Hellespont;" upon which they made the best of their way back again to Miletus. And now the Athenians, having gained so large an accession of strength, show themselves immediately before Miletus, with a hundred and eight sail, desirous of coming to an engagement with the enemy. But, as nothing stirred out against them, they also returned to Samos.

In the same summer, immediately after the former movements, the Peloponnesians—who had waived coming out to an engagement, since with the whole of their strength they thought themselves by no means a match for their enemy, and were now reduced to great perplexities about the methods of procuring subsistence for so numerous a fleet, especially as Tissaphernes was so remiss in his payments—send away to Pharnabazus (pursuant to the prior instructions from Peloponnesus) Clearchus the son of Ramphias, with a detachment of forty sail: for Pharnabazus had demanded such a force, and was ready to support the expenses of it; and it had been farther notified to them in form that Byzantium was ripe for a revolt. And thus this detachment of Peloponnesians, having run out far to sea to get clear of the Athenians during the course, met with very tempestuous weather. The bulk of them, it is true, with Clearchus, rode it out to Delos,

and from thence return again to Miletus. But Clearchus, setting out again, travelled over-land to Hellespont, and took upon him the command. Ten ships, however, of the detachment, under Elixus the Megarean, who was joined in the command, reached the Hellespont without damage, and effectuate the revolt of Byzantium. The Athenians at Samos, informed of these incidents, send away a detachment to the Hellespont, to support and guard the adjacent cities; and a small engagement happens before Byzantium, between eight ships on a side.

Those who were in the management at Samos, and above all Thrasybulus, adhering still to the sentiments they had entertained ever since the last turn of affairs there, that Alcibiades must needs be recalled; the latter at last obtained, in full assembly, the concurrence of the soldiery. Accordingly, when they had voted a return and an indemnity to Alcibiades, Thrasybulus repaired immediately to Tissaphernes, and brought Alcibiades back with him to Samos; convinced their last resource depended on his being able to alienate Tissaphernes from the Peloponnesians. Hereupon an assembly being called Alcibiades at large expatiated upon and deplored the malignity of his fate, in having been exiled from his country: and then, having amply run over every topic relating to the present posture of affairs, he raised their expectations high in regard to the future. He magnified, with a mighty parade of words, his own interest in Tissaphernes; from the view, not only to intimidate the patrons of the oligarchical government at Athens, and put a stop to their cabals but also to render himself more respectable to those at Samos, and to raise up their confidence in him as high as possible:—to give the enemy, farther, as many handles as he was able to calumniate Tissaphernes, and to lower all their present sanguinary expectations. These were the schemes of Alcibiades, when, with all imaginable ostentation, he gave the strongest assurances to his audience, that "Tissaphernes had pledged his word to him, that, could he once firmly depend upon the Athenians, they never should be distressed for want of supplies whilst he had any thing left, nay, though at last he should be forced to turn into ready cash the very bed he lay on; and the Phœnician fleet, already come up to Aspendus, he would join with the Athenians but never with

the Peloponnesians; the only pledge of fidelity he required from the Athenians was, for Alcibiades to be recalled and pass his word for their future conduct.

The army, delighted with these and many other soothing topics, proceed immediately to associate him with the rest of the commanders, and implicitly trusted every thing to their management. Not a man was any longer to be found amongst them who would have parted with his present confidence of certain security and revenge on the four hundred for all the treasure in the universe. Nay, they were ready this very moment, upon the strength of what Alcibiades had said, to slight the enemy now at hand, and steer directly for the Piræus. But, though numbers with vehemence recommended the step, he stopped their ardour by remonstrances, that "they ought by no means to think of steering for the Piræus, and leave their nearer enemies upon their backs; but, in relation to the operations of war, since he was elected a general, (he said,) he would first go and confer with Tissaphernes, and would then proceed to action." Accordingly, the assembly was no sooner dissolved than he immediately departed, that he might appear in all respects to be perfectly united with Tissaphernes; desirous also to raise himself in his esteem, and give him a sensible proof that he was appointed a general; and, by virtue of this, enabled either to do him service or to do him harm. It was the peculiar fortune of Alcibiades to awe the Athenians by Tissaphernes, and Tissaphernes by the Athenians.

The Peloponnesians at Miletus had no sooner heard of the recall of Alcibiades, than, as before they suspected treachery in Tissaphernes, they now loudly vented invectives against him. What more inflamed them was, that, ever since the Athenians showed themselves before Miletus and they had refused to put out to sea and engage them, Tissaphernes had slackened more than ever in his payments; and thus, hated by them for that reason sufficiently before, he now became more odious on account of Alcibiades. The soldiers again, as on former occasions, ran together in parties, and enumerated their grievances. Nay, some of higher rank, persons of real importance, and not merely the private men, were full of remonstrances, that "they had at no time received their full subsistence: his payments had been always scanty, and even those had never

been regular; in short, unless they were led directly against the enemy, or carried to some other station where they might be sure of subsistence, the crews would abandon their vessels. And the whole blame of all that befell, ought to be charged upon Astyochus, who for private lucre endured patiently the caprices of Tissaphernes." Employed as they were in thus enumerating grievances, a tumult actually broke out against Astyochus: for the mariners belonging to the Syracusan and Thurian vessels, by how much they enjoyed the greatest liberty of all others in the fleet, by so much the more heightened confidence did they flock about him and demand their pay. Upon this, Astyochus returned an answer too full of spirit, threatening hard that Dorian,¹ who seconded and encouraged the demands of his men, and even lifting his staff and shaking it at him. This was no sooner perceived by the military crowd, than, seamen as they were, with a loud uproar, they rushed at Astyochus to knock him down; but, aware of their design, he flies for refuge to an altar. He escaped, indeed, without any blows, and the fray was ended without any harm committed.

The Milesians also made themselves masters, by surprise, of a fort erected by Tissaphernes, at Miletus, and obliged the garrison left in it to evacuate the place. These things pleased the rest of the allies, and not least of all the Syracusans. Lichas, however, was by no means satisfied with these proceedings. He insisted "the Milesians were obliged in duty to be submissive to Tissaphernes; and that all others who lived in the dominions of the king lay under the same obligation, and were bound to pay due regard to his just authority, till such time as the war was handsomely completed." This drew upon him the resentment of the Milesians; and, because of these expressions and some others of the same nature, when he afterwards died of a natural disease, they would not suffer him to be buried in a spot of ground which the Lacedæmonians who were amongst them had chose for his interment.

Whilst affairs were thus sadly embroiled, between the soldiery on one side, and Astyochus and Tissaphernes on the other, Mindarus arrived from Lacedæmon, as successor to As-

¹ Hermocrates.

tyochus in the chief command of the fleet. Accordingly he takes the command upon him, and Astyochus sailed away for home. But with him, as ambassador, Tissaphernes sent one of his own creatures, by name Gaulites, a Carian, who spoke both languages, to accuse the Milesians about the seizure of the fort, and also to make apologies for his conduct. He knew that the Milesians were already set out with an outcry, chiefly against him: and that Hermocrates was gone with them, well armed with proofs that Tissaphernes, in concert with Alcibiades, baffled all the Peloponnesian schemes, and basely tampered with both the warring parties. But an enmity had always subsisted between these two about the payments of subsistence. And at length, when Hermocrates was banished from Syracuse, and other Syracusans came to Miletus to take upon them the command of the Syracusan vessels, (namely, Patamis, and Myscon, and Demarchus,) Tissaphernes vented his choler more bitterly than ever against Hermocrates, now an exile; and, amongst his other accusations of him, affirmed, that "he had demanded a sum of money, which being refused him, he had ever since declared himself his enemy." Astyochus, therefore, and the Milesians, and Hermocrates, are now sailed for Lacedæmon.

By this time also Alcibiades had repassed from Tissaphernes to Samos; and from Delos the deputation sent from the four hundred on the late revolution to soothe and gain the concurrence of those at Samos, arrive also whilst Alcibiades is there. Upon which, an assembly being called, they endeavoured to open the cause. The soldiers at first refused to hear them, and roared aloud for the murder of those who had overturned the popular government. At length, with great difficulty, being quieted, they gave them a hearing.

The deputies remonstrated, "that not for the ruin of Athens was this new change introduced, but purely for its preservation—in no wise to betray it into the hands of the enemy; because that might have been done effectually upon the late approach of its enemy to her walls, since they were in power. Every single person amongst the five thousand was intended to have a regular share in the administration. Their friends and relations are not treated in an insolent manner, as Chæreas had maliciously suggested to them; nay, were not in the least

molested, but everywhere remained in the undisturbed possession of their property."

Though on these topics they amply enlarged, yet they were heard with no manner of complacence, but with manifest indignation. Different methods of proceeding were recommended by different persons; but the majority declared for sailing away at once for the Piræus. On this occasion Alcibiades first showed himself a true patriot; nay, as much a patriot as ever Athenian had been; for, when the Athenians at Samos were hurried furiously along to invade their own selves, the plain consequence of which was giving up at once Ionia and Hellespont to their public foes, he mollified their fury; and, at a crisis when no other man living could have been able to restrain the multitude, he persuaded them to desist from this strange invasion; and, by reprimanding those whose private resentments burst out most violently against the deputies, prevented mischief. At length, he himself dismissed them with the following answer—That "the administration in the hands of five thousand he had no intention to oppose: but he ordered them to give an immediate discharge to the four hundred, and to restore the council of five hundred to their prior state. If, farther, from a principle of frugality, they had made retrenchments, in order that those who served in the armies of the state might be better subsisted, he praised them altogether. He then recommended to them a steady resistance, and by no means in any shape to give way to the enemy; for, could the state once be secured from its public foes, a reconciliation amongst its members might easily be hoped for; but, should either party be once destroyed, either this at Samos, or theirs at Athens, none would soon be left to be reconciled at all."

There were present at this audience ambassadors from the Argives, who brought assurances of aid to the people of Athens at Samos. Alcibiades commended them for their zeal; and then, exhorting them to hold themselves in readiness to come upon a summons sent, he civilly dismissed them. These Argives came to Samos in company with the Paralians, who had been lately turned over by the four hundred into a vessel of war, to cruise round Eubœa, and to carry to Lacedæmon the ambassadors, Læspodias, Aristophon, and Melisius, sent thither from the four hundred

But, when advanced to the height of Argos, they put the ambassadors under arrest, as chief agents in pulling down the democracy, and delivered them up to the Argives. They had no business now at Athens, and so came from Argos to Samos, convoying the Argive ambassadors in the trireme which they had seized.

The same summer, Tissaphernes,—about that juncture of time in which the Peloponnesians were most furious against him, for the other reasons, and the recalcitrance of Alcibiades, as having now pulled off the mask and declared for the Athenians,—desirous, as in truth it appeared, to efface the bad impressions they had entertained of him, got ready to go to Aspendus to the Phœnician fleet, and prevailed with Lichas to bear him company. In regard to the Peloponnesians, he declared that he substituted his own lieutenant, Tamas, to pay them their subsistence, whilst he himself should be absent. Various accounts are vented about this step; nor can it certainly be known with what view he repaired to Aspendus, or why, when there, he did not bring up the fleet. That a Phœnician fleet, consisting of one hundred and forty-seven sail, was now come up to Aspendus, is allowed on all sides; but, why they did not come forwards, is variously conjectured. Some think he went out of sight merely to carry on his old scheme of wearing away the Peloponnesians; and, in consequence of this, Tamas paid in their subsistence which he was ordered to pay, not better but even worse than Tissaphernes. Others say it was, that, since he had brought the Phœnicians to Aspendus, he might save large sums by dismissing them there, as he never had sincerely designed to make use of their service. Others, again, attribute it to a desire to quiet the clamours against him at Lacedæmon, and to get himself represented there as one abounding in good faith, and who is actually gone to bring up a fleet fairly and honestly fitted out for service.

But, in my opinion, the true solution of the mystery is this: he would not bring them up, merely to wear out and to balance the strength of the Grecians, that, during his absence and this studied prolongation, the latter might be running into ruins; and, farther, for the sake of balancing, to join with neither party, for fear of making them too strong; for, had he once determined to join heartily in the war, the con-

sequence was certainly beyond a doubt. Had he brought them up to join the Lacedæmonians, he must in all probability have given them the victory, since already their naval strength was rather equal than inferior to that of their opponents. But, that their ruin alone was designed by him is plain from the excuse he made for not bringing up that fleet: he pretended they were fewer in number than the king had ordered to be assembled: yet, if this were so, he might have ingratiated himself more abundantly with the king, if he made a great saving of money for his master, and with less expense had accomplished his service. To Aspendus, however, whatever was his view, Tissaphernes repairs, and joins the Phœnicians; nay, farther, at his own desire, the Peloponnesians sent Philippus, a noble Lacedæmonian, with two triremes, to take charge of this fleet.

Alcibiades had no sooner received intelligence that Tissaphernes was at Aspendus, than, taking with him thirteen sail, he hastened thither after him, promising to those at Samos an assured and important piece of service: for, “he would either bring the Phœnician fleet to the Athenians, or at least prevent their junction with the Peloponnesians.” It is probable that from a long acquaintance, he was privy to the whole intention of Tissaphernes never to bring up this fleet; and his project was now, to render Tissaphernes still more odious to the Peloponnesians for the regard he showed to himself and the Athenians, that so he might at last be necessitated to strike in with the latter. He stood away therefore directly by Phaselis and Caunus, and held on his course upwards.

The deputation, sent from the four hundred, being returned from Samos to Athens, reported the answer of Alcibiades;—how “he encouraged them to hold out, and give way in no shape to the enemy: and that his confidence was great, he should be able thoroughly to reconcile them with the army, and give them victory over the Peloponnesians.” By this report they very much revived the spirits of many of those who had a share in the oligarchy, and yet would gladly extricate themselves from the business upon assurances of indemnity. They had already begun to hold separate cabals, and show open discontent at the train of affairs. They were headed by some of principal authority even in the present

oligarchy, and who filled the great offices of state, namely, Theramenes,¹ the son of Agnon, and Aristocrates, the son of Sicelius; and others who were most deeply concerned in late transactions; and from a dread, as they gave out, of the army at Samos, and Alcibiades had concurred in sending an embassy to Lacedæmon, lest by unseasonable dissents from the majority they might have done mischief to the public. Not that they hastened themselves even now to put an utter end to the oligarchical government, but to enforce the necessity of making use of the five thousand not merely in name, but in act, and to render the polity more equal. This was, it must be owned, the political scheme which they all pretended; but, through private ambition, the majority had given into that course, by which an oligarchy, founded upon the ruins of a democracy, is ripe for subversion: for it was the daily claim of each single person concerned, not to be equal with the rest, but to be pre-eminently the first; whereas, when out of a democracy a preference is awarded, the distinction is the more easily brooked, as if it were the real consequence of superior worth. But what of a certainty elevated them most, was the great influence of Alcibiades at Samos, and their own consciousness that this business of an oligarchy carried with it no prospect of firm or lasting continuance. A contention, therefore, ensued among them, which of them should show the greatest zeal for the people.

But such of the four hundred as made the greatest opposition to this new scheme, and were leaders of their party;—namely, Phrynichus, who formerly, during his employment as general* at Samos, had embroiled himself

¹ Theramenes was very expert at turning about and shifting his party. He got by it the nickname of Cothurnus, or the Buskin; because the tragedian's buskin was made large enough for any foot to go into it. He was however a man of great abilities, and generally regarded as a lover of his country. His turns were dextrous, well-timed, and made with a view of public good. Cæsar, when making Cicero a compliment, likened him to Theramenes. He was deeply concerned in all the subsequent revolutions at Athens. He put the finishing hand to the peace with the Lacedæmonians after the taking of Athens by Lysander, when they demolished their long walls, opened their harbours, and gave up their shipping. He was afterwards, nominally, one of the thirty tyrants; for he soon began to oppose them; first with moderation, then with vehemence; which exasperated them so, that they put him to death.

with Alcibiades; and Aristarchus, one of the most violent and also most inveterate opponents of the people; and Pisander, and Antipho, and others of the greatest influence amongst them; who formerly, upon establishing themselves first in the government, and ever since the army at Samos had dissented from them in favour of the democracy, had bestirred themselves, in sending embassies to Lacedæmon, in more firmly establishing the oligarchy, and erecting a new fortification on the spot which is called Eetioneia;—these, I say, exerted themselves with much greater ardour than ever, since the return of the deputies from Samos, as they plainly saw the inclinations of numbers, and some of their own body, on whose perseverance they had highly depended, were entirely changed. They even caused Antipho, and Phrynichus, and ten others, to set out with all expedition; so apprehensive were they of fresh opposition both in Athens itself and from Samos; and charged them with instructions to strike up an accommodation with the Lacedæmonians upon any tolerable terms they could possibly procure. They also carried on with redoubled diligence the new works at Eetioneia. These works were intended, as was given out by Theramenes and his party, not so much to keep out of the Piræus those from Samos, should they endeavour to attempt it, as to enable themselves, at their own discretion, to receive both the ships and land forces of the enemy; for Eetioneia is the mole of the Piræus, and the entrance into it opens at the end of this mole. The new work was therefore joined in such a manner to that which guarded it before on the side of the land, that a small party posted behind could command the entrance. For the extremities of it were continued down to the fort in the very mouth of the harbour, which was narrow; and both the old wall, which was built on the land side, and this new fortification within, reached down to the sea. They also enlarged and secured the great portico, which adjoined to the new work erected in the Piræus, and kept it entirely in their own custody. Here they obliged all the citizens to lodge what corn they already had, and all that should hereafter be imported, and here only to expose it to sale and to vend it.

These proceedings had for a long time drawn sharp insinuations from Theramenes; and, when the embassy returned from Lacedæmon

without bringing to any manner of issue a general accommodation for the whole of the state, he averred, that "by this new work the safety of the city was visibly endangered." For from Peloponnesus, at this instant of time, at the request of the Eubœans, no less than forty-two sail of ships were on the coast of Laconia; some of which were Italian, from Tarentum and from Locri, and some Sicilian; and all were now bound for Eubœa. At the head of this equipment was Hegesandridas, a Spartan, the son of Hegesander. Theramenes maintained, that "it was set out less for Eubœa than for those who were now fortifying at Ectioneia; and, unless we stand upon our guard, they will surprise and complete the ruin of Athens." There was really something in the conduct of the men he accused, to countenance this charge, nor was it merely the outcry of slander. Those who now composed the oligarchy were principally desirous to preserve in their hands the whole appendage of the republic; if this were impracticable, to secure the shipping and walls, and subsist with independence; but, should they be unable to compass this, rather than fall the first victims to the democracy re-established, to let in the enemy; and, resigning their shipping and fortifications, to make any terms whatever for the state, provided they could obtain security for their own persons. They accelerated, therefore, this new work; which was so contrived as to have posterns, and sally-ports, and passages enough to let in the enemy; and they proceed with all imaginable despatch, in order to outstrip prevention.

Hitherto, indeed, this charge against them had only been whispered with an air of secrecy amongst a few. But, when Phrynichus, upon his return from the embassy to Lacedæmon, was treacherously stabbed by one of the patrolle in the forum, at the hour of public resort, being got but a few steps from the house where the council was sitting, and dropped down dead upon the spot;—when, farther, the assassin made his escape; and a stranger from Argos, who assisted at the fact, being apprehended and tortured by the four hundred, discovered not the name of any one person who set them on, nor made any farther confession than that "he knew large numbers met at the house of the officer who commanded the patrolle, and at other places;"—then, at length, as nothing could be made of this affair, Theramenes and Aristocrates, and as many either of

the four hundred or of others as were combined with them, proceeded to act in a more open and resolute manner. For by this time the fleet was come round from Laconia; and riding before Epidaurus, had made ravages upon Ægina. Theramenes therefore averred it improbable, that "were they intended for Eubœa, they would ever have put into Ægina, and then go again and lie at Epidaurus, unless they had been sent out at the express invitation of those whom he had always accused of traitorous designs; and it was impossible to be passive any longer under such practices." In fine, after many speeches made to excite a tumult, and many suspicions disseminated abroad, they fell to work in earnest. For the heavy-armed, posted in the Piræus to carry on the new works of Ectioneia, amongst whom Aristocrates himself was employed at the head of his own band, lay under an arrest. Alexicles, who commanded there for the oligarchy, and was a most vehement adversary to the opposite party; and, carrying him into a house, put him under confinement. To this action they were also emboldened by the concurrence of others, as well as by Hermon, who commanded the patrolle assigned for Munichia; and, what was of most importance, it was openly countenanced by the whole body of the heavy-armed. The news of it was immediately carried to the four hundred, who were this moment assembled together in council; and all, excepting those dissatisfied with their measures, were ready to run to arms, and vented terrible threats against Theramenes and his associates.

But he, apologizing for himself, declared his readiness to take up arms along with them, and attend them to the rescue of Alexicles; and, taking with him one of the generals who was in his secret, he hurried down to the Piræus. Aristarchus also ran down to assist; as did, farther, the young men belonging to the cavalry of the state.

Great, in truth, was the tumult, and full of horror: for those who were left in the upper city imagined that the Piræus was already seized, and that Alexicles was slain; and they in the Piræus each moment expected an assault from those in the city. Not without difficulty could the men of years and experience stop such as were wildly running up and down the streets, and rushing to arms. And Thucydides, the Pharsalian, public host of the state, who happened then to be at

Athens, threw himself with lively zeal in the way of all who were flocking down; and conjuring them earnestly "not to finish the ruin of their country, when the enemy lay so near to strike the blow." But thus, at length, their fury abated, and the effusion of one another's blood was prevented.

As for Theramenes, he was no sooner got down to the Piræus, than, assuming authority, (for he himself was at this time a general,) he pretended to rate the heavy-armed for this piece of mutiny, at least so far as mere making a noise could do it: whilst Aristarchus and all the opposite faction were angry with them in earnest. But the bulk of the heavy-armed drew together in a body, and betray no sign of regret for what they had done. Nay, they demanded aloud from Theramenes,—“If, in his judgment, these new works were raised with a good design, or would not better be demolished?” His reply was this—That, “if they thought it expedient to demolish them, his opinion should concur with theirs.” Hereupon, at a signal given, the heavy-armed and many others who belonged to the Piræus rushed on in a moment, and pulled down all the new fortification.

The watch-word now published to the multitude was this—“Whoever would have the administration lodged in the five thousand instead of the four hundred, let him join in the work.” For even still they judged it politic to veil their design under the name of the five thousand, and not to say downright—“Whoever would have the democracy restored,”—lest possibly the former might have been actually in force, and a person speaking to any one of them might spoil all by some inadvertent expression. And, on the same account, the four hundred would neither have the five thousand declared, nor yet have it known that they had never been appointed. To admit so large a number into a share of the government, they judged was in fact a mere democracy; but that leaving the matter in suspense would strike a dread of his neighbour into every Athenian.

The next morning, the four hundred, though highly disordered in their politics, assembled however in council. But these in the Piræus, after enlarging Alexicles, whom they had put under confinement, and completing the demolition of the new works, marched to the theatre of Bacchus in Munichia, and there, all armed as they were, held a formal assembly; and

then, in pursuance of what had been resolved, marched directly into the upper city, and posted themselves in the Anaceum. Here they were accosted by a select committee sent from the four hundred, who man to man reasoned calmly with them; and, perceiving any to be tractable, plied them with persuasions to proceed in a gentle manner, and to restrain the fury of their associates; giving them assurance, that “the five thousand would be declared; and from them, by regular succession, at the pleasure of the five thousand, the four hundred should be appointed; conjuring them, in the meantime, “not to forward, through impatience, the destruction of the state, nor give it up for a prey to the public enemy.” The whole multitude of the heavy-armed, attentive to these arguments, on which many expatiated at large and pressed home upon numbers, became more tractable than they were at first, and were most terribly alarmed at the mention of the total destruction of their polity. It was at last concluded, that, on a set day, an assembly should be held in the temple of Bacchus, to devise an accommodation.

But, when this assembly, to be held in the temple of Bacchus, came on, and all parties were only not completely met, comes in the news that “the two and forty sail and Hegesandrides are coasting along from Megara towards Salamina.” Not one of the heavy-armed this moment but pronounced it true, what before was given out by Theramenes and his friends, that “to the new fortifications these ships are now bound;” and it was judged that in the nick of time they had been levelled with the ground. But Hegesandrides, as perhaps had beforehand been concerted, only hovered about at Epidaurus or the adjacent coast. It is however probable, that, on account of the present addition amongst the Athenians, he lay for a time in this station, in hope to seize some fair opportunity to strike a blow.

Be this as it will, the Athenians no sooner heard the news, than, to a man, they flocked down again to the Piræus; less alarmed at their own domestic war, than at invasion from a public enemy, no longer remote, but at their very ports. Some of them threw themselves on board what shipping was ready; others launched such as were aground; and others posted themselves upon the walls and at the mouth of the harbour.

But the Peloponnesian fleet, having sailed by and doubled the cape of Sunium, comes to anchor between Thoricus and Phrasia, and proceeds afterwards to Oropus. Hereupon the Athenians, in all imaginable hurry, manning out their ships with what hands could be got on this sudden emergency, as in a city distracted with sedition, and yet eager to stave off the greatest danger that had ever threatened it, (for, as Attica was occupied by the enemy, Eubœa was now their all,) cause Thymocharis, a commander, to stand away with their fleet to Eretria. On their arrival there, and their junction with such as were already in Eubœa, they amounted to six and thirty sail, and were immediately forced to engage: for Hegesandridas, after the hour of repast, came out in line of battle from Oropus.

The distance of Oropus from the city of the Eretrians, across the sea, is about sixty stadia;¹ and therefore, upon his approach, the Athenians ordered their men on board, imagining the soldiers to be ready at hand to obey their orders; whereas they happened not yet to be returned from the market, whither they had gone to buy provisions. For, through the management of the Eretrians, nothing could be got by way of sale, except in such houses as lay in the most remote quarters of the city; with an intent that the enemy might attack the Athenians before they were all embarked, and oblige them in a hurrying and disorderly manner to begin the fight. Nay, a signal had even been held out to the enemy from Eretria towards Oropus, at what time they ought to come forward to the attack.

Upon so short a notice, the Athenians, having formed their line as well as they were able, and engaging the enemy before the harbour of Eretria, made however a gallant resistance for a time. At length, being compelled to sheer off, they are pursued to land; and as many of them as ran for safety to the city of the Eretrians suffered the most cruel treatment, in being murdered by the hands of men whom they supposed their friends. Such, indeed, as could reach the fort of Eretria, which was garrisoned by Athenians, are safe; as also the vessels which could make Chalcis.

But the Peloponnesians, after making prizes of two and twenty Athenian vessels, and either butchering or making prisoners all on board

them, erected a trophy. And, no long time after, they caused all Eubœa to revolt, excepting Oreus, which an Athenian garrison secured, and then settled the state of that island at their own discretion.

When advice of what was done at Eubœa reached Athens, the greatest consternation ensued of all that had to this day been known. Not even the dreadful blow received in Sicily, though great concern, in truth, it gave them, nor any other public disaster, caused so terrible an alarm amongst them. For, at a time when their army at Samos was in open revolt, when they had no longer either shipping in store or mariners to go on board, when they were distracted with intestine sedition, and ready each moment to tear one another to pieces;—and on the neck of all these this great calamity supervened, in which they lost their fleet, and (what was more of consequence) Eubœa, which had better supplied their necessities than Attica itself,—had they not ample reason not to fall into utter dejection? But what alarmed them most was the proximity of ruin, in case the enemy, flushed with their late success, should stand immediately into the Piræus, now utterly destitute of ships. Not a moment passed but they imagined they were only not in the very harbour; which, in truth, had they been a little more daring, they might easily have been. Nay, had they made this step and blocked up the city, they must infallibly have increased the seditions within it; must have necessitated the fleet to come over from Ionia, though averse to the oligarchy, in order to prevent the ruin of their own relations and the total destruction of their country; and, in the meantime, Hellespont, Ionia, the isles even up to Eubœa, in a word, the whole empire of Athens, must have been their own. Yet, not in this instance only, but many others, the Lacedæmonians showed themselves most commodious enemies for the Athenians to encounter: for, as nothing differed more than their respective tempers; the one being active, the other slow; enterprising these, but timorous those, especially in naval competitions; they gave them many advantages. The truth of this the Syracusans most plainly showed, who very nearly resembled the Athenians in disposition, and so warred against them with the highest spirit and success.

Terrified, however, at these tidings, the Athenians made a shift to man out twenty vessels,

¹ About six English miles.

and convened an assembly of the people, on the first report of their loss, in the place which is called the Pnyx, and where generally that assembly was held. In this they put an end to the administration of the four hundred, and decreed "the supreme power to be vested in the five thousand, which number to consist of all such citizens as were enrolled for the heavy armour; and that no one should receive a salary for any public magistracy; whoever offended in this point they declared a traitor." Other frequent assemblies were afterwards held, in which they appointed Nomothetæ,¹ and filled up the other posts in the government. And now, at least, though for the first time in my opinion, the Athenians seem to have modelled their government aright. A moderation, finely tempered between the few and the many, was now enforced. And, from the low situation in which their affairs were now plunged, this enabled Athens to re-erect her head.

They decreed, farther, the recallment of Alcibiades and his adherents; and, despatching a deputation to him and the army at Samos, exhorted them to exert their utmost efforts for the public service,

In the first moments of this new revolution, Pisander and Alexicles, with their partizans, and in general all the great sticklers for the oligarchy, withdraw privately to Decelea. But Aristarchus, who was one of the generals of the state, took a different route from all the rest; and, carrying off a party of archers, though rank Barbarians, went off towards Oenoe: Oenoe was a fortress of the Athenians on the frontiers of Bœotia. But the Corinthians, on a provocation peculiar to themselves, having procured the concurrence of the Bœotians, held it now blocked up, because a party of their countrymen, drawing off from Decelea, had been put to the sword by a sally of the garrison from Oenoe. Aristarchus, therefore, having in a conference settled matters with the besiegers, deceives the garrison in Oenoe, by assuring them, that, "as their countrymen in Athens had made up all their quarrels with

the Lacedæmonians, they also were bound to deliver up this place to the Bœotians; and that this was an express provision in the treaty." Giving credit therefore to him as in public command, and ignorant of all the late transactions, because closely blocked up, they agree with the enemy and evacuate the fortress. In this manner the Bœotians regained possession of abandoned Oenoe: and thus the oligarchy and sedition were suppressed at Athens.

But, about the same space of time in the current summer, in regard to the Peloponnesians at Miletus:—When none of those, who were substituted by Tissaphernes during his absence at Aspendus, made regular payments; and nothing could be seen either of Tissaphernes or the Phœnician fleet, and Philippus, who accompanied him, sent advice to Mindarus, the admiral in chief; and Hippocrates, farther, a citizen of Sparta, who was then at Phaselis, advised him also, that, "this fleet would never join him, and in all respects they were shamefully abused by Tissaphernes;"—as Pharnabazus had made them an invitation, and declared himself ready, if aided by the confederate fleet, to engage as strongly as Tissaphernes for the revolt of what cities yet remained in subjection to the Athenians;—Mindarus, hoping to find more punctuality in the latter, with notable conduct, and by a sudden signal to the fleet, that his motions might not be discovered at Samos, weighs from Miletus with seventy-three sail, and bent his course to the Hellespont. But, earlier this summer, sixteen ships had steered their course thither, and ravaged part of the Chersonesus. Mindarus met with tempestuous weather in his passage, which forced him to put into Icarus; and, after staying there five or six days for want of weather to keep the sea, he arrives at Chios.

Thrasyllus, so soon as informed of the departure from Miletus, stood after him with five and fifty sail, making the best of his way lest the other should enter the Hellespont before he reached him. But, gaining intelligence that he was put into Chios, and concluding he designed to remain there, he fixed his scouts at Lesbos and the opposite continent; that, if the Peloponnesian fleet put out, their motions might be descried. He himself, repairing to Methymne, ordered quantities of meal and other necessaries to be prepared, that in case he should be forced to stay in these parts, he

¹ The general course of appointing Nomothetæ was by lot. Their number in the whole was a thousand and one. Their business was not, as the name seems to imply, to make new laws, since that belonged to the supreme power lodged in the people; but to inspect such as were already made, to reconsider such as were thought to be, or were complained of, as grievous, and regularly report such as ought to be continued or ought to be repealed.

might make frequent cruises from Lesbos against Chios.

But, as Ereusus in Lesbos had revolted, his design was farther to attempt its reduction, in case it were feasible. For some of the Methymnean exiles, and those not the most inconsiderable of the number, having brought over from Cyme about fifty heavy-armed who were most firmly attached to their cause, and hired others from the continent, which increased their number to about three hundred, Anaxarchus, the Theban, in respect of consanguinity, being chosen their leader,—assaulted first Methymne; and, being repulsed in the attempt by the Athenian garrison which came up from Mitylene, and then driven quite off by a battle fought in the field, they retired across the mountain, and made Ereusus revolt. Thrasyllus, therefore, steering with his fleet against Ereusus, projected an assault. But Thrasybulus, with five ships from Samos, arrived there before him, upon information received of the re-passage of the exiles; yet, coming too late before Ereusus to prevent a revolt, he lay at anchor before it. Two other ships, also, bound homewards from the Hellespont, came in, and the Methymnean. All the ships in the fleet amounted now to sixty-seven, from which they draughted an army for the operations of land, as fully bent, if possible, to take Ereusus by a bold assault, with engines and all the arts of attack.

In the meantime, Mindarus and the Peloponnesian fleet at Chios, after two whole days employment in taking in provisions, and receiving from the Chians every man on board three Chian tesseracosts,¹ on the third day with urgent despatch launch out from Chios into the wide sea, that they might not be descried by the fleet before Ereusus; and leaving Lesbos on the left, stood over to the continent. There, putting into the harbour of Cratermæ on the coast of Phocæa, and taking their noon repast, they proceeded along the coast of Cyme, and supped at Arginusæ of the continent, against Mitylene. From thence, at dead of night, they went forwards along the shore; and, being arrived at Herma-

tus which lies facing Methymne, and having eat their dinner there, they passed with the utmost speed by Lectus, and Larissa, and Amarithus, and other adjacent places, and reach Rhægium of the Hellespont before midnight. Not but that some ships of the fleet got up no farther than to Sigæum and some other adjacent places on that coast.

The Athenians, who were lying with eighteen sail at Sestus, when the lights were waved by their own friends for signals, and they beheld numerous fires kindled on a sudden on the hostile coast, were well assured that the Peloponnesians are approaching. The same night, therefore, under favour of the dark, and with the utmost expedition, they crept along under the Chersonesus, and reached Eleus, desirous to put out to sea, and avoid the enemy; and, for the sixteen ships at Abydus, they stole away unperceived of the Abydians, though notice had been sent them from their friends just arrived, to keep a good lookout, and not suffer them to steal off. Yet morning no sooner appeared, than, finding themselves in sight of the fleet under Mindarus, and that they were actually chased, they could not all get off. The greater part, indeed, fled safe to the continent and Lemnos; but four, that got lost under sail, are overtaken by the enemy near Eleus; one, also, that ran ashore at the temple of Protesilaus, they seize with all her hands; and two more, the crews of which escaped. One, farther, but abandoned, they burn at Imbrus.

This done, the ships from Abydus having joined them, and the whole fleet being now increased to fourscore and six sail, they spent the rest of the day in investing Eleus; but, as it would not surrender, they drew off to Abydus.

The Athenians, who had been deceived by their scouts, and never imagined that so large a number of hostile ships could pass along undescried, were very coolly carrying on their siege; but yet were no sooner informed of the enemy's motions, than, instantly quitting Ereusus, they advanced with the utmost expedition to secure the Hellespont. They also pick up two ships of the Peloponnesians; which, running out too boldly to sea in the late pursuit, fell in amongst them: and, coming up only one day after them, they anchor at Eleus, and re-assemble from Imbrus the ships which had fled thither. Five whole days they spend here in

¹ This, according to Spanheim, was a month's pay, since he explains it by forty-three Chian drachmas. But the words will not bear such a construction: a tesseracost was, it is most probable, a coin peculiar to the Chians; but of what value it is not known, nor is it of any great importance.

getting every thing in readiness for a general engagement: and after this respite they came to an action in the following manner.

The Athenians, ranged in line of battle a-head, stood along shore towards Sestus. The Peloponnesians, aware of their design, stood out to sea from Abydos, to be ready to receive them. And, as both sides were determined to engage, they unfolded their lines to a greater length; the Athenians, along the Chersonesus, reaching from Idæus to Arrianiæ, in all sixty-eight sail; and the Peloponnesians over-against them from Abydos to Dardanus, being eighty-six. The line of the Peloponnesians was thus formed: the Syracusans had the right; and on the left was ranged Mindarus, and the ships most remarkable for being good sailors. Amongst the Athenians, Thrasyllus had the left, and Thrasybulus the right: the rest of the commanders were regularly posted according to their rank. The Peloponnesians, showing most eagerness to begin the engagement, endeavoured with their left to over-reach the right of the Athenians, in order to exclude them, if possible, from stretching out into the main sea, and, by keeping them cramped up, to force their centre against the shore, which was not far distant. The Athenians, aware of the enemy's design to shut them up, plying up a-head, forced themselves an opening, and in velocity beat them all to nothing.

By these motions, the left of their line became extended beyond the cape called Cynossema. The consequence of which was exposing their centre, composed only of the weakest ships, and those ranged at too great a distance from one another; especially as in number of vessels they were quite inferior, and as the coast round the Cynossema was sharp, and in an acute angle runs out into the water, so that part of the line on one side was out of sight of the other. The Peloponnesians, therefore, charging the centre, drove at once the ships of the Athenians upon the beach; and, being so far manifestly victors, leaped boldly on shore to pursue them. But neither those under Thrasybulus could assist the centre from the right, because of the multitude of ships that stood in to save them; nor could those under Thrasyllus do it from the left, because the interposition of cape Cynossema hid from him the view of what had passed; and at the same time the Syracusans and others, who,

equal in strength, lay hard upon him, prevented his moving. At length, the Peloponnesians, presuming the victory their own, broke their order to give different chase to single ships, and in too heedless a manner threw confusion upon a part of their own line. And now those under Thrasybulus, finding the squadron opposed to them began to slacken, stopped all farther extension of their line a-head; and tacking upon them, resolutely engaged, and put them to flight. Charging next the dispersed ships of the Peloponnesians, which composed the squadron that presumed itself victorious, they made havoc; and, by striking them with a panic, routed the greater part without resistance. Now also the Syracusans were beginning to give way before the squadron under Thrasyllus; and seeing others in open flight, were more easily tempted to follow their example. The defeat now being manifestly given, and the Peloponnesians flying away for shelter, first towards the river Pydius, and afterwards to Abydos, the Athenians made prize of only an inconsiderable number of shipping; for the Hellespont, being narrow, afforded short retreats to the enemy. However they gained a victory by sea, most opportune indeed in their present situation; for hitherto, afraid of the naval strength of the Peloponnesians, because of the rebuffs they had lately received from it, and the calamitous event of the Sicilian expedition, from this moment they stopped all fruitless self-accusations or groundless exaggerations of the enemy's ability by sea. Some ships of the enemy in fact they take; for instance, eight Chian, five Corinthian, two Ambraciote, two Boeotian; but, of Leucadian, and Lacedæmonian, and Syracusan, and Pellenean, a single one of each: but then they suffered the loss of fifteen ships of their own.

After erecting a trophy upon the cape of Cynossema, and picking up the shatters of the fight, and giving up, under truce, their dead to the enemy, they despatched a trireme to Athens to notify the victory. On the arrival of this vessel, those at home, after hearing the news of this unhopèd-for success, greatly resumed their spirits, which had been dejected by the recent misfortunes at Eubœa and the sad effects of the sedition, and hoped the state might again resume its power if they cheerfully exerted their efforts in its behalf.

On the fourth day after the battle, the Athenians, having diligently refitted their fleet at Sestus, sailed against Cyzicus, which had revolted; and, despoiling eight ships from Byzantium riding at anchor under Harpagium and Priapus, they crowded sail towards them; and, having in battle upon the shore defeated their crews, made prizes of them all. Repairing thence against Cyzicus, which was quite unfortified, they reduced it once more, and exacted large contributions from it.

But, during this interval, the Peloponnesians made a trip from Abydus to Eleus, and brought off as many of their own ships which had been taken as were able to sail; the residue the Eleusians burnt. They also despatched Hippocrates and Epicles to Eubœa, to fetch up their fleet from thence.

About the same space of time, Alcibiades also, at the head of his squadron of thirteen sail, returned from Caunus and Phaselis into the harbour of Samos, reporting that "by his management he had diverted the junction of the Phœnician fleet with the Peloponnesians, and made Tissaphernes a faster friend than ever to the Athenians." After enlarging his squadron by the addition of nine more just manned, he levied large contributions upon the Halicarnassæans, and fortified Cos. After these exploits, and putting the government of Cos into proper hands, he returned again, about autumn, to Samos.¹

¹ As the English reader is here to take his leave of Alcibiades, he may have the curiosity to know what became of him after.—Every thing succeeded so well, under him and his active colleagues, that the Lacedæmonians, having received several defeats both by land and sea, and lost two hundred ships, were again necessitated to sue for peace. After such great services, Alcibiades returned triumphant to Athens. The whole city flocked down to the Piræus to meet him. All strove to get a sight of Alcibiades: they caressed him, crowned him, cursed the authors of his exile, and hurried him away to an assembly of the people. There he harangued them for a time; then stopped and shed tears in abundance; then harangued them again. In short, they undid all they had ever done against him; and Alcibiades for a time was all in all at Athens. Yet, in subsequent commands, he happened not to be successful; a crime which his countrymen very seldom forgave. He became a second time an exile from Athens. His great abilities made him a continual terror both to foreign and domestic enemies. Yet now he persevered to serve his country, by caballing in their favour, and advising them on critical occasions. Yet all in vain: Lysander was soon master of the Piræus and of Athens. Alcibiades retired into Phrygia, and was handsomely

From Aspendus also Tissaphernes rode back post haste into Ionia, so soon as advised of the departure of the Peloponnesian fleet from Miletus for the Hellespont.

But, as the Peloponnesians were now in the Hellespont, the Antandrians, (who are of Æolic descent) having procured from Abydus a party of heavy-armed who marched across mount Ida, received them into their city, provoked to this step by the injuries conduct of Arsaces, a Persian lieutenant to Tissaphernes. This man, pretending he had enemies to cope with whom yet he new named, prevailed with the Delians settled in Adramittium, because they had been obliged by the Athenians to quit Delos in the affair of the expiation, to attend him in this secret expedition with the flower of their strength; and, leading them forwards with all the show of friendship and alliance, watched the opportunity when they were busy at their meal, surrounded them with a body of his own soldiers, and shot them to death with darts. Fearing him, therefore, because of this instance of a cruel temper, lest some such act of violence he might execute also upon them, as in other respects he had imposed some burdens upon them which they could not bear, the Antandrians eject his garrison out of their citadel. But Tissaphernes, perceiving how deeply the Peloponnesians were concerned in this affair, and esteeming himself sadly injured also at Miletus and Cnidus (since in those places too his garrisons had been ejected;) and fearing they would proceed to other commissions of the same nature; chagrined moreover that perhaps Pharnabazus, in less time and with less expense, having obtained their concurrence, should make a greater progress against the Athenians;—he determined in person to repair to Hellespont, in order to expostulate with them about

supported by the bounty of his friend Pharnabazus: who however was wrought upon at last by the joint solicitations of his enemies and the plea of its necessity for the service of the king, to undertake his destruction. The agents of Pharnabazus durst not attempt him in an open manner, but set fire to his house by night. By throwing in clothes to damp the flames, he got out safe. The Barbarians soon spied him, shot him to death with arrows and darts, then cut off his head, and carried it to Pharnabazus. I shall only add, that he was but forty years old when he was thus destroyed.

their late proceedings at Antander, and to wipe off, as handsomely as he could, the aspersions thrown upon his own conduct in regard to the Phœnician fleet and other points. Arriving therefore first at Ephesus, he offered sacrifices to Diana * * * * *

When the winter following this summer shall be ended, the twenty-first year of the war will be also completed.

¹ Here breaks off abruptly the history of the Peloponnesian war by Thucydides. The adjustment of time annexed seems plainly of another hand.



INDEX.

Abrotychus, 30.

Acanthus, 187.

Acaruaniens; excellent slingers, 83—conquer the Ambraciots, 129—make peace with them, 131—enter into an alliance with the Athenians, 77.

Acherians, 61.

Admetus, king of the Molossians, 45.

Aegistides, tyrant of Lampsacus, 240.

Aegineta, formerly of great power at sea, 6—stir up the war against the Athenians, 21—conquered by the Athenians at sea, 34—how and why expelled Aegina by the Athenians, 63—are settled by the Lacedemonians at Thyrea, *ib.*—how used by the Athenians when they reduced Thyrea, 159.

Aegyptians, which of them most warlike, 35.

Aeneas, 173.

Aeneas, 53.

Aenians, 281.

Aelians, tributary to Athens, 261.

Aesimides, 16.

Aeson, 194.

Aethians, 33.

Aetolians, 3—invaded by the Athenians, 125—defeat them, 126.

Agamemnon, 4.

Agatharchidas, 83.

Agatharcus, 267.

Agasander, 47.

Agasippidas, 201.

Agis, king of Sparta, 123, 133—he commands against the Argives, 201—lets them go without a battle, 202—is accused for it at Sparta, 203—marches a second time against them, *ib.*—gains the victory at Mantinea, 207—fortifies Decaea in Attica, 265—makes an unsuccessful attempt on Athens, 319.

Agnon, 88—the son of Nicias, colleague to Pericles, 38—besiegeth Potidea, 72—the founder of Amphipolis, 167, 183.

Agroans, 130.

Agrianians, 89.

Agrirentines, neutral in the Sicilian war, 282.

Alceus, archon at Athens, 188.

Alcamenes, 297, 299.

Alcibiades, son of Clinias, 195—his expedition into Peloponnesus, 200—and to Argos, 210—named for one of the commanders in Sicily, 250—his speech on that occasion, 223—is accused about the Mercuries, and for profaning the mysteries, 227, 237—insists on a trial, 228—sets out for Sicily, *ib.*—his opinion at a council of war, 236—is recalled to take his trial, 237—flies and is outlawed, 241—takes refuge at Sparta, 251—his speech at Sparta, *ib.*—adviseeth the Lacedemonians about prosecuting the war, 297, 299—sent to Chios with Chalci-

deus, 300—his transactions at Miletus, 301—goes to Tissaphernes, and becomes a favourite, 310—contrives his own recalcment to Athens, 311—his quarrel with Phrynichus, 312—is recalled, 323, 331—his management at Samos, 323, 325—goes to Aspendus, 326. *Alcidas*, the Lacedemonian admiral, sent to Lesbos, 98, 101—he flies, 102—returns to Peloponnesus, 117—sails to Corcyra, 118—one of the three leaders of the colony to Heraclea, 124.

Alcinidas, 187, 188.

Alciphron, 202.

Alcmaeon, 91.

Alcmaeonides, 240.

Alexarchus, 265.

Alexicles, put under arrest, 328—flies to Decaea, 331.

Alexippidas, 315.

Ambraciots, aid the Corinthians against the Corcyreans, 9, 10—make war on the Amphilocheians, 77—and the Acarnanians, 82—make another expedition against both, 127—take Olpe, 128—are defeated, 129—make peace, 131—send aid to the Syracusans, 282.

Ameinias, 177.

Ameiniades, 77.

Aminocles, 5.

Amorges, revolts from the king of Persia, 297—is taken prisoner by the Peloponnesians, and delivered to Tissaphernes, 305.

Amphilas, 187.

Amphias, 173.

Amphilocheians, 77, 130.

Amphisacensians, 126.

Amyntas, 88.

Amyntas, 35.

Anazarchus, 332.

Anaxilas, 219.

Andocides, 18.

Androcles, 317.

Andromenes, 194.

Androsthenes, 190.

Andrians, 281.

Anthippus, 187, 188.

Anticles, 38.

Antimonides, 194.

Antiochus, king of the Orestians, 82.

Antiphemus, 218.

Antipho, 318, 327.

Antisthenes, 308, 316.

Antitanians, 82.

Apodoti, 124.

Aradians, furnished with ships by Agamemnon in the Trojan expedition, 4—mercenaries, 281.

Archades, 240.

Archelaus, 90.

- Archestratus*, 19.
Archetimus, 10.
Archias, of Camarina, 141.
Archias, the Corinthian, founder of Syracuse, 218.
Archidamus, king of Sparta, his speech about the war, 96—commands in the invasion of Attica, 56—his speech, *ib.*—commands in another invasion, 69—and against Plataea, 78.
Archonides, 259.
Argyllians, a colony of Andrians, 167.
Argives, have thirty-years' truces with the Lacedemonians, 184—are irritated by the Corinthians against the Lacedemonians, 189—aim at being a leading state, *ib.*—make war upon the Epidaurians, 200—are surrounded by the Lacedemonians, but let go, 202—are defeated at Mantinea, and make peace, 207, 208.
Arionthides, 268.
Aristagoras, 167.
Aristarkhus, 327, 328, 331.
Aristeus, son of Pellicon, 10.
Aristeus, son of Adimantus, 19, 21, 77.
Aristeus, the Lacedemonian, 177.
Aristides, son of Lyalmachus, 30.
Aristides, son of Archippus, 150, 156.
Aristocles, 185, 206.
Aristocrates, 187.
Aristocrates, 188, 327, 328.
Aristogiton, 7, 238.
Aristo, 273.
Aristonous, of Larissa, 62.
Aristophon, 325.
Aristotle, son of Timocrates, 198.
Ariston, king of the Lyncestians, 160—warred against by Brasidas and Perdiccas, *ib.* 174.
Artabazus, 42.
Artaphernes, 150.
Artas, 271.
Artaxerxes Longimanus, 33—begins to reign, 46—dies, —150.
Asopius, son of Phormio, his exploits and death, 94.
Asymachus, 111.
Asyoehus, the Lacedemonian admiral, 301—306—goes to Chios, 302—in great danger, 308—refuses to succour the Chians, *ib.*—betrays Phrynichus, 312—is mutinied against by his own seamen, and returns to Sparta, 324.
Athenians, gave shelter at first to all who would settle amongst them, 2—had war with the Æginets, 21—how they became a naval power, 7—abandoned Athens and fought at Salamis, 24—rebuilt their walls, 29—made war against the king of Persia, under Pausanias, 31—gain a victory at Eurymedon, 32—reduce the Isle of Thasos, *ib.*—receive the Helots, and settle them at Naupactus, 33—their war in Egypt, *ib.* 35—with the Corinthians, *ib.*—and Epidaurians, and Æginets, 34—with the Lacedemonians, 35—Boeotians, 36—Sicyonians, *ib.*—Cyprians, *ib.*—recover Cherona, *ib.*—defeated at Coronea, *ib.*—reduce Eubœa, 37—make war upon Samos, 38—make alliance with the Corycæans, 15—assist them against the Corinthians, 16—their measures with the Potidæans, 19—make war upon Perdiccas, *ib.*—fight the Potidæans and Corinthians, 20—besiege Potidæa, 21—deliberate about the Peloponnesian war, 47—prepare for defence, 55—send their fleet to cruise upon Peloponnesus, 62—attack Methone, *ib.*—invade Locris, 63—eject the Æginets from the Isle of Ægina, *ib.*—make an alliance with Sitaces, *ib.*—take Solium and Astacus, 64—invade the Megaris, *ib.*—fortify Atalante, *ib.*—celebrate a public funeral, *ib.*—are afflicted with the plague, 66—send their fleets to cruise on Peloponnesus, 72—angry with Pericles, 73—take Potidæa, 78—war upon the Chalcidæans, 81—fight the Peloponnesians at sea, 83—send a fleet to Lesbos, 93—besiege Mitylene, 94—reduce it, 101—seize the island of Minoa, 110—send a fleet to Sicily, 122—their war in Acarnania, 124—are defeated by the Ætolians, 126—their proceeding in Sicily, 133—they seize and fortify Pylos, 134—fight between them and the Lacedemonians, 136—fight the Syracusans, 140, 141—invade the Corinthians, 147—take Anactorium, 150—conquer Cythra, 151—take Thyrea, 152—surprise Nisæa, 156—invade Boeotia, and are defeated at Delium, 163, 165—invade Amphipolis, 167—make a truce with the Lacedemonians, 171—take Mende, 176—besiege Scione, 177—eject the Delians, 179—are conquered by Brasidas at Amphipolis, 188—make a peace, 185—take Scione, 191—want to break the peace, 195—make an alliance with the Argives, 197—invade and reduce Melo, 200—determine on the Sicilian expedition, 217—their preparations, 227—they sail for Sicily, 228—land at Syracuse, 242—fight, 243—solicit the alliance of Oromartes, 246—take Epipolis, 255—besiege Syracuse, 256—fight with Gylippus, 261—send a reinforcement to Syracuse, 265—fight the Corinthians at Erine, 271—defeated in the attack of Epipolis, 276—are raising the siege, 278—are stopped by an eclipse of the moon, *ib.*—fight the battle in the harbour, 286—march away, 288—forced to surrender, 292, 293—their consternation at Athens, 295—their measures, 296—take Mitylene, 302—subdue the Cluzomenians, 303—besiege the Chians, *ib.*—defeat the Milesians, 304—quit Miletus for fear of the Peloponnesians, *ib.*—fight and are defeated, 309—solicit the friendship of Timophernes, 314—fight with the Chians, 316—lose their democracy, *ib.*—lose Eubœa, 320—defeat the Peloponnesians in the battle of Cynossema, 333.
Athenæus, 173.
Athenagoras, his speech at Syracuse, 232.
Atrous, 4.
Autocles, 151, 173.
- B
- Battus*, 146.
Boeotians, ejected out of Arne, 5—conquered by the Athenians at Oenophyta, 35—become free, 36—win the battle of Delium, 165—besiege Delium, 166—take Panactum, 160—send aid to the Syracusans, 265.
Boeotian Rulers, eleven in number, 163, 193—four councils, *ib.*
Bomionsians, 125.
Bottians, 19, 81, 90.
Brasidas, saves Methone, and receives the public commendation at Sparta, 62, 63—is of the council to Akidas, 118—his gallant behaviour at Pylos, 136—saves Megara, 158—marches to Thrace, 159—his character, 160—marches against the Lyncestians, *ib.*—harangues the Acanthians, 161—gets possession of Amphipolis, 168—is repulsed at Elion, 169—marches into Acte, 170—takes Torone, *ib.*—and Leceythus, 171—crowned by the Scioneans, 173—marches a second time against the Lyncestians, 174—his brave retreat, 175—makes an unsuccessful attempt on Potidæa, 178—opposes Cleon at Amphipolis, 181—resolves to attack, 189—harangues, *ib.*—sallies, 183—conquers and dies, *ib.*—his funeral, *ib.*

Dreusae, 169.

Syracusan, revolt from the Athenians, 27.

C

Callias, son of Calliades, 20—killed, 21.

Callicrates, 10.

Calchiensis, 125.

Camarianians, twice ejected, 219—their conduct in the Sicilian war, 237, 250.

Cambyzes, 6.

Carcinus, 63.

Carians, 2, 3.

Carthaginians, 6, 231, 252.

Carystians, 32, 281.

Cataneans, dwell under mount Ætna, 132—reduced by the Athenians, 237, 262.

Cecrops, king of Athens, 59.

Ceryces, 313.

Chareas, 321, 325.

Chalcidicus, the Lacedemonian admiral; 299—his exploits, 300, 301—killed by the Athenians, 303.

Chalcidians of Eubœa, make war with the Eretrians, 6—subject to the Athenians, 281.

Chalcidians of Thrace, revolt from the Athenians, 19—defeat them, 81—enter into league with the Argives, 191.

Chaonians, 82.

Charicles, 266, 268.

Charminus, an Athenian commander, 306—defeated by the Peloponnesians, 309—helps the oligarchial party at Samos, 320.

Charadæas, son of Euphillus, 122—killed, 123.

Chionis, 187, 188.

Chians, suspected, 298—revolt from the Athenians, 300—their war, 302.

Chrysis, 53, 178.

Cilicians, 36.

Cimon, son of Miltiades, takes Eion, 32—beats the Persians at Eurymedon, *ib.*—dies in the expedition to Cyprus, 36.

Clearchus, 323.

Clearchidas, commands in Amphipolis, 177, 182—conquers Cleon with Brasidas, 183—endeavours to break the peace, 187.

Cleippides, 93.

Cleobulus, 199.

Cleomedes, 211.

Cleomenes, 42.

Cleon, his speech, 103—command at Pylus, 143, 144, 146—his command in Thrace, 179, 181—conquered by Brasidas, and killed, 183.

Cleopompus, 72.

Cnemus, the Spartan, commands a squadron against Zacynthus, 77—sent into Acarnania, 82—retires from Stratus, 83.

Cnemus, 270.

Cepiansians, 164.

Corcyreans, founders of Epidamnus, 8—were themselves a Corinthian colony, 9—make war on Epidamnus, *ib.*—beat the Corinthians at sea, 10—beg the alliance of Athens, 11—their speech at Athens, 12—their success, 15—engage the Corinthians at sea, 16—their sedition, 177, 149—aid the Athenians in the war of Sicily, 281.

Corinthians, first built ships of war, 5—their quarrel with the Corcyreans about Epidamnus, 8—their

speech at Athens, 13—continuation of their war with the Corcyreans, 16—send aid to Potidea, 20—hate the Athenians, 21—their first speech at Lacedemon, *ibid.*—their second, 39—excite discontent in Peloponnesus, 188, 189—make alliances with the Eleans and Argives, 191—aid the Syracusans, 254, 264.

Coronians, 164.

Cranians, 64.

Cranonians, 62.

Cratæones, 218.

Crestonians, 170.

Cretans, 281.

Cræsus, 6.

Cyclops, 217.

Cylon, the history of him, 41.

Cynus, 91.

Cyrus the elder, 6.

Cyrus the younger, 33.

D

Daithus, 187.

Damagetus, 187.

Damagon, 124.

Damotimus, 173.

Darius, king of Persia, succeeds Cambyses, 6—reduces the Isles, *ib.*

Darius, son of Artaxerxes, 297—his leagues with the Lacedemonians, 301, 307, 315.

Dascon, 219.

Delians, removed out of Delos by the Athenians, 179—brought thither again, 191.

Demaratus, 258.

Demarchus, 325.

Demodochus, 158.

Demosthenes, 123—his war in Ætolia, 125—his seizure of and exploits at Pylus, 134, 135—his harangue, 136—his attempt on Megara, 155—carries up a reinforcement against Syracuse, 265—arrives at Syracuse, 274—repulsed at Epipolis, 275—is for raising the siege, 277—decamps, 287—surrenders with the troops under his command, 292—is put to death, 293.

Demoteles, 141.

Dercylidas, 316.

Derdas, 19.

Dersæans, 90.

Dians, 89.

Dielaideans, take Thyssus, 192—dwell on mount Athos, 209—revolt from the Athenians, *ib.*

Diemporus, 53.

Diitripheus, 269.

Diodotus, his speech, 106.

Diomedon, besieges the Chians, 303—favours the democracy, 320.

Diomilus, 16.

Diotrophes, 317.

Diphilus, 271.

Dolops, 32.

Doris, 31.

Dorians, in Peloponnesus, 5—founders of Lacedemon, 34, 124—bordering on the Carians, 56—warred upon by the Phocians, 24—perpetual enemies to Ionians, 248.

Dorians the Rhodian, 95.

Dorians the Thuriat, 307.

Dreusæ of Thumos, 96.

E

- Edonians*, 33, 90, 170.
Egestæans, at war with the Selinuntians, 219—solicit aid of Athens, *ib.*—their trick, 235.
Eleans, defeated by the Athenians, 63—an alliance with the Corinthians and Argives, 190—with the Athenians, 197.
Elousinians, warred against Erechtheus, 59.
Elymi, 217.
Empedias, 187, 188.
Endius, the Spartan, 297—ambassador to Athens, 198—his enmity with Agis, 299.
Entimus, the Cretan, founder of Gela, 218.
Eordians, 90.
Epidamnians, harassed with seditions, 9—beg aid at Corcyra, *ib.*—at Corinth, *ib.*—besieged by the Corcyreans, *ib.*—reduced, 10.
Epitadas, 135, 146.
Epitides, 177.
Erechtheus, 59.
Eretrians, at war with the Chalcidæans, 6—subject and tributary to Athens, 261.
Erythræans, 200.
Eteonicius, 302.
Eualas, 302.
Evarchus, tyrant of Astacus, 61—another of the name, 218.
Eubulus, 302.
Eucles the Athenian, 168.
Eucles the Syracusan, 258.
Eucledes, founder of Himera, 219.
Eustemon, 306.
Euseperita, 278.
Eumachus, 64.
Eumolpida, 212.
Eumolpus, 59.
Euphamidas, 64, 173.
Euphemus, his speech at Camarina, 248.
Eurylochus, the Spartan, 126, 128, 129.
Eurymachus, 53, 55.
Eurymedon, sent to Corcyra, 119—to Sicily, 134—is fined for returning, 155—sent thither again, 264—arrives at Syracuse, 274—killed, 279.
Eurystheus, king of Micene, 4.
Eurytanians, 196.
Eutrophus, 194.
Euthydemus, 187, 188—a commander at Syracuse, 264—unsuccessful in the last battle, 286.

G

- Gelen*, king of Syracuse, 218, 219.
Geloans, build Agrigentum, 218—aid the Syracusans, 222.
Geta, 68.
Glauco, 18.
Goazis, 169.
Gongylus, the Eretrian, 42.
Gongylus, the Corinthian, 260.
Greans, 89.
Grecians, account of the old, 2—how they undertook the Trojan expedition, 4—applied themselves to maritime affairs, 6, 7.
Gylippus, sent to command at Syracuse, 254—arrives there, 260—his battles, 261—takes Plemmyrium, 266—procures succour, 278—fights the Athenians, 279

—stops their decampment, 288—takes Nicias prisoner, 293—brings home the fleet from Sicily, 298.
Gyrtenians, 62.

H

- Haliartians*, 164.
Harmodius, history of him, 238.
Hegessander, 263.
Hegesandrides, 228, 232.
Hegesippides, 260.
Helen, 4.
Hellenicus, 32.
Hellen, son of Deucalion, 2.
Helots, their revolt from, and war with the Lacedæmonians, 32, 33—are feared, and 2000 of them made away with, 160.
Heraclæts, 199.
Heraclida, kill Eurystheus, 4.
Heraclidas, the Syracusan, 245, 256.
Hercans, 205.
Hermæondas, 94.
Hermocrates, his speech to the Sicilians, 152—to the Syracusans, 230—his character, 245—encourages the Syracusans, *ib.*—made a commander, *ib.*—his speech at Camarina, 246—his stratagem, 268—banished, 285.
Hermen, 322.
Hesiod, 125.
Hesians, 196.
Hestians, 37, 261.
Hestiodorus, 78.
Hieransians, 194.
Hierophon, 128.
Hippagrates, 146.
Hipparchus, history of him, 238.
Hippias, the eldest son of Pisistratus, history of him, 238.
Hippias the Arcadian, 103.
Hippoclus, tyrant of Lampeacus, 240.
Hippoclus, son of Menippus, 299.
Hippocrates the Athenian, 155—his attempt on Megara, *ib.*—his harangue, 165—killed at the battle of Delium, 167—tyrant of Gela, 219.
Hippolochidas, 159.
Hipponicus, 123.
Hipponeidas, 206.
Homer, 2, 4, 127.
Hyæns, 127.
Hybleans, 254.
Hyblon, 218.
Hyperbolus, 320.

I

- Iberians*, 217, 252.
Illyrians, 9, 175.
Imbrians, 94, 261.
Inarus, an African king, revolts from the Persian monarch, 33—crucified, 35.
Iolcius, 187, 188.
Ionians, had a great fleet in the reign of Cyrus, and were masters at sea, 6—subdued by Cyrus, *ib.*—revolt, 31—enemies to the Dorians, 248—used to assemble at Delos, 127.
Ippensians, 126.
Iscarchidas, 10.
Ischagoras, 177, 187, 188.
Isocrates, 83.

Knocorates, 83.
Nauchmionians, 187, 188.
Phalus, 218.
Phamans, 103.
Phonians, 182.
Phye, 63.

L

Lacedemonians, their power in Peloponnesus, 4—their dress, 3—were the first who stripped in the public games, 3—demolished tyrants, 6—deluded by Themistocles, 30—accuse him, 45—war against their Helots, 33—at war with the Athenians, ib.—and the Dorians, ib.—beat the Athenians at Tanagra, 35—make a truce for five years, 36—begin the holy war, ib.—make a thirty years' truce with the Athenians, 37—consult about the Peloponnesian war, 36—determine for it, 28, 29—send embassies to Athens to spin out time, 41—invade Attica, 56—assign Thyrea to the *Æginets*, 63—invade Attica, 69—make war on Zæcynthus, 77—march to Plataeæ, and besiege it, 78—invade Acarnania, 89—fight at sea, 83—their project to seize the Piræus, 87—invade Attica, 97—resolve to succour the Mityleneans, ib.—become masters of Plataeæ, 110—put the Plateans to death, 116—beat the Corcyreans at sea, 119—send a colony to Heraclea, 123—their expedition against the Amphilocheians, 128—invade Attica, 133—their endeavours to recover Pylus, 134—send an embassy to Athens to solicit a peace, 137—vanquished in Sphacteria, 146—make away with 2000 Helots, 160—take Amphipolis, 168—make peace with the Athenians, 172—march into Arcadia, 191—forbid to assist at the Olympic games, 199—succour the Epidaurians, 201—gain a victory at Mantinea, 206—determine to succour the Syracusans, 254—fortify Decælia, 265—succour the Chians, 299—enter into league with the Persian monarch, 301, 307, 315—take Iasus, 305—fight with and beat the Athenians, 308—seize Rhodes, 310—are beat at the sea-fight of Cynossema, 333.
Lacedemonius, son of Climon, 16.
Laches, commander of the Athenian fleet in Sicily, 122, 187, 188—makes war on Myleæ, 123—defeats the Locrians, 127.
Laco, 111.
Laepodias, 258, 255.
Lastrigons, 217.
Lamachus, loath a squadron, 158—one of the three commanders in Sicily, 220—his opinion at a council of war, 236—killed, 257.
Lamis, 218.
Lamphilus, 187, 188.
Lampo, 187, 188.
Laenus, 89.
Laerchus, 77.
Lemnians, 94, 182—accompany the Athenians to Sicily, 281.
Leocrates, 34.
Leon the Lacedemonian, 194.
Leon the Athenian, 302, 303, 314.
Leontines, 141—at war with the Syracusans, 123—in sedition, 180.
Leotychides, 29.
Lesbiens, 94.
Leucadians, aid the Corinthians against the Corcyreans, 9—join the Ambraciots, 62.

Lichas, an Olympic victor, but scourged, 190—his embassies, 187, 208—public host of the Argives, ib.—his dispute with Timaphernes, 309, 394—his death, ib.
Locrians, *Otolian*, 3—lose Naupactus, 23—confederate with the Athenians, 125.
Locrians, *Episephyrians*, 259.
Lycophron, 84, 148.
Lyncestians, 90, 160, 174.
Lysicles, 99.
Lysistratus, 170.

M

Macarius, 126, 129.
Maccho, 83.
Mantineans, 129, 130—war with the Tegeans, 178—make alliance with the Argives, 189—at war with the Lacedemonians, 191—renew the peace with them, 200—mercenaries, 261.
Megabotes, 42.
Megabazus the Persian, 35—son of Zopyrus, ib.
Megaraeans, aid the Corinthians against Corcyra, 10—prohibited the harbours and markets of Athens, 21, 47—scheme to betray their city to the Athenians, 155—demolish their long walls, 169.
Melaens, 181.
Melanchridas, 298.
Melanthus, 297.
Meleas, 94.
Melissander, 78.
Melians, their conference with the Athenians, 211—besieged, 215—reduced, ib.
Melissians, 194—fight with the Heraeleots, 199.
Menander, an Athenian commander in Sicily, 264, 286.
Menas, 187, 188.
Mendeans, 174.
Menecolus, 219.
Menocrates, 173.
Menon, 62.
Messenians of Peloponnesus, ejected by the Lacedemonians, 33—settled by the Athenians at Naupactus, ib.—take Phia, 63—replaced at Pylus, 147.
Messenians of Sicily, at war with the Naxians, 141.
Metagenes, 187, 188.
Metapontians, 281.
Metimymneans, 95, 281.
Micidas, 16.
Milesians, their war with the Samians, 37—beat the Argives, 304—demolish the fort built by Timaphernes, 324.
Mindarus, the Lacedemonian admiral, 394, 331—defeated, 333.
Minoæ, his naval power, 2, 3.
Mityleneans, revolt from the Athenians, 93—their speech at Olympia, 95—reduced, 101—ordered to be massacred, 103.
Molossians, 89.
Mycæssians, massacred, 269.
Myronians, 196.
Myrcinians, 181.
Myronides, 34, 35, 165.
Myrrinus, 258.
Myrtillus, 187, 188.
Myrtillus, 188.

N

- Naxos*, 53.
Naxians, favour the Athenians, 227, 261—vanquish the Messenians, 142.
Nicator, 82.
Nicias, son of Niceratus, 116, 142, 147, 151, 174—his speeches, 220, 225, 243, 283, 289—takes Minoa, 118—attacks Melos, 123—invades the Corinthians, 147—takes Cythera, 151—and Mende, 175—besieges Scione, *ib.*—author of the peace, 185, 197—named for the command in Sicily, 220—his opinion at a council of war, 236—defeats the Syracusans, 244, 262—his stratagem, 257—left in the sole command, 258—his letter to the Athenians, 262—refuseth to raise the siege of Syracuse, 277—raiseth the siege, 268—surrenders to Gylippus, 293—put to death, *ib.*
Nicias, the Cretan of Gortyna, 84.
Nicoles, 77.
Nicomachus, 163.
Nicomedes, 34.
Nicon, 265.
Niconidas, 126.
Nicostratus, aids the popular faction at Corcyra, 118—takes Cythera, 151—takes Mende, 175—besieges Scione, *ib.*—203.
Nymphodorus, 63.

O

- Odontians*, 90, 151.
Odryians, 59.
Oanthians, 127.
Oeniada, 83, 131—invaded by the Athenians, 95—received into their alliance, 159.
Oetans, 124, 296.
Olynthians, 193.
Onasimus, 173.
Onomacles, 306.
Ophionians, 125.
Opicians, 218.
Orestes, 35.
Orestians, 82.
Oroedus, 82.
Oropians, 62.

P

- Pachas*, sent by the Athenians to reduce Mitylene, 98—takes it, 101—and Notium, 103—and Pyrrha and Eressus, *ib.*
Pedaritus, or *Pedaritus*, 305, 306, 308—killed, 314.
Pæonians, 89.
Pagondas, his harangues to the Boeotians, 163—wins the battle of Dellup, 165.
Palirensians, 64.
Pamphilus, 218.
Panaeans, 90.
Pandion, 63.
Paralians, 124.
Paravaeans, 82.
Parians, 168.
Pausanias, captain-general of Greece, 31—subdues Ocyprus, *ib.*—besieges Byzantium, *ib.*—grows a tyrant,

- ib.*—recalled and tried at Sparta, *ib.*—returns to Edespont, 42—his letter to Xerxes, *ib.*—driven from Byzantium, 43—betrayed, 44—starved to death, *ib.*
Pausanias, son of Pleistonax, 101.
Pelops, 4.
Peloponnesians, their colonies, 5—their character, 4—originally Dorians, 248—their war with the Athenians: see Athenians and Lacedemonians.
Perabians, 159.
Perdiccas, king of Macedonia, his political turns, 19, 26, 63, 88—invaded by Sitalces, 88—in conjunction with Brasidas, invades Atrihens, 160, 172—quarrels with Brasidas, 177—makes peace with the Athenians, *ib.*—is again their enemy, 210.
Pericles, commands the Athenians, 36—conquers Euboea, *ib.*—and Samos, 37—his speech for war, 41—makes the funeral oration, 65—his speech in defence of himself, 73—his death and character, 75, 76.
Persians, 218.
Persians, at Thermopylae, 146—their noble custom, 8.
Phacians, 9.
Phaax, 180.
Phadimus, 195.
Phainis, priestess of Juno, 172.
Phanomachus, 78.
Pharnabazus, 227, 306.
Pharnaces, 77.
Pharsaliens, 62.
Phereans, 62.
Philippus, the Lacedemonian, 205, 321.
Philocharidas, 173, 187, 188, 196.
Philocrates, 315.
Philontates, 4.
Phliansians, 19.
Phocaeans, built Maroneia, 6—beat the Carthaginians at sea, *ib.*
Phocians, at war with the Dorians, 34—recover the temple of Delphi, 36.
Phonicians, exercised piracy, 3—inhabited the isles, *ib.*—had settlements in Sicily, 218.
Pharmio, an Athenian commander, 21, 38—commands their fleet at Naupactus, 78—beats the Peloponnesians at sea, 84—prepares for a second engagement, *ib.*—his harangue, 85—beats them again, 87.
Photius, 82.
Phrynicus, 303—his intrigue against Alcibiades, 312—deprived of the command, 314—is of the oligarchical faction, 318, 327—is assassinated, 328.
Pierians, 90.
Pisander, overturns the democracy at Athens, 313, 316, 327—flies to Declea, 321.
Pisistratus, the tyrant, 127, 238—purifies Delos, 127—dies an old man, 238.
Pisistratus, the son of Hippias, 238—dedicated statues, *ib.*
Pissuthnes, 37, 103.
Pittacus, 169.
Plataeans, confederate with Athens, 54—besieged, 78—body of them make their escape, 100—surrender, 110—their speech to the Lacedemonians, *ib.*—are put to death, 116.
Pleistonax, king of Sparta, 34, 37—banished, 61—restored, 185, 188, 191.
Pleistolas, 187, 188.
Pleistarchus, 43.
Polis, 77.
Pollex, 181.
Polyanthes, 271.

Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, powerful at sea, 6—consecrates Rhenea to the Delian Apollo, ib. 187.
Polydamidas, 174, 177.
Polydamis, 62.
Potidaeans, originally from Corinth, 19—defeated by the Athenians, 21—besieged, ib. 73—surrender, 78.
Prædemonus, 77.
Procles, 123, 167, 168.
Procles, 63.
Proctas, 16, 62.
Proxenus, 127.
Ptoleorus, 158.
Pythilus, 219.
Pythen, 258, 259.
Pythias, 117.
Pythodorus, the archon at Athens, 53—the son of Isoclochus, in the command, 131, 167, 186, 258—banished, 155.

R

Rampias, 47, 184.
Rhégians, 122—attacked by the Locrians, 123, 140—neutral in the Sicilian war, 235.
Rhodians, Doric by descent, 261.

S

Sabylanthus, 82.
Sacon, 219.
Sadocus, son of Sitalces, 64—made a citizen of Athens, ib.
Salaethus, sent to Mitylene, 101—taken prisoner and put to death by the Athenians, 103.
Salynthius, king of the Agræans, 131.
Samians, conquered by the Athenians, 37—their insurrection, 302.
Sargeus, 267.
Scioneans, of the Pelene, originally from Peloponnesus, 173—revolt, ib.—crown Brasidas, ib.—reduced and severely treated by the Athenians, 191.
Scironidas, 314.
Scythians, 89.
Selinuntians, 281—at war with the Egestæans, 219.
Sermylians, 186.
Sesuchus, 89, 167—succeeds Sitalces in the kingdom of Odryse, 89—marries the sister of Perdicas, 91.
Sicanians, 217.
Sicilians, 152, 154.
Siculi, 218, 251, 257.
Sicyonians, 35, 36, 167.
Simonides, 134.
Simus, 219.
Singoans, 186.
Sintians, 89.
Sitalces, king of Thrace, 63, 77—ally to the Athenians, 64—invades the Macedonians, 88—his power, 89—conquered by the Triballians, 167.
Socrates, son of Antigenes, 62.
Sophocles, son of Sostratides, 131—sent to Sicily, 133—his acts at Corcyra, 149—banished from Athens, 155.
Stesagoras, 38.
Stenelaidas, his speech, 28.
Stratonice, 91.
Stratiens, conquer the Chaonians, 82.
Strombichides, 300—his exploits, 306, 323.

Styphen, 146.
Styrensiens, 261.
Syracusans, at war with the Locustines, 122—are defeated by the Athenians, 140—draw up against the Athenians, 242—prepare for battle, ib.—are defeated, 244—fortify their city, 245—send ambassadors to Camarina, 246—to Corinth and Sparta, 251—engage and are defeated by the Athenians, 253, 257—raise their counter-works, 256—are about treating with Nicias, 257—prepare their fleet, 266—attack the Athenians by land and sea, ib.—erect two trophies, 276—prepare again for an engagement, 279—defeat them again, ib.—prepare for the last battle, 282—engage, 286—are victorious, 287—stop the Athenians by a stratagem, 288—pursue them and take them all prisoners, 290—send aid to the Peloponnesians, 304, 333.

T

Tages, 229.
Tamus, 306.
Tantalus, a Lacedæmonian commander, 152.
Taurus, 173.
Tegonia, fight with the Mantinea, 178.
Telios, 187, 188.
Tellias, 236.
Tenodides, 60.
Tenedians, 93, 261.
Tetians, 102, 261, 300.
Teros, father of Sitalces, 62—how he got the kingdom of Odryse, ib.—enlarged it, ib.
Tentapius, 102—his advice to Alcidas and the Peloponnesians, ib.
Tharyps, king of the Molossians, 82.
Thasians, revolt from Athens, 32—defeated, ib.—beg aid from the Lacedæmonians, ib.—surrender, 33.
Theanetus, 99.
Theagenes, 41.
Thebans, surprise Plataea, 53—their speech to the Lacedæmonians against the Plateans, 113—demolish the walls of Thebes, 177.
Themistocles, 24, 45, 47—by his advice the battle was fought in the strait of Salamis, 84—is sent ambassador to Sparta, 29—deludes the Lacedæmonians, ib.—gets the Long-walls and Piræus secured, 30—banished Athens by the Ostracism, 45—resides at Argos, ib.—accused by the Lacedæmonians, ib.—flies to Corcyra, ib.—to Admetus, ib.—the danger he escaped, ib.—his letter to the king of Persia, 46—his character, ib.
Theramenes, the Athenian, 318—one of those who overturned the democracy, ib.—turns to the other side, 337.
Theramenes, the Lacedæmonian, carries the fleet to Asia, 304.
Thermo, 299.
Thesens, 59.
Thessalians, drive the Bœotians from Arne, 5—confederate with the Athenians, 33—send them aids, 34, 62—their form of government, 159.
Theucles, founder of Naxos, 218.
Thracians, overthrow the Athenians 32, 167—are free, 63—their sordid custom, 89—fight with the Thebans after the massacre at Mycaleus, 270.
Thrasylbulus, 321—supports the democracy, ib.—made a commander, 322—brings back Alcibiades, 323—beats the Peloponnesians at sea, 333.
Thrasycles, 187, 188.

Thrasylus, the Argive, 302.
Thrasylus, the Athenian, 229, 230, 231.
Thrasymachus, 126.
Thucles, see *Thouclides*.
Thucydides, son of Olorus, why he wrote the history of the war, 1, 7, 8, 189—had the plague, 69—his gold mines, and great credit in Thrace, 168—commands in Thrace, ib.—arrives too late to save Amphipolis, ib.—secures Eion, ib.—was an exile for twenty years, 189.
Thucydides, the colleague of Agnon and Phormio, 28.
Thucydides, the Pharsalian, 229.
Thymocharis, 330.
Tiliataus, 89.
Timagoras of Cynicus, 297, 298.
Timagoras of Tegea, 77.
Timanor, 10.
Timocrates, 84—kills himself, 87.
Timonius, 194.
Tiscander, 196.
Tisias, 211.
Tissaphernes, lieutenant of Darius, 287, 303—his compacts and leagues with the Peloponnesians, 301, 305, 307, 309, 314, 315—is conquered at Miletus by the Athenians, 304—fortifies Iasus, 305—pays the Lacedemonian ships, ib.—lessens their pay by the advice of Alcibiades, 310—wants to be reconciled to the Lacedemonians, 314—involved against by the mariners, 322, 324—why he did not bring up the Phœnician fleet, 326.
Tlepolemus, 38.
Tolmides, son of Tolmæus, 35, 36.

Telephoniens, 126.
Trachinians, 124.
Trerians, 89.
Triballians, conquer Sitalces, king of the Odrysians, 187.
Trilesonsians, 126.
Trejans, how enabled to resist the Greeks for ten years, 5—some of them settled in Sicily after the taking of Troy, 217.
Tydeus, 308.
Tyndarus, 4.
Tyrrhenos, 220, 222.

U

Ulysses, 140.

X

Xenares, Ephorus at Sparta, 192.
Xenares, commander of the Heracleots, killed, 190.
Xenocides, 16, 131.
Xeno, 265.
Xenophantides, 314.
Xenophon, son of Euripides, 78, 81.
Xerxes, 12, 36—his letter to Pausanias, 42.

Z

Zacynthians, a colony of Achæans, 77—aid the Athenians in the Sicilian war, 221.
Zeusidas, 187, 188.

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


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